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Abstract 
 
Britain’s stormy relationship with the European Union is a frequently cited illustration of a 
Eurosceptic state par excellence. Possessive of a strong national identity, a unique island 
status, a plethora of wartime experiences and a tenacious hold over its sovereignty, Britain 
has long been invested with an ‘awkward partner’ status. This dissertation seeks to unravel 
such presuppositions to answer the central research question: how has British national 
identity been forged and constructed by competing political elite visions of Europe? 
 
I deploy a discourse analytic approach and the Self/Other nexus to examine elite 
configurations of Europe over three critical events in European integration history. The 
empirical findings suggest three things. Firstly, discursive constructions of Europe play a 
fundamental role in determining perceptions of national identity. Secondly, the emerging 
trend in poststructuralist discourse analysis that views the Other not as a single, radical, 
hostile adversary, but as a whole array of much subtler and less easily defined Others is 
pertinent to identity construction. Finally, although national identities are perceived as 
contingent on previous conceptualisations and shifts in identity are subsequently slow and 
incremental, the case of Britain actually reveals a range of discontinuities in its nationhood 
over the historical events.    
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Introduction  
 
Background 
 
We joined a living, growing body, capable of change, indeed, crying out for 
it. The half-hearted involvement of one of its most powerful members and 
the constant impression that we are only in it on the narrow accountancy 
basis of a grocer’s shop has cut off most attempts at change before they 
even started.1 
 
There are those who imagine that the EC is a sort of Western European 
fraternal gathering, but it is not like that. It is a number of nation states that 
argue together so that they can obtain the best possible advantage … The 
EEC is not a fraternal body of harmony and light in Western Europe.2 
 
Europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, Spain as 
Spain, Britain as Britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. 
It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of identikit European 
personality.3 
 
With the Labour Party I realised quickly that you couldn't simply do a spray 
job. If you repaint an old car, it's still going to be an old car. Instead you 
have to re-engineer the model, reconstruct it, rethink whether that model is 
what the public wants and whether they would feel comfortable driving it. 
In a sense, we've got to do the same for Europe.4 
 
The European Union has become “an irreversible movement of history”5 and since its 
inception has created a virtually uninterrupted frenzy of political and public discussion 
regarding its causes, character and role. The case of Britain provides no exception to this as 
post-war British history offers a wide array of contested ideas about how the European 
project has been perceived. The above quotes can barely do justice to a topic that has been so 
                                                     
1 Jenkins, R. (1983) ‘Britain and Europe: Ten Years of Community Membership’, International Affairs, 59, 2, pp. 147-153 
(at 150-151). 
2 Cryer, R. (1988) HC Deb., 24 October, vol. 139, col. 130.  
3 Thatcher, M. (1988) ‘The Future of Europe’, Speech given to the College of Europe, 20 Sept. Available at: 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/speeches/displaydocument.asp?docid=107332. [Accessed 24 Nov. 2008].    
4 Mandelson, P. (2005) ‘We Have to Reinvent the Idea of Europe’, Time Magazine, 19 June, Available at: 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1074075,00.html. [Accessed 15 Dec. 2008].   
5 Smith, A. D. (2006) ‘‘Set in the Silver Sea’: English National Identity and European Integration’, Nations and Nationalism, 
12 (3), pp. 433-452 (at 433). 
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widely discussed since its inception. Roy Jenkins decries the stagnation of an institution 
whose British members obfuscate the real possibility of achieving change within the Union 
by allowing themselves to dither over an ‘in or out’ obsession. The emphasis on change 
echoes the idea that Europe must evolve on the basis of new challenges rather than stay fixed 
within the framework set by its original architects. Bob Cryer mocks the communal vision of 
the integration enterprise and constructs Britain’s relationship as that of a zero-sum game: 
territorial states jostling for a position of economic dominance whereby any power that goes 
to Brussels is a simultaneous loss to London. Margaret Thatcher, in her much talked about 
speech in Bruges, affirms that no such European identity exists because if it did, it would 
have to be imposed by a supranational behemoth. As for those with an idealistic image of 
Europe, “[u]topia never comes, because we know we should not like it if it did.”6 Peter 
Mandelson, much like Roy Jenkins, highlights the transitional and developmental nature of 
the EU by drawing attention to the need for reinvention; that the original purpose of the EU 
was to safeguard against war and to promote peace, and that its purpose must now be 
reformulated to achieve further substantive goals.  
 
These multiple positions are just a small example of how British political elites have 
constructed Europe. Several have formulated the entity as a threat to British interests, as an 
attack on national sovereignty, and as an attempt to supplant Britishness with a continentally 
oriented, foreign-imposed identity. Such reluctance to embrace the European project, it has 
been argued, stems from a variety of attitudes including British exceptionalism – its specific 
and almost exclusive geographical position, language, history and national myths – as well as 
the fear of economic calamity were Britain to gain ever closer ties with mainland Europe. It 
has also been claimed that such a position originates from Britain being an initial outsider and 
                                                     
6 Thatcher, M. (1988) ‘The Future of Europe’. 
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then trying to shape what it had previously spurned; influence occurring “from the sidelines 
rather than in ‘the heart of Europe’”.7 In contrast, alternative political elites have recognised 
the economic importance of the Union and have championed the institution for projecting a 
vision far beyond the narrow self-serving interests of nation-states. Europe has absorbed 
many different identities as states have attempted to shape it to reflect and embody their own 
concerns and images. It has functioned as a space where ideas are projected; where no single 
interpretation of what Europe is rules, but Britain, in order to have an influence on the 
direction Europe takes, must be part of that process. Hence, the aim of my thesis is to reveal 
how different perceptions of Europe are played out and the effect that this has had on British 
national identity.   
 
Britain, Europe and Identity 
 
It is a common argument that the nation-state is still the most germane form of collective 
identity despite its long-heralded demise. National identity – be it defined as a commonality 
of laws, national myths, culture, memories and/or psychological we-feeling – is what, in 
essence, holds a nation together. Identity is important because it is the ‘sense of self’ that 
enables a country to define its interests, and therefore its political outcomes, in a particular 
way. Who we are still largely defines and determines what we do. National identity, 
according to the constructivist position, is not exogenous to the political system but is 
constructed via processes of social interaction. As identity is constructed and reconstructed, it 
is important to highlight its ever-changing composition and nature rather than assume it to be 
fixed. This process of change and fluidity is revealed in my research by an analysis of the 
various perceptions British political elites have had of Europe. That is, the identities I am 
                                                     
7 Geddes, A. (2004) The European Union and British Politics, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 1. 
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seeking to uncover are British political spokespeople’s understandings of national identity. A 
focus on Britain is relevant because, as a major economic power within Europe, it has had 
considerable influence on the integration process and is frequently seen as being one of the 
primary shapers of Europe. A study of how British identity gets constructed vis-à-vis Europe 
is apt precisely because no governing consensus of what Europe is dominates. An analysis of 
political discourses can reveal how such positions are constructed and reconstructed, how 
some dominate, and how these perceptions have forged British identity.  
 
However, is it right to talk about British identity, as if Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales 
do not have their own ideas of who they are? How can these regional discourses be reduced 
into a national amalgam? For the purpose of this study, a focus on identifying British 
discourses rather than regional ones is for two main reasons. Firstly, despite the Council of 
Europe charter in 1985 highlighting the necessity within a democracy for a level of local 
government and autonomy, and despite the creation of devolved institutions within which 
attitudes to Europe vary from region to region, my intention is to examine the overall debate. 
Welsh, Scottish and English discourses on Europe may contain overlapping similarities as 
well as marked differences but the focus on Britain aims not to ignore these disparities, but to 
provide a comprehensive picture of how national identity, rather than regional identity, 
becomes destabilised and reformulated. Secondly, although Celtic identities have had a 
feeling of duality, British as well as their own identity,8 the inherent complexity of what 
constitutes British identity makes any study that intends to disconnect these components 
increasingly complex. To highlight an English discourse, over a Welsh or Scottish one, is 
fraught with difficulty precisely because they are so embedded within one another. 
                                                     
8 Larsen, H. (1997) Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe, London: Routledge, p. 36. 
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Subsequently, this dissertation takes British identity, as reflected and produced by discourses 
on Britain, as the central focus.  
 
Thesis Aims  
 
The multitude of positions about what Europe is reveals that no single idea dominates. There 
is no Europe; there are instead many different perceptions of Europe, or many Europes, each 
being discursively constructed to try to achieve a position of dominance. These might 
include, for example, cultural, historical and/or economic readings of Europe as well as the 
political formulation of “EU-rope”9 associated with the organisation, processes and 
institutions of integration. However, although much of the literature is keen to identify the 
effect Europe has had in defining a certain kind of Britain, the result has frequently been 
characterised by a rigid conformity. The traditional or much-lauded view of Britain’s 
approach to Europe has been one ensconced in phobia, scepticism and grudging partnership. 
Britain’s position has frequently been characterised by “missed opportunities”,10 an 
“awkward partner”,11 suffering from “semi-detachment”12 and “reluctance”.13 Although these 
manifestations must also be considered when providing a wide spectrum of British elite 
attitudes to Europe, this dissertation attempts to offer a deeper reading of how the debates 
over Europe are both more multitudinous than some of the literature suggests and are identity 
driven. That is, the debates are in fact struggles over British national identity. As such, a 
number of important questions frame this project. How have British political elites 
                                                     
9 Ash, T. G. (2001) ‘The Gamble of Engagement’ in Rosenbaum, M. (ed.) Britain and Europe: The Choices we Face, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 39-45.  
10 Camps, M. (1964) Britain and the European Community, 1955 - 1963, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 506. 
11 George, S. (1998) An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, 3rd edition, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
12 George, S. (ed.) (1992) Britain and the European Community: The Politics of Semi-Detachment, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
13 Geddes, A. (2004) The European Union and British Politics, p. 1.  
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constructed and reconstructed discourses over the events? Why have some discourses become 
more dominant? What images were utilised when producing these discourses and why were 
these images employed and not others?  What other voices were formulated and why weren’t 
they heard? From here, the central question of this study is how has British national identity 
been forged and constructed by these divergent competing visions? This project reveals the 
many different constructions of Europe and shows that attitudes of the British political elite 
towards it are numerous, contested and in a state of flux. It illustrates that Europe is not 
Britain’s sole Other, but that the attitudes of elites have encapsulated many different Others. 
These Others reveal the many competing ideas about what Europe is and show that such 
perceptions are each being played out amongst many. This process of Othering elucidates 
how Europe – being filled with actors and subsequently identities – has shaped British 
national identity. My research maps out the struggle of what Britain and Europe mean to one 
another to show how certain meanings of Europe – be they sceptical, ambivalent or friendly – 
have become dominant. It is only by considering these Others; be they other states, Europe as 
a whole, or historical events or myths; and the political discourses that reflect them and are 
reflected in them, that we can hope to gain a greater and more comprehensive understanding 
of Britain’s approach to Europe and in turn highlight how national identity is not monolithic 
and static but multiple and in motion.  
 
Theoretical Framework and Methodology  
 
This dissertation examines three critical events in post-war British history: the 1975 
referendum on continued membership of the Common Market, the 1993 ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the 2009 enactment of the Lisbon Treaty. The events are linked by 
both temporality and discourse and are ‘critical’ in the sense that they are characterised by an 
14 
 
intensity in political and media activity and have thus produced a wealth of documentation, 
discussion and commentary. Although the theoretical and methodological explanation of this 
study is developed in detail in Chapter One, there are a number of characteristics of both 
discourse analysis and Self/Other relations that I will briefly outline. I focus on what political 
elites – heads of state, civil servants and government spokespeople – write and say because it 
is they who interpret events on the basis of the particular visions or ideas they have. This 
dissertation predisposes a discursive approach as a methodological tool for analysing these 
diverse perceptions. Hence, I am interested in how political actors write about, talk about, and 
construct their ideas about Europe and how these ideas become reflected in national 
identities. Firstly, as a broad definition, discourse “looks at patterns of language across texts 
and considers the relationship between language and the social and cultural contexts in which 
it is used.”14 Consequently, what political actors say and write can be formulated into a 
structure, that we are able to understand the patterns in this structure, and that these patterns, 
in turn, further influence what can and cannot be said or written about. Secondly, discourse 
focuses on linguistic and non-linguistic communication and not on the individual actors’ 
hidden motivations or secret agendas. Thus, methodologically, the nebulous process of 
uncovering the reasons and motivations as to why a politician might say the thing that he or 
she does is avoided. In short, we stay firmly within the realm of language and derive meaning 
from language alone. Thirdly, a discursive approach perceives language as a social 
phenomenon and meanings are therefore contingent on social and cultural context.  There is 
no universal standard by which actors constitute political phenomenon – be it citizenship, 
institutions, identities or policies – because each of these concepts is created within a 
particular social setting. Finally, language and power are mutually constitutive. The 
                                                     
14 Paltridge, B. (2006) Discourse Analysis: An Introduction, London and New York: Continuum, p. 2. 
15 
 
dominance of one particular discourse necessitates the subjugation of another or others. As 
such, this thesis also examines not merely when but how this process happens.    
 
The Self/Other nexus is a pertinent framework for looking at how ideas about Europe are 
constructed and how national identity is produced. The national identity of the in-group only 
contains meaning when contrasted with other national identities of the out-group(s). Hence, 
the existence of Others, be they frictional or fraternal, affect and shape the identity of the 
Self. The constant reconfiguring and redefining of who the Others are reveals how identity 
becomes destabilised and reformulated. However, although Othering presumes a level of 
difference and therefore confrontation, this study does not seek to identify solely ‘Radical 
Others’, a process of binarisation that pits, for example, educated against ignorant, modern 
against traditional and Western against Third World.15 This, I believe, mistakenly groups 
relations solely in terms of conflict. Othering reveals the friends as well as foes, the 
similarities and not just differences. Instead, my analysis identifies the ever-changing Others 
and explains how British identity has been constituted via the roles these Others have played.  
The interconnectedness of states, particularly in a ‘postmodern polity’ like the EU, requires 
an understanding of how they engage with one another, how they perceive one another and 
how this, in turn, affects their ideas of Europe. Self/Other analysis is the approach adopted to 
reveal how this interrelatedness operates and how it can help us gain “a better understanding 
of who ‘the actors’ are, how they were constituted, how they maintain themselves, and under 
which preconditions they may thrive.”16 
 
                                                     
15 Milliken, J. (1998) ‘The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods’, European 
Journal of International Relations, vol. 5 (2), pp. 225-254 (at 229). 
16 Neumann, I. (1996) ‘Self and Other in International Relations’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 2 (2), 
pp. 139-74 (at 168). 
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Summary 
 
To summarise, this project examines how British political figures, over three critical events in 
European Union history, have constructed Europe. The patterns implicit in the language they 
have utilised are discursively structured and elites are key players in determining which of 
these discourses become dominant. These discourses reveal a process of linking and 
differentiation between not merely a single Other (the object) and the Self (the subject), but 
various Others implying different gradations of threat or accord. This array of Others – 
defined as friendly, non-radical and radical – construct and shape the Self’s national identity. 
The following figure, employed from Hansen, represents the research design for my study:  
 
Figure 1: Research Design17 
 
Organisation 
 
The organisation of this thesis is as follows. Chapter One provides the theoretical and 
                                                     
17 Hansen L. (2006) Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War, London and New York: Routledge, p. 
88. 
 
Number of Selves                                                                                                                 Intertextual Models 
  
     Single: Britain                                                                                                  Model 1: Official discourses 
 
 
 
 
 
The Construction of British National Identities 
 
 
 
 
 
     Historical development from 1970 to 2009                                    3 events: related by discourse and time 
 
Temporal perspective                                                                                                  Number of events 
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methodological framework of this study. The chapter begins with an overview of the 
difficulties in defining the core outcome of this dissertation, national identity. Following this 
is a critical engagement of other theoretical approaches that factor identity as an explanation 
for state behaviour. The rationale for this is firstly to provide an argument for the increasingly 
important role identity plays within International Relations and secondly to reveal how the 
approach to identity I adopt differs from others. Second, the essential assumptions of 
discourse analysis utilised for the empirical sections are outlined. Third, an overview of the 
Self/Other nexus, the manner in which it is defined and the reason for its application are all 
described. Fourth, I present the methodology which explains the importance and relevance of 
both the historical events and the textual materials chosen. After that, an explanation is 
provided to elucidate the method of identifying linking and differentiation, key factors in 
revealing the process of Othering. The final section summarises the chapter by revealing the 
definition of identity applied throughout this study.  
 
Chapter Two is a review of the literature on British national identity. Although this study 
focuses on the construction of British national identities as seen by statespeople, it is 
pertinent to examine the broader conceptualisations of national identities. This is because in 
order for political figures to successfully articulate a particular identity, it must in part be 
attached at a more national level and needs to have salience to the wider public. This chapter, 
therefore, highlights the major themes, images and processes that get picked up and utilised 
as well as reformulated in the empirical sections. This chapter concludes with references to 
how such thematic representations are pertinent to this study.  
 
The third, fourth and fifth chapters are the empirical content. Each chapter covers a different 
historical event. The organisation of each chapter follows the same pattern. First of all, a 
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historical overview leading up to the event is given. Despite the fact that this study is 
predicated on the notion that Europe is inherently contestable, this section serves as both an 
aide-mémoire and as a means of contextualising the discourses. Its purpose, therefore, is not 
to present a thickly descriptive account but to provide an understanding of some of the 
dominant themes and discussions using Europe as a prism. Secondly, the various discourses 
are presented, systematised and then analysed using a discourse analytic method. This reveals 
the many differently contested meanings that Europe possesses within the debates. The 
grouped themes and readings of Europe and other actors are summarised in Tables 2 and 3, 5 
and 6, and 8 and 9. From here, these findings are employed to expose the various processes of 
Othering. Again, these are diverse and, as such, are arranged in a systematic way and 
presented in Tables 5, 7 and 10. The final section of each empirical chapter argues how such 
practices have produced a range of Selves. These ‘images of nationhood’ are products of the 
various national identities attributed to Britain over the historical events. They are illustrated 
in Figures 4, 5 and 6 and followed by an explanation.    
 
Chapter Six is the final empirical chapter and has two purposes. Firstly, it synthesises the 
results of the previous chapters by showing the chronological struggle over identity over the 
particular historical junctures. Secondly, by amalgamating the findings in the empirical 
chapters, it introduces a comparative element by examining the continuity and discontinuity 
over the discourses, identities and British Selves. This study concludes with a recapitulation 
of the findings as a summary of the whole project and presents possible applications and 
future areas of research.   
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Conclusion 
 
To conclude, this dissertation seeks to make an original contribution to the field of 
International Relations in three ways. Firstly, it applies a novel discursive approach to map 
out a range of British national identities which use Europe as their focus. Starting with a 
simplified pro- versus anti-dichotomy, this is dissolved to produce a range of British Selves 
up to now frequently unexamined in the literature. Secondly, the Self/Other nexus is 
employed with an eye to extracting national identities. In contrast to much of the existing 
research, I introduce and highlight the neglected role of non-radical and friendly Othering. 
Consequently, the aim of this study is not merely to identify differences and the roles that 
they have had on shaping British national identity, but also to locate the different levels of 
difference hitherto ignored. Finally, the three events studied are linked temporally and 
discursively and subsequently allow a deeper reading of the evolution of British national 
identities. Hence, although a synchronic study in which phenomena are examined at a 
particular historical time, this dissertation entertains a comparative element that enables the 
identities to be analysed systematically over the episodes. The results impact considerably on 
contemporary attempts to cultivate a British national identity.   
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CHAPTER ONE: THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
1.1 The Problems of Defining National Identity 
 
Even before any attempt to unravel how British national identity has been constructed, an 
early difficulty centres on labelling. A number of terms – such as nation, state, nation-state 
and nationalism – are important to differentiate in terms of the role they play in constituting 
national identity. Nationalism is important because it animates and brings nations into being. 
It is “an ideology that places the nation at the centre of its concerns and seeks to promote its 
well-being.”18 Nation and state are important because they have been treated so 
synonymously as to produce the all-pervading label ‘nation-state’ to describe the territorial 
and sovereign units common to the international system. Consequently, the nation is 
significant both because of its ubiquity and because its characteristics embody an identity 
specific to it: an identity that is national in scope, rather than personal or private. However, 
despite the plethora of literature on the topic, the task of defining national identity is a 
bewildering task due to both confusing assumptions and unclear explanations. Such 
expressions, Connor argues, are “shrouded in ambiguity due to their imprecise, inconsistent, 
and often entirely erroneous usage.”19 He goes on to identify the many terms that reveal how 
an allegiance to the nation is regularly conflated with an allegiance to the state including 
ethnicity, primordialism, pluralism, tribalism, regionalism, communalism, parochialism, and 
subnationalism. This confusion has caused governments and scholars to misunderstand and 
underestimate the power of non-state loyalties and has subsequently limited any attempt to 
explain them. Hence, one can argue that the tendency to blindly equate the state with the 
                                                     
18 Smith, A. D. (2001) Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 9. 
19 Connor, W. (1978) ‘A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group ….’, Ethnic and Racial Studies, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 
377-400 (at 378).  
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nation, instead of accepting that many states are comprised of more than one nation, is one of 
the first and most obvious errors when formulating ideas of allegiance to a bounded entity 
and therefore national identity.20  
 
A second and related problem is definitional. What and when is a nation? With reference to 
just three exemplary scholars amongst many, the challenges of how to classify the nation can 
be underscored. Benedict Anderson famously configured the nation as imagined because the 
members will never know most other individuals. It is limited because the nation was 
produced from a time when the Enlightenment and Revolution were tearing down religious 
dynasties. It is also imagined as a community because it is conceived in terms of fellowship 
despite any inequalities that may exist.21 Whereas Anderson highlights the imagining of the 
nation as fuelled by “print-capitalism” which gave fixity to language and created a cultural 
awareness between speakers of the same language22, Ernest Gellner posits both cultural and 
voluntaristic definitions that are merely provisional: 
Two men are of the same nation if and only if they share the same culture, 
where culture in turn means a system of ideas and signs and associations 
and ways of behaving and communicating. ... Two men are of the same 
nation if and only if they recognise each other as belonging to the same 
nation. In other words, nations maketh man; nations are the artefacts of 
men’s convictions and loyalties and solidarities.23 
 
Furthermore, pre-modern political units, being small, did not require shared linguistic and 
cultural communication as social roles were totalising but the eventual wearing away of these 
strict positions made a shared culture more important.24 Gellner’s approach to nationalism, 
                                                     
20 In fact, Connor posits that in a survey of the 132 entities considered as states in 1971, only 12 states (9.1%) can justly be 
described as nation-states. Ibid., p. 382. 
21 Anderson, B. (1983) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism, New York: Verso, pp. 
6-7. 
22 Ibid., pp. 44-6. 
23 Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism, 2006 edition, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., pp. 6-7.  
24 O’Leary, B. (1997) ‘On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner’s Writings on Nationalism’, British 
Journal of Political Science, 27, pp. 191-222 (at 193-4). 
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like Anderson’s, is modernist. That is, “population explosion, rapid urbanisation, labour 
migration, and also the economic and political penetration of previously more or less inward-
turned communities”25 all forged new cultural boundaries and, as a consequence, nations are 
products of late eighteenth century industrialism. In contrast to this position is one that 
highlights the importance of pre-existing traditions. Anthony Smith, in a celebrated debate 
with Gellner, outlined that a commitment to modernism overlooks “the persistence of ethnic 
ties and cultural elements in many parts of the world, and their continuing significance for 
large numbers of people.”26 Termed ‘ethno-symbolism’, the nation is consequently “a named 
population sharing a historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass public 
culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for its members”.27 Pre-
modern epochs contain looser cultural units called ethnies, which are defined as “named units 
of population with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared 
culture, some link with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among 
their elites.”28 As a result, Smith’s approach posits that nations, although modern, owe much 
of their present structure to pre-existing ethnic bonds which stemmed from earlier ethnies.29 
This cursory overview reveals how the debate over how to define the nation is governed by a 
temporal binary: is the nation a modern, invented and essentially elite-authored construct or is 
it primordial with ethnic, cultural and historical linkages to the pre-national cultural unit? 
  
A third complication arises when viewing a nation’s identity through the lens of a composite 
of nationally specific features. Language, territory, geography, history and culture, for 
example, have all been frequently postulated components of national identity. To begin with, 
                                                     
25 Gellner, E. (1983) Nations and Nationalism, p. 41.  
26 Smith, A. D. (1995) The Warwick Debate. Available at: http://www2.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/units/gellner/. 
[Accessed 8 Feb. 2012]. 
27 Smith, A. D. (1995) Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 56-7.  
28 Ibid., p. 57.  
29 Ibid.  
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a common language is no guarantee of unity. British people may speak English or Welsh, 
Canadians may talk in English or French, and Swiss might converse in German, French, 
Italian or Romansch.30 This point is echoed by Rustow31 who argues that the size of linguistic 
communities differs to such an extent that some groups are large enough to traverse several 
national boundaries. For example, the Hausas live in Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Dahomey 
(Benin) and Togo. He goes on to provide several other reasons as to why language offers no 
persuasive benchmark for nationality. To begin with, language is not fixed but mediates 
between shaping politics and being shaped by politics. To say that language defines the 
political outcomes of a group readily ignores how outcomes are both reflected in and reflect 
language. In addition, the demise of empires and the subsequent emergence of nations have 
produced a change in thoughts towards diversity: “[w]here the older nation-states of Europe 
were to find in ethnic loyalty and linguistic unity their stablest foundation, dynastic and 
colonial empires sought their security in diversity and mixture.”32 The permeability of 
language and the way it traverses borders, undermining attempts to define a group 
linguistically, has also been addressed by Kedourie. Upon a Hungarian statesman enquiring 
about the number of Poles in the disputed district of Teschen over which both Czechoslavakia 
and Poland laid claim, a Czech politician remarked to him that “the figures change. The 
people of certain villages are changing their nationality every week, according to their 
economic interests and sometimes the economic interests of the mayor of the village.”33 
 
The issues of territory and geography pose another set of problems in identifying the nation. 
Territory, far from being historically immutable, has contained ever-shifting borders. The 
                                                     
30 Deutsch, K. W. (1966) Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, 2nd 
edition, Cambridge (Mass.): M.I.T. Press, p. 18.   
31 Rustow, D. A. (1967) A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization, Washington D.C.: The Brookings 
Institution, pp. 47-51.  
32 Ibid. p. 49. 
33 Kedourie, E. (1960) Nationalism, London: Hutchinson, p. 124.  
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transitory nature of divides has meant that “[r]egions easily fragment into localities, and 
localities may easily disintegrate into separate settlements.”34 Geographical features have also 
not exclusively helped define difference but have sometimes fostered sameness. For example, 
the French and Spanish are divided by the Pyrenees but the Alps helped formulate the Swiss 
into a nation and while geographical inaccessibility ensured Japanese distinctiveness, the 
same level of insularity did little to prevent the various invasions of Britain.35 Furthermore, 
Deutsch argues how feelings of nationality have often navigated across sovereign divides, in 
particular islands, which have bonded Crete to Greece, Sicily to Italy and Northern Ireland to 
Great Britain, despite their geographical separateness.36 
 
Another much-cited characteristic of national identity is history – that a people’s shared 
experience provides the adhesive that bonds them together. Deutsch, however, argues that 
“[i]nstead of being automatically united by a shared history, men at least under some 
conditions cannot share the historical events through which they live, unless they are already 
in some sense united.”37 For something to be common presupposes a feeling of cohesiveness 
in knowing what can and cannot be shared. There is no guarantee in presuming that two 
people who share the same ravaging historical events might draw the same conclusions as to 
the events’ origins, causes or effects. The claim of objective history might, after all, be 
another’s ‘history’, replete with distortions or fabrications to justify ethnic, religious or 
national exceptionalism. Furthermore, the desire to identify with certain symbols and events 
has helped create a number of myths which defy historical refutation. Claims of a group 
asserting its ethnic homogeneity or its distinct ancestry may well provide a feeling of 
                                                     
34 Smith, A. D. (1991) National Identity, London: Penguin Books Ltd., p. 4.  
35 Rustow, D. A. (1967) A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization, p. 40.  
36 Deutsch, K. W. (1966) Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry into the Foundations of Nationality, p. 19. 
37 Ibid.    
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distinctiveness but “what ultimately matters is not what is but what people believe is.”38 By 
incorporating history into identity we are not left with an objective attempt to understand 
which events have patterned and constituted a nation’s identity. Instead, we are faced with a 
nationalist tug-of-war – an arena dominated by jostling national interests – all parties trying 
to monopolise certain historical events and use them to embellish or individualise their own 
pasts. 
 
The obscurity in defining national identity can be summed up by exposing the inadequacy of 
offering a composite or static approach. To believe that people belong to a “solid, 
unchanging, intrinsic collective unit”39 does not adequately explain “why the social actors 
involved act in a certain way and how such political and military conflicts could arise.”40 
Similarly, an understanding of national identity as inert does little to reveal the differences 
between an identification with the nation and an identification with other political or social 
units. Smith, for example, identifies the difference between ‘objective’ factors that define the 
nation, such as language, territory and customs, and ‘subjective’ factors, such as attitudes, 
perceptions and sentiments. However, he asserts that the objective factors exclude many 
accepted nations and the subjective factors include too wide a number of cases which makes 
it difficult to distinguish between nations and regions, tribes, city-states and empires41. Any 
one of these components, if altered in anyway, might not automatically result in a change or a 
loss of identity. For example, “the Irish and the Scots could lose their language without losing 
their conviction of a separate national identity. Similarly, Jews can sever their affiliation with 
                                                     
38 Connor, W. (1978) ‘A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group ….’, p. 380.  
39 Wodak, R., de Cillia, R., Reisigl, M. and Liebhart, K. (1999) The Discursive Construction of National Identity, Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, p. 11.   
40 Ibid. 
41 Smith, A. D. (1991) National Identity, p. 11.  
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Judaism, while remaining very consciously tied to the Jewish nation.”42 Due to the inherently 
transitory and indefinable nature of such aspects as language, territory, geography, history, 
culture and emotions, we are left with the salutary warning that “[a]t best the idea of the 
nation has appeared sketchy and elusive, at worst absurd and contradictory.”43  
 
1.2 Working towards a Definition: Identity in International Relations 
 
In order to illuminate how national identity has been formulated and reformulated due to 
various perceptions of Europe, it seems pertinent to provide an overview of the approaches 
that also factor identity. The wealth of literature on the topic supports the argument that what 
was once regarded as epiphenomenal is now a leading feature in many post-positivist and 
constructivist approaches. As the centre of gravity of this dissertation is rooted primarily in 
the field of International Relations, I focus specifically on this literature. The purpose of this 
section is two-fold. Firstly, a description of approaches that treat identity as endogenous helps 
situate this research within an academic context. That is, its location within international 
relations theory can perhaps best be argued via a broader examination of the various 
approaches with which is sympathises and from which it differs. Secondly, the theoretical 
foundations of this dissertation are based on particular assumptions that are influenced and 
shaped by a range of perspectives. Again, a critical engagement with some of these helps to 
clarify the theoretical assumptions of this dissertation and establishes in the conclusion to this 
chapter the definition of identity I employ. The following section examines constructivist, 
critical, discursive and gendered approaches. Each perspective is explored and each section 
concludes with an explanation of the relevance of these approaches for this research project.  
                                                     
42 Connor, W. (1978) ‘A nation is a nation, is a state, is an ethnic group ….’, p. 389.  
43 Smith, A. D. (1991) National Identity, p. 17.  
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1.2.1 Constructivist Approaches 
 
Social constructivism, commonly labelled constructivism, takes its animus from 
dissatisfaction with existing neorealist and neoliberal thinking. Neorealism takes an 
ontological position of a unified state, neoclassical microeconomic theory that has been 
imported into its framework44 and rationalist postulations. The character of the state offers 
little explanation of behaviour, neorealists argue, because states are unitary actors. “[C]ulture 
and identity”, therefore, “are, at best, derivative of the distribution of capabilities that have no 
independent explanatory power.”45 Liberal intergovernmentalism is the leading neoliberal 
theory of European integration. Its foremost scholar, Andrew Moravscik, argues that the 
European Community has developed through “a series of celebrated intergovernmental 
bargains”46 between domestic interest groups and the relative power of these groups defines 
which outcomes are produced. Being a neoliberal theory, it has greater faith in institutions 
than its realist counterparts but still perceives states as being the main actors, that interest 
groups define their interests rationally, and that a positivist ontological position of self-
interested actors attempting to realise their goals leads to interests being largely (although not 
exclusively) economic and material. Constructivism, in contrast, makes a number of 
alternative claims. Hopf identifies several of these.47 The first concerns the constitution of 
structure and agency. Hay defines this as “the relationship between the political actors we 
identify (having decided upon our specification of the sphere of the political) and the 
                                                     
44 Waltz, K. (1979) Theory of International Politics, New York etc: McGraw-Hill, pp. 54-5, 72-4, 89-94, 118. Cited in Wind, 
M. (1997) ‘Rediscovering Institutions: A Reflectivist Critique of Rational Institutionalism’ in Jørgensen, K. E. (ed.) 
Reflective Approaches to European Governance, London: Macmillan, p. 24. 
45 Katzenstein, P. J. (1996) ‘Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security’ in Katzenstein, P. J. (ed.) The 
Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 17. 
46 Moravcsik, A. (1993) ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach’, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 473-524 (at 473).  
47 Hopf, T. (1998) ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, International Security, vol. 23, no. 1, 
pp. 171-200 (at 172-181). 
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environment in which they find themselves.”48 Constructivism argues that structure and actor 
are mutually constituted. Although material constraints do exist, what is important from the 
constructivist perspective is “how an action does or does not reproduce both the actor and the 
structure.”49 Secondly, anarchy operates as an imagined community. It is imagined because it 
is constituted via the communities own intersubjective understandings and practices and, as 
such, has multiple meanings.50 Thirdly, identities are an inextricable feature of constructivism 
because they contribute to defining the interests of political actors. This occurs because of 
what constructivists call constitutive rules rather than regulative rules. These are rules that 
“define the set of practices that make up a particular class of consciously organised social 
activity – that is to say, they specify what counts as that activity.”51 Hence, social norms not 
only regulate actors’ conduct, but they also constitute the identity of the actors involved.52 In 
addition, identities help define what actors’ interests are. For example, Checkel argues that 
social learning – argumentative persuasion which is a social act rather than manipulative 
persuasion which lacks any form of interaction – involves changing actors’ attitudes through 
argument and debate.53 Identities, therefore, not only determine particular outcomes but are 
also susceptible to change through socialisation.  
 
Hopf outlines the functions that identities perform in a society: “they tell you and others who 
you are and they tell you who others are.”54 However, what is also important is how “the 
                                                     
48 Hay, C. (2002) Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 89.  
49 Hopf, T. (1998) ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, p. 172. 
50 Ibid., p. 174.  
51 Ruggie, J. G. (1998) ‘What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist 
Challenge’, International Organization, 52, 4, pp. 855-885 (at 871).   
52 Risse, T. (2004) ‘Social Constructivism and European Integration’ in Wiener, A. and Diez, T. (eds.) European Integration 
Theory, p. 161. 
53 Checkel, J. (2001) ‘Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change’, International Organisation, 55, 3, pp. 
553-588 (at 562). 
54 Hopf, T. (1998) ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, p. 175. 
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producer of the identity is not in control of what it ultimately means to others.”55 The way 
state X acts towards state Y is formulated not merely through materialistic notions of the 
balance of power and the distribution of capabilities, but the perceptions X has of Y as 
formulated via long-running and complex social, cultural and historical processes. 
Constructivism, therefore, takes it that “[i]dentities are the basis of interests”,56 and 
subsequently views the representations of identities as constructed, multiple and contextually 
contingent. This alternative is in stark contrast to the neorealist position that postulates that 
units possess only one meaningful identity, that of self-interested states.57 The constructivist 
perspective helps reveal a whole gamut of attributes that can be imbued by one actor onto 
another: 
It might be endowed with leadership; it might be aggressive and hostile or 
peaceful and non-threatening; it might be potentially but not actually 
dangerous; it might be weak, strong or simply annoying.58  
 
Perhaps an early source of confusion investigating a critical reading of literature that 
privileges identity, however, is the lack of consensus regarding how the various 
constructivisms can be grouped. For example, Adler mentions that constructivism occupies a 
middle ground between rationalists and interpretivists.59 Hopf makes clear the distinction 
between various constructivisms and argues that “conventional constructivism, is a collection 
of principles distilled from critical social theory but without the latter’s more consistent 
theoretical or epistemological follow-through.”60 Guzzini cautions that constructivism “does 
not succumb to the sirens of poststructuralism, which critics have turned into a radical idealist 
                                                     
55 Ibid.  
56 Wendt, A. (1992) ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, p. 398. 
57 Hopf, T. (1998) ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, p. 175. 
58 Weldes, J. (1996) ‘Constructing National Interests’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 2 (3), pp. 275-318 
(at 281-2).   
59 Adler, E. (1997) ‘Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics’, European Journal of International 
Relations, vol. 3 (3), pp. 319-363 (at 319-320).  
60 Hopf, T. (1998) ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, p. 181.   
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position, increasingly emptied of any intelligible meaning.”61 Constructivist research has also 
been placed along a rationalist/reflectivist axis with widely diverging results.62 However, 
Risse helps clarify the confusion by identifying a number of misleading assumptions relating 
to constructivism.63 Firstly, its claims are not exclusively wedded to a post-positivist 
epistemology even though some radical positions do question an objective reality. Secondly, 
as an approach influenced by more general theorising on international relations, 
constructivism offers no substantive theory and subsequently its scholars may join a number 
of different readings of European integration. The crucial point, as he goes on to mention, is 
that constructivists believe that “[t]he social environment in which we find ourselves, defines 
(‘constitutes’) who we are, our identities as social beings.”64 Subsequently, identity is viewed 
as a social phenomenon, configured via culturally and historically specific social 
environments. Therefore, what can be broadly agreed upon is the fact that the myriad of 
approaches that fit under the umbrella term of social constructivism has sought to place issues 
of identity at the core of an understanding of European politics. In relation to this study, 
British elite perceptions of Self are very much constituted via what Wendt labels “signaling, 
interpreting, and responding”:65 As I take it that the formulation of the Self is grounded in 
both antagonistic and non-antagonistic relationships, and are stable enough to be constituted 
and analysed, the relationships between Self and Other are based on intersubjective 
understandings. These are what Wendt calls “reciprocal typifications.”66 They come about via 
                                                     
61 Guzzini, S. (2000) ‘A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations’, European Journal of International 
Relations, vol. 6 (2), pp. 147-182 (at 148).  
62 Christiansen, T., Jørgensen, K. E. and Wiener, A. (1999) ‘The Social Construction of Europe’, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 6:4, pp. 528-544 (at 542-3).   
63 Risse, T. (2004) ‘Social Constructivism and European Integration’ in Wiener, A. and Diez, T. (eds.) European Integration 
Theory, p. 159-160. 
64 Ibid., p. 161. 
65 Wendt, A. (1992) ‘Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics’, p. 405. 
66 Ibid. 
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lengthy interaction that rewards and discourages actors holding certain ideas about each 
other.67   
 
Where this study does differ, however, is in regard to its explanative focus on discourse.  
Despite all branches of constructivism acknowledging that identities in some way matter, the 
field of conventional constructivism has sought to avoid any liaison or linkage with its 
interpretivist counterparts. For example, Jepperson, Wendt and Katzenstein stress that “we 
part company with those scholars who have pointed the way to a more sociological approach, 
but who insist on the need for a special interpretive methodology”.68 Also, conventional 
constructivism, according to Hopf, entails treating identities as causes of behaviour and has 
little recourse to consider the role theorists have in participating and subsequently affecting 
the social world they seek to observe.69 As my approach seeks to examine identity 
formulation through a more critical rather than conventional constructivist approach, I deal 
with a critique of conventional accounts first. 
 
An initial observation of the conventional constructivist position is that despite highlighting 
the significance of identity, there are few attempts to go beyond the rather cursory 
proclamation that it is a social act whose formulation occurs due to cognitive processes. 
Risse-Kappen notes research “has failed so far to specify the conditions under which specific 
ideas are selected and influence policies while others fall by the wayside”70 and the same 
argument can be applied to the role of identities. Such a lacuna occurs because despite 
                                                     
67 Ibid. 
68 Jepperson, R. L., Wendt, A. and Katzenstein, P. J. (1996) ‘Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security’ in  
Katzenstein, P. J.  (ed.) The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics, p. 67. 
69 Hopf, T. (1998) ‘The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory’, p. 183-4. 
70 Risse-Kappen, T. (1994) ‘Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the 
Cold War’, International Organisation, vol. 48, no. 2, pp. 185-214 (at 187).   
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accepting that states acquire identities via their interaction with other states,71 the branch of 
liberal constructivism has questioned whether identities need to come into being via 
difference. In short, identity is still given rather than born and this makes an investigation into 
why certain identities rise or fall difficult. Wendt, for example, argues that pre-social or 
corporate identities preclude the dichotomy between Self and Other because differentiation 
… becomes trivial if it leads to a totalizing holism in which everything is 
internally related to everything else. If a constitutive process is self-
organizing then there is no particular Other to which the Self is related. 
Having a body means you are different than someone else’s body, but that 
does not mean that his body constitutes yours in any interesting way.72 
 
Firstly, Rumelili73 argues that the perpetual drawing of boundaries – even if the Other is not 
complicit in this – negates the idea of a collective being self-organizing. Even though the 
Spanish existed independently of and had an identity autonomous of the Aztecs, Spain’s 
corporate identity became reconfigured upon first contact in order to construct the Aztecs as 
inferior and subsequently ripe for colonisation.74 Secondly, the process of ingroup identity 
construction, even if not formulated from the existence of an outside Other, can still be 
created via ingroup Othering. Certain characteristics or attributes can be revered, producing 
inequalities and patterns of dominance and subjugation, all under the pretext of preserving the 
survival of the ingroup. Consequently, attributes that do not comply are othered – treated as 
weaker, denigrated and/or marginalised. One such notable example of the universal ingroup 
Other, traversing all cultures and time, is ‘women’, whereby masculine dominant discourses 
have constructed women as voiceless, inferior and relegated to the private sphere.75 Thirdly, 
the somewhat formulaic image of a pre-social identity is that of the primitive jungle-dwelling 
                                                     
71 Rumelili, B. (2004) ‘Constructing Identity and Relating to Difference: Understanding the EU’s Mode of Differentiation’, 
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72 Wendt, A. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 225.  
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tribe, insulated from the outside by their remoteness and formidable habitat and untouched by 
foreign contact. However, the environment, weather conditions, natural dangers or even 
deities or certain animals76 might still be regarded as the Other. Language, clothes, the type of 
shelters built, hunter-gathering practices and protocols, and human relations within the group 
all reflect and create a specific identity to ensure survival in the surroundings in which the 
group finds itself, and this inherent desire to adapt and triumph over the hardships might be 
synonymous with the conquest of the Other. Finally, one might posit the existence of the 
‘imagined Other’ and how identity might not need to be constructed via the demonisation of 
‘real’ threats or groups: “[l]ong-standing historical notions of identity are not rendered 
irrelevant for all the arguments that they may be ‘mythical’ or ‘imagined’. Imagined essences 
of identity are potent social forces, and appeals to them have been very dangerous.”77 Taylor 
goes on to mention how the ‘imagined Other’ threatens the unity and intransigence of the Self 
and can produce, in its most fervent incarnation, acts such as “ethnic cleansing”.78 From the 
perspective of my own study, therefore, identity does not merely come into being and cannot 
be configured independently of other identities – irrespective of whether they are personal, 
national or transnational identities. Consequently, I argue that the notion of identities existing 
as “constitutionally exogenous to Otherness”79 is flawed for three main reasons. Firstly, the 
concept seeks to define identity within the structure of the international system and 
consequently analyses identities only in so far as they relate to ‘state’, ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘anarchy’.80 This ignores the fundamental issue that the nature of the international system, 
though possibly constraining to actor behaviour, does not give a state a particular identity, 
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cannot explain historical changes and therefore cannot elucidate why identities change.81 
Secondly and relatedly, a concentration on systemic theory offers little advice as to “how 
each state, nation or other ‘unit’ has to create its own terms or rationales, its identity and 
foreign policy”.82 Conventional constructivism, as already mentioned, cites identity as a 
fundamental cause of action yet even if one accepts a positivistic connection between cause 
and effect, one needs to know what an identity is before one can explicate what it can do. A 
case by case approach, rather than a broader set of generalisations about the international 
system, can help explain what an identity is. Finally, the existence of pre-social identities 
implies a level of stability that is less methodologically equipped with analysing change. 
Subsequently, the view of identity being reformulated via co-determinism between actors 
takes as its starting point a particular fixed concept of identity. Again, this fixity ignores the 
contestations and processes that cause one identity to become another. 
 
By way of addressing some of these issues, other scholars within the conventional 
constructivist vein have focused on nation-state identities in particular situations. Katzenstein, 
for example, introduces a number of essays that seek to redress the shortcomings of a 
systemic approach.83 Robert Herman argues that Soviet reform occurred not via the realist 
prism of material capabilities but through the efforts of a liberal specialist group that helped 
replace Marxist-Leninist ideology with a pro-Western vision.84 Thomas Berger reveals the 
reformulation of German and Japanese identities in the wake of the Second World War and 
argues how the subordinate military roles these countries have had in the post-war era are 
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attributed to the construction of ‘trading state’ identities in opposition to their previously 
militaristic ones.85 Risse-Kappen analyses the evolution of NATO through the Suez and 
Cuban missile crises and explains that the persistence of NATO has occurred via its 
transnational linkages of domestic polities to the foreign policies of states.86 Two issues can 
be pointed out about the articles in this volume. Firstly, several of the essays seek to establish 
identity as a causal factor and this can only be achieved if things are held constant: A causes 
B, B causes C, and so on.87 Similarly, in relation to Berger’s essay, Hopf points out that 
“[s]uch a claim requires the presumed nonexistence of relevant unobservables, as well as the 
assumption that the practices, institutions, norms, and power relations that underlay the 
presumption of those identities are somehow fixed or constant.”88 Secondly, Wæver claims 
that states with very similar cultural and historical backgrounds might maintain very different 
foreign policies.89 Once again, what conventional approaches lack is an investigation into the 
processes that have enabled identities to come into being. This requires a consideration of the 
alternative constructions of identity that foundered and a more ‘critical’ approach to 
constructivism would seek to answer this fundamental question.   
 
To summarise, one might conclude this overview of constructivism by recapitulating its 
relevance for this study. Three points can be considered. Firstly, British political elite 
readings of Europe are, in effect, struggles over identity. Identities are the basis of interests 
rather than the more rationalist assumption that treats self-interest as an unquestionable pre-
given. Again, much constructivist literature on Europe supports the argument that integration 
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is not solely an exercise in the pursuit of economic and material interests. For example, an 
emphasis on economic influences can be questioned by looking at the German and French 
examples. French politicians, to assuage the power of Germany, should actually prefer a 
federalist version of the EU while Germany, in an attempt to extricate itself from the 
constrictive effects of integration, should pursue a ‘Europe of nation states’.90 Secondly, 
Risse et al.,91 in their study of British, French and German policies and attitudes towards the 
Euro, contend that actors’ perceptions of interests are “deeply controlled by their visions of 
European political order.”92 Thirdly, within the British debates, incidents such as Margaret 
Thatcher’s support for a single market but hostility towards greater integration stem not 
merely from the desire to realise economic benefits but from “economic ideas which provide 
the framework in which economic interests are constructed.”93 The arguments against greater 
integration have included discourses based on economic self-interest, but they in turn have 
been produced from conceptual ideas about how countries have been constructed vis-à-vis 
Europe. Viewing economic interests in isolation is dangerous because “economies are always 
embedded in societies (thus they are not asocial technical machineries amenable to 
naturalistic analysis), and national economies have extensive linkages to trans-national global 
networks.”94 Thus, rather than perceiving the EU as a process ruled solely by economic 
forces, this dissertation argues that nation-state identities have been instrumental in 
determining how economic ideas are formulated and which economic ideas become 
prevalent.  
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Additionally, I take it that Self and Other come into being via both difference and similarity. 
That is, pre-social identities do not exist as the Self only possesses identity in relation to the 
intersubjective understandings it formulates of Others. Again, for the purposes of how this 
position moulds this dissertation, the Self is taken to be British political elite interpretations 
of the events. The Others are a number of state-dominated actors that appear within the 
debates, such as France, Germany, the USA, etc., as well as other entities which include the 
EU, the Commonwealth and Central and Eastern Europe. I take it that British political elite 
perceptions of these actors reveal a range of British national identities.  
 
Finally, this thesis, rather than causal in its explanations, takes a descriptive line in keeping 
with much constructivist research. By way of example, in relation to the smaller Nordic EU 
states, Hansen mentions that the constructivist approach the authors utilise confirms “that we 
ask and answer different types of question.”95 The Nordic study, instead of an attempt to 
explain the causes of integration as determined by the larger states of Britain, France and 
Germany, tries to identify “the most basic ‘codes’ which structure the way in which 
constructions of ‘Europe’ can be argued politically in a given country.”96 Again, I take it that 
these codes are symbolic of attempts by British political elites to impose a certain reading of 
Europe and it is these efforts this dissertation seeks to uncover.  
 
1.2.2 Critical Approaches 
 
Critical perspectives, although once again suffering from little consensus on their 
categorisation, are arguably unified by their attempt to “seek to escape the intellectual 
                                                     
95 Hansen, L. (2002) ‘Introduction’ in Hansen, L. and Wæver, O. (eds.) European Integration and National Identity: The 
Challenge of the Nordic States, p. 8. 
96 Ibid., p. 9.  
38 
 
straitjacket of traditional political science by questioning assumptions about political systems 
and institutions, economistic rationalities and methodologies”.97 I focus on the literature 
relating to critical theory because of its contributions in trying to produce a post nation-state 
configuration and an identity that is not founded upon traditional notions of territory. 
Subsequently, although it focuses more on the processes of “argumentation, deliberation, and 
persuasion … with the aim of reaching a mutual understanding based on a reasoned 
consensus”,98 identity is an important part of the emancipatory attempt to transcend the 
restrictive notion of the Westphalian state and instead offer multi-perspectivity – that another 
Europe is possible.99 Other such schools loosely labelled under the emblem ‘critical’ may 
also include Marxist and Gramscian perspectives. However, as I am confining the argument 
to a consideration of perspectives that factor identity in the functioning and formulation of the 
EU – rather than examining the EU from the position of class relations – I will focus first on 
the critical perspective of the Habermasian mould and then second in the deconstructive 
sense. 
 
Jürgen Habermas has, for the past fifty years, been one of the staunchest advocates for a 
universalist and non-exclusionary antidote to nationalism.100 Although he has consistently 
argued that nation-state solidarity must be “widened to embrace all citizens of the Union”,101 
he has also highlighted that this process is not inevitable and must occur by means of a 
learning process “stimulated via the development of tools for social integration – the clear 
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and obvious one being social policy.”102 Hence, he makes three claims: first, the nation-state 
is not destined to be ever-lasting because it is a product of modern history; second, the forces 
of globalisation reveal that the modern state is susceptible to powers over which it has no 
control; and third, a new ‘cosmopolitan consciousness’ is the only alternative to the vagaries 
of modern society.103 One can argue that the burgeoning of NGOs within Europe104 supports 
the argument that the EU has greater sensitivity towards inclusivity and diversity and is 
heading towards a post-Westphalian conceptualisation of sovereignty in the Habermasian 
sense. However, a number of issues can be raised about this quest for a post-national polity. 
Firstly, Murphy asks the obvious but noteworthy question: “how realistic is it to talk about a 
future solidarity that is at present non-existent?”105 He cites how forms of solidarity are 
deeply embedded at national levels and national myths have no such European equivalent. In 
reaction to the demonstrations in Europe against the war in Iraq in 2003, Habermas and 
Derrida cited the protests as “a sign of the birth of a European public sphere.”106 Others argue 
that such a proclamation might be premature. In a review of Old Europe, New Europe and 
Core Europe: Transatlantic Relations After Iraq, a collection of essays calling for Europe to 
act as a counterweight to American hegemony, Lloyd comments on the simplistic 
binarisation between a pro-European identity being envisaged solely through anti-
Americanism, the equally naive assumption that the only two choices for Europe are to unite 
or perish and the observation that national identities should somehow be treated as 
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“illusionary”.107 Lloyd concludes: “[u]s Europeans cannot exploit a caricature of the new 
world to solve the problems of the old: for America is not responsible for the real issues 
which face us. The fault, that we are underlings, lies not with the US, but with ourselves.”108 
Subsequently, while not denying the role of compromise and consensus within the EU and its 
institutions that try to reconcile the divergent and competing viewpoints of the myriad of 
political actors, I argue that such positions have been formulated by the particular views these 
actors have of other actors. It is quite correct to assume that states bring their own particular 
visions to the debating table and attempt to promulgate their ideas and shape the various 
institutions according to these ideas. However, it is of greater salience to understand not 
merely how these contestations are played out in an attempt to achieve harmonisation or 
compromise, but how these visions have come about due to the perceptions the actors have of 
Others. Therefore, I argue that the communicative approach neglects to consider how the 
process of argumentation is actually a forum for contested identities to be played out, all 
having been constructed via their perceived relationship to one another.  
 
Deconstructivism, by contrast, posits a range of alternative interrogative techniques for 
revealing or deconstructing the implicit binary oppositions that permeate the political 
landscape. Hay notes that Western/modern thought is structured and dependent on a never-
ending series of stratified dualisms which repress and marginalise others.109 Deconstructivist 
approaches deal with a wide range of phenomena. First, Derrida’s analysis of Europe, for 
example, reveals a journey towards the Other and a subsequent “redefinition of European 
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identity that includes respect for both universal values and difference”.110 Hence, European 
identity needs to be configured within an acceptance and respect for differentiation and guard 
against “closing itself off in its own identity and advancing itself in an exemplary way 
towards what it is not.”111 Likewise, other scholars have added a much-needed empirical 
dimension and have attempted to investigate and pinpoint who these European Others are. 
Illustrations include the former Soviet Union,112 Islam113 and the USA.114 Many attempts to 
capture and expose the Other has a tendency to reify the process and reduce what I argue is a 
subtler configuration of identity contestations into an oversimplified dichotomy between ‘us’ 
and ‘them’.  
 
Second, Wæver argues that this deconstructive approach also deals with configuring identity 
not merely as an object, but how the media and technologies shape it as a practice.115 For 
example, Delanty explores four dimensions of community – the political, the cultural, the 
social and the transnational – and argues that attempts to create a European demos and ethnos 
have monumentally failed.116 He concludes that as cognitive processes enable us to 
experience social reality more and more – what he calls ‘knowledge society’ – then “if 
Europe cannot be (a) ‘real’ community perhaps it can become a ‘virtual’ one.”117 In addition, 
Burgess argues that the history of Europe is synonymous with the crisis of cultural identity, 
and that the attempt to create an identity requires fixity that negates the prospects of diversity; 
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hence the necessity but impossibility of constructing a European culture.118 He also highlights 
the role of the media and technology in creating this paradox as modern technologies add to 
the alienation of consumers whilst simultaneously uniting them via the power of tools of 
communication.119 A final aspect of the deconstructive approach seeks to investigate the 
linkages between identity and legitimacy. Howe optimistically argues that a European 
identity need not be lodged within an ethnic or cultural homogeneity and that “the idea of a 
shared destiny to catalyse the development of the American and Canadian nations”120 can be 
utilised as a framework for constructing such a community. Laffan, on the other hand, 
discusses how problems of identity – evident in immigration, the revival of nationalist 
populist parties and the fragmentation of Communist bloc – have caused the EU to act as a 
“catalyzing agency for inculcating certain political norms and rights within the EU and 
enticing non-EU states towards similar values as the price for entering the club.”121 Also, 
Hansen and Williams discuss the role myths play in determining legitimacy and raise the 
important issue of how competing myths create “socially operative practices.”122 They claim 
that taking myths seriously involves examining social and political structures more directly 
and conclude that the ill-fated 1980s attempt to formulate a cultural identity has given way to 
the Maastricht Treaty’s introduction of European citizenship as well as the Amsterdam 
Treaty’s endeavour to given the EU a ‘human face’. 
 
From this brief overview of critical approaches, two points can be highlighted that contribute 
to the manner in which identity is configured in this study. Firstly, despite the fact that some 
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practitioners of critical theory highlight the birth of a European identity, I would argue that 
national identities still continue to be omnipresent and are formulated only in relation to other 
such identities. That is, even though this study denies the impact of an all-encompassing  
European identity, critical theory nonetheless emphasises the process of Othering in defining 
how Europe constitutes itself via patterns of inclusion and exclusion, and calls attention to the 
role of ‘imagined Europe’ in helping understand arguments for and against integration. 
Shared histories and languages, cultural linkages, the pull of modernity, and national and 
transnational myths have all been important stabilisers of British national identity. Secondly, 
some critical theorists have prioritised the role of communication in the attempt to formulate 
a post-national political sphere. Although communication is important for the transmission of 
ideas about what identities are, this dissertation utilises patterns of language, or discourses, in 
its attempt to define identities. That is, the process of argumentation is not merely about the 
attempt to impose a particular vision but also about recognising that these visions are 
constrained by the prevailing discursive field. This delimits what can and cannot be said and, 
in turn, enables a discursive reading of identity to take place. In short, the approach I adopt 
attempts to explore the background conditions and discursive structures that also enable 
change to occur.123 
 
1.2.3 Discursive Approaches 
 
Discursive approaches also consider how nation-state identities affect the process of 
European integration. One approach towards analysing European governance from this 
perspective has sought to explain foreign policy via the concepts of state, nation and Europe. 
This structural approach, stemming from what has been called the Copenhagen School, 
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examines the issue of change within a three-tier formation: first, the basic concept of state-
nation; second, the relational position of state and nation vis-à-vis Europe; and third, the 
concrete policies pursued by actors.124 State, nation and Europe are used because they are 
“we-concepts, identities we hold simultaneously and which therefore have to be articulated 
with each other.”125 Despite presenting a possible process of how nation-state identities shape 
Europe, one can argue that such an approach suffers from a number of drawbacks. Firstly, the 
presumption is that European discourses are dominated by certain concepts at the expense of 
others. Similar such studies have exercised this framework to include other discourses such as 
security and the nature of international relations.126 Another obvious lacuna, however, is that 
of economistic discourses which crop up particularly frequently within debates affecting the 
national economies of European countries, such as the adoption of the Euro. Technological, 
religious and militaristic structures might also be included as we-concepts. However, not only 
does a structural approach neglect the inclusion of important discourses, but one can argue 
that there is no consensus of opinion about what state, nation and Europe might mean. The 
concept of the EU, for example, is constructed differently according to context127 while the 
concept of state is perceived very differently in Denmark (broadly interventionist) and Britain 
(non-interventionist) and may include concepts that are non-state or nation related.128 
Secondly, a structural approach tends to view language as “too static, stable, and coherent”129 
whereas a more poststructuralist analysis would highlight “the inherent tensions within any 
move towards coherence and thus their ironies and strange effects.”130 A structural approach 
argues that change is difficult precisely because it views language as stable and static rather 
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than contested and fluid. Hence, the concepts of state and nation remain comparatively 
constant due to their higher “degree of sedimentation”.131 Subsequently, this approach is less 
sympathetic at analysing the manner in which discursive hegemony can become contested, 
destabilised and ultimately replaced, perhaps a core focus of investigation for much 
poststructuralist discourse analysis. 
 
By way of contrast, a governance approach accounts for change via linking polity-ideas to 
meta-narratives which capture ‘deeper’ concepts such as politics, progress and economy.132 
This approach makes use of the notion of discursive nodal points whereby a number of 
discourses become tied together allowing meaning to become stabilised.133 Diez goes on to 
give the example of European governance functioning as a Free Trade Area whereby its 
specific rules “determine the overall argumentative structure of articulations of European 
governance within the discourse and prescribe the kind of relations that can reasonably be 
drawn between various metanarratives.”134 By emphasising the disputed nature of Europe, 
this approach is particularly adept at identifying misleading characterisations about various 
nation-state identities. One of these has been the oversimplified dichotomy of pro- versus 
anti-European – perhaps most commonly exemplified in the British debate – as well as 
traditionalist views that British identity stems exclusively from the Empire or its island 
status.135 Similarly, the governance approach has opened the political landscape to encompass 
non-state centrism, unlike the comparatively rigid structurationism implicit within the 
Copenhagen School’s notions of nation and state. However, a number of shortcomings can be 
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identified. Firstly, it “downplays the inter-connectedness of different discourses that are 
mutually defined in relation to each other, e.g. British Conservatives are very likely to 
develop their position in relation to Labour and this is usually more important to them than 
family connections to other Conservative parties.”136 Hence, a governance approach tends to 
attach less importance to national contexts and instead overplays transnational linkages 
between groups. Secondly, a focus on polity ideas and ideal-type models, defined as 
“normative orders in which specific constructions of the legitimacy of a political system are 
(re) produced through the ascription of purpose and meaning”,137 suffers from the accusation 
of being un-discursive. In short, “[i]t goes against the basic idea of discourse analysis where 
no categories are universally valid … it is surprising to see ideal types derived from general 
overarching considerations and then used as boxes into which discourses fit.”138  Finally, the 
mapping of central ideal types “does not tell us why certain ‘Europes’ were put forward in a 
particular national context, how easily they might be changed, and what structures within a 
domestic discursive field govern those processes.”139  
 
The literature on discursive approaches impacts on this dissertation in several ways. To begin 
with, although agreeing that state, nation and obviously Europe are important we-concepts, 
identity is formulated through the ever-changing conceptualisations of other state and non-
state actors. A particularly transparent example from the British debates concerns the altering 
perceptions of France. Ludlow, for example, recounts how Britain’s eighteenth-century elite 
equated Europe, and particularly France, as civilised and modern. The weakening of this 
attitude was prompted by a literary and artistic trend that became critical of all things 
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‘foreign’, the political reformism that brought to light ‘Saxon freedoms’ being subjugated by 
the ‘Norman yoke’ and the French Revolution characterised less by its progressivism and 
more by its brutality.140 Such images, far from being curios of a forgotten past, continue to 
play out in the present. Hence, notions of state, nation and Europe are reflective of national 
identities but these identities are configured via the perceptions elites have of other actors. In 
addition and in contrast to some of the literature mentioned, this study does employ a 
simplified pro/anti dichotomy. It is important to clarify the reasoning behind this. Firstly, the 
debates clearly point towards this demarcation. British political elite perceptions initially take 
the form of being supportive of or resistant to the initial continued membership of the EEC 
and of the treaties examined. As a consequence, the pro/anti delineation is both a useful 
starting point from which to methodologically begin inquiry as well as a naturalised 
preliminary position articulated by political figures. Secondly, as has been mentioned, an 
anti-position is not synonymous with a broader scepticism, fear or dislike of anything 
Europe-related. As I take it that language is “the means through which social meaning is 
communicated”,141 we stay firmly within the realm of text to extrapolate identity from that 
which political figures have said or written. As an illustration, from the Maastricht debates, 
one famed political figure stated the following: 
I bitterly resent the title “Euro-sceptic”. Am I an “Anglo-sceptic” because I 
did not like the Thatcher government? I oppose the Maastricht treaty as a 
European because it takes from every country in Europe the rights that are 
being taken away from us.142 
 
Consequently, no singular meaning of Eurosceptic, phobic, sclerotic or pro-European, pro-
EU and so on, dominates. As such, although the debates are initially cast in pro/anti 
straightforward terms – either for or against continued membership or whatever treaty is 
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being discussed – this study then groups the underlying meanings of Others to reveal how the 
Self is constructed. Finally, from an initial pro/anti position, the range of British Selves 
produced reveals a number of patterns or dominant strands of identity that are examined in 
the final empirical chapter. Again, as an example, one such thread that pervades all three 
debates is sovereignty. Hedetoft points out that “sovereignty is the central building block in 
the wall of national identity”143 and an initial pro-/anti-dichotomy reveals how sovereignty is 
not merely configured differently within each debate but also shows how the concept evolves 
over the arguments.  
 
1.2.4 Gendered Approaches 
 
Gendered approaches also take stock with the view that identities are irreversibly soldered to 
the notion of the sovereign state. Within the framework of championing such non-state 
identities, gender “articulates an aspect of political subjectivity which is potentially 
transnational by virtue of including all women from all countries and cultures.”144 Hansen 
goes on to reveal that despite the fact that EU and European Court of Justice rulings have 
sought to pressure member states into passing ‘women’s rights’ legislation, this has been 
achieved without re-examining the inherent gender bias that exists within the neoliberal and 
masculine organisation of the EU. Women’s lack of support for the EC is bound up with its 
patriarchal and elitist structure, and this “sceptical dichotomy”145 alludes to the existence of 
inclusion and exclusion, rather than communitarianism and solidarity. 
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The wealth of other studies in this area provides ample testimony to the gendered nature of 
the EU and its institutions. Firstly, several studies have sought to counter the illusion that the 
EU is an unconditional ‘progressive polity’, distributing gains for all irrespective of age, race 
or gender. Bretherton,146 for example, has sought to identify how a supposed commitment to 
gender mainstreaming – “the (re)organisation, improvement, development and evaluation of 
policy processes, so that a gender equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all 
levels and at all stages, by the actors normally involved in policy-making”147 – reveals a 
considerable gap between the rhetoric and the reality. She also argues that such opposition to 
gender mainstreaming occurs due to discriminatory practices in training and recruitment, the 
lack of gender impartiality in the labour market as well as social conservatism and matriarchy 
promoted via institutions such as the Catholic Church and entrenched notions of male 
dominance. Similarly, Mazey, Shaw, Elman and Bell148 present arguments to suggest that 
although gender perspectives have perforated into “world trade and globalisation, EU 
enlargement, fisheries, and asylum and refugee policy”,149 ‘gender blind’ areas are still 
prevalent including “the internal market, competition policy, trade, energy and transport”.150 
Such absences occur due to a lack of political commitment, under-funded lobbying groups 
(such as the European Women’s Lobby) that might press for greater inclusion for women, 
under-representation within certain events (such as the Convention of the Future of the 
Union) and the difficulty in determining what counts as ‘evidence’ when arguing that Europe 
is progressing to end sex discrimination. Despite that such studies accord with a general 
agreement on EU legislation that is becoming more inclusive and respectful towards the 
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previously ignored area of gender, it has been argued by Claudia Roth, President of the Green 
Group of the European Parliament, that “[e]qual rights and equal opportunities are reduced to 
the workplace and that is not enough. The question of the role of women in society remains 
unresolved.”151 
 
Subsequently, gender approaches to the EU, notwithstanding their panoply of diversity, are 
unified by their struggle to highlight not merely the under-represented role of women within 
legislation and institutions, but also to underscore the many entrenched attitudes that act as an 
obstacle to the de-masculinisation of the polity. In short, “[f]eminist scholarship has gone 
beyond an emphasis on rights and policies, towards the gendered nature of the polity 
itself.”152 Indeed, due to the commitment to revealing the inside/outside, inclusive/exclusive 
nature of the EU, a gender approach frequently sits well with similar such attempts to 
emphasise the Self/Other nexus as a means of making the Community a more inclusive and 
communitarian entity. Likewise, feminist approaches highlight a neglected perspective on the 
world and help to propel previously ignored voices and viewpoints into the forefront of 
political debate and decision-making. Weber, for example, cites Peterson’s view of gender 
“not as something that can be placed but instead as something that helps us to place things – 
events, people, ideas – that we encounter in our everyday world.”153  
 
To summarise, although the unit of analysis – gender – is not the focal point of this 
dissertation, gendered approaches to Europe nonetheless impact in two important ways. 
Firstly, a consideration of gender helps challenge the notion of the inviolability of the 
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sovereign state. Although what British political elites say and write are taken as the sources 
of identity construction, political figures have consistently articulated broader and non-state 
centric appeals to national identity. Indeed, the national dimension of identity contains the 
articulation of a societal and civic sense of attachment that frequently positions the 
government as its effective protector or guardian. Secondly, gendered approaches sit well 
with the attempt by political elites to influence the pattern of European integration. 
Frequently within the British debates, what is being argued is a vision in spe. By way of 
example, the ILP politician Robert Edwards, stated during the 1969 Annual Labour Party 
Conference that there lies the occasion to build “a new civilisation, giving our young people a 
majestic aim – a united Europe and eventually a socialist Europe.”154 As such, the British 
debates do not merely focus on what Europe is but what it might become. Not merely does 
this concur with a fundamental constructivist premise that our identity – who we are – 
determines, shapes and influences the world within which we function, but that it also opens 
up other vistas, such as gender, for change and reconfiguration.    
 
1.3 The First Layer: Discourse Analysis 
 
1.3.1 The Assumptions of Discourse Analysis 
 
Discourse analysis may be defined as an “approach to the analysis of language that looks at 
patterns of language across texts as well as the social and cultural contexts in which the texts 
occur.”155 Subsequently, it is firmly lodged within a view of our world as socially 
constructed. Discourse analysis, therefore, seeks to argue that an external reality cannot be 
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held as authoritative and universal but is instead a series of representations. External reality 
is not independent of our perceptions of it and our social world only becomes accessible to us 
via the manner in which we organise it and place it into categories.156 An investigation into 
these categories can help reveal which representations are utilised within the attempt to 
impose a reality and why such representations were more successful than others.  
 
The labelling of these subject and object categories has been abundant over the ages with 
such examples including “God, Reason, Humanity, Nature, and the Iron Laws of 
Capitalism”.157 These categorisations enable our understanding of our ‘reality’ which is 
contingent on social, cultural and historical contexts. Although we may not dispute the 
existence of a natural phenomenon, our understanding of it is contingent on our social 
practices that attribute meaning to that which occurs: 
An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists, in 
the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But 
whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural 
phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the 
structuring of the discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects 
exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could 
constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition of 
emergence.158  
 
The essence of discourse theory is rooted in the study of both spoken and written language 
because the language we employ when describing our ‘reality’ gives it meaning. However, 
how can language reveal discourses that are structurally fixed enough to enable them to be 
studied whilst assuming language is inherently volatile? This peculiarity can be explained in 
two ways. Firstly, Laclau and Mouffe adopt the concept of nodal points which are “privileged 
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signifiers or reference points … in a discourse that bind together a particular system of 
meaning or ‘chain of signification’.”159 Hence, the act of articulation contains the 
construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning160 allowing for a structural reading 
of language. Secondly, one can adopt a differential rather than a referential approach to 
language. A referential understanding, according to Wæver, is “where words and concepts 
are names used in order to make reference to objects out there in reality.”161 A referential 
approach, therefore, “will not have much to work with than the degrees of deviation from the 
ideal of language as a transparent medium”,162 resulting in a bias towards psychological 
accounts rooted in “‘perceptions’ or ‘belief systems’ or ‘images’”.163 On the other hand, a 
differential understanding incorporates a more systemic approach because “meaning is 
located in the differences among concepts – we know how to use the term horse by the 
distinctions differentiating it from other animals, from other means of transportation as well 
as through other sets of distinctions.”164 Hence, by rooting language in a system of linking 
and differentiation, and even though ‘suture’ or discursive closure can never be fully realised, 
“[t]his does not mean that elements of stability may not be identified.”165 In short, the 
volatility of language does not preclude a study of it. 
 
Milliken highlights “three analytically distinguishable bundles of claims”166 which highlight 
the theoretical commitments of discourse scholarship and its research programme. The first 
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claim is that discourses function as systems of signification within which meaning occurs via 
the relationships between objects placed within the sign system. One might add that meaning, 
in this deconstructionist approach, “is always an unfinished business because these signs 
constantly alter their relationship to other signs as they travel from context to context.”167 The 
second is by defining who the actors are and the knowledgeable practices by these actors 
towards the acted upon, discourses identify how some actors and actions are engaged while 
others are excluded and silenced. As such, discourses produce and reproduce a certain reality 
that becomes commonsense. The final assertion is that discourse offers how meaning can 
become dominant, hegemonic and fixed while also examining whether stabilisation can be 
challenged due to the “overflowing and incomplete nature of discourses that opens up the 
space for change, discontinuity, and variation.”168 Again, the highlighting of both change and 
continuity emphasises the inherently unstable nature of discourse. Hence, meaning resides in 
linguistic signs, the manipulation of these signs determines who speaks and about what, and 
dominant meanings, therefore, can be fostered or maintained. These key points reveal the 
inherently contestable and conflictual nature of discourse and how language and power are 
mutually constitutive. Although listed as separate claims for the purpose of clarity, I utilise all 
three for the following reasons. Firstly, I am interested in showing how dominant discourses 
of Others affect national identity as well as how these discourses become dominant. 
Secondly, as “systems of signification never fully close up and fall into place – they always 
retain paradoxes, open ends, and impossibilities”,169 a study of identity formation can 
investigate how these signs link with one another to produce a constellational web of 
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meaning. Thirdly, the interlinking between subjects and objects can be revealed empirically 
via the conceptual tools of predication, presupposition and subject positioning. Although 
expanded on later, these three methods for analysis provide the particular features and 
attributes of subjects that are referred to, the background that is taken to be true and the 
manner in which the subjects and objects are linked and related. It is via these three processes 
that the practice of linking and differentiation, and subsequently the three claims made by 
Milliken previously cited, can be established. 
 
1.3.2 Why Discourse Analysis? 
 
As already mentioned, discourse analysis functions as an empirical tool for scrutinising what 
is said, written or communicated, and no less importantly, what may not be said, written or 
communicated. Often, however, discourse scholars have been condemned as belonging to a  
“deviant community”,170 while discourse theory has been condemned as “dangerous science, 
seductive but ‘prolix and self-indulgent’”.171 Despite frequently made complaints about its 
untestability, several notable studies have revealed how discourse analysis can be framed 
empirically.172 Although not meeting criteria demanded by positivist expectations of 
scientific rigour173 (and neither does discourse analysis attempt to) and despite not asserting 
that the only thing in the world is discourse,174 a discursive approach offers a limiting and 
delimiting tool for examining how we assemble, perceive and subsequently act within our 
social world.  
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A discursive approach, because it posits that language is inherently unstable, offers an insight 
into how norms, values and identities are subject to change. Poststructuralist discourse theory 
states “that there is no pre-given, self-determining essence that is capable of determining and 
ultimately fixing all other identities within a stable and totalizing structure.”175 Rationalist 
methodologies, on the other hand, have frequently argued that norms, values and identities 
are fixed and given, and interests, therefore, need not be bogged down by their consideration. 
Discursive and constructivist approaches, however, have been at pains to deny the exogeneity 
of these phenomena which, in turn, allows for a study of the catalysts which construct and 
reconstruct them. As this study focuses on the inherent flexibility and multidimensionality of 
identity, a constructivist/discursive approach is employed over a more methodologically 
narrowing rationalist one. 
 
Furthermore, as “discourses reproduce the everyday assumptions of society”,176 a discursive 
position illuminates power structures that are implicit in the social and political world.  
Indeed, instead of power being perceived as the possession of material resources or capacity, 
it “is conceived in terms of the political acts of inclusion and exclusion that shape social 
meanings and identities and condition the construction of social antagonisms and political 
frontiers.”177 Instead of taking interests as realised through power as given, the approach I 
adopt contends that interests are actually constructed and illuminated through patterns of 
language, or discourses. Power structures, be they evident or hidden, permeate the political 
arena and set certain privileged agendas because “[l]anguage and discourse are dominated by 
the powerful in society who can impose meanings and explanations of social reality which 
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protects their interest and undermine the rest of society.”178 Hence, a discursive approach 
helps expose and critique that which is often accepted as commonsense or somehow ‘natural’ 
to the political and social world. 
 
Finally, by revealing how identity is constructed and reconstructed, a discursive approach can 
reveal not only the monolithic formulation of a single identity, but also the conflictual nature 
of competing identities as revealed in discourses.179 As Diez notes, by viewing a particular 
topic of study, for example Europe, as a “discursive battlefield”, the political territory reveals 
discursive linkages which help define what can and cannot be discussed.180 Rather than a 
focus on explanation, this approach contributes to a much deeper ‘critical understanding’ of 
which policies become implemented and which are rejected.181  
 
1.4 The Second Layer: Self/Other Analysis 
 
1.4.1 Introduction and Assumptions 
 
As already mentioned, identities can only exist in relation to those that it is not. The claim 
that I am a European, for example, only makes sense if we are able to understand the wide 
array of non-European identities, be they Asian, African, Latin American, and so on. The  
Other does not merely nominally influence the Self for the Self’s identity to be configured, 
but the Self’s identity, shaped by several factors of socialisation, is “always constituted in 
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relation to difference because a thing can only be known in relation to what it is not”.182 
Political identities, consequently, do not appear to exist without the difference between the 
Self and Other.183 Whilst accepting these assumptions, I would also add another important 
dimension to the concept of the Self being configured solely through difference. I would like 
to argue that there are different levels of difference which can function as a shaper of the 
Self’s identity and that “meaning and identity are constructed through a series of signs that 
are linked to each other to constitute relations of sameness as well as through a differentiation 
to another series of juxtaposed signs.”184 There are a number of reasons for arguing that 
meaning can be articulated through different gradations of difference. To begin with, the 
formation of what can be called the radical Other might have the effect of inextricably 
forging two near-Selves together in the pursuit of a common agenda against it. Two examples 
can be provided to support this point. Firstly, Banerjee185 highlights Jawaharlal Nehru’s 
invocation of the Self-Self opposition within colonial India to counter the common Other: 
“[i]t is all the more astonishing and astounding … that such things [violence], which made 
the common foe of all the communities – British Imperialism – laugh in unholy glee, should 
have at all happened.”186 In order to quell the violence occurring between Hindus and 
Muslims, Nehru sought to “discipline elements of the group self through the specter of the 
other.”187 Hence, what are perceived as deep-running historical, cultural and religious 
differences become moderated and a common identity is constructed to deal with the 
universal threat. The second example concerns the security practices of the Cold War. The 
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threat of the USSR – the radical Other – encouraged a level of cooperation amongst European 
states that might not have happened had the threat not existed. As such, an all-encompassing 
European identity “was a Cold War construct shaped and defined by the global confrontation 
of capitalism and communism.”188 A further argument for advancing how Othering 
encapsulates different levels of difference is that less powerful countries, by lacking the 
means or resources, might identify themselves with more powerful ones in the hope of 
realising their interests. In this case of bandwagoning, the promotion and protection of the 
Self is orchestrated by a linking to a more powerful near-Self or non-Self as a way of trying 
to ensure the Self’s survival. The persistence of the ‘special relationship’ might echo this 
point. Finally, by embodying the notion of different levels of difference, empirical analysis 
becomes much broader by not merely concluding “that all foreign and security policies 
therefore have to be built on a conquest of the Other.”189 Hence, the processes of both 
equivalence and difference might be revealed in the concept of ‘democracy’, for example, as 
a privileged identity that creates a set of relations with other states on the basis of their 
‘democratic potential’ and also situates this identity within a structure of spatial and temporal 
difference because not all states can be regarded as adequately democratic.190  
 
Apart from drawing attention to different levels of difference, which I believe to be an 
important but neglected aspect of identity construction, I would argue that Self/Other analysis 
has three other important characteristics. First of all, the Self/Other nexus involves a dualistic 
character. It is both inward-looking because it defines a measure of commonality within the 
group and also outward-looking because it identifies those who must be distinguished from 
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the ingroup. Hence, “[i]t involves both self-awareness of the group and awareness of others 
from which the nation seeks to differentiate itself.”191 Furthermore, Self and Other do not 
merely come into being but are formulated due to the perceptions actors have of them. 
Consequently, they are defined via a process of socialisation – the practice of knowing – and 
“the activity of knowing is a formulation of the world.”192 Lastly, the relationship between 
Self and Other is not a permanent configuration but is liable to change. “[T]here is no such 
thing as a permanent or privileged self”193 because the interconnectivity of actors is 
orchestrated through a multitude of Others and is therefore not reducible to a perennial Other. 
This implies the existence of what Diez argues as “different kinds of difference: more or less 
exclusive, antagonistic and violent ones.”194 As identity is multilayered and constructed from 
a variety of sources, I categorise Others into three distinguishable groups, each demarcated 
by its threat value. An explanation of them follows. 
 
1.4.2 Friendly, Non-radical and Radical Others 
 
While not ignoring the impact of the radical Other, and clearly accepting that its existence 
implies “that some forms of othering are more problematic than others”,195 I believe that the 
interrelatedness of actors in the political arena is as governed by non-radical actors as by 
radical ones. The process of clear and lucid differentiation and subsequent hostility implicit in 
defining the radical Other does not reveal a comprehensive picture of how actors perceive 
and define one another because “it definitely does not follow from a poststructuralist starting 
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point that antagonisms should be the main source of meaning.”196 Wæver goes on to mention 
that unadulterated difference is less information rich than more nuanced structures of 
differentiation as the Self is influenced and constructed via its relationships with friends and 
relatives, and not just foes.197 The Other should not be perceived as a pantomime villain and 
may well exhibit characteristics that although foreign are not necessarily repugnant: 
(The public enemy) … does not have to be morally evil, he does not have 
to be aesthetically ugly, he does not have to appear as an economic 
competitor, and it can … even be advantageous to have business dealings 
with him. He is nevertheless the Other.198     
 
Part of the dominance of the perception of the radical Other stems, in part, from the security 
practices of the Cold War. Hansen argues that the simplistic notion of the overtly threatening 
Other has been coloured by these practices during the post-World War Two period and that 
its confrontational legacy still continues to infuse the perceptions we have.199 Similarly, 
judgements that hinge on singularities – the West versus the East, for example – tend to deny 
the multiplicity of national and regional positions that might not be so easily reducible to the 
officially accepted position. Although, for example, such constructions as the negative 
invocations of the ‘Turk’ have had (and continue to have) resonance within Europe,200 not all 
states have constructed the threat in the same way or at the same level of danger. This is not 
to deny that identities cannot collectively embody a diverse transnational group or that a Self 
cannot be embodied in a larger configuration or entity, such as Europe for example, only that 
caution must be displayed in presuming Self/Other necessitates an overriding black/white 
distinction. In short, Self/Other is more of a multifaceted spectrum than the process of radical 
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Othering presupposes. The following figure diagrammatically represents this constellational 
process of Othering along with the processes of linking and differentiation:  
 
Figure 2: Othering and the Self 
 
                                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 outlines characteristics and examples of friendly, non-radical and radical Others. 
Four examples, along with references, are provided for each category. As is evident, Others 
can be internal (residing within the boundaries of the entity regarded as the Self) or external 
to this entity. Others may also be real or imagined/symbolic. They might also be regarded as 
radical within one era, non-radical or friendly in another, or even unnoticed or non-existent at 
a different stage. Such a situation is context-, issue-, time- and event-dependent and is an 
endemic feature of the ever-evolving nature of identity construction. Subsequently, due to the 
fact that identities are fluid, the configuration of Others is captured at a particular point in 
time. Although a common configuration is to construct the Other as a singular entity, this 
does not exclusively need to be the case as the development of national identity hinges on a 
continuous reconstruction and search for Others from which to formulate the Self.201 Finally, 
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since my focus is to reveal how national identity is represented by the process of Othering, 
the examples I provide are states, transnational entities, and ethnic and political groups. 
Needless to say, this in no way implies that Others must be formulated in this way: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Campbell posits that American identity has been so linked to the articulation of 
dangers that it has produced a welter of Others that have shaped an expansionist US foreign policy. He includes such 
examples as the war on illegal drugs, Vietnam, Japan and Iraq amongst others.  
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Table 1: Friendly, Non-radical and Radical Others 
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Jews 
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1.5 Methodology 
 
1.5.1 Historical Events 
 
As already mentioned, the historical events focused on are the 1975 referendum on continued 
membership of the Common Market, the 1993 ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the 
2009 enactment of the Lisbon Treaty. There are three main reasons as to why they have been 
chosen. Firstly, they can be classed as ‘critical junctures’. Critical junctures have been 
defined as “perceived crisis situations occurring from policy failures, but also triggered by 
external effects.”214 They are important because established arrangements of identity become 
destabilised and reconfigured. The events can be classed as crises because they all caused 
British political elites to define and redefine themselves in terms of what meaning Europe had 
for them. In this sense, the 1975 referendum remains the only UK-wide vote on European 
membership to date. Unlike general elections in which issues over Europe can be ignored or 
downplayed, the appeal to the electorate catapulted Europe into the public sphere and 
effectively became an early harbinger of ideas over what Europe actually meant. The 
Maastricht Treaty functions as an acute exercise in how divisions over Europe are so 
fundamental to the nature of British politics that they can rupture political parties and even 
have the potential to topple governments. Furthermore, by leading to the implementation of 
the single currency, the Treaty highlights the ever-changing values and objectives of Europe 
and also acts as a high point in the battle over national sovereignty. The Lisbon Treaty can 
perhaps be regarded as one of the most important recent episodes to galvanise British opinion 
on the nature of Europe. It again helped trigger a flurry of familiar themes and also 
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contributed to the argument that Britain’s relationship with Europe continues to remain at the 
forefront of British political debate. In short, the conflict over European integration has been 
labelled as “one of the dominant and most divisive issues of modern British politics”215 and 
the three events I examine are acute illustrations of this.   
 
A second reason why I focus on these episodes is that quite simply one cannot construct 
identity from non-events. As already outlined, the process of Othering, whilst not exclusively 
glued to the restrictive and gloomy presumption of conflictual relations as evident in the 
construction of the radical Other, nonetheless presupposes a process of linking and 
differentiation that is perhaps more reified when emergencies occur. The three events 
conjured up a host of Others because they caused British leaders to examine Europe and the 
course of integration in a way they might not have done had the events not occurred.  Lesser 
or non-events do not create the same sense of political frenzy and commentary and do not 
reveal how discursive constructions of identity become challenged, destabilised and/or 
predominant. Finally, the events are grouped according to temporality and discourse. That is, 
they are organised within a time frame which renders comparative analysis possible. It is 
opportune to choose events that are not so disparate because, for example, “[c]omparing 
national discourses on Europe in 1850 and 2005 might provide an interesting snapshot, but it 
would leave the question of how discourses develop between 1850 and 2005 unanswered.”216 
This study is not only a reading of history that discloses how identity was constructed in the 
past, but also how certain linkages have been utilised to forge identities that still resonate 
today and may provide some indications as to how they might be reformulated in the future.  
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1.5.2 Official Discourses and Textual Material 
 
Utilised from Hansen217, the analytical focus, objects and goals of analysis can be explained 
as follows. The official discourse focuses on heads of states, governments and senior civil 
servants. The objects of analysis centre on supportive and critical texts including debates, 
political speeches, memoirs and diaries. The goals of analysis are to examine the processes of 
how dominant discourses become dominant, the stabilisation and hegemony of the official 
discourses, as well as the response of official discourses to critical discourses. Although this 
focus has been incorporated by Hansen to show the impact on policy, official discourses are 
pertinent to the formulation of identity because those closest to the instruments of policy, i.e. 
party elites, “have always been major vehicles for the transmission of ideas”.218 In turn, they 
are constrained by the existing structure whereby the formulated ideas must contain certain 
resonance towards the electorate. Hence, official discourses reveal a process of identity 
reinvention. As this analysis seeks to reveal the hegemonic discursive structures about 
Europe, the actors most associated with the creation of these discourses are political elites. 
The term ‘political elites’, however, is not unproblematic. Giddens, amongst others, has 
argued how terms which include “‘ruling class’, ‘political class’, ‘elite’, ‘power elite’, and 
‘leadership group’ vie with each other for supremacy in the literature.”219 However, the three 
events analysed in this study position Europe as an object of policy. As a consequence, I have 
taken political elites to include party political actors who were in some way connected to 
shaping policy and opinion on Europe. 
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In terms of how spokespeople have argued, I have focused on parliamentary debates, political 
speeches, memoirs and diaries as the objects of my analysis because they broaden the 
discursive field of study. Official discourses can arguably suffer from a ‘scripted’ feeling, 
that politicians are liable to trot out well-rehearsed party mantra, whereas impromptu 
challenges and questions in debates force elites to ‘think on their feet’ and allow for a more 
extemporaneous and therefore genuine invocation of their positions. Similarly, whilst 
memoirs raise the question of legacy-hunting,220 they provide a background and insight that 
rarely gets investigated within a focus on solely official documentation and commentary and 
they also offer an attempt to “clear the past for the future”.221 Although Gamble stresses how 
memoirs need to be utilised with other texts to safeguard against unreliability, he mentions 
that they provide “insights into how agents imagine their role and interpret events.”222 That is, 
bearing in mind the social constructivist position I take views language as a social practice, 
memoirs do not reveal identity itself but do reveal elite perceptions of identity. It is from the 
interpretations of events that particular notions of identity are being realised and 
promulgated. Memoirs are also juxtaposed with parliamentary debates and speeches. This 
enables empirically richer findings as well as a greater degree of consistency. As has already 
been mentioned, the ideas political elites have must in some capacity be ‘sold’ to the 
electorate. Parliamentary debates and speeches, particularly in terms of their dissemination by 
the media, function as apt vehicles. The criteria for the texts used are that they offer clear 
articulations, are widely read and attended to, and are all from a formal and recognised 
authority.223 In addition, despite the fact that poststructuralist discourse analysis gives 
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“priority to the study of primary texts”,224 I have included secondary texts which provide 
historical background and analysis to the events in question, and help ‘set the scene’ for the 
official debates, commentary and statements.  
 
A final consideration concerning the texts is the manner in which they are organised. The 
pro- and anti-divide is initially invoked for several reasons. Firstly, the literature points quite 
clearly to this demarcation. The evidence suggests that agnosticism or indifference to 
European integration was not paramount and that the EEC, EC and EU in their various guises 
and stages have been fundamental to the way Britain is seen. However, a particularly 
important caveat is required. Utilising a pro- or anti-EU categorisation has the danger of 
equating it with a range of other positions precisely because what is meant is dangerously 
clouded. An anti-position, for instance, might mean anti-Euro, anti-Commission, anti-
Franco/German, anti-deepening or even anti an idea. Consequently, it is quite logical and 
indeed common within the debates to witness an anti-Europe position when Europe is meant 
as the structure, organisations and/or role of the Community, whilst being pro-Europe in its 
historical and cultural sense.225 To avoid this obfuscation, the various viewpoints are 
categorised as pro/anti-membership, pro/anti-Maastricht Treaty and pro/anti-Lisbon Treaty. 
In this sense, the wider implications of what is meant are explored but from an initial 
understanding of the author’s position over the treaty or membership being debated. 
Secondly, the pro/anti dichotomy is an ideal type. An ideal type can be defined as “like a 
utopia ... formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the 
synthesis of a great many diffuse, discreet, more or less present and occasionally absent 
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concrete individual phenomena”.226 Accordingly, ideal-type configurations enable the 
systematic organisation of evidence to allow examination. Finally, although the pro- and anti-
positions are convenient starting points to scrutinise the debates over Europe, they are 
simplifications. As such, and as a means of extracting the identity issues contained within the 
texts, the pro/anti divide is dissolved to produce a more nuanced, less rigid formulation of 
how identity becomes configured.  
 
The organisation of the textual materials is as follows. Firstly, pro- and anti- are employed to 
reveal the implicit meanings of Europe as well as other objects featured within the Europe 
debates. Secondly, those textual meanings are categorised according to their status as Others. 
From this, the various characteristics are presented with an aim to revealing the identities that 
have been formulated. To reiterate, the pro/anti divide becomes fused at this stage because 
certain identities are cross-cutting. That is, Europe is taken to be a contestable entity that 
broaches many divides, including political parties, genders and age groups, and as a 
consequence of this, individual identities may appear in both pro- or anti-positions in the 
same way. Finally, these identities are systematised to produce a range of British Selves. 
These are the products of the identities constructed and, as such, are taken to be British 
political elite perceptions of Britain or, in other words, images of nationhood. 
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1.5.3 How to Look for Linking and Differentiation 
 
Articulation 
 
In order to identify the processes of linking and differentiation, and to reveal the different 
gradations of difference which constitute friendly, non-radical and radical Others, I intend to 
utilise the process of articulation. Hall, whilst acknowledging the potential misunderstandings 
of the definition of articulation he applies, narrates its double meaning: 
…‘articulate’ means to utter, to speak forth, to be articulate. It carries out 
that sense of language-ing, of expressing, etc. But we also speak of an 
‘articulated’ lorry (truck): a lorry where the front (cab) and back (trailer) 
can, but not necessarily, be connected to one another. The two parts are 
connected to each other, but through a specific linkage, that can be 
broken.227 
 
Subsequently, articulation possesses two distinct dimensions. Firstly, it refers to the manner 
in which meaning can become temporarily fixed through the connection of signifying 
components.228  For example, Weldes, in her study of how US security was constructed in 
light of the Cuban Missile Crisis, gives the example of how “references to Castro and his 
revolutionary associates were persistently articulated to the adjective ‘bearded’” thus 
implying that ‘bearded’ indicated Castro was “irresponsible, uncivilized, and a danger to the 
United States.”229 Secondly, it reveals how meanings are connected to various institutions and 
social relations.230 For instance, chains of connotation in early neoliberal discourses on 
Thatcherism might include the linking of “‘unemployment’ to ‘welfare state’ to ‘big 
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government’ and in turn to ‘deregulation’ and privatization’ in order to make markets ‘free’ 
and ‘flexible’”.231  
 
The process of articulation is revealed through the concepts of what Doty calls predication, 
presupposition and subject positioning to show how subjects and objects can be organised 
into a “grid of intelligibility.”232 Such notions are interconnected although I will briefly 
explain them individually for the purposes of clarification and convenience. Firstly, 
predication views discourse as a system of signification which, via linkages and processes of 
differentiation and equivalence, suggests an analytical study of language practices “in order 
to draw out a more general structure of relational distinctions and hierarchies that order 
persons’ knowledge about the things defined by the discourse.”233 Milliken and Sylvan,234 in 
their study of US foreign bombing strategy in Indochina, offer an adroit application of how 
predicate analysis presents a more critical interpretation of foreign policy via gendered 
distinctions between North and South Vietnam. The gendered nexus pits North Vietnam as 
the masculine entity – with “hard” targets, “tough” opponents, and a “harsh” landscape; 
whilst South Vietnam is constructed as feminine – “soft” targets and “squabbling” allies.235 
Predicate analysis “focuses on the language practices of predication – the verbs, adverbs and 
adjectives that attach to nouns.”236 It looks at how the object (the Other) is linguistically 
constructed and imbued with “particular features and capabilities”237 by the subject (the Self).  
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Secondly, Doty argues that presuppositions are made to formulate background knowledge. 
Hence, “[w]hen one uses language, one is implying something about the existence of 
subjects, objects, and their relation to one another.”238 The process of presupposition, 
therefore, takes something for granted or ‘sets-the-scene’ to allow a particular reality to be 
true. It is also an important textual mechanism for examining what elements of an entity, in 
this case Europe, are established before the debates take place. For example, Biebuyck argues 
[t]o say we are ‘disappointed’ or ‘surprised’ in Europe due to recent 
political events prompts an even more fundamental question: what 
naturalized assumptions, about Europe and its form of politics, made 
disappointment and surprise normal responses?239  
 
Presupposition helps uncover these assumptions and therefore asks similarly searching 
questions about how Britain, Europe and other subjects and objects are formulated. 
  
Finally, subject positioning refers to the fact that subjects and objects are always produced in 
respect of other subjects and objects.240 Predicates and presuppositions, subsequently, can be 
positioned to reveal relationships such as “opposition, identity, similarity, and 
complementarity.”241 Extreme forms of binarisation permeate negative meaning into 
constructing the Other and thus define the Self as superior. One such example is that of the 
European perception of the Balkans which acted as a prelude to Western involvement in the 
Bosnian War of 1991 to 1999. Hansen argues that the Balkans were perceived as barbarian, 
violent, irrational and underdeveloped, thus constructing Europe as its antithesis: civilised, 
controlled, rational and developed.242 As already mentioned, discursive practices need not be 
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exclusively wedded to the construction of binary opposites but might also include processes 
of linking and similarity.  
 
For the purposes of this study, articulation is thus important methodologically for two main 
reasons. Firstly, articulation – via the textual mechanisms of presupposition, predication and 
subject-positioning – not merely indicates the perceptions the Self has of an Other, but helps 
construct a diversity of Others. The interwoven and multiple natures of the various linkages 
reveal different nuances of difference, rather than a single, monolithic disparity. A discourse, 
therefore, should not be read as if it functions as a solitary, self-enclosed harbinger of 
meaning, but as a constellational set of linkages containing relations and hierarchies to other 
components. Subsequently, the perceptions British decision-makers have contain 
presuppositions that construct Europe as a series of particular ‘truths’ and various qualities 
are inscribed into other entities that reveal either linking or differentiation. Secondly, political 
identities are revealed by these “struggles over meaning”,243 which take the form of 
articulations. The multitude of linkages and differentiations implicit within the employment 
of articulation exposes a range of identities as “[i]t is not the individual elements of a 
discourse that have political or ideological connotations, it is the ways those elements are 
organised together in a new discursive formation.”244  
 
Methodological Steps 
 
Neumann, in his study of Russia, utilises Todorov245 to ask three questions of each text: What  
is the framework of knowledge within which the European Other is seen? What moral 
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judgement is made of the Other? What relationship is proposed between Russia and the 
European Other?246 Within a European context, Wæver asks the following questions: What 
are the powerful categories on which each argument rests? How are they related? Are some 
concepts tied together as necessarily companions (e.g. “us”, Europe, Germans, 
civilization)?247 The passages are also read with a focus on “[h]ow the texts argue, not what 
they say.”248 Firstly, I ask several similar questions of each text in order to extrapolate 
meaning and assemble the predicates, presuppositions and subject positioning. The predicates 
are highlighted first as they show how meaning is produced via the production of certain 
qualities. Presuppositions are then enumerated as they provide the background knowledge in 
which the processes of articulation operate. Lastly, subject positioning exposes the relational 
position between the various subjects and objects. Hence, the concepts of presupposition and 
predication construct various subjects and objects whilst the relationships between them can 
be taken as subject positioning.249 Figure 3 shows the methodological steps taken:     
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Figure 3: Articulation of Representations 
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1.6 Defining the Concept of National Identity 
 
To conclude, I would like to offer the definition of national identity employed in this study. 
This is perhaps essential by way of bringing together the different strands and approaches 
already discussed as well as highlighting the framework within which this dissertation 
operates. Firstly, I would posit that the nation, and subsequently its identity, is a constructed 
entity. Benedict Anderson defines the nation as an “imagined political community … (it) … 
is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their 
fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of 
 What background knowledge is assumed to exist? 
 What nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs are used to 
instil meaning? 
 How are the concepts related?  
 What moral judgement is made? 
 What is the relationship between the Other(s) and 
Britain? 
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their communion”.250 The imagined character of a nation reveals that it is an ideal-type 
notion: an impression that means different things to different people and is therefore liable to 
change depending on the focal point of the observer. The way in which a nation was 
imagined several generations ago might not have the same resonance to the way it is 
constituted today. Many European countries, for example, had their monarchies firmly 
embedded in their sense of ‘we’s’. Nowadays, it can be purported, monarchies might not be 
considered as strong a factor in determining national identities. Conceptualising identity, 
therefore, as an all-encompassing, rigidly defined monolith, suffers from an inability to 
account for change. Subsequently, I argue that “national identity has always been a 
constructed identity and … we need to move beyond a simple evocation of historical identity 
to acknowledge the constancy of active formation and reformation.”251 In addition, what is 
referred to as national identity is actually an attempt to impose a particular perception of what 
the speaker, or in this study political elites, wishes others to have. Identity, therefore, is not an 
independent, exceptional and ever-static configuration, but a spectrum that is continuously 
being challenged and reformulated on the basis of the ways other identities get perceived and 
therefore instilled with meaning. 
 
Secondly, in keeping with the belief that there is no overriding nationalism, that “nationalism 
is a protean phenomenon, capable of taking on a multiplicity of forms depending on the – 
historical, social and political – context over which it reigns”,252 I would assert that identities 
are relational and multilayered. Identities can be nested, cross-cutting and/or separate253 and 
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“actors normally have multiple social identities that vary in salience.”254 Consequently, to 
talk of a country possessing a national identity, one can argue, is a misnomer because 
whichever definition we use or variable we seek to privilege – be it common or collectively 
held cultural images, historical narratives, language, and so on – is susceptible to change over 
time precisely because identity has an intrinsic capacity for reformulation. As such, what 
makes an identity national is the manner in which individuals or groups make use of national 
discourses.255 The preponderance of national discourses, as opposed to other identity 
discourses, occurs because of its constant articulation in day-to-day practices as a “mode of 
cognitive access to the world … (and) … a mode of agency”.256 The manifold nature of 
identity ensures that allegiances are not fixed and stable but traverse areas according to issue. 
As Wendt mentions, “I may identify with the United States on military defence but with the 
planet on the environment. In any given situation, however, it is the nature of identification 
that determines how the boundaries of the self are drawn.”257 
 
Thirdly, I would argue that the nation is always constituted in relation to an Other.  Identity, 
therefore, comes into being via its juxtaposition with other identities. The significance of 
these other identities determines, in part, the composition of the Self. Thus, via the notion of 
identity I utilise, one can circumvent the focus on hazy concepts that supposedly embody 
national identity by embarking on a journey – what Neumann calls a “tour d’horizon”258 – 
when talking about a collective European identity. A reading of these Others – instead of the 
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fixity of an analysis of the Self – and the level of threats formulated from how these Others 
are perceived, can help reveal how the Self is constituted.  
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CHAPTER TWO: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON BRITISH NATIONAL 
IDENTITY 
 
 
2.1 British National Identity 
 
2.1.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter functions as a survey of the existing debates. It is organised thematically in order 
to shed light on the roots of many of the configurations articulated by British political elites. 
Although not exhaustive, I have focused on those discourses that contain elements picked up 
in the empirical sections of this dissertation. More specifically, the purpose of this chapter is 
two-fold. Firstly, it provides an introduction to many of the recurring themes which appear 
within the discourses on Europe. However, it critically engages with such concepts to argue 
that although such identities have been historically dominant, they have frequently moulded 
into other configurations. That is, historical discourses on Britain and Europe are relevant but 
must be read contextually as a means of comprehending how resonant they might be for the 
historical events analysed. Secondly, it attempts to show from where political elites get their 
ideas and how they argue. Therefore, it supports the idea that spokespeople have to articulate 
arguments which have a meaning with the wider public and bolsters one of the central 
notions of this dissertation: that elite configurations matter in the construction of national 
identities. As such, arguments are not extemporaneous but instead draw on deeply embedded 
historical readings and beliefs. Each theme is introduced with relevant literature and I 
conclude with what relevancy such readings of identity have for this project. This literature 
review, therefore, is an examination of how identity has been configured so far.  
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2.1.2 Interpreting History 
 
The invocation of historical myths and exclusivity of nationally specific events are abundant 
in the various attempts political spokespeople have used to fashion a British national identity. 
The role that history plays in shaping identity, however, cannot be extricated from the 
disagreements over what constitutes British history in the first place. Pertinent to this study is 
the fact that although common or frequently occurring historical events are called upon, they 
are read in a multitude of ways. Subsequently, while historical images are consistently 
utilised to inject national characteristics, “the problem is not history as such, but rather the 
truncated and selective view of it that is often purveyed and believed.”259 For that reason, it is 
important to iterate that history is not a value-free objective process but “[a]ll of us, living in 
our own time, tend to see the past on our own terms.”260  
 
In approaching British history, an early difficulty is to identify how Britain is categorised. As 
Nairn points out, the myriad of different terms are all equally unsatisfactory:  
[W]e live in a State with a variety of titles having different functions and 
nuances – the U.K. (or ‘Yookay’, as Raymond Williams relabelled it), 
Great Britain (imperial robes), Britain (boring lounge-suit), England (poetic 
but troublesome), the British Isles (too geographical), ‘This Country’ (all-
purpose within the Family), or ‘This Small Country of Ours’ (defensive- 
Shakespearean).261 
 
Such confusion, however, reveals that the various classifications are invoked to serve a 
particular political purpose. Identities, therefore, possess multiple meanings. Neither is such a 
cluster of labels merely a contemporary problem as the various monikers for Britain had been 
noted by George Orwell over seventy years earlier:  
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It is quite true that the so-called races of Britain feel themselves to be very 
different from one another ... You can see the hesitation we feel on this 
point by the fact that we call our islands by no less than six different names, 
England, Britain, Great Britain, the British Isles, the United Kingdom and, 
in very exalted moments, Albion.262 
 
Whether such disparities are recognised has the effect of producing two quite divergent 
histories and correspondingly different identities. The first seeks to produce a more 
homogenous and unified narrative by arguing that Britain is synonymous with its most 
economically and culturally dominant component, England. In this history, Wales, Scotland 
and Ireland are peripheral figures in the shaping of British history. The second rejects this 
Anglocentric approach and attempts to argue that a real history must take note of Britain’s 
polyethnic and multiple natures. I deal with both of these approaches in turn.  
 
The first approach takes its strength from the Whig interpretation of history which informs 
the debates over Europe even today. Whig history has a number of important characteristics. 
Lord Macauley, writing in the nineteenth century, opens his five-volume History of England 
heralding how the settlement of England was defended against enemies, how liberty and 
freedom ushered in a period of unrivalled prosperity, how bondage was shaken off to be 
replaced by Empire and how huge merchantry spawned a maritime power unsurpassed in 
history.263 Whig history also includes  
the tendency in many historians to write on the side of Protestants and 
Whigs, to praise revolutions provided they have been successful, to 
emphasize certain principles of progress in the past and to produce a story 
which is the ratification if not the glorification of the present.264 
 
Closely wrapped up with the belief in the inexorable path to progress is the celebration of a 
number of important historical milestones. These are significant as they are all part of the 
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teleological view that events have culminated in perhaps the high point of the Whig 
interpretation: the inviolability of the Constitution. Victories such as the Magna Carta in 
shaking off the ‘Norman yoke’, the ‘Glorious Revolution’ of 1688 in heralding a new 
political liberty, and the sanctity of a non-interventionist state in direct opposition to 
continental systems,265 are all watersheds within this interpretation. In short, Whiggishness is 
a hagiographic portrayal of progress coupled with a celebration of English superiority. The 
success of this approach is synonymous with Britain as a world power. Fuelled by industrial 
development266 and the expansion of Empire, this interpretation sat comfortably with Britain 
as pioneer: “where Britain led, the rest of the west soon followed, and the Third World might 
confidently be expected to advance in the same direction”.267 Unsurprisingly, Britain’s 
declining world role augmented an assault on the Whig interpretation. However, it would be 
wrong to presuppose that past glories are not still invoked by political elites with the direct 
intention of bolstering the politics of the present. One notable example, by the then Prime 
Minister John Major, was during the election campaign for the European Parliament in 1994: 
This British nation has a monarchy founded by the kings of Wessex over 
eleven hundred years ago, a Parliament and universities formed over seven 
hundred years ago, language with its roots in the mists of time, and the 
richest vocabulary in the world.268  
 
In contrast, the ‘four nations’269 approach has sought to question the simplicity of this 
interpretation. A number of scholars have contributed to producing a more pluralistic history. 
Norman Davies revises the conventional notion of Britain being governed by an immutable 
and eternally characterised England to instead “pay due respect to all the nations and cultures 
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in the history of the Isles.”270 With the highlighting of a more disparate Britain comes a 
plethora of examples which chip away at the received wisdom. These include shedding light 
on the prehistory of Celtic Britain, as against the more standard starting point of Roman 
Britain; the well-worn tale of the Norman invasion of England actually being a Viking 
invasion;271 and the Reformation, commonly perceived as extricating England from Catholic 
vassalage, actually having the effect of destroying England’s European elements.272 In a 
similar vein, Hugh Kearney offers a view in which British history is a complex of interacting 
cultures with England being part of a “multi-national conglomerate.”273 His research looks at 
the many cultural fault lines that peppered the Isles. Examples include a sixteenth century 
Scotland with a Gaelic-speaking west having closer links to Ulster and loyalties going to 
local chiefs, as against the English-speaking Lowlands where feudal loyalty was determined 
by religious persuasion and a Puritan insistence on Bible-reading eventually improving 
literacy.274 In the same way, Raphael Samuel argues how the borders of Anglo-Saxon 
England were entirely permeable, with Scotland appearing to be politically united but pitted 
with a menagerie of Irish, Picts, Angles, Saxons and Britons.275 He concludes that Scotland 
“seems to have been inhabited by virtually everybody except the Scots.”276 Similar 
fractiousness occurred in Wales whereby two cultures became sub-divided by religion and 
class277 and the symbol of territorial divide, Offa’s Dyke, actually functioning as a crossing 
point which suggests a symbiotic relationship between English and Welsh lords. 
 
Although not an advocate of ‘four nations’ history, Linda Colley, rather than emphasising the 
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disaggregate nature of Britain, has stressed how Britishness was forged in the wider context 
of contact with the external Other: “Britishness was superimposed over an array of internal 
differences in response to contact with the Other, and above all in response to conflict with 
the Other.”278 The Other being Catholic France. Subsequently, instead of viewing history as 
the internal machinations of four separate but interrelated entities, Colley broadens the 
picture to include overseas as a major constituent in the making of Britain. Hence, she argues, 
that Britain was forged ‘top-down’ by the twin complements of Protestantism and Empire as 
a way of dealing with the Catholic threat. This subsequently positions Ireland as a peripheral 
actor, as Colley not uncontroversially admits: “the Welsh, the Scottish, and the English saw 
(and often still see) the Irish as alien in a way that they did not regard each other as alien.”279  
 
These two conflicting approaches to British history can be summarised in a much-cited 
commentary which first initiated the debate. In 1975, J. G. A. Pocock called for an 
intercultural approach which sought to present British history not as separate histories of its 
constituent parts, but as a number of “phases in which it can be seen as the interrelations of a 
number of advanced and sophisticated provinces.”280 This contextual approach, as already 
noted, emphasises the interrelatedness of the entities of England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland 
and attempts to untether British history from a hegemonic English standpoint. As for the 
dominance of England: “[t]he fact of a hegemony does not alter the fact of a plurality, any 
more than the history of a frontier amounts to denial that there is a history beyond the 
advancing frontier.”281 In short, British history, in order not to fall into the trap of offering an 
over-arching, simplistic narrative, must make room for a profusion of non-English voices. By 
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contrast, A. J. P. Taylor’s rebuff to Pocock paraded the English versus British history not as 
an exercise in the politics of language, but “a fuss over names, not over things”.282 He went 
on to state that the so-called common cultural experience between the various nations of 
Britain “is not true. The culture is and always has been exclusively English, with some 
contributions from the outposts that are on a very small scale.283 
 
To reiterate, the study of British history has been frequently characterised by the conflation of 
England as Britain. This elision is most evident in the Whig interpretation of history, an 
approach dominant in the nineteenth century, which sought to highlight an inexorable 
progress towards enlightenment. In contrast, a vigorous backlash, sometimes labelled ‘four 
nations history’, has attempted to position England as one of several provinces that helped 
shape British history. Emphasis is placed on the non-homogenous nature of the four nations 
and the interrelatedness between them.  
 
2.1.3 War and Empire 
 
British national identity has been manifestly affected by the contact Britain has had overseas. 
Other countries have acted as mediums which have instilled both Britain and other states with 
certain characteristics, attitudes and behaviour. Seeley, in his celebrated and influential 
Expansion of England, mentions that “the history of England is not in England but in 
America and Asia.”284 Consequently, Empire enabled the British to take both themselves and 
their culture overseas, which although producing very different societies, were arguably 
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British in the first instance.285 Despite Seeley’s notable claim that “[w]e seem, as it were, to 
have conquered and peopled half the world in a fit of absence of mind”,286 the growth of trade 
could not be disentangled from the growth of sea power. Mahen’s The Influence of Sea 
Power upon History, which held an enormous amount of sway on naval strategy, particularly 
in the US, begins with reference to “that English nation which more than any other has owed 
its greatness to the sea.”287 However, rivalry and Empire certainly predate the late nineteenth 
century world of Seeley and Mahen, and it is worth examining the influences behind the 
origins of Empire and the consequent effect such perceptions have on this study. 
 
Armitage identifies a number of potential roots.288 One traces the British Empire back to the 
reign of Elizabeth I in which Empire became defined as Protestant, Anglo-British, benign and 
extra-European, and is characterised by the maritime feats of English sailors. A second points 
to Empire having its roots in the sixteenth century when ‘internal colonialism’ was replaced 
by external ‘imperialism’ and the previously disparate nature of local power characteristic of 
Norman Britain would give way to racial, political and cultural dominance starting with the 
civilising missions in Ireland during the same period. At this time, Armitage notes, Empire 
was no longer benign and no longer exotic as it sought to amalgamate the disparate centres of 
power closer to home. Another derivation of Empire starts from the twelfth century and is 
characterised by “its supremacist racism, its crusading national identity and its ideology of 
conquest”.289 What is clear is that the very nature of Empire brought England and Britain into 
contact and conflict with a range of other states and ethnicities. What is also clear is that 
differing accounts of the origins of Empire still reveal a number of characteristics of present-
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day national identity. As Armitage goes on to note, the British Empire, in contrast to present 
empires such as the Spanish Monarchy as well as past empires, was primarily Protestant, 
commercial, maritime and free.290  
 
Perhaps the most obvious example of the articulation of such characteristics is embodied 
within Britain’s turbulent and much-historicised wars with France. Several examples can be 
provided to support the view that France has functioned as a key influence on British identity. 
Smith argues how “France assumed a leading role within a European Catholic Christendom, 
providing the model of a Christian European aristocratic civilization.”291 By contrast, 
“[w]hen England was detached from Rome, it also separated as both state and nation from the 
Catholic realm.”292 Hence, despite the predominance of the Europe-as-Christendom narrative 
and not forgetting the weakening of its spiritual roots,293 “Britons enlisted Protestantism 
chiefly as a way of strengthening its simple antithesis in which ‘Protestant Britain’ 
confronted ‘Catholic France’.”294 As already mentioned, this point is echoed by Colley. 
Britain, she mentions “was an invention forged above all by war. ... Britons ... defined 
themselves as Protestants struggling for survival against the world’s foremost Catholic 
power. They defined themselves against the French as they imagined them to be, 
superstitious, militarist, decadent and unfree.”295 
 
Even the Battle of Culloden in 1746, with the Jacobite cause extinguished, did little to 
assuage a more general anti-Catholic sentiment. This emotion was entrenched in a more 
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perennial historical narrative in which “[a] powerful and persistently threatening France 
became the haunting embodiment of that Catholic Other which Britons had been taught to 
fear since the Reformation in the sixteenth century.”296 After the Napoleonic Wars, the threat 
of the Catholic peril, it has been argued, shifted from France to Ireland. McLeod states that 
Ireland in the nineteenth century was both feared and despised: feared because of the threat of 
armed revolution and the possibility that Ireland might function as a stepping-stone for 
foreign invaders; despised because its poverty was symbolic of drunkenness and 
fecklessness.297 This negative imaging was further bolstered by Irish immigration to England, 
particularly during and after the Great Famine in the late 1840s, as well as the proliferation of 
Irish nationalism characterised as Fenianism. A further shift in view occurred during the 
middle of the nineteenth century in which the image of the drink-sodden but largely 
inoffensive Irish peasant became replaced by an apelike belligerent intent on stone-throwing, 
violence and anarchy.298 Such characterisations also appeared within publications such as 
Punch.299 As Haydon points out, “[i]f, in the nineteenth century, protestant Englishmen saw 
Irish catholics as ‘the other’, whose many failings negatively defined and extolled the 
former’s values, continental papists were ‘the other’ for protestant Britons in the preceding 
century.”300 He goes on to highlight two broad depictions of Catholic elites. Firstly, they 
bolstered despotism and tyranny. Spanish dignitaries were portrayed as “cruel and proud” and 
French noblemen as “foppish and debauched”.301 Secondly, Catholicism was constructed as a 
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perversity of the gospels with cohorts of monks, nuns and clergy promulgating false doctrine 
and surrounded by grotesque wealth in contrast to the poor and servile peasantry.302 A 
pamphlet issued by the Association for the Preservation against Republicans and Levellers 
focused on French atrocities in Alexandria, Jaffa and Europe and stressed that “the same 
soldiers, the very same rapacious and sanguinary host” were poised to invade Britain “like 
gaunt and hungry wolves”.303 An address to the people of England, but not Britain, from an 
American newspaper, The Balance, and Columbian Repository, conjured up similar images 
of French terror. On the French invasions of Germany in 1796 and 1798,  
[t]hey spread themselves over it like beasts of prey, devouring and 
destroying every thing before them ... In many places they stripped the 
clothes from the backs of people, set their liquor flowing in the cellar, burnt 
their provisions to ashes ... Towards women of all ages and all conditions, 
they were guilty of brutality never before heard of ... but the lower orders of 
the people, the artisans and the labourers, were the objects of their direst 
malignity; against them was directed the sharpest bayonets.304 
 
In short, such negative imaging – from elites, the press and the people – helped to infuse a 
fundamental difference between Britain and the Continent. This relationship can be aptly 
summed up by Kumar: 
Protestant nations were free, independent, tolerant and prosperous, friendly 
to and thriving on commerce and constitutional liberties. Catholic nations 
were sunk in despotism, dogma and poverty, the prey of power-hungry 
monarchs and superstitious priests.305  
 
Throughout the twentieth century, the negative representations of France lingered. War time 
images of a supine France collapsing so quickly to German aggression not only “strengthened 
established national stereotypes of continental corruption and English exceptionalism”,306 but 
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have also been fiercely intransigent because they are deeply embedded in a web of self-belief 
and national myths. During the post-war period, Smith argues how France’s harmonisation of 
relations with Germany from after the Second World War devalued its former relationship 
with Britain and how Franco-British relations still continue to be a formative influence on 
British Eurosceptic attitudes today.307 The French vetoes of the British applications for entry 
into the Common Market, first in 1963 and again in 1967, perhaps also serve as conceptual 
reference points Eurosceptics use to propagate their views. Finally, Margaret Thatcher’s 
brusque comments in an interview with Le Monde in 1989 underscore entrenched notions of a 
British aptitude for rules of fair play and respect for rights and ethics, freedoms that have not 
been crudely imported from the Continent but have been gradual and home-grown: “[h]uman 
rights did not begin with the French Revolution ... (We English) had 1688, our quiet 
revolution, where Parliament exerted its will over the King ... it was not the sort of 
Revolution that France's was.”308 Lady Thatcher went on to present President Mitterrand with 
a first edition copy of Dickens’ A Tale of Two Cities, “which also made somewhat more 
elegantly the same point as my interview.”309  
 
France, however, has not been the only nation to serve as a foil for defining Britishness. 
Greene notes how the Elizabethan-era surge in mercantilism and exploration enabled England 
to be defined as both the bulwark against papal belligerence and the harbinger of commercial 
benefits and freedoms.310 England could then be defined as a great trading nation in contrast 
to “Spanish tyranny, Spanish cruelty, and Spanish ambition.”311 By the end of the nineteenth 
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century, challenges from the USA, Russia, Germany and Japan would relegate Protestantism 
as a defining characteristic of British national identity. Instead, Judd has argued that by this 
time, the Empire served as a fig leaf to cloak Britain’s declining world power status.312 So 
successful was the masquerade that it caused an Italian and German scramble for colonies. 
One Hanoverian officer complained that the British “plume themselves not only upon them 
being free themselves, but being the Assertors and Bulwarks of Liberty all over Europe,” 
while “they vilify most of the Nations of the Continent ... for being Slaves, as they call us.”313 
As perceptions of Empire altered, so did the effect on national identity. While the Empire was 
once lodged within a celebratory triptych of Protestantism, economic prosperity and the 
extension of natural born freedoms to the Dominions and much of the ‘uncivilised’ world, 
this view began to be questioned. For example, Thompson argues how the Boer War 
effectively stifled any new attempts at conquest as the British army found itself cowed by a 
small community of Dutch farmers.314 This, he continues, caused the Dominions to be seen in 
more federal and cooperative terms as a way of ensuring continued competition with the likes 
of Germany and the USA. This sense of community between Britain and its Dominions was 
articulated by the Navy League, a non-party pressure group designed to promote the 
importance of maritime supremacy, through references to family metaphors, such as ‘sister 
nations’, ‘daughter dominions’, and ‘parent’ and ‘mother country’.315  
 
The role of the US in fashioning British identity is also particularly notable, especially as the 
relationship includes not merely the mutual rivalry so associated with the Continent, but also 
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sentiments of commonality and kinship as perhaps embodied in the well-worn motif of the 
‘special relationship’. The links between Britain and her distant colonies could only be 
maintained by a sense of cohesion; that as Britain was the home of freedom in Europe, so too 
was the British Empire in America.316 These freedoms were to eventually give way to the 
perception of Empire as a conduit of power and domination over the settlers. As Benjamin 
Franklin observed, settlers were not “fellow subjects, but subjects of subjects”.317 
Subsequently, the origins of the ensuing revolution were to be found in Britain, not America, 
as the growing economic and strategic importance of the colonies created the fear that greater 
autonomy might lead to their loss.318 The injurious legislation enacted upon the colonies was 
a simultaneous attempt to deny the colonists the traditional rights of all Britons.319 Hence, 
although the American Revolution may have had its foundations in unfair taxes, the upheaval 
was symptomatic of a much broader clamour for democracy.  
 
Colley has observed how the loss of the American colonies instigated “a rise in enthusiasm 
for parliamentary reform, for imperial reform, for religious liberalisation, for the reforms of 
gaols and lunatic asylums: for virtually any change, in fact, that might prevent a similar 
national humiliation in the future.”320 The issue of humiliation, and the broader turbulent 
nature of Britain’s relationship with America, reveals several shifting configurations of 
British national identity. Firstly, many of the perceptions of the relationship are lodged within 
a begrudging nexus of superiority and inferiority. As Hitchens mentions: 
Post-imperial Britain, during the arduous and sometimes embarrassing 
process of becoming post-imperial, leaned very decidedly towards the 
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United States. Not without rancour, it appointed the United States as its 
successor. Not without quibbling and reservation, the United States took up 
the succession.321  
 
He goes on to reveal how the remnants of Empire were reformulated by ruling elites to 
reinvigorate the idea that Britain still had a role to play in a world no longer shaped by it. 
Hence, the ‘special relationship’ might “somehow allow the English ghost to pass into a new 
and vigorous body.”322 Secondly, Britain has been viewed as a ‘transatlantic bridge’ and 
capable of mediating between Europe and America.323 This pits British identity as lodged 
within a solidaristic and sympathetic sense of affinity based on common and shared values 
and interests. Finally, and stemming from the experience of the Second World War, both 
Britain and America are perceived as stalwarts against totalitarianism and embodiments of 
freedom. Much of this is configured against the Continent with particular emphasis on the 
idea of Germany as naturally authoritarian and France predisposed towards corruption and 
cowardice.324 
 
Apart from the Empire fashioning British identity via conflict, Britain’s overseas conquests 
have had several other ramifications. Firstly, Judd has remarked how via the increase in 
prosperity, employment opportunities and mass emigration, the Empire functioned as a 
stabilising factor in post-revolutionary Britain and instilled a sense of national confidence.325 
Secondly, the legacy of the Empire also helped construct an identity different to that in the 
Continent by which the significance of Europe could be denied.326 McCrone has pointed out 
how the British state was primarily geared towards the management of its overseas 
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possessions thus producing the ‘nightwatchman state’, overwhelmingly concerned with 
matters of defence.327 Thus, unlike continental states, “[i]t’s inhabitants are not citizens of a 
state ... [t]hey are subjects of a monarch, enjoying ‘liberties’ which their ancestors won from 
previous monarchs.”328 Wellings mentions that as industrialisation increased, an alliance of 
common interests formed between the aristocracy and bourgeoisie which centred on the state 
and was fuelled by the defence of Empire.329 However, as the state had existed prior to the 
process of rapid industrialisation, it was never obliged to force itself upon civil society to 
cultivate this economic expansion.330 This helped produce a state identity that was less 
interwoven into civil society.  Thirdly, Empire has been seen as a means of denying closer 
links to Europe and again highlighting a sense of British separateness from the Continent. For 
example, Bell has provided an account of the attitudes towards the Continent of three notable 
and highly influential English historians: George Trevelyan, Herbert Fisher and Arthur 
Bryant.331 Although all three historians focused on England rather than Britain, Bell isolates 
four main themes in their histories: the character of England was separate from the Continent; 
English institutions and society were superior; England found her true self when she crossed 
the oceans to plant colonies; and when England involved herself within European affairs, it 
was traditionally to save the Continent from tyranny.332 Bell goes on to cite how influential 
these historians’ attitudes, particularly favoured among Prime Ministers, and concludes that 
in the early post-Second World War period, “these ideas were still firmly established in the 
minds of educated Englishmen as they considered the case of European integration, and in 
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most cases rejected it.”333 Finally, it has been argued that the notion of Empire made society 
more integrated. As Morgan has noted, the growth of railways and communications, national 
banking systems and mass newspaper press were all made easier by the vision of Empire 
which fostered an image of unity.334 Consequently, the Empire popularised a view that all 
participants of the ‘four nations’ could contribute and benefit from being part of British 
expansionism, and the inhabitants of ‘the Celtic fringe’ would all play their part in the 
founding, running and defending overseas territories. Hence, national identity was notable for 
an allegiance to the Crown, rather than any ethno-cultural sameness.335 This has the effect of 
understanding Empire as a way of revealing dual identities, whereby citizens could be 
Scottish, Welsh, Northern Irish and English at home but British abroad.  
 
To summarise, both war and Empire have had tangible effects on British national identity. 
Historical rivalries have pitted the Continent, most notably France, Germany and Spain, in 
opposition to Britain. In order to embolden the notion of a unified and superior Britain, the 
characteristics of Britishness were embodied in the virtues of an expanding Empire, which 
transmitted the inalienable right of freedom as well as prosperity abroad. In order to 
guarantee this wealth, the state was geared towards the defence of Empire and subsequently 
took a less active role within civil society. Such affluence is located in stark contrast to 
foreign poverty and degradation. Further characterisations of the Continent positioned it as 
tyrannical, superstitious and corrupt as against a Britain defined as independent, rational and 
principled. However, as the Empire bolstered the national image at home, its decline resulted 
in Britain having to create an identity of dependence on its natural successor, America. 
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2.1.4 Geography and Landscape 
 
For millennia, geography has had an explicit effect on the political world. Livingstone 
highlights how geography has had an intimate involvement with exploration and been an 
instrument of imperialism, has been exploited in an attempt to point to a divine creator, has 
vitalised the human experience by extricating humankind from nature’s grip and has also 
functioned as a bridge between nature and humanity.336 Moreover, places are important for 
identities and particularly for national identities because nations straddle both the social and 
the spatial: the people as part of a community and the place as a homeland.337 Two 
predominant geographical themes are implicit within the attempt by British political elites to 
depict a British national identity over the Europe debates. The first is the invocation of the 
island story and the second is the role of landscape, and in particular, the rural countryside.  
 
To begin with, the evocation of the ‘Britain as island’ narrative has emboldened the image of 
Britain as a unique and geographically separate nation. Although linked to the Whig 
interpretation of history which stresses British exceptionalism, the island story far predates 
industrial Britain. The Roman historian Tacitus, for example, drew up an early geographical 
and ethnographic study of the British Isles: 
[N]owhere has the sea a wider dominion, that it has many currents running 
in every direction, that it does not merely flow and ebb within the limits of 
the shore, but penetrates and winds far inland, and finds a home among 
hills and mountains as though in its own domain.338 
 
Tacitus’ text arguably foreshadows the role geography plays in forging a distinct identity. 
The insularity of ancient Britain and its people is accentuated by its geographical remoteness. 
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This must become reformulated as a precursor to conquest. Subsequently, the ocean, which 
once functioned as a barrier now becomes a medium by which the Romans can seize 
Britain.339 The sea is multipurpose: “[i]t limits size, marks boundaries, and insulates against 
continental contaminants.”340 The insularity, therefore, harbours the poetic notion of the 
garden kingdom, untrammelled by foreign influence. A number of scholars, however, have 
shed light on the romanticised vision of the island story. Davies firstly highlights the 
tendency within some scholarship to be fixated with the one island allure.341 Examples 
include Roy Strong’s opening claim that “Britain is an island and that fact is more important 
than any other in understanding its history”,342 and A. L. Rowse’s imperial pronouncement 
that “[t]he story of Britain is that of the island which has influenced the outside world more 
than any other island in history.”343 The second point Davies addresses is the ever common 
elision between England and Britain. He expresses scepticism of the claims in The Oxford 
History of Britain that Venetian ambassadors in the fifteenth century might have been 
“convinced of the special quality of British society”344 when the British state was yet to be 
formed and late-medieval emissaries would likely have visited only England. Similar such 
problems with the island story have been elucidated by Crick who highlights the mythdom of   
uninterrupted peace and tranquillity by citing the Scottish occupation of Newcastle in 1640 
and Dutch invasion in 1688 as examples.345  
 
Although the notion of landscape has most commonly been used to construct a particular 
English identity, it is pertinent to British national identity in three ways. Firstly, a dualism 
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exists which has its roots in the discourses of Whiggishness and Empire. That is, the 
smallness of England helped cultivate the pride of an overseas British Empire and that both 
Englishness and Britishness, therefore, are fused.346 In terms of historical symbolism, these 
two facets have been most commonly illustrated by the countrified John Bull347 and the ruler-
of-the-waves Britannia.348 Secondly, images of a rural England have been influenced by 
factors outside of the geography of the South. Thirdly, the attempt to provide a unifying idea 
of ruralism was an attempt to downplay the fractiousness and rivalries between different 
intranational communities, many of which were scattered all over Britain.  
 
Ruralism is perhaps most readily identified with wholesomeness and civility. As illustrated 
by Howkins: 
Purity, decency, goodness, honesty, even “reality” itself are closely 
identified with the rural south ... It is an organic society, a “real” one, as 
opposed to the unnatural or “unreal” society of the town.349 
 
These dominant representations are seen as embodying Britain as a whole. Howkins, for 
example, further argues that at the turn of the twentieth century, rapid urbanisation and 
industrialisation, along with racial tensions, had created a ‘Back to the Earth’ policy in which 
the solution to urban crises could only be found in the countryside.350 Political elites had 
abandoned a sense of national allegiance as the “rapacity of international capital had 
martyred three generations on the wheels of industry”,351 whereas the country and its people 
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“were seen as the essence of England, uncontaminated by racial degeneration and the false 
values of cosmopolitan urban life.”352 The recourse to rural imagery was a way of traversing 
the class divide and ensuring continuity against the decimation of the First World War. As 
Howkins adds, “there simply had to be a world outside Flanders, and this world equally could 
not be that of ‘dark satanic mills,’ even if that did better represent the reality of home.”353 
Consequently, pastoral imagery was an important counterweight to the grim realism of war.  
 
This homogeneity and continuity has also been exemplified by Readman who illustrates how 
a particular inward-looking and localised feeling of Englishness was prevalent in the 
nineteenth century.354 By using centenary celebrations, primarily the 1901 thousandth 
anniversary of the death of King Alfred, as well as references to the proliferation of 
antiquarian literature, travelogues and preservationist movements, he shows that although 
such appeals to history may have been elite inspired, they firstly had too much popular appeal 
to be merely elite representations, and secondly, the manifestations of Englishness were 
locally grounded and not born out of external conflict related to Empire or Protestantism. 
Hence, “pageants evoked the spirit of a pastoral and contented ‘Merrie England’ ... largely 
due to the emphasis many placed on the Elizabethan past.”355  
 
Similar such pleas to idyllicism occurred during the Second World War. Lunn highlights how 
images of Britain in newsreels were sometimes industrial, but, in order to imbue patriotism, 
gave way to a more mystical vision which also had the purpose of countering ‘abroad’ and 
the other more social realist ‘Britains’ which existed.356 The Blitz is another war time image 
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constructed as congruous and has been investigated by Calder.357 The hegemonised narrative 
paints a picture of gritty Cockney resilience and national unity against the German air raids. 
As written in The Economist at the time, “[t]hese sufferings have been borne with courage 
and cheerfulness. It is common form in all such disasters to say that the morale of the people 
is excellent. In London this week the hackneyed phrase has had a real meaning.”358 Calder, 
however, reveals a quite different picture with spates of muggings and rapes occurring under 
the protection of black-outs and dirty over-cramped air raid shelters providing a breeding 
ground for racial and sexual harassment. Entrenched class divisions continued to permeate 
society and negate the idea of national unity while “Jews were blamed for monopolising the 
shelters, women for the shortage of cigarettes, American soldiers for seducing English 
girls.”359 Similarly, Rose shows how the wartime attempts to foster the image of Britain as a 
paternalistic and benign colonial nation fighting a ‘People’s War’ against Nazism was 
undermined by the ‘colour bars’ and racial discrimination against the very people needed to 
win a global conflict.360 The all-in-it-together narrative is further questioned by how close 
Britain had actually been to social disintegration. Such was the desperation, Clement Attlee 
said “[i]f only the Germans had had the sense not to bomb west of London Bridge, there 
might have been a revolution in this country.”361 Due to, rather than in spite of such 
uncomfortable realities, images of rural England continued to flourish. 
 
A final point relates to how the rural setting is synonymous with particular outdoor pursuits 
which have also been articulated to reveal national characteristics. The proliferation of horse-
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breeding, grouse-shooting and salmon-fishing, as Kumar notes, emphasises a shift from the 
town to the country and is related to the integration of the British nobility that practised these 
pursuits in all corners of the kingdom.362 Similarly, by the 1840s and 1850s, landed gentry no 
longer had the monopoly over field sports as nouveaux riches began to partake more and 
more in the pursuits of the so-called country gentleman.363 One such recreation, full of 
national meaning and elite-monopolised, is fox-hunting. It has an effect on the Britain-as-
rural identity and the broader issue of national identity in several ways. Firstly, before the 
Hunting Act of 2004, a number of parliamentary debates revealed, once again, how such a 
topic functions as a vehicle for thrashing out contested notions of identity. One Member of 
Parliament linked a respectful visit to commemorate the war dead at the Cenotaph in London 
to the threat against liberty of a fox-hunting ban: 
Although I do not expect Labour Members to understand the concept, it 
must be true that all those people who gave their lives would wonder today 
whether the pursuit of liberty and their final sacrifice for the defence of 
freedom against tyranny was worth dying for.364 
 
The ban being a threat to liberty was also taken up by several newspapers and magazines. 
Wallwork and Dixon cite several in their study on how the various debates over the ban 
produced rhetorical constructions of particular places and identities.365 The March Magazine 
included the following: 
Millions of countrymen died in two World Wars. They were fighting for 
freedom. The threat to the countryside and the country way of life is a 
dictatorship, precisely what our gallant soldiers, sailors and airmen fought 
and died to prevent366    
 
So, although an elite-dominated pursuit, the right to hunt foxes is articulated as a more 
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general exercise of personal freedom and a ban is perceived as an assault on the freedoms of 
all. The notion of liberty is seen as a fundamental, inalienable British right. Secondly, a 
leader in the Daily Telegraph points out how hunting “provides a model of the organisation 
of country life, totally unsubsidised” and that this tradition “must now be abolished because 
of the urban, anti-Christian ideology”.367 In this sense, hunting is symbolic of an organic and 
voluntary mechanism for managing the countryside and is at risk from the interfering 
ambitions of urban dwellers. A tension exists between town and country and yet “‘country’, 
in the sense of nation, is closely bound up with ‘country’ in the sense of green fields.”368 
Finally, country life is seen as an integral part of national identity and country pursuits 
embody this sentiment. Rural sport provides a link to this identity which is threatened. That 
is, “[h]unting with dogs remains one of the few ways in which people who live in towns can 
participate actively in real rural life”369 and “[m]ost British people, wherever they live, have a 
strong sense that the countryside is part of their identity.”370   
 
In summary, an examination of some of the literature on geography and landscape reveals 
two dominant themes that have been consistently articulated: the island story and the image 
of rural England. Both, one might add, heavily appeal to emotional imagery and mythdom. 
As such, myths are needed as a means of constructing national identity because they 
“consume the least amount of resources in an attempt to rally a people around a common 
cause.”371 The articulation of the island story has a major effect. By highlighting the 
singularity of Britain, and downplaying the peripheral groups or fragmented nature, it 
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positions Britain as unified, isolated and unique. Common references also position this 
distinctiveness against the backdrop of a disparate and patchy Continent. The image of rural 
England has a three-fold effect. Firstly, it preaches a sense of idyllicism against the milieu of 
war and social upheaval. Hence, the pastoral image is utilised in an attempt to repulse 
economic decline and urban squalor. Secondly, the representation functions as a way of 
unifying the disparate elements within British society, particularly class and ethnic 
differences as well as antagonisms between town and country. Again, in the advent of war, 
such images had a unifying effect which cut across social differences. Thus, as Lunn 
mentions of Hobsbawm, the image of rural England is an ‘invented tradition’ which attempts 
to make sense of the present by invoking a sanitised version of the past.372 Thirdly, this image 
is wrapped up within a discourse of power; that this image is not necessarily home grown or 
locally cultivated, but imposed as a way of dealing with the social problems of war and 
urbanisation. For example, John Major’s attempt to define Britain as an unerring and 
continuous entity invoked images of “the country of long shadows on cricket grounds, warm 
beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and pools fillers.”373 This endeavour to highlight 
an undying image resonating across the whole nation merely exposes a cloying nostalgia for a 
Britain many people might not recognise or want to eulogise: masculinised, middle class and 
rustic.  
 
2.1.5 The Break-up of Britain? 
 
One of the most recent elite-driven attempts to fashion a British national identity has been the 
pursuit of a unifying sense of Britishness. This attempt occurred due to widespread agreement 
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over what can be called the crisis of Britishness, evident within a number of apocalyptically 
titled books on the subject.374 The death throes of the British state are seemingly in motion 
and it is not unreasonable to assume that Britain, at least in its current format, shall not 
survive. Such a position is largely connected to the issue of devolution with the establishment 
of the National Welsh Assembly and the reestablishment of the Scottish Parliament under the 
Blair government. The crisis also has other purported causes including the 2005 London 
bombings, the stalled Northern Ireland Peace Process and the after-effects of the Iraq War.375 
The potential break-up of Britain, it can be argued, has even broader antecedents whereby 
previously unifying factors, such as Protestantism, the Second World War and Empire 
mentioned in the preceding sections, are fading in the national consciousness to such a degree 
that they have little to offer a modern-day formulation of British national identity. As such, 
the literature points to a clear demarcation between Britain as a modern construction and 
Britain as possessing an ever-lasting essence. This final section examines these arguments. 
 
A recently published special issue in The Political Quarterly addresses the consequences and 
meaning of Gordon Brown’s well-publicised attempt to launch the Britishness project aimed 
at a declaration of British values. In an address to the Fabian Society in 2006, Brown argued 
that while America has its Independence Day and France its Bastille Day, Britain too needed 
a day of patriotic pride and national celebration.376 Such feelings, Brown argued, have been 
hijacked by the far-right when in actual fact they encompass the ideas of “liberty, fairness and 
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376 ‘Brown speech promotes Britishness’ (2006), BBC News, 14 Jan. Available at: 
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responsibility.”377 Hassan outlines the evolution of Brown’s thinking culminating in his 
conversion to (re-) discovering Britishness.378 He is highly critical of the unoriginal and 
contradictory nature of these stages of transformation: in the 1970s, ‘red Brown’ posturing as 
a radical but following conventional Labour thinking; in the 1980s, ‘supply side Socialism’ in 
which ‘efficiency and fairness’ are paraded but no critique of the casino capitalism of the 
City attempted; and the 1990s, whereby commitments to child and pensioner poverty ignored 
any reference to the responsibilities of the super-rich.379 Thus, the search for Britishness was 
born out of “a realisation that his economy and social justice messages were neither 
distinctive nor that appealing.”380 But what was the purpose of the mission to locate 
Britishness? Hassan argues it was three-fold: to try and synthesise the Labour story in a post-
Thatcherite world, to support devolution whilst sustaining the unity of the state and to surpass 
geographically determined political allegiances via homogenisation.381 Brown’s omissions, 
however, are the crux of the problem and function as a distinct reminder of the difficulties in 
articulating an overarching national sentiment. Two major oversights are noteworthy. Firstly, 
Brown’s Britain is one where “Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are nations and England 
is a collection of regions.”382 Critical events in English history including the Magna Carta, the 
Peasants’ Revolt and the English Civil War are appropriated as part of Britain’s tale. Hence, 
the age-old conflation of using Britain for England undergoes a reversal: English history 
becomes British as a means of concocting a feigned narrative of national unity. Secondly, 
Brown’s Britishness is insular and ignores Britain’s relationship with the Commonwealth, 
                                                     
377 Cited in Ibid. 
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380 Ibid., p. 89. 
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Europe and America.383 His attempt to glean the essence of Britishness by looking inward 
rather than outward overlooks the many foreign influences that domestic identities are 
subjected to.       
 
Colley argues that the weakening of the roles of Protestantism and Christianity, the 
marginalised role of the Royal Family, the lack of a clearly defined foreign enemy or Other 
(for example, the shadowy and non-consensual War on Terror) and the level of 
interrelatedness which ensures that decisions in Washington have far greater impact on the 
UK than could have been imagined prior to the Second World War384 are all suggestive of a 
shift in the meaning of Britishness. She stresses the importance of the establishment of a 
written constitution which might serve as “valuable cement”385 and the fact that its absence 
has been responsible for the somewhat muddy concept of British citizenship. This current 
notion is firmly attached to both Empire and monarchy in that subjecthood can no longer be 
characterised by either and a more robust language of citizenship is required. A further 
restriction on articulating a more inclusive and wide-reaching sense of Britishness concerns 
the electoral system. Instead of rewarding parties whose support is geographically 
centralised, proportional representation would erode the close connection political parties 
have to certain regions and this would enable a party to more justifiably claim to represent all 
of the UK.386 In short, political willpower is the necessary precondition for instigating 
widespread reform. This would have the effect of nurturing and producing a sense of 
Britishness that might have greater resonance for many more citizens than a geographically 
concentrated few. 
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Parekh argues that British self-definition is a political project that although elite driven must 
grow out of public debate and not merely be proscribed or enforced by statespeople.387 He 
asserts that the Thatcherite approach to Britishness relied too heavily on notions of Empire, 
religion, England and the Atlantic relationship; and the Blairite vision could not reconcile the 
contradictions of affirming the importance of social responsibility with rampant 
individualism nor with the significance of continental and trans-Atlantic ties particularly after 
the Iraq War had estranged many European allies.388 The polyethnic and cultural dimensions 
ensure that Britain exists on two levels: one consisting of four nations which have their own 
rituals, myths, customs, etc., and the other residing within a common British identity based 
on an all-encompassing civic and public culture characterised by certain institutions, values 
and practices.389 Although welcoming the debate, Crick regards the politicians’ desire to 
pinpoint the constituent elements of Britishness as both senseless as Britishness means 
different things to different people and unnecessary because Britishness is not the glue that 
holds the country together. On Gordon Brown’s 2007 speech to the TUC, in which The 
Guardian recorded 34 uses of the expression Britishness, Crick mentions that “Gordon 
Brown really does seem to believe that the unity of the United Kingdom is in danger if there 
is not a strong and common sense of Britishness.”390 In contrast to the pursuit of the chimera 
of Britishness which, according to Kellner, possesses a formidable range of meanings,391 
Crick argues that what we might need is simply “good government and social justice.”392  
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Two papers on devolution also appear in this publication. Firstly, Jeffrey argues that although 
the British public may agree on Brown’s set of values – including freedom and liberty, a 
sense of duty and fair play, openness and tolerance – “those values may simply express a 
broader set of commonalities shared across western democracies”393 and the fact that such 
values might be held by all of the constituent components of the UK is not sufficient enough 
to believe continued devolution and the possible independence of Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland may not occur. The relationship between England and its counterparts is not 
multilateral and redolent of unity but is bilateral and fragmentary in that administrative 
agreements between England and Scotland, for example, do not necessitate identical 
arrangements with Wales or Northern Ireland.394 The British government inherited a number 
of pre-devolution practices including adhocery and lack of transparency among others which 
illustrates that Brown’s attempt to fuse the disparate units of the UK presupposes a 
commonality that doesn’t exist. Secondly, Aughey posits that the constitution of the UK has 
historically comprised of three key factors: contingency, the cultural and national make up 
and the geographical scope of the state; complementarity, in which diverse and distinct 
practices and institutions added to the collective whole and thus enabled a national identity to 
survive; and solidarity, a sense of being a part of a nation and bound to other nations.395 With 
the weakening of contingency and the complementarity of national differences flourishing 
due to solidarity being reflected in the component entities of the UK, devolution became the 
wager to try and stymie the unpalatable reality of disintegration.396 Aughey goes on to argue 
that Brown’s attempt to impede disintegration of the union is tantamount to a personal 
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crusade and yet the dissolution of the UK can best be contested “by working according to 
principles already imitated in the traditions of British political life.”397  
 
A scholar who does subscribe to the narrative of disintegration is Tom Nairn. Nairn’s seminal 
work on nationalism plots the evolution of the British state and predicts its demise.398 Nairn 
argues how external imperial successes masked the hierarchical nature of the English state 
and that the revolutionising ethos prevalent in France could be safely abjured by the 
improvement in material conditions. Nairn further argues that political elites claim to 
instigate democratising changes but are in reality intent on preserving the status quo. This 
stability could only be preserved via recourse to myths. Having no myth pool with which to 
draw on, examples being the lack of English national dress and the ambiguity of English 
folklore, the twin concepts of popularism and romanticism were galvanised to inject an 
English nationalism. Nairn argues that the break-up is inevitable as the uneven development 
of capitalism creates fissures between the haves and have nots, or the core and periphery, and 
multi-statism is therefore destined to collapse. Devolution is thus merely an attempt to slow 
down the constitutional break-up of Britain and to make the transition more gradual. On the 
inevitability of dissolution, Hobsbawm raises the issue that neo-nationalism, at its heart, 
might not ultimately demand separation, that political independence is one of several possible 
outcomes, and that economically and historically, regional interests have tended to be best 
realised via their integration into larger units.399  In addition, as iterated by Wright and 
Gamble, devolving power, as in Spain, has not led to disintegration and a refusal to devolve 
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can lead to disintegration in the same way that devolution can be integrating.400 In short, has 
the ultimate integration project, the European Union, really eroded the nation-state system? 
 
2.1.6 Conclusion 
 
The various themes elucidated in this chapter reveal a number of aspects that are pertinent to 
this study. In relation to England, Preston argues that “there have been several ‘Englands’ and 
several ‘Britains’ and these variously remembered historical episodes present us with a stock 
of resources – images of England and images of Britain – with which we can make 
preliminary sense of our present situation.”401 A cursory overview of these various Englands 
reveals several characterisations including “liberal, commercial and energetic; rural, pacific 
and enduring … radical and forward looking … (and) multi-cultural”.402 Firstly, I would 
similarly argue that it is only via an understanding of Britain as heterogeneous that identity 
formation can occur. As Pocock iterates: 
“British history” thus denotes the historiography of no single nation but of 
a problematic and uncompleted experiment in the creation and interaction 
of several nations ... But “British history” does not stop there; it extends 
into oceanic, American and global dimensions.403  
 
Subsequently, approaches which seeks to concentrate on the internal – by positing a set of 
perennial traits or characteristics – “take for granted the very thing that needs investigation: 
the wider world”.404 Cohen posits that identity has been formulated along the interactions of 
six frontiers: the United States, Europe, the former white Dominions, the rest of the 
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Commonwealth, the Celtic fringe and the body of ‘aliens’ seeking British citizenship.405 I 
would support the argument that national borders are, in fact, ‘fuzzy’406 and this has the effect 
of including a range of other actors and influences.  
 
Secondly, I take it that identity is always a plural contestation and, in the words of Davies, 
“[e]veryone feels a sense of belonging to a complex network of communities; and there is no 
necessary tension or conflict between them.”407 What I argue, however, is that the attempts to 
render identity single are the critical historical events I examine in this study. Hence, I 
examine the attempt to formulate a British identity as the British identity. Again, these 
attempts are very much intertwined with the themes outlined in this literature review. This 
also goes to support the idea that political elites do not articulate their arguments from 
scratch, but make references to already deeply entrenched and historically rich imagery, 
myths, prejudices and stories. 
 
Thirdly, war and empire, Protestantism and liberty, geography and landscape, and viewing 
the nation as unified or heterogeneous are all vehicles employed by political elites to try and 
define a British national identity. They function as dominant representations or ‘signs’ which 
have become partially stabilised and hegemonic. This is not to say that they function as the 
only categories within which identity discourse operates but that they are important as they 
are commonly articulated. Despite also being hegemonic, they are prone to destabilisation 
and replacement by other signs as I take it that identity is in a constant state of flux. Similarly, 
these mediums do not carry equal levels of potency. Indeed, as has already been mentioned, 
although historically significant in aiding the inviolability of British national sovereignty and 
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freedom versus tyranny in the eighteenth century, Protestantism waned significantly as a 
means of constituting national identity in the twentieth century. Similarly, whether, for 
example, ‘the island story’ is invented or perennial is not a fundamental dilemma for this 
study. The focus is on the manner in which this narrative is discursively constructed, rather 
than the veracity of the claims made about it.  
 
Fourthly, the attempt to pinpoint and celebrate the shadowy concept of Britishness and the 
notion of the potential break-up of Britain are fundamentally important. To begin with, the 
contested nature of Britishness supports the position that identities serve a political purpose. 
That is, Britishness is a reflection of certain interests and the attempt to formulate an elite-
inspired Britishness quickly degenerated into a jostling of different stances each purporting to 
lay claim to the real Britain. This realisation is important for this study as I seek to extricate 
the various attempts to forge several national identities. The break-up of Britain is similarly 
important as this project occurs against the backdrop of a radically changing nation. Despite 
being a historical analysis, the articulation of the potential disintegration of Britain is evident 
of a deep national crisis. This has the effect of catapulting identity into the forefront of 
political debate and forces elites to try and answer the quasi-metaphysical question of who we 
are and the rather more foreboding one of what we are going to become.  
 
Finally, as Europe and, more broadly, the Continent have been regarded as key harbingers of 
meaning for British national identity, this study aims to use this as its focal point in 
constructing a range of British national identities. Subsequently, I argue that “[a]ny realistic 
view of Britain will have to see it within the perspective of Europe and the whole Atlantic 
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world”.408 Other key identifiers such as the Commonwealth, the USA, the USSR and Russia 
are utilised. Consequently, I take it that identity is constructed, relational and always 
constituted against other identities, be they oppositional or non-oppositional. Viewing British 
identity as multiple and constructed offers a counter to unchallenged preconceived ideas 
about what Britain is and isn’t, and also configures an identity within a constellation of other 
identities which are subject to pressure, influence and modification. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES MEMBERSHIP 
REFERENDUM 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out to examine the discourses surrounding the 1975 referendum and the 
subsequent processes of Othering and the constructions of British national identity. The 
primary sources used in revealing the rival discourses and subsequent national identities are 
listed in Appendix 1. The descriptive explanations as well as Tables 2 and 3 have numbers 
next to each quotation which relate to the source in the appendix. The appendices have all 
been arranged alphabetically and the numbers in the tables are sequential. Single quotation 
marks within the tables appear in the original. The quotes, therefore, may not have been 
necessarily stated by the author of the source but by an individual or group cited within the 
text. The sources can be categorised broadly into four groups. Firstly, I utilise the general 
election manifestoes of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal parties in the February and 
October 1974 general elections. As they were widely distributed and read, they function as 
key documents in the attempt to convey particular ideas of Europe409 to the general public. 
The second group of documents takes the form of memoirs and biographies from leading 
Euro-exponents and antagonists within the debate. These key political figures featured highly 
within the echelons of government and are important as they helped create and propagate 
particular perceptions of Europe. Thirdly, I employ several other texts containing primary 
source statements, declarations and press releases from a range of various political figures 
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and groups. These documents also include the official referendum leaflets distributed by the 
Post Office in the last ten days of May, which were designed to argue the cases for and 
against continued membership. Finally, I examine the parliamentary debate that took place 
between 7 and 9 April 1975, which concluded with a ‘Yes’ majority on continued 
membership. This “great Commons debate”410 featured protagonists from across the political 
spectrum and functions as a crucial source in how political elites envisioned the Community 
just before the historic referendum.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. The opening provides the historical background 
leading up to the referendum. This orientation section, however, is not designed to offer an 
alternative viewpoint to the commonly received understanding of events. Instead, its function 
is as an aide-mémoire to highlight the actors and political environment within which the 
discourses are produced. It is also not designed to examine all major domestic and 
international issues that affected the governments of the day. It is to observe recent British 
political history through the lens of Europe. The second section provides an account of the 
various nouns, verbs, adjectives and descriptive meanings revealed by an analysis of the 
sources and presents the various predicates and processes. The predicates are the meanings 
that are attached to the subjects. Depending on the particular verbs, adjectives and adverbs 
used, the subjects and objects are described in a particular way and subsequently infused with 
meaning. The debates are separated into two positions: arguments for and against continued 
membership of the EEC. As iterated in the Theory and Methodology chapter, pro- and anti-
positions are not synonymous with a broader feeling of anti-Europeanism. In addition, and 
although admitting that pro and anti were not the only arguments articulated, these two 
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antagonisms function as ideal types which enable the diversity of opinions to be organised 
into a systematic structure. The empirical evidence also suggests that agnostic positions, 
although previously existent, played little role in how Europe was formulated during the 
debates. In short, membership of the EEC mattered. Next, I examine the presuppositions. 
This background knowledge enables a particular reality to be formulated as the truth. After 
that, the manner in which these meanings are organised, the subject positioning, is discussed 
with a view to analysing oppositional and non-oppositional relationships between the central 
concepts and to disclose the relationships between them. The subject positioning, as a 
consequence, reveals several discourses that have been formulated according to the 
perceptions British political elites have had on Europe and other actors. This then reveals the 
process of Othering with the range of friendly, non-friendly and radical configurations 
implicit in the discourses which are presented in Table 4. After a discussion of what British 
national identities are evident within this process of Othering, the final section synthesises the 
pro-/anti-dichotomy, the discourses and the identities to show how such formulations have 
produced a number of British Selves. These are the images of nationhood that are products of 
the national identities attributed to Britain by the perceptions British political elites have had.  
These finding are produced in Figure 4 and are followed by an explanation. For clarification, 
the discourses and identities are italicised and the range of British Selves is highlighted in 
bold.   
 
3.2 Historical Background 
 
On 5 June 1975, of the twenty-five million British people who voted on whether to continue 
membership of the EEC, seventeen million voted ‘Yes’. As Britain’s only national 
referendum on membership to date, the event functions as a constitutional peculiarity not 
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least because it endorsed a level of British participation in Europe far beyond the expectations 
of the pro-European camp at the time.411 The justification for the referendum was severalfold. 
Firstly, according to the Labour-led argument, admission to the EEC, on 1 January 1973, had 
been procured by the Conservative government of Edward Heath under unfavourable terms. 
Entry had not occurred with the “full-hearted consent of the British people”412 and the new 
Labour government of Harold Wilson stated in its October 1974 manifesto that the British 
people would have the final say “through the ballot box”.413 The referendum also occurred 
because the Labour, Conservative and Liberal parties, despite dissenting voices championing 
withdrawal from the Common Market, all officially assented to remain within the 
Community and a general election, therefore, would not have enabled voters to express their 
views on membership.414 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, to avoid a dangerous fissure 
between the Labour pro- and anti-membership camps, the party made a commitment that 
once in power, it would offer the renegotiated results to a national referendum.415 
Subsequently, although the unprecedented nationwide vote was exhibited as an exercise in 
unfettered democracy, “the real reason for the referendum was to cover up a split in the 
Labour Party”.416 Bernard Donoughue, Senior Policy Adviser from 1974 to 1979, further 
argues how Wilson exploited two devices to ensure his party and his leadership remained 
intact.417 Firstly, by allowing dissenting voices that contradicted the Party’s official position 
of Europe, an atmosphere of flexibility was created that would help avoid a split Cabinet. 
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Secondly, a vote by the British people would sink the Labour opponents of the EEC, who 
were dominant and powerful within the Party but weak on a national level.  
 
Britain’s early leading role in the formulation and ratification of European treaties has been 
well documented. The Dunkirk Treaty on 4 March 1947 between Britain and France and the 
Brussels Treaty on 17 March 1948 between Britain, France and the Benelux countries both 
attest to the argument that Britain wished to play a leading role in the building of the new 
Europe. However, the leap from union to unity faced British recalcitrance.418 Winston 
Churchill perhaps best characterises this stance of obdurate defiance. Hugo Young, whilst 
acknowledging Churchill’s role as the Father of Europe, argues that he “was also the father of 
misunderstandings about Britain’s part in Europe.”419 A year after the Second World War, 
Churchill’s speech to the Academic Youth in Zurich, illustrated the need to build a United 
States of Europe with France and Germany taking the lead together but with “Great Britain, 
the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America, and I trust Soviet Russia” acting as 
the “friends and sponsors of the new Europe”.420 This highlighting of the distinction between 
Britain and Europe was confirmed in Churchill’s celebrated ‘three circles’ doctrine421,  
presented originally in 1948, and which provided an important conceptual blueprint for future 
British foreign policy.422 The first and most important of the ‘three circles’ was the British 
Commonwealth and Empire. Second was the English speaking world with Canada, other 
British Dominions and the USA. Finally, there was United Europe. The concept of the ‘three 
circles’ was pivotal because, as Churchill elaborated, Britain was the only country to be part 
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of all three entities and hence the only country with the opportunity of joining them together. 
What was also pertinent was the lack of parity between the concepts with United Europe 
being mentioned in more detached and less affectionate terms than the other two.423  
 
From then on, until the late 1950s, diffidence became the locus of the relations between 
Britain and Europe. The 1950 Schuman Plan, the chief aim of which was to place German 
and French coal and steel production under a common High Authority, was reported on by a 
committee of officials appointed by Clement Attlee: 
It is not merely pooling of resources, but also, in the first place, the 
conception of fusion or surrender of sovereignty in a European system 
which the French are asking us to accept in principle.424 
 
The Messina Conference of 1955 – a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the European Coal 
and Steel Community in order to appoint the new High Authority – was attended by a British 
representative, Russell Bretherton of the Board of Trade, who later withdrew from the 
discussions in Brussels in November the same year.425 However, the 1956 Suez Crisis – the 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal by Colonel Nasser of Egypt and the subsequent intervention 
by the British and French – perhaps revealed that the Atlantic Alliance might not be 
everlasting.426 Similarly, the nature of the Commonwealth was changing as “Canada and 
Australia emerged as Powers in their own right … India, Pakistan, Ceylon, Burma, Malaysia 
all became independent, to be followed by the many African territories.”427 In opposition to 
the obvious progress ‘the Six’428 were making, the Cabinet, after drawing up various 
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strategies, proposed an industrial free trade area which excluded agriculture and allowed 
individual member states to determine their own tariffs against non-members.429 The 
European response was unenthusiastic and integration pressed on regardless. In short, the 
‘three circles’ concept was under threat: the first two circles seemed to be vanishing whilst 
the third was crystallising without Britain having a role.430  
 
The first application, by Harold Macmillan’s Conservative government in July 1961, was 
arguably an attempt to redress the realities of Britain’s fading role. Membership would have 
satisfied several interests including salvaging the Anglo-American relationship whilst 
avoiding British seclusion from a French-led community.431 The French President, Charles de 
Gaulle, gave a statement on 14 January 1963, which effectively vetoed British entry. 
Macmillan, in his diaries, lamented how “French duplicity has defeated us all.”432 Several 
reasons can be given for the anticipated veto. A common argument centres on the ‘politics of 
grandeur’ which demonstrated “a will to restore, preserve, (and) promote an abstraction, 
France”.433 Subsequently, the veto occurred due to the threat Britain posed to the natural 
unity of the nascent organisation, de Gaulle’s distaste for the United States and dislike of the 
UK (the Trojan horse assertion), and the belief that so as long as the Community remained 
small, the French President would be more able to dominate it and secure his particular vision 
of France.434 An alternative hypothesis argues that the veto occurred because de Gaulle was 
principally motivated by commercial concerns, in particular those of agriculture. As a country 
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that imported its food from outside of the EEC, Britain would inevitably block legislation that 
pushed for preferential trading agreements between the European nations.435 Consequently, 
Britain was excluded from the Community as the Common Agricultural Policy and, in 
particular, the stabilisation of prices, was of paramount importance to French foreign policy 
and only seconded by the civil war in Algeria.436 The second application in May 1967 was 
then made by the Labour government of Harold Wilson. The attempt to cultivate the ‘friendly 
Five’, it has been argued,437 ensured interaction with France was kept to a minimum. This had 
the effect of further souring relations with Britain’s greatest obstacle to entry. Coupled with 
the French desire to have a Europe free from Atlantic authority and steered by France,438 as 
well as a major currency crisis that eventually led to the devaluation of sterling,439 the 
General issued a ‘velvet veto’ later that month, followed by a more categorical renouncement 
in November. In the sixteenth Press Conference delivered by de Gaulle on the issue of British 
entry, he stated that “[i]n order that the British Isles can really make fast to the Continent, 
there is still a very fast and deep mutation to be affected”.440   
 
The British government must have felt that the much-needed mutation occurred with the 
resignation of de Gaulle on 28 April 1969, after losing a referendum on regional and Senate 
reform.441 The subsequent President, Georges Pompidou, was significantly less obtrusive. At 
the same time, a new and unexpected win by the Conservative government in the general 
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election on 19 June 1970 brought considerable progress on the issue of Europe. Edward 
Heath became noted for “a lifetime of undeviating effort”442 towards British entry, and unlike 
the majority of his predecessors, “Europe was his great theme”.443 The Heath-Pompidou 
summit held in Paris on 20-21 May 1971, made considerable headway on the issue of British 
entry. Eventually, after a year and a half of further diplomatic effort, Britain, along with 
Denmark and Ireland, signed the Brussels Treaty of Accession on 22 January 1972, thus 
leading to their formal entry on 1 January the following year. The Labour Party in opposition 
had rejected a referendum on joining but had instead emphasised the need to renegotiate the 
terms of entry in late 1971 and early 1972.444 These circumstances had come about as the 
actual conditions of entry emerged as being less than beneficial to British interests. Issues 
included an excessive British contribution to the Community’s Budget, an agricultural policy 
that inflated food prices, barriers against well-established trading partners and the risk of 
jeopardising the future welfare of other regions, namely Wales and Scotland.445 The degree of 
opposition led to the cabinet decision on 21 January 1975 that the terms of remaining within 
the Community would be put to the country in a referendum and the cabinet members were 
given the opportunity to campaign either way.446 
 
This ‘agreement to differ’ reveals one more point worth noting about the political 
environment. Europe did not function within a traditional ideological divide which neatly 
pitted Labour against Conservative. Frequently, the arguments drawn upon cut across the 
political spectrum and created notable alliances. By way of example, the prominent Labour 
member and staunch opponent of the EEC, Michael Foot, appeared on a radio discussion 
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programme with the Conservative politician Enoch Powell on 11 June 1973, and stated, “I 
don’t mind having allies in defending the House of Commons, particularly when there are so 
many deserters.”447 In the same broadcast, Powell opined on the election of a Labour 
administration that would withdraw Britain from the Common Market: “I would say: ‘[w]ell, 
so be it. But at least we have retained the power to decide under what general principles this 
nation is to be governed.’”448 As such, the debates on the referendum did not merely embody 
entrenched and long-held opinions, but actually revealed constantly shifting positions, some 
by individual members and others by the party as a whole.  
 
It has been suggested that material factors also dominated the early debates over membership 
of the Common Market. A common argument, for example, suggests that from 1962 to 1975, 
Britain’s applications were not about cultural or emotional links to Europe; “concrete benefits 
were weighed up against concrete losses”;449 the argument “was technical in nature and had 
little to do with Britons’ sense of themselves”450 and, apart from a few Euro-friendly voices, 
there was little appeal to “Euro-mythology”.451 Reports taken less than a month before the 
referendum support the argument that British citizens were mostly concerned about prices 
and the cost of living (58%), food prices more specifically (37%), unemployment (15%), with 
sovereignty and independence having marginal importance (9%).452 In the wake of the 
economic position of Britain in the early to mid–seventies, with over 20% inflation, the 
spectre of the 1973 oil-price hike and the effects of the three-day working week on output and 
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the miners’ strikes, it is not surprising that ‘bread-and-butter’ issues prevailed. However, in 
keeping with the essentially contested nature of discourse, evidence suggests that identity 
played a key role within the debates. Young narrates, for example, that when Edward Heath 
was accused of disguising the political ramifications of continued membership, culminating 
in the threat of monetary union, he produced references to former statements which 
highlighted the consistency of his belief in the Community as a political construct.453 A 
similar such position has been echoed by Roy Jenkins who claimed that “throughout the 
campaign the issue that really seized people’s attention was the political issue of Britain’s 
orientation in the world.”454 Analogous examples can be applied to the anti-membership 
camp with prices and unemployment being the focus of figures like Douglas Jay and Barbara 
Castle and national independence and sovereignty being the concerns of Enoch Powell and 
Michael Foot.455 Subsequently, the various positions on EEC membership reveal the struggle 
over conceptualising Europe as primarily an economic union or a political community. 
Suffice to say, the following analysis does not postulate that economic factors were not 
paramount in the debates, only that the examination of identity-related conceptualisations of 
Others opens up a previously neglected vista of identity politics exerting a significant 
influence on how Europe was and is formulated. National identity was very much part of the 
debates on Europe and that despite the public preoccupation with how continued membership 
would affect them monetarily, this did not stop political elites from arguing that the EEC had 
a variety of different meanings and connotations.   
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3.3 The Pro-Membership Debates 
 
In this section, I analyse the predicates and processes relating to the pro-membership 
positions as represented in Table 4. These are the descriptive characteristics extrapolated 
from the documents listed in Appendix 1. Next, I explain how these descriptive characteristics 
make sense given specific background knowledge. After this account of the process of 
presupposition, I present how these practices produce subject positions which place the 
particular subjects in relationship with one another. The documents, page numbers and 
columns taken from the appendix are given in square brackets in the following explanatory 
section and Table 4. However, in keeping with the discursive approach I adopt, I have not 
explicitly listed the names of all individuals cited. Although it can be argued that the role and 
reputation of political spokespeople also contributes to their ability to disseminate ideas, I am 
predominantly concerned with how elites have argued about Europe, rather on who has said 
what.  
 
3.3.1 Predication within the Pro-Membership Debates 
 
To begin with, Britain is constructed as a particular type of subject. Firstly, it is positioned as 
playing an essential rather than peripheral role in Europe. A considerable degree of agency is 
imported into Britain to reveal ‘a great nation’ [11], always having ‘played a major role in the 
world’ [21-col.1033] and which can continue to ‘be a force’ [20-col.907]. Secondly, the 
evocation of historical events places the notion of decline as central to the way in which 
Britain engages with Europe. A tension exists between the idea that membership provides a 
substitute for ‘having lost an Empire’ [20-col.907] whilst remaining outside of the 
Community would conjure up ‘a sort of Churchillian myth that we were the greatest and most 
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important country in the world’ [7-p.347]. On the one hand, Britain is seen as fulfilling a 
historical role of natural leader of Europe. One such example by the Britain in Europe 
pressure group asks ‘are we going to stay on the centre of the stage where we belong, or are 
we going to shuffle off into the dusty wings of history?’ [19]. On the other hand, Britain is 
also seen as a fading power whose voice, in order to be heard, must be linked within a 
European framework of fellow nations in order to, according to the Conservative Party 
manifesto, ‘reverse our political and economic decline’ [4]. A third configuration 
demonstrates how continued entry is the best way of realising British interests. The policy of 
a ‘siege economy’ [19] is demonised as isolationist and nationalist, and as indicative of an 
‘insular mentality’ [11-p.539]. Anti-marketeers are perceived as ‘Little Englanders’ [9-p.412] 
who hark back to past glories. British interests are positioned as wholly contingent on the 
interdependence between other European nations and Britain must therefore rely on ‘friends 
and allies’ [1] and ‘partnership with our democratic neighbours’ [3]. To summarise, though 
Britain is conceived as a leading international actor, continued EEC membership is construed 
as being reflective of a sense of crisis: is continued membership the means to exercise 
Britain’s global and historically entrenched impact or is it more of an attempt to address 
Britain’s declining power? 
 
Three dominant themes construct Europe: as a means of securing peace, as inevitable and as a 
way of bolstering national sovereignty. Firstly, the debates make references to the European 
legacy of bloodshed and configure membership as the only means to safeguard Europe from a 
resurgence of its bloody past. The Community represents a ‘struggle for freedom’ [11-p.210], 
‘one world at peace’ [11-p.381], ‘it removed fears of a continuation of the three wars between 
France and Germany’ [13h-p.180] and created an international structure ‘free from tyranny 
and bloodshed’ [16-p.295]. This security discourse, therefore, focuses on the role unification 
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plays not in weakening Germany, but in insuring its inclusion into a peaceable Europe. 
Edward Heath, for example, stated that Europe is fundamentally a political union as its 
original purpose was to ‘absorb the new Germany into the structure of the European family’ 
[11-p.545]. Subsequently, Europe has the power to foster harmony between previously 
antagonistic members. A sanguinary Europe-as-violent past is invoked to highlight a Europe-
as-peaceful present.   
 
Secondly, Britain is irretrievably linked to Europe. The process of integration, therefore, is 
viewed as inexorable. As early as 1971, in a decisive vote that saw 69 Labour MPs vote with 
the Conservative government over entry to the Common Market, the Labour member Roy 
Hattersley saw entry ‘as not only essential but inevitable’ [15-p.140]. Similarly, Lord 
Denning likened the Treaty of Rome to ‘an incoming tide’ [16-p.250] and consequently 
‘cannot be held back’ [16-p.250]. Entry is seen as an ‘irrevocable decision’ [7-p.348] and the 
Community ‘will not go away if we say ‘No’’ [17]. Any sense of voluntary disassociation is 
unworkable and, as a consequence, Britain ‘has to adapt’ [1] to reconcile and harmonise its 
position within the inescapability of union. Coupled to this theme is a particular concentration 
on the consequences of withdrawal from the Community. The unprecedented nature of the 
referendum and the lack of understanding of what life would be like outside of the 
Community enabled advocates of continued membership to paint a particularly bleak picture 
of an isolated Britain. Consequently, withdrawal would be ‘a disaster’ [1], ‘Britain’s future 
would be dismal’ [11-p.363] and ‘we should be alone in a harsh, cold world, with none of our 
friends offering to revive old partnerships’ [19]. Thus, the metaphor James Callaghan used to 
describe the referendum as “a rubber life-raft into which the whole party may one day have to 
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climb”456 may be equally applicable to describing the nascent membership of the 
Community. This aspect, therefore, helped create  
a belief that Britain will have more influence as a member of this group, 
that the Community is a useful port in an economic storm, and it would be 
better, particularly in such stormy times, not to rock the boat by leaving the 
Community shortly after joining it.457 
 
Thirdly, a particularly dominant motif within the pro-membership debates is arguably the 
particular perceptions of sovereignty and democracy. A fluid reading of sovereignty produces 
two subdivisions: sovereignty as a pooled concept and sovereignty as a means of promoting 
prosperity. The first positions sovereignty as something that cannot be ‘hoarded, sterile and 
barren’ [15-pp.146/7] but can instead be malleable and apportioned. The debates vacillate 
between recognising that British sovereignty can actually be boosted by union whilst also 
accepting that interdependence, even outside of the structure of EEC membership, has 
adulterated the idea of national integrity. The former rests with the notion that as sovereignty 
is a shared concept, Britain can effectively influence Europe via its own particular vision thus 
bolstering its own national sovereignty. The second – sovereignty as a means of advancing 
prosperity – focuses on the fact that since ‘no country in the modern world enjoys absolute 
sovereignty’ [10-p.211], it is sheer idealism to view Britain as a self-contained, self-governed 
entity. The commitment to Europe negates a ‘billiard-ball’ formulisation of sovereignty but 
opens up how it can instead be a way of enhancing British power via the creation of linkages 
to other European states.  
 
Of the other countries referred to, I have limited the investigation to those specifically related 
to Britain’s membership. The Atlantic and Commonwealth are important as they reveal the 
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fissure between Britain and Europe.458 Both the Atlantic and the Soviet Union are significant 
because of the issues surrounding security during the Cold War. The more conciliatory and 
friendlier role towards Europe as a whole mirrors a similar such attitude of association with 
other states. A struggle however exists within this position. The consolidation of friendships 
in the Far East, China and America jars with the idea that Europe has come to dominate 
British political thinking. Callaghan, for example, highlighted the desire to ‘cultivate the rest 
of the world once more’ [8-p.296]. Former Communist countries also, it is argued, look to 
Europe as a way of distancing themselves from their authoritarian pasts. Europe is also 
perceived as a blueprint for peace in conflict-ridden corners of the world. Heath, with 
reference to Africa, drew attention to ‘how much there is to be gained by working for closer 
unity’ [11-p.217]. By enhancing prosperity and soldering peace – what are perceived as key 
European values - the Community not merely benefits European citizens but also provides a 
framework for propagating those values and conditions beyond. The position of the 
Commonwealth vacillates between recognising Britain’s obligations towards it, whilst 
simultaneously accepting the realities of its diminished role in shaping Britain. This reveals 
the changing role of the Commonwealth. It is constructed as yesterday’s alliance, in contrast 
to Britain’s nascent membership of the EEC. Despite, therefore, the fact that ‘close relations’ 
[1] with the Commonwealth were assured, it nonetheless had become evident that it was now 
‘fissiparous’ [11-p.361] and ‘largely self-governing’ [20-col.833]. It is the Commonwealth’s 
ability to align itself with Britain’s new partners that determines whether or not the 
diminished role it possesses can be reinvigorated.  
 
In contrast, Britain’s relationship with the Soviet Union reveals quite different predicates and 
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is formulated as a subject quite distinct from the other states and organisations mentioned. 
Two aspects of this relationship are worth noting. One is the belief that the Soviet Union was 
not against Britain’s continued membership as this situation could function as a buttress 
against German economic power. The second, however, is firmly lodged within a balance of 
power perception that dominated Cold War thinking and places the referendum within an 
international setting blighted by fears of the East. The EEC is perceived as a security barrier 
against potential Soviet invasion. Of the texts, a dominant stance argues that the Common 
Market, although maybe not initially popular, was preferable to the prospect of a socialist 
Britain.459 Thus, 
[t]he real reason which could not be told publicly for our entry to the 
common market was because our intelligence service had learnt the Soviet 
Union had plans to invade Western Europe and these would be carried out 
once trade unions in Western Europe led by a Communist Fifth Column had 
fomented widespread strikes to prevent the invasion being resisted.460  
 
Subsequently, part of the success of this discourse lies in its ability to argue that not only was 
the Common Market an essential barrier to Soviet domination, but that EEC detractors, by 
“being labelled as Communists and ‘fellow-travellers’”,461 were actively sowing the seeds for 
a Britain to become ‘part of the Soviet bloc’ [19]. The threat was not peripheral but 
ontological: the very existence of Britain was in jeopardy. 
 
Of the final non-European state examined in the texts, the role of the USA indicates a 
schizophrenic position. The Atlantic Alliance is heralded as important but the relationship 
should include ‘a Europe of which we are a part’ [19]. The Superpowers are perceived as 
possessing such power that ‘the voice of Europe was in danger of being lost in world affairs’ 
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[8-p.305]. Subsequently, a united Europe is constructed as a means of competing against an 
American-Soviet dominated environment. Furthermore, it is suggested that Britain’s 
relationship with America actually obstructs better relations with Europe. As Young argues, 
“[i]n contrast to all other post-war British prime ministers, Heath’s Europeanism led him to 
distance himself from the US. He even wished to avoid any use of the term ‘special 
relationship’.”462 The bond between Britain and America, therefore, is characterised as ‘an 
allegiance foreign to Europe’ [16-p.222].   
 
To summarise the predicates and processes in Table 2, a tension exists which firstly views 
Britain as a fading power which needs membership to abate its decline. Secondly, Britain is 
conversely seen as a dominant player by which it can shape and develop the Community. The 
EEC is constructed as a force for good in which issues of peace and security are paramount. 
Europe is viewed as an instrument for guaranteeing peace and prosperity and many 
references to the bloodshed of the Second World War make membership vital. The 
Community is also seen as an inevitable entity in which Britain is no longer able to ignore or 
sideline whilst withdrawal is a potential disaster leading to weakness and isolationism. 
Complete sovereignty is regarded as illusionary. Interdependence as characterised by EEC 
patterns of trade and cohesion has penetrated nationalistic and outdated views of sovereignty. 
Of the other countries mentioned, the Commonwealth is looked upon as part of yesterday’s 
heritage, with states which are no longer dependent on Britain and look more towards a 
united Europe as a trading partner of which Britain is a part. The Soviet Union is classed as 
expansionist and threatening which highlights the importance of continued membership as 
part of an anti-Soviet bloc. In short, it functions as the antithesis to how Europe is perceived. 
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Finally, the Community is seen as a welcome bulwark to American dominance and 
Superpowerdom.     
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Table 2: Predication and Processes within the Pro-Membership Debates 
Britain European Economic Community Other countries 
We need friends and allies [1] 
Has to adapt to the Community [1] 
We shall be ready to play our full part in  
    developing a new and wider Europe [2] 
Is a European nation [2] [5] 
Narrow-minded nationalism of many so- 
    called ‘internationalists’ [3] 
A better life in these islands depend(s) on  
    partnership with our democratic  
    neighbours [3] 
Gives us the opportunity to reverse our  
    political and economic decline [4] 
If we did not go in, we would go back to a  
    sort of Churchillian myth that we were  
    the greatest and most important country  
    in the world [7-p.347] 
Anti-marketeers were ‘Little Englanders’  
    [9-p.412] 
Insular mentality [11-p.539] 
A great nation like Britain – a nation  
    that…twice this century… fought in  
    Europe and in the process bled itself  
    white in the cause of liberty and  
    democracy for the peoples of Europe  
    [11-p.547] 
Frightened of the UK being left isolated,  
    outside the Magic market circle [13j- 
    p.192] 
If we turn our backs on Europe who is  
    there to turn to? [14-p.91] 
We are better able to advance and protect  
    our national interests [17] 
Some want an isolationist Britain with a    
    ‘siege economy’ [19] 
Are we going to stay on the centre of the  
    stage where we belong, or are we going  
    to shuffle off into the dusty wings of  
    history? [19] 
Having lost an empire and … the imperial  
    power it once had, can be a force [20- 
    col.907] 
Sad impotence of this country [20-col.922] 
Has always played a major role in the   
    world [21-col.1033] 
Peace and Security: 
Need for a Europe that is united [1] 
Partnership instead of rivalry [1] 
Instrument for improving the life of the people [1] 
Make a similar war impossible in future [4] 
Only through unity could the Western European nations  
   recover control over their destiny [4] 
Liberal, outward looking federation of free people with   
   sovereignty [6] 
Larger groups of nations acting together in the common  
   interest leads to greater unity and this adds to our strength  
   in the struggle for freedom [11-p.210]  
We were creating one world at peace [11-p.381] 
Free and democratic, prosperous and peace-loving, unselfish  
   in recognising and accepting its responsibilities to those  
   less fortunate than its own people [11-p.382] 
It was founded for a political purpose…to absorb the new  
   Germany into the structure of the European family [11- 
   p.545]  
(Peace) has been secured by the conscious and concerted  
   effort of nations to work together [11-p.546] 
It removed fears of a continuation of the three wars between  
   France and Germany [13h-p.180] 
Memories of the Second World War provide an attraction for an  
   organisation which brings countries together [13i-p.187]  
40 million people died in two world wars ... Vote Yes to keep  
   the peace [14-p.90] 
For your children’s future vote yes [14-p.90] 
Free from tyranny and bloodshed, living in peace and  
   prosperity [16-p.295]  
To bring together the peoples of  Europe … To help the  
   poorer regions of Europe and the rest of the world. To  
   help maintain peace and freedom [17] 
Force for stability in world relations [20-col.876] 
United Socialist Europe [20-col.908] 
Centre of stability, activity and prosperity [22-col.1279] 
If we are to avoid a future holocaust…(our) interests require  
   a compromise with the nations of Europe [22-col.1325] 
Inevitability: 
It (entry) was an irrevocable decision [7-p.348] 
Membership...(is) not only essential but inevitable [15-p.140] 
Like an incoming tide. It flows into the estuaries and up the  
   rivers. It cannot be held back [16-p.250] 
The Common Market will not go away if we say ‘No’ [17] 
 
Sovereignty and Democracy: 
Sovereignty was destroyed anyway by interdependence  
   [7-p.343] 
No country in the modern world enjoys absolute  
   sovereignty [10-p.211] 
We could influence the development of our continent  
   and so increase the effective sovereignty of Britain  
   [11-p.548] 
What is proposed is a sharing and an enlargement of  
   individual national sovereignties [15-p.137] 
Sovereignty is not something to be hoarded, sterile and  
   barren…Nor is sovereignty something which has to be  
   kept in the crypt … Sovereignty is for this House to use  
   in the way it thinks best [15-p.146-7] 
Sovereignty isn’t something you put down in the cellar in  
   your gold reserve, and go down with a candle once a  
   week to see if it still there [16-p.246] 
Membership … imposes both rights and duties, but has  
   not deprived us of our national identity [17] 
What real sovereignty is left in a world that can destroy  
   itself overnight by nuclear holocaust? [21-col.1083] 
Withdrawal: 
A disaster for which future generations would never  
   forgive us [1]  
Would give us less power and influence in the world not  
   more [4] 
Would confront us with the choice of almost total  
   dependence on others or retreat into weak isolation [4] 
Siege economy [8-p.326] 
Britain’s future would be dismal without Europe [11- 
   p.363] 
This is no time for Britain to be considering leaving a    
   Christmas club, let alone the Common Market [16- 
   p.289] 
We would just be outsiders looking in [17] 
Outside we are on our own [17] 
This tearing apart would be a major upheaval [19] 
Would leave us weak and unregarded, both economically  
   and politically [19] 
We should be alone in a harsh, cold world, with none of  
   our friends offering to revive old partnerships [19] 
Grim and barren alternative [21-col.1040] 
Cold and hostile world [21-col.1066] 
 
 
Commonwealth: 
Maintain close relations with our fellow-members [1] 
Wants us to stay in [7-p.345] [17] [19] 
Was fissiparous [11-p.361] 
Some want us to fall back on the Commonwealth – but the Commonwealth  
   itself doesn’t want that [19] 
Largely self-governing [20-col.833] 
Have become independent [21-col.1027] 
Total fantasy to believe…we can summon up the lost legions of the  
   Commonwealth [21-col.1066] 
The Soviet Union: 
Progress…in re-establishing a proper relationship [1] 
Note with concern the continuing expansion of all branches of the Soviet  
   armed forces [1] 
Not an attempt to change each other’s systems because we had to learn from   
   each other [7-p.149] 
Secretly they might like us in, to control the Germans [7-p.345] 
Some want a Communist Britain – part of the Soviet bloc [19] 
The USA: 
Reaffirm our full support for the Atlantic Alliance [1] 
The strength of the Superpowers was so much greater than other individual  
   nations that the voice of Europe was in danger of being lost in world affairs  
   [8-p.305] 
Britain need not fear that she would be cold-shouldered [8-p.320]  
Instead of being little more than the subject matter of American-Soviet  
   relations, we must aim to become an equal determinant in our own future  
   [8-p.330] 
Resentment of America dominating our continent [13g-p.171] 
An allegiance foreign to Europe [16-p.222] 
Even Super Powers…do not have complete freedom of action [17] 
They want a close Atlantic relationship…with a Europe of which we are part  
   [19] 
Some want us even closer to the United States than to Europe – but America  
   itself doesn’t want that [19] 
Strong currents of neo-isolationism in the United States [21-col.1067] 
Interdependent relationship with the United States rather than a one-sided  
   relationship [21-col.1089] 
Major supporters of a strong and united Europe [21-col.1093] 
Other:  
Consolidated friendships in the Far East, China, the Indian Sub-Continent,     
   Africa and the American Continent [1] 
The time has come to cultivate the rest of the world once more [8-p. 296] 
African countries will appreciate how much there is to be gained by working  
   for closer unity themselves [11-p.217] 
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3.3.2 Presupposition within the Pro-Membership Debates 
 
A number of presuppositions help construct a world within which the predicates have 
meaning and are therefore recognised as fact. Several of them are subtle in their configuration 
and contain elements of similarity and kinship. Others are clearly formulated along a nexus of 
binary oppositions. To begin with, although Britain is referenced as a ‘country’ [7-p.347] [20-
col.922] and ‘these islands’ [3], it is identified foremost as a nation [2] [5] [11.p.547]. This 
has a dual effect. Firstly, it creates a perception of unity by positioning Britain as a single 
homogenous entity. The articulations of ‘we’ and ‘us’ [1] [2] [4] [7-p.347] [14-p.91] [17] 
[19] denote the nation and contribute to forging a sense of togetherness. Secondly, it takes for 
granted that nations are the principal political actors within Europe and beyond. Categorising 
Britain as one of many nations helps to construct the presupposition that European integration 
has been fuelled by the need to reconcile previously warring interests between different 
peoples and that interrelatedness and interdependence now govern the political world. In 
short, membership of Europe is the conceptual and practical means of anchoring one nation 
to others. This point is very much related to the manner in which sovereignty is predicated. 
Real sovereignty is configured as an illusion imagined by isolationists. Sovereignty is instead 
a malleable entity that is utilised by political actors to realise national interests. That is, 
British sovereignty is actually empowered by being within the Community because 
attachment to ‘Europe as a power-bloc’ enables Britain to function as a more instrumental 
power.  
 
A principal oppositional formation pits the notion of the ‘Little Englander’ [9-p.412], steeped 
in the mythology of isolationism, against a far more internationalist and less exclusionary 
understanding of Europe. Individuals who muse over the golden age of self-containment are 
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condemned for their ‘insular mentality’ [11-p.539] and inability to accept that the 
Community is an entity that cannot be avoided and is the best chance to preserve peace and 
prosperity. EEC detractors are constructed as lodged within a static worldview against a 
Community that continues to develop and evolve. Thus, this outward-looking/inward-looking 
nexus constructs non-membership in absolutist terms: that independence from the Common 
Market is a call for economic and political seclusion.    
 
A further opposition situates the EEC as a harbinger of stability as against the instability 
emanating from other nations, Britain’s economic and domestic woes and Europe’s bloody 
past. This stable/unstable opposition draws on historical images to construct a modern, 
peaceful Europe in contrast to a predatory Soviet Union, a United States that sits outside of 
the regionalism important to Europeans and a fading Commonwealth. The ‘three circles’ 
doctrine, therefore, is reformulated to position a united Europe, not the English speaking 
world, as the means of ensuring stability. The historical references are read in an important 
number of ways. First of all, the Second World War features heavily within both debates. 
Such imaging is especially trenchant given the fact that many of the spokespeople would 
have had personal experience of either the Second World War or at least of the immediate 
aftermath of a postwar Britain. Within the pro-debates, the Second World War is highlighted 
as a product of unfettered nationalism which can only be checked from reoccurring via a 
compromise with other states. Secondly, the references highlight the need to anchor Germany 
firmly to the European fold. The EEC is configured not merely as an economic stabiliser that 
increases prosperity due to the free flow of commerce, but also as a political project designed 
to create peace between France and Germany. Thus, rather than iterating the need for Britain 
to be at the heart of Europe, both France and Germany are reified as exemplifying the core of 
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Europe and Britain is conceived of as ensuring this relationship remains strong. As William 
Whitelaw, the then Conservative Shadow Deputy Leader remarked: 
Two world wars in one generation had their origins in the long-standing 
antagonism between France and Germany. Today these two countries work 
together as partners. By working with them we in Britain can do much to 
cement this new relationship. Reflecting on the sadness of personal loss and 
the horrors of those wars, I certainly would hate to throw away that 
opportunity, and so, I suspect, would many of our fellow citizens.463 
 
Finally, the war time references are formulated as the end of an old era of nationalism and 
rivalry and the start or continuation of a new one of conciliation, cooperation and economic 
prosperity. The stable/unstable nexus is reliant on the sustenance of peace via the propagation 
of wealth. A stable Europe generates wealth which in turn contributes to further stability.   
 
A concluding opposition is formulated along the nexus of globalist/nationalist. The EEC is 
positioned more broadly as a global entity whilst its detractors are located as provincial and 
narrow in outlook. The issue of sovereignty is also deeply lodged within the struggle between 
global and purely national interests. The need for pooling, in order to safeguard the common 
interests of all members, is positioned against the hoarding of sovereignty which again is 
indicative of self-containment and insularity. Thus, Europe functions as a global community 
within which Britain is both a constituent, dominant and historically embedded member.  
 
3.3.3 Subject Positioning within the Pro-Membership Debates 
 
Both the predicates and the presuppositions establish subject positions which reveal how the 
subjects and objects are related to one another. As already mentioned, both Britain and 
Europe are perceived as embodying a significant degree of instrumentality and influence. 
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That is to say that interdependence is inherent as they are both constructed as powerful actors 
and both possess regional and international influence. However, to recapitulate, Britain is 
positioned with Europe in three important ways which all contribute to the image of 
inseparability. Firstly, Britain is in decline. The sense of desperation of the period has been 
aptly highlighted by Vernon Bogdanor, a participant in the Witness Seminar held in on the 
20th anniversary of the referendum: 
I think someone said that one cannot exaggerate the state of fear which 
existed in Britain in the mid-1970s. In 1974 the abyss seemed to be opening 
up. What had seemed to be a civilised society seemed to many to be under 
threat ... It is difficult to imagine now, but people felt that the ground was 
shifting under them.464 
 
Secondly and conversely, Britain is a global power. Isolationism is perceived both as 
anathema to Britain’s natural historical role and as a threat to the ability to project power not 
merely from Europe but on a worldwide level. Thirdly, Britain is irretrievably linked to 
Europe. However, the linkage is not merely defined by geographical proximity but is invoked 
by reference to the commonality of values and interests. A coupling of the EEC as ‘new’ and 
Europe as ‘old’ enables integration to be constructed as a dynamic and fresh alliance whilst 
simultaneously invoking historical and deep-seated kinship. Such positioning also helps to 
demonise what is perceived as the perils of returning to a non-participatory detachment. This 
is indicative of what is seen as a thirst for past imperial glories and an unwelcome return to 
the stultifying myth of Empire.  
 
Europe as an object is constructed to produce four distinct discourses. The first can be 
defined as Europe as a security bloc. Several dimensions within it are apparent. It is both 
economic and political: economic in that it is trade focused and political in that it demands an 
international structure to enforce agreement and unification. Furthermore, it is dualistically a 
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militarised coalition driven by Cold War threats which lie outside its borders whilst 
simultaneously functioning as a demilitarising union designed to stabilise member states and 
prevent conflict between them. The second formulation can be defined as Europe as its 
historical antithesis. This is a temporal construct. That is, European history is read as bloody 
and destructive and a violent European past is invoked to instil fears not about what Europe is 
but what it once was and may become again. The third classification of Europe is Europe as 
established. The EEC is treated as a given entity, possessive of power and influence and, 
most importantly, as indelible and irreversible. The final categorisation is Europe as a 
network of sovereignties. This definition requires some clarification. Although sovereignty is 
articulated within the debates in a national context; i.e. that British sovereignty possesses a 
level of predominance, the belief that Britain was becoming an increasingly weak 
international actor helps reinforce the notion of a network in two ways. Firstly, EEC 
membership is seen as a way of strengthening Britain’s depleted sense of Self by which it 
might regain its former sense of stateliness. Second, a malleable understanding of sovereignty 
helps explain that a loss of sovereignty in one area might bolster other deeply held identities 
in another. Membership is seen as augmenting free trade, enhancing prosperity and ensuring 
stability which are also many-cited factors of British identity articulated within the debates. 
In addition, the articulation of ‘free’ [6] [11-p.382] [16-p.295] [17], ‘democratic’ [3] [11-
p.382] [11-p.547] and ‘prosperous’ [11-p.382] [16-p.295] [22-col.1279] helps to bind Britain 
to a Europe of shared values. As a consequence, Britain, along with other member states, is 
part of a common network which is prepared to pool its sovereignty to produce a Europe 
which reflects both its interests and its identity. Britain plays a leading role in ensuring the 
free, democratic and prosperous nature of the Community whilst enlargement ensures the 
dissemination of those values to other states. That is, Europe, by embodying certain 
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advantageous qualities, rights and prospects helps ensure the democratisation of those values 
and therefore functions as a model for non-Europe.  
 
Other actors are located in a hierarchical structure that formulates them with varying degrees 
of significance. By far the least essential is the Commonwealth. It is positioned as important 
but reminiscent of a dwindling alliance. The Commonwealth is secondary and the cultural 
and historical linkages to Britain are only recognised in so far as Britain retains its position in 
a wider European community. It is also suggested that trade patterns between Britain and the 
Commonwealth have changed and, although regrettable, is lodged within what is seen as an 
inevitable shift. This discourse can be labelled as the Commonwealth as past. It also contains 
a duality: that past patterns of dependence possess importance because they are historically 
embedded but that an alignment, if it is to continue or be reinvigorated, must fit into the 
realism of newer, fresher and more vibrant relationships. 
 
The Soviet Union is labelled as expansionist and fundamentally different. Although a ‘proper 
relationship’ [1] is mentioned as being possible, the interdependence is imposed. The 
Otherness of the USSR is embedded in the Soviet aspirations to threaten mainland Europe 
and eventually impose Communist principles. Thus, the dominant view pertains to a Soviet 
Union as not Europe discourse that further buttresses the goal of European membership and 
fortifies the discourse of Europe functioning as a security coalition. This threat is ontological.  
 
The USA is positioned somewhat differently. First, it is used as an example to argue that even 
great powers do not have complete independence, thus rendering the loss of Britain’s 
sovereignty as more acceptable. Subsequently, the positioning of the USA as simultaneously 
possessing Superpower status and considerable restraints supports the idea that greater 
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interdependence is not merely contingent on the say-so of individual nations but is locked in 
to a historically determined path of mutualism. Second, the USA is constructed as in mild 
opposition to European regionalism that must in some way be united to influence world 
affairs. Therefore, a sense of competitiveness is compounded to reveal an America that 
should be challenged rather than blindly followed. The final references reveal a much broader 
sphere of influence both for Europe and Britain. Friendships reaching as distant as the Far 
East, China and the Indian Sub-Continent help to position Europe once more in a global 
context. Rather than an inward-looking entity, the combined strength of European states 
enables a greater influence outside of Europe. That influence is also not constructed as a 
threat but as a means to forge greater linkages worldwide.   
 
As a consequence of other non-European states, I would argue that two further discourses on 
Europe spring from these readings. The first is Europe as a transnational cooperative. The 
Commonwealth, as has been mentioned, is defined as a particular object lodged within an 
increasingly distant history. The ability for the Commonwealth to repossess any importance 
is very much attached to its configuration to the new Europe. That is, Europe is not 
exclusionist in its operations but stretches out to forge new collaborative projects. Similarly, 
the USA and the USSR are both part of the scope of Europe’s transnationalism and are 
included as important actors with which Europe can influence and be influenced by. 
Secondly, and again in relation to the USA and the USSR, a Europe as superpower discourse 
is evident in the way Europe is configured as a dominant and rival entity. Such dominance is 
orchestrated as both a challenge to bipolarity and as a means to further enfranchise European 
states by providing Europe as the tool within which they can exercise governance beyond the 
grip of America or the Soviet Union.   
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3.4 The Anti-Membership Debates 
 
In this section, I analyse the predicates involving the anti-membership positions as 
represented in Table 3. As with the previous section, the predicates and processes are 
presented and then the background knowledge, or presuppositions, discussed. Subsequent to 
this, the relationship between the various subjects and objects, the subject positioning, is 
examined with an eye to revealing the range of discourses implicit within the debates.  
 
3.4.1 Predication within the Anti-Membership Debates 
 
As with the pro-membership debates, a key theme centres on the notion of decline. Within 
the previous debates, decline is the mechanism that anchors Britain to Europe and effectively 
speeds up the need for further integration. Within the anti-debates, however, decline is 
articulated quite differently. Firstly, membership is seen as indicative of this degeneracy; that 
the need for union demonstrates that Britain is effectively helpless. Instead, as uttered by 
Peter Shore, the Labour Secretary of State for Trade, Britain must be burdened with ‘terms 
and conditions, penalties and limitations’ [16-p.292] as though defeated in war. Implicit in 
this discourse are a number of references to Britain’s greatness, perhaps most famously 
characterised many years earlier by then Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell, warning how the 
Common Market would lead to “the end of a thousand years of history”465. Secondly, it is 
argued that membership actually exacerbates decline by effectively ending any sense of 
British exceptionalism and uniqueness. Membership requires the country to become 
‘absorbed’ [20-col.903] thus rendering pro-marketeers as ‘defeatists’ [18] in accepting the 
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Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair, p. 163. 
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shackling of Britain to the Community. A further aspect of decline focuses on the emotive 
language employed to describe this process of assimilation. References to ‘dismemberment’ 
[7-p.343], ‘decapitate’ [7-p.153], ‘guillotine’ [7-p.153], ‘strangled’ [7-p.48] and ‘destruction’ 
[13j-p.193] position the Community as a body intent on the dissolution of Britain. The ‘long 
and famous story of the British nation and people has ended’ [16-p.292] reveals Britain as 
effectively under siege from an existential threat. A final observation focuses on how deeply 
decline is ensconced within an Empire-driven identity. In the House of Commons debate on 9 
April 1975, Enoch Powell argued how many EEC supporters view the EEC  
… as a surrogate for Empire. It supplies the same sensation as is believed 
to have been enjoyed in the past, of belonging to a great and powerful 
show. ... We shall participate in that not as a nation but as members of 
something different; for the nation, our independence, our “we-hood”, must 
be traded in as the price of gaining membership of that new power 
structure. 466 
 
That is, pro-membership is attached to a desire for national greatness and a global projection 
and influence reminiscent of the British Empire. However, the EEC is a new power structure 
that does not accommodate nation-statism and, by way of its composition, actually demands 
the opposite: that individual members must forfeit national power and sovereignty. Thus, the 
misguided need to belong to a greater entity, far from bolstering nationhood, actually strips it.  
This is closely related to what is arguably the dominant theme within the anti-debates: that 
the EEC is a threat to British independence and national and parliamentary sovereignty. 
Several layers are related to this position. Firstly, an elision of two different concepts occurs 
within this discourse. Wallace makes the distinction between national autonomy, defined as 
“the ability of a nation to attain its objectives through unilateral action”,467 and national 
sovereignty, which is “the ability of a nation to act on its own rather than under the 
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instruction of another nation.”468 Thus, within the debates, no distinction is made between 
autonomy, which is constrained, and sovereignty, which is preserved.  The conflation of these 
concepts, therefore, positions sovereignty in zero-sum terms with ‘shifts (of) power from the 
elected to the unelected’ [13g-p.175], ‘transfer of power to the centre’ [13i-p.187], ‘greater 
centralization of power to Brussels’ [13j-p.192] and ‘too much power had drained away to 
Europe’ [7-p.135]. A second observation focuses on the lack of democracy within the 
European structure. The democratic deficit is not seen as a by-product or peripheral element 
of supranationality but is its locus. The EEC is ‘a carefully constructed mechanism for 
eliminating all democratic influences’ [13g-p.173], a ‘threat to democracy’ [13g-p.170] and a 
means to removing ‘the power of governments to discourage revolution or riot’ [13g-p.173]. 
‘Betraying’ [7-p.343], ‘conniving’ [7-p.343] and ‘deception’ [13j-p.193] are all implicit in 
this reading which emphasises that the real nature of the Community has been hidden and 
promoted surreptitiously. Consequently, continued British membership leads to a political 
infringement on sovereign issues which are being masked behind a carefully constructed 
façade of economic arguments. A final aspect of the sovereignty is how the EEC is rife with 
bureaucracy and corruption. Bureaucrats are likened to belonging to an omnipotent cabal or 
inner circle, producing a continuous ‘flood of regulations and directives’ [13f-p.168], making 
decisions that are ‘ridiculous or foolish’ [13i-p.185] and being involved in ‘corruption and 
waste’ [13i-p.185]. Indeed, ‘unelected Commissioners’ [18] are even blamed for 
circumventing the law to such a degree that ‘if it were a private company, (they) would be 
languishing in jail’ [13h-p.177]. The EEC buildings, apparatuses and processes are 
demonised by reference to their size. Tony Benn, the then Secretary State for Industry, 
described the whole mechanism as ‘so big and bureaucratic’ [7-p.144] and the ‘huge 
Commission building in Brussels, in the shape of a cross’ feeling ‘absolutely un-British’ [7-
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p.180]. Subsequently, a sense of victimhood permeates the debates that focus over 
sovereignty and democracy. The analysis is singularly apocalyptic in that “the nation is ever 
under attack from Brussels.”469 
 
A related reading positions the EEC as a ‘rich man’s club’. Two aspects are implicit in this 
construction. Firstly, by being ‘welcomed by the multinationals’ [13g-p.172] and ‘dedicated 
to a capitalist or market economy theology’ [7-p.346], the EEC is seen as a big business 
blueprint designed to satisfy corporate interests and further domination. Therefore, and 
although falling outside of the articulations by political elites, many trade unions “concluded 
that the EU was an undemocratic, bureaucratic extension of the interests of big business, 
designed to benefit multinational capital at the expense of citizens and workers”.470 Secondly, 
this representation reveals how the EEC functions as the main barrier to building both a 
socialist Britain and a socialist Europe. This position is obviously heavily indebted to Labour 
party ethos and, in particular, a focus on trade unionism. However, and although one cannot 
glean what kind of socialist Britain is being threatened, interests and identity are very much 
lodged within an anti-corporate, pro-worker configuration. That is, this account contributes to 
viewing ‘the Community machine’ [22-col.1289] as an elite-driven, corrupt and anti-
democratic venture that couples the sinister interests of its political architects to those of big 
business.    
 
Of the other countries referred to, France, perhaps most obviously, is predicated as a foe. A 
number of formulations construct it as ‘nationalistic’ [8-p.306] and ‘no friend’ [7-p.348] of 
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Britain’s. Further references examine the attempt to make French the official language of 
EEC business which is seen as eroding the English language and even putting the literary 
greatness of ‘Chaucer, Shakespeare and Milton’ [16-p.273] under threat. Hence, France is 
perceived as a strong actor, jostling for hegemony, intent on destroying the cultural heritage 
of Britain. Similarly to the pro-membership debates, the references to the Commonwealth 
demonstrate a conflict between Britain’s obligation to the historical alliance and recognition 
of its fading importance. The Commonwealth had been relegated to the role of ‘diminished 
concern’ [8-p.296] and the prevalence of positions towards Common Market membership, 
although antagonistic, nonetheless reveals the cardinal role that Europe increasingly took. 
The Soviet Union is mentioned as possessing the desire to drive out Britain from the 
Community in accordance with Europe functioning as a bulwark against the Soviet model. 
An obsession with membership of the Community is also blamed for weakening Britain’s 
relations with the USA. The USA is actually read in two ways. Firstly, it is a security 
coalition in which an unreliable Europe is scant replacement. Secondly, the relationship is 
historically and culturally embedded within the practices and policies of both states. This 
linkage is cultivated with reference to Cold War terms which again help diminish the 
importance of the EEC. Of the other references, abroad is described as ‘bloody’ [8-p.302] 
while the Continent is constructed as possessing an autocratic and politically unstable history 
of which Britain sits apart: they ‘have been ruled by dictators, or defeated or occupied’ [18] 
and ‘are more used to abandoning their political institutions than we are’ [18]. Britain is 
located, therefore, as possessing a superior political structure that should be protected against 
the import of mainland European political instability and strife. 
 
To summarise the predicates in Table 3, Britain is seen as resolutely free and independent in 
contrast to the undemocratic, bureaucratic, threateningly large, corrupt and authoritarian 
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nature of the Community. The EEC is a direct threat to the British parliament and much focus 
is given to the waste, dishonesty and lack of transparency of unelected European officials.  
Aiding Community bureaucrats is the motive of big business. Hence, elite interests are fused 
into a mutual relationship of combined political and corporate power. France is consistently 
singled out as overbearing and imperial. The Commonwealth is conveyed as an important 
relationship at risk from greater links to Europe. The USSR is intent on weakening the unity 
of the union as the EEC is perceived as a rival power structure. The USA is characterised as a 
part of a trusted alliance at risk from moves to deepen EEC membership. Finally, the 
Continent is viewed as a homogenous cluster characterised by virtually uninterrupted 
despotism or occupation.   
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Table 3: Predication and Processes within the Anti-Membership Debates 
Britain European Economic Community Other countries 
We are conniving at the dismemberment of  
    Parliament…betraying…our whole  
    history [7-p.343] 
‘We are friends and allies with most  
    neighbours on the Continent but we don’t  
    have that degree of intimacy with them.  
    We can survive without them’ [7-p.348] 
Most important decisions about our  
    future can only be taken here in  
    Britain [13a-p.135] 
Let us free ourselves to do what’s best for  
    Britain…Tomorrow will be too late [14- 
    p.106] 
The long and famous story of the British  
    nation and people has ended; that we are  
    now so weak and powerless that we must  
    accept terms and conditions, penalties and  
    limitations, almost as though we had  
    suffered defeat in war [16-p.292] 
The British parliamentary system has been  
    made farcical and unworkable…It is as if  
    we had set fire to the place as Hitler did  
    with the Reichstag [16-p.292] 
Those who want Britain in the Common  
    Market are defeatists; they see no  
    independent future for our country [18] 
A future in which we are absorbed [20- 
    col.903] 
We shall be a continuing irritant [20- 
    col.914] 
Unique method of government and unique  
    relationships with Europe…can play a  
    unique part in making a bridge [20- 
    col.919] 
For many people membership…is seen as  
    compensation for the real or believed loss  
    of Empire [22-col.1300] 
Sovereignty and Democracy: 
Community’s institutions can be improved…to reinforce democratic control [1] 
Power has gone to Brussels, to the TUC and the CBI, and we are just a rubber  
   stamp [7-p.16] 
Democracy was being strangled [7-p.48]  
Democracy is completely undermined [7-p. 128]  
Too much power had drained away to Europe [7-p.135]  
The myth of Empire had been replaced by the myth of Europe [7-p.143] 
The Commission will decapitate or apply the guillotine to British Democracy [7- 
   p.153]  
The huge Commission building in Brussels, in the shape of a cross, is absolutely  
   un-British. I felt as if I was going as a slave to Rome [7-p.180] 
A long retreat from parliamentary democracy…is being forced upon us [7-p.292] 
The Community will destroy the whole basis on which the labour movement was  
   founded, and its commitment to democratic change [7-p.343] 
Membership of the EEC will fatally dilute some of the main motive power of  
   British social democracy and give a great fillip to consensus politics [9-p.605] 
To encroach still further into the law-making authority of the member states [13f- 
   p.168] 
Threat to democracy [13g-p.170] 
A carefully constructed mechanism for eliminating all democratic influences  
   [13g-p.173] 
Removes the power of governments to discourage revolution or riot [13g-p.173] 
Will stimulate nationalism…may break up amidst hostility between nations  
   [13g-p.174] 
Shifts power from the elected to the unelected [13g-p.175]  
Undermines democratically accountable authority [13g-p.177] 
The myth of ‘inevitability’ [13g-p.179] 
Transfer of power to the centre [13i-p.187] 
Greater centralization of power to Brussels [13j-p.192]  
The destruction of self-government [13j-p.193]  
Authoritarian system of legislation, taxation and government…sapping away the  
   sovereignty…(and) democratic control [15-p.144] 
That choice is nothing less than whether we shall remain a nation at all [15-p.146]  
To merge Britain with France, Germany, Italy and other countries into a single  
   nation [18] 
An authoritarian system of legislation, taxation and government...sapping away  
   not just the sovereignty of this country as an independent self-governing nation  
   but the democratic control of our people over the laws and powers of  
   government [20-col.860] 
The nation, our independence, our ‘we-hood’ must be traded in [22-col.1301] 
Bureaucracy and Corruption: 
Absurd the way the bureaucracy was growing there.   
   Nobody believed in it – they just took their hat along  
   because they felt they had to join in [7-p.142] 
I can think of no body of men outside the Kremlin who  
   have so much power without a shred of accountability  
   for what they do [7-p.343] 
Flood of regulations and directives [13f-p.168] 
If it were a private company, the Commissioners would be  
   languishing in jail [13h-p.177] 
Decisions made by Europe are just ridiculous or foolish  
   [13i-p.185] 
Corruption and waste [13i-p.185] 
Undermining the powers of industry and commerce  
   [13i-p.188] 
Gross deception [13j-p.193] 
So big and bureaucratic [7-p.144] 
Unelected Commissioners in Brussels [18] 
Macro-planning organisation [20-col.915] 
The Community machine [22-col.1289] 
Capitalist Club: 
Dedicated to a capitalist or market economy theology [7- 
   p.346] 
Rich men’s club [13g-p.170] 
EEC was set up to rebuild Europe on safe capitalist lines  
   [13g-p.171] 
Was welcomed by the multinationals…as a way of  
   overcoming the policies of national governments to  
   which they objected [13g-p.172] 
Commission is little more than a regional agent of  
   globalisation, enforcing the diktats of the bankers  
   [13g-p.175]   
Club of relatively privileged nations which want to  
   maintain their positions [20-col.918] 
The largest capitalist organisation in the world today [20- 
   col.939] 
The Treaty of Rome as a Magna Carta for the barons of  
   multinational mega-corporations [20-col.939] 
France: 
‘France is no friend’ [7-p.348] 
France, one of the oldest and most nationalistic of  
   countries [8-p.306] 
The French get their own way to an alarming extent [9- 
   p.472] 
France’s approach to the EEC would mean ‘a complete  
   rupture of our identity’ [16-p.273] 
‘The language of Chaucer, Shakespeare and Milton’…  
   was threatened by the French demand for linguistic  
   hegemony in the EEC; ‘Non, merci beaucoup’ [16- 
   p.273]  
Commonwealth: 
Concentration on negotiations…had given the impression  
   of a diminished concern for the Commonwealth [8-p.  
   296] 
We shall cease…to be a member of the Commonwealth  
   [18] 
The Soviet Union and the USA: 
The Soviet aim was to dislodge us from the Common  
   Market [7-p.155] 
Deep and lasting commitment to Europe had weakened   
   our relations with the United States [8-p.295]  
We were about to exchange our old friends in the  
   Commonwealth and the United States for ‘an aroma of  
   continental claustrophobia’ [16-p.273] 
Other: 
For him (Douglas Jay) abroad is ‘bloody’ [8-p.302] 
In recent times, they (Continental countries) have been  
   ruled by dictators, or defeated or occupied. They are  
   more used to abandoning their political institutions than  
   we are [18] 
They (certain European countries) do not have the long- 
   term commitment to democratic control [20-col.903] 
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3.4.2 Presupposition within the Anti-Membership Debates 
 
Several presuppositions are evident that provide background knowledge of what is presumed 
to exist. The predicates are primarily configured along a series of hierarchical differences and 
oppositions. From the perspective of Britain, the EEC is configured as a particular kind of 
threat which can be enumerated along four principal oppositions. Firstly, and very similarly 
to the pro-marketeer debates, Britain is exemplified as a nation. Again, the invocation of this 
produces a sense of unity and places Britain as a parliamentary-bound political unit, which 
protects the nation, rather than as being defined by the mechanism of state. In contrast, the 
EEC is very much governed by executive interests. Consequently, what can be called a 
parliamentary-oriented/executive-oriented nexus is revealed as a principal opposition. The 
workings, functions and primary interest of the EEC are governed by an array of groups 
whose interests operate in antagonism to the general populace. These groups include 
businessmen, bureaucrats, capitalists, commissioners, bankers and privileged nations. As the 
European project has been designed by and for self-serving elites, the EEC is beyond reform 
precisely because it functions against the common interest.  
 
Secondly and relatedly, the predicates operate within a reified democratic/undemocratic 
opposition. European institutions are branded as authoritarian in contrast to the autonomy that 
is constructed as firmly rooted within British parliament. Thus, parliamentary sovereignty is 
presumed to be inviolable and this legislative autonomy is attached to and emblematic of a 
broader national democracy. For example, in an open letter to his constituents, Tony Benn 
wrote:   
Britain’s continuing membership of the Community would mean the end of 
Britain as a completely self-governing nation and the end of our 
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democratically elected Parliament as the supreme law-making body in the 
United Kingdom.471 
 
Thus, Britain is constructed as a state that exemplifies the notion of autonomy and self-rule 
whilst the EEC is perceived as its antithesis.  
 
A third presupposition positions membership as a sign of economic and political failure. The 
EEC is orchestrated as a mechanism to convene those powers which cannot sufficiently 
exercise their authority on an international scale. Subsequently, a great power/minor power 
nexus is presupposed to exist within which membership is a test of an individual state’s 
status. Again, invocations of ‘weak’ [16-p.292], ‘powerless’ [16-p.292] and ‘defeatist’ [18] 
are all symptomatic of a craven need to anchor Britain to the security blanket of Europe. In 
short, this presupposition effectively demonstrates that those who support integration are 
positioning Britain as a peripheral actor whilst resistance to integration is emblematic of a 
British national identity that perpetuates an imperial narrative: that Britain possesses a wider, 
global and more powerful actor status than other European states.  
 
The final and related opposition is formulated along a local-national/supranational 
opposition. That is, non-participation in the EEC would bring about two things. Firstly, the 
local and regional are very much implanted within the notion of independence. The sheer 
scale of the institutions of European governance, along with the assumptions of bureaucracy, 
waste and corruption, helps articulate a threat against more localised, national interests. 
Secondly, the focus on state identity as functioning at the national level contributes to once 
                                                     
471 TNA (The National Archives), PRO PREM (Records of the Prime Minister’s Office) 16/558, Benn to the Constituents of 
Bristol South East, 29 December 1974. Cited in Collins, A. (2010) ‘The Cabinet Office, Tony Benn and the Renegotiation of 
Britain’s Terms of Entry into the European Community, 1974-1975’, Contemporary British History, 24: 4, pp. 471-91 (at 
481).   
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again positioning Britain as operating beyond the restrictiveness of Europe. That is, 
membership is stultifying as it limits British involvement with non-European trading partners.   
 
3.4.3 Subject Positioning within the Anti-Membership Debates 
 
The predication and presupposition produce a number of subject positions. Similarly to the 
previous debates, a considerable level of instrumentality is afforded to principle subjects. 
However, Britain is positioned in two additionally important ways. Firstly, as a great power, 
it possesses a level of agency beyond those of its counterparts. Subsequently, EEC-
membership is an attempt to deaden Britain’s global actor status. This threat is exacerbated 
by the fact that Britain, by being a more predominant agent, has more to lose than others. By 
way of example, and not denying the diminishing role the Commonwealth had, a pamphlet 
written in 1971 by a New Zealand campaign against EEC membership contained the 
following doom-laden message: 
Together we stand at the crossroads of history. THE SECOND BATTLE 
OF BRITAIN is imminent. In the mystical sense, am I to be the stranger 
from New Zealand standing on a broken arch of London Bridge to gaze 
upon the ruins of St Paul’s?472 
 
Accordingly, Britain is positioned in relationship to other European states as multi-tentacled 
and dominant: that its influence goes far beyond the confines of geographical Europe and the 
EEC, therefore, is a mechanism to restrict British influence and trading traditions.   
 
Secondly, Britain is positioned as sovereign. The issue of sovereignty is made more potent by 
its attachment to a long narrative of domestic and international struggles within which this 
value has prevailed. Sovereignty is very much exemplified within the functioning of 
                                                     
472 Weal, T. (1971) The Second Battle of Britain, New Zealand Common Market Safeguards Campaign. Cited in Wellings, 
B. (2010) ‘Losing the peace: Euroscepticism and the foundations of contemporary English nationalism’, Nations and 
Nationalism, 16 (3) pp. 488-503 (at 491).  
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parliament and is therefore defined institutionally rather than popularly. Ron Leighton, a 
Labour politician, sums up this how preciously sovereignty needed to be safeguarded: 
Our present liberties and freedoms in Britain were fought for and achieved 
by our forefathers in a long struggle included such milestones as Magna 
Carta, the Bill of Rights, the Chartist movement, the various reform bills, 
women’s suffrage, and so on. Our present MPs have inherited these rights 
and liberties, and now they are custodians responsible for handing them on 
to future generations. They certainly have no mandate to surrender or 
abandon our right to self-government and self-determination to the 
apparatus in Brussels and would never be forgiven for doing so.473   
 
Europe is read in two important ways. Firstly, there is Europe as a federal state. This 
discourse is heavily punctuated with the transfer of power becoming increasingly and 
irreversibly centralised. It is also coupled to Empire building, as opposed to more regional 
and localised structures of governance. The EEC, therefore, is positioned as behemothic, 
elite-drive, corrupt and deceptive. The second reading posits Europe as a syndicate.  In this 
sense, a capitalist versus worker nexus is utilised to reveal that the EEC is constructed as a 
means to facilitate globalisation with the intent on safeguarding corporate power structures. It 
is governed by a corporate ethos which propagates expansion for reasons of profit. As early 
as 1963, Tony Benn wrote that “the Treaty of Rome entrenches laissez-faire as its philosophy 
and chooses bureaucracy as its administrative method”.474  
 
Within the references to other actors, the first is the USA as a security alliance. In as much as 
Europe is vilified for its increasingly more assertive role, Britain very much identifies not 
with any attempt to forge new security alliances out of Europe but to stick with older, more-
established ones. The second positions America as a historical and cultural linkage. As such, 
the alliance is very much embedded in the psyche of British political elites in that Atlanticism 
                                                     
473 Leighton, T. (1971) The Labour Case against Entry into the Common Market, Hullbridge: Labour Committee for 
Safeguards on the Comon Market, p. 13. Cited in Wellings, B. (2010) ‘Losing the peace: Euroscepticism and the foundations 
of contemporary English nationalism’, p. 492. 
474 Benn, T. (1974) Bodington, J. (ed.) Speeches, Nottingham: Spokesman Books, p. 93. Cited in: 
www.ena.lu/comments_common_market_tony_benn_january_1963-020002915.html. [Accessed 10 May 2011]. 
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is the means by which Britain’s past survives into the present. It is seen as a way for Britain 
to relive and act out past influence. 
 
The Continent as a whole is demonised by referring to the ‘bloody’ [8-p.302] mainland as 
against a peaceful Britain. Its history is conceived as being a long series of uninterrupted wars 
and conflicts. The EEC, the Continent and Europe are all used synonymously. This locates a 
much broader threat and seeks to homogenise quite separate entities into a whole. Attempts to 
reinvigorate British historical and cultural linkages as a way of countering EEC 
encroachment help formulate a USA that should not be snubbed. The Commonwealth is also 
positioned as an alliance wholly contingent on the national independence of Britain and, as 
such, cannot retain a relationship of importance so as long as Britain becomes submerged into 
Europe. Consequently, both pro- and anti-positions share the Commonwealth as past 
discourse. 
 
3.5 Self, Other and National Identities  
 
The array of Self/Other configurations are summarised in Table 4. Each Self and Other 
configuration, its particular characteristics and the sources from Appendix 1 have been listed. 
Within the pro-membership debates, the EEC is constructed as friendly, with shared values 
and history, and the prospects of withdrawal risk creating a situation of international anarchy 
and a return to the nationalist wars of the twentieth century. The Commonwealth is classified 
as a non-radical Other. It retains ‘close relations’ [1] with the Self but is indicative of a fading 
affinity. Despite the importance of the Atlantic Alliance, Britain is firmly pitted as existing 
within a regional context. It is also evident that this does not necessarily conflict with US 
interests but instead enables the USA to engage more fitfully with a united Europe. The USA, 
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therefore, can be viewed as a non-radical Other. Britain’s past is constituted as a radical 
Other. The past is perceived not merely historically, relating to previous European wars, but 
also to past attitudes that are configured as decadent and antiquated. The Soviet Union and 
Communism as a whole are also posited as a radical Other. The Soviet Union is hostile and 
the need for continued British membership of the EEC is a barrier to its expansionism.  
 
In contrast, the anti-membership debates configure the USA as a friendly Other, playing a 
fundamental role in ensuring the defence of the new Europe and demonstrates the importance 
of retaining this association. The Commonwealth is positioned as an ‘old friend’ [16-p.273] 
but the relationship also reveals the preponderance of the nascent Community in relegating 
the Commonwealth to secondary role. The Commonwealth is constructed as an alliance 
lodged within a historically contingent setting. The EEC is positioned as a radical Other. 
Through a clear process of binarisation, the Self is pitted as democratic, free and victimised 
as against an undemocratic, meddling and malevolent Other. Such negative characterisations 
are also extended to the Continent which is also perceived as a radical configuration steeped 
in a history of bloody campaigns and authoritarian control of which France is notable as its 
chief belligerent.  
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Table 4: Self and Other within the Pro and Anti-Membership Debates 
Debate Self Other Categorisation Characteristics Source  
 
T
he
 P
ro
-M
em
be
rs
hi
p 
D
eb
at
es
 
Britain The EEC Friendly Process of strong linking: clear association between 
Self and Other; malleable notion of Other 
formulates it in a flexible and non-threatening way; 
fear of withdrawal; persistent references to peace, 
prosperity and common interests and values 
1, 4, 6, 
7, 8, 10, 
11, 13h 
& i, 14, 
15, 16, 
17, 19, 
20, 21, 
22 
Britain The 
Commonwealth  
Non-radical Process of mild differentiation: close relations but 
liable to fracture, does not want Self to isolate 
itself, recognition of shifting importance of the EEC 
 
1, 7, 11, 
17, 19, 
20, 21  
Britain The USA Non-radical Process of mild differentiation: clear importance of 
Atlanticism but with a focus on regionalism, desire 
to create European unity in order to compete at an 
international level, recognition that a united Europe 
does not necessarily conflict with the US 
 
1, 8, 
13g, 16, 
17, 19, 
21 
Britain’s present Britain’s past Radical Process of strong differentiation: internationalism 
vs. isolationism, interdependence vs. ‘little 
Englandism’, partnership vs. rivalry 
 
3, 7, 9, 
11,  
Britain The Soviet 
Union / 
Communism 
Radical Process of strong differentiation: free Britain vs. 
Communist Britain, peaceful vs. aggressive, 
democratic system vs. nondemocratic system 
 
1, 19 
      
 
T
he
 A
nt
i-
M
em
be
rs
hi
p 
D
eb
at
es
 
Britain  The USA Friendly Process of strong linking: defined as an ‘old 
friend’, essential to maintain alliance for defence 
 
7, 8, 
13g, 16 
Britain The 
Commonwealth 
Non-radical Process of mild differentiation: defined as an ‘old 
friend’, positive commitment and obligation to the 
Other but recognition of declining role, Other is 
constructed as part of historical alliance that has 
become interrupted and ruptured 
 
8, 18 
Britain The EEC Radical Process of strong differentiation: democratic vs. 
undemocratic, greatness vs. decline, free nation vs. 
encroaching community, elected national 
politicians vs. unelected bureaucrats, local and 
national vs. large and supranational, victim vs. 
Perpetrator 
 
1, 7, 
13a, f, g, 
h,  i & j, 
15, 16, 
18, 20, 
22,   
Britain The Continent Radical Process of strong differentiation: 
peaceful vs. bloody, stable vs. unstable, ruled by 
parliament vs. ruled by dictators, victor vs. defeated 
or occupied 
 
8, 18, 
20,  
Britain France Radical Process of strong differentiation: international 
values vs. nationalist values/conciliatory vs. 
hegemonic 
 
7, 8, 9, 
16 
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Due to the discursive contestations, and the range of Others produced, a number of conflicting 
national identities are generated. The positioning of a number of threats and alliances, as 
indicated by the formulation of Others, has repercussions for elite interpretations of Britain’s 
sense of Self. I argue that the various processes of Othering – friendly, non-radical and radical – 
reveal the following attempts to impose a number of national identities. 
 
3.5.1 National Identity and Friendly Othering 
 
The EEC in the pro-debates is predictably positioned as a friendly Other. A number of important 
linkages help attain this relationship. Firstly, the EEC is constructed as the means to harbour and 
project British interests and identity. This is achieved via the articulation of the fear of isolation. 
Withdrawal is perceived as an existential threat and the cementing of links to Europe is the 
process necessary to sustain individual national identities. To combat the frequently cited 
concern over the loss of sovereignty, it is wedded to the notion of pooling. Sovereignty is a 
pooled construct akin to a continental approach which views it as “being multi-layered, local, 
regional, national and European”.475 By pitching Europe as a fundamentally evolutionary project, 
it is argued that identities themselves are not intrinsically inert and can shape and mould to their 
new surroundings. Identity, therefore, is essentially malleable and its potency rests on a need to 
accept change and to recant what are seen as primitive and outmoded readings of sovereignty 
that configure it as sacrosanct and timeless. Secondly, the references to the EEC as a galvaniser 
for peace and prosperity make much use of the existence of shared and common values. British 
                                                     
475 Baker, D. (2005) ‘‘E with much less U’: or ‘No More E or U’? British Eurosceptic Exceptionalism after Enlargement’ in 
Workshop: National Identity and Euroscepticism: A Comparison between France and the United Kingdom, 13 May, Centre for 
the Study of Democratic Government, European Research Group, University of Oxford, p. 5.  
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national identity is positioned within a European framework and subsequently no longer 
embodies exceptionalism but universalism. That is, not only is Britain part of a European legacy 
but it is also a key contributor and promulgator of the common values that help define what 
Europe is. Finally, much use of the economic and political malaise that would befall Britain if it 
chose to stay outside of the Community reveals an identity no longer lodged within a discourse 
perpetuated by empire. Forster notes how “[i]n the Conservative party, many MPs based their 
anti-Europeanism on a strong emotional commitment to the Empire/Commonwealth”476 and, as 
would be expected, pro-marketeers similarly articulated a position that sought to extricate 
Britain’s present and future from the shackles of its imperial past. The ability to distance Britain 
from its expansionary, colonial history positions national identity in new and vibrant terms and 
helps to formulate it in partnership with rather than in rivalry with other such national identities.  
 
The configuration of the USA as a friendly Other in the pro-membership debates is bound up 
with two distinct readings of the relationship. The first is cultural in that both countries have 
being forged culturally and historically and this homogenising legacy continues to live on. Roger 
Scruton captures this sentiment:  
The British Empire lives on in America, just as the Roman Empire lived on in 
Byzantium, although in a form more vital, more industrious and more generous 
than its ancient archetype.477 
 
In short, cultural ties and values not merely reveal an affinity, but the embodiment of what was 
once celebratory about Britain continues to operate in America. To prop up this link, key 
historical events are illustrative of the proximity in values of the two countries. For example, 
                                                     
476 Forster, A. (2002) ‘Anti-Europeans, Anti-Marketeers and Eurosceptics: The Evolution and Influence of Labour and 
Conservative Opposition to Europe’, The Political Quarterly, vol. 73, issue 3, pp. 299-308 (at 299). 
477 Scruton, R. (1986) The Times, 14 Jan. Cited in Wallace, W. (1986) ‘What Price Independence? Sovereignty and 
Interdependence in British Politics’, p. 386. 
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Wallace mentions how the legacy of the Second World War helped to fortify the image of a 
fundamentally British national character.478 One might add how this national character was 
bolstered by the image of an occupied mainland Europe as against both free and resilient Britain 
and America. America became positioned as a fundamental lifeline for free states hostile to the 
intimidation of Communism and fascism and this also positions British identity as freedom-
loving and liberal. The second is material. The predominance of the ‘special relationship’ is 
inextricably linked to a static reading of security. Subsequently, an evolving, growing Europe is 
not constructed as an entity that can in any way rival the dominance of America’s Superpower 
status. In short, the relationship is a pre-given and little trust is placed in the ability of the EEC to 
cultivate a sense of security that could ever compete with the Atlantic Alliance.  
 
3.5.2 National Identity and Non-Radical Othering 
 
The Commonwealth is positioned as a non-radical Other in both the pro- and anti-membership 
debates. Firstly, the natural role of British leadership had been supplanted by a dual recognition 
of the importance of fomenting closer ties to Europe and the understanding that the nature of the 
Commonwealth had radically altered. The Commonwealth states had become largely 
independent and, as referenced in the pro-membership debates, any attempt to ‘summon up the 
lost legions of the Commonwealth’ [21-col.1066] was pure fantasy. Subsequently, the fading 
role of the Commonwealth is synonymous with the fading role Britain possessed in attempting to 
shore up an alliance that no longer had its previous resonance. This positions a British sense of 
Self which understood that the resurgence of economic and political links to non-European 
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nations could not compete against the thrust of the new Europe which was being made. Despite 
this shifting locus towards the European venture, the Commonwealth, however, is not 
constructed as an entity that should be ignored or sidelined. References are made to how 
Commonwealth interests do not sit in opposition with a pro-European Britain which enables 
identity to be less nationally defined, but more transnational and cross-cutting. The 
Commonwealth is also partially constructed as a remnant of colonial days in which a more pro-
European stance might position Britain in less imperial terms and more as part of an anti-Empire, 
voluntaristic association.   
 
In the pro-debates, the USA functions as a non-radical Other. The much-lauded ‘special 
relationship’ is dramatically reconfigured to reveal the emergence of a quite different 
association. Hitherto, the Anglo-American rapport was essential for British identity in a number 
of ways:  
It fitted British pre-dispositions perfectly. It was image building; it flattered 
popular feeling and imagery about Britain’s world role; it was a direct 
continuation of Britain’s wartime experience, so deeply engraved in the 
national psyche; it gave substance and sense to Britain’s mission to serve world 
security.479 
 
By the 1970s, however, the ‘special relationship’ had become coined as the ‘natural relationship’ 
by Edward Heath480 and despite clear associations with the USA, a number of identity-based 
changes started to occur. Firstly, the focus towards regionalism helped foster the idea that the 
EEC, irrespective of any suspicion towards it, could no longer be sidelined. In the 1960s, “[w]e 
took it for granted that Britain was a world power, entitled to a seat at the top tables. Europe was 
                                                     
479 Hibbert, R. (1993) ‘Britain in search of a role, 1957-1973; a role in Europe, European integration and Britain: a witness 
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not then a top table”.481  By the 1970s, “the basic doctrines of English pan-Anglo-Saxonism (as) 
the unquestioning identification of British and American leadership”482 had been corroded by the 
realisation that Britain could not continue to ignore the integration of Europe. Secondly, there is 
perhaps the early understanding that European and American values and interests were 
essentially no longer the same and that Britain fundamentally had to choose between the two. 
This perhaps reveals an early process of the Europeanisation of Britain whereby Atlantic ties had 
to be softened in order to be part of the European family. The gradual shift away from the USA 
being positioned as Britain’s most important ally is reflected in the dwindling identification with 
American values. This slow process reveals a national identity that is sticky but not immutable 
and a future that is firmly planted within a European rather than Atlantic sphere. As a 
consequence, the USA as a non-radical Other retains a level of importance but is adulterated by 
Britain’s growing sense of purpose to attach itself to the core of the new European sphere.   
 
3.5.3 National Identity and Radical Othering 
 
The practice of radical Othering reveals how past invocations of history, Communism, the EEC 
and the Continent are all positioned as a series of threats and these reveal certain kinds of 
national identities. Firstly, although both sceptics and enthusiasts evoke past memories when 
making their cases, “they do not talk about the same past.”483 The radical Othering of a history 
replete with past glories helps recognise the importance of how historical legacies are tightly 
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constraining,484 whilst simultaneously identifying how these myths can be debunked. This 
temporal Othering, therefore, is somewhat related to a more general European Other that, since 
World War Two, has constructed a European identity in opposition to its past.485 Subsequently, 
within the pro-EEC debates, and perhaps unconventionally, I also argue that Britain’s past, 
particularly viewed at a time by political elites who had had experience of this violent history, is 
a radical Other. Additionally, the preoccupation with weakness, and the fear of withdrawal, helps 
reveal a national identity which operates in contrast to the previously dominant configuration of 
Britain as being fundamentally detached from the rest of Europe. The detachment rests on a 
“myth created by the Victorians as an explanation for the historical inevitability of the British 
empire.”486 The references to decline seek to question this inevitability and the romanticised 
view of a go-it-alone, imperial Britain and subsequently positions British national identity as 
internationalist rather than isolationist. As “the United Kingdom was obliged to seek admission 
to a Europe it could no longer control or avoid”,487 this indelible linkage to the Continent seeks 
to reposition a British national identity that is no longer constitutive of the British empire and no 
longer in opposition to Europe. As a consequence, Britain’s past, cloaked in imperial dominance 
and idealised isolationism, is very much pitched as a radical Other. 
 
The second process of radical Othering within the pro-membership debates elides Communism 
and Socialism as similar threats and constructs Britain as under siege from all variants of what is 
seen as left-wing authoritarianism. As was articulated by one Conservative politician during the 
House of Commons debates: 
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The Left calls the Community a capitalist club. I do not know what the 
opposite to capitalism is – presumably it is Socialism, with a large capital S – 
the sort of Socialism which is so closely allied to Communism that in my view 
it is difficult to differentiate between the two.488     
  
This fear is very much lodged within a Cold War West versus East binarisation. In 1951, a 
Foreign Office memorandum argued how integration had been innervated by the Soviet threat 
and the sheer size of the Soviet bloc drew attention to the weak and fragmentary nature of 
Western Europe.489 The security risks continued to permeate the period during and after the 
referendum leading to the conclusion that “anti-Communism had provided British 
Conservatism’s main external enemy in the post-war era.”490 The security dimension has a 
number of repercussions for identity. To begin with, the East as threat helps to instil the idea that 
national sovereignty is an integral part of British identity and can only be realised within a 
setting of closer union to other European nations. Sovereignty is positioned as indivisible and 
unitary and its preservation is seen as integral to the continuation of a democratic tradition.  
Next, the manner in which this sovereignty is not at risk from dilution with other European states 
situates Britain as firmly wedded to the Continent. Subsequently, the process of the radical 
Othering of the Soviet Union helps construct a Britain that has a leading role to play in the 
containment of the Other. Finally, the process of binarisation pits an aggressive East against a 
Britain as victim to this aggression. Again, the previously dominant position of Britain as 
possessing a sense of Self based on imperial conquest is repudiated to reveal a much more 
peaceful and conciliatory nation.  
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The third radical Other, taken from the anti-membership debates, locates Britain in conflict with 
the EEC. However, although unsurprising, a number of important formulations help consolidate 
this stance. Historical ruptures, such as the Second World War, are displayed as events which 
threatened but did not alter the essentially enduring and teleological nature of sovereignty. The 
articulation of sovereignty is embedded within a tightly drawn historical framework which seeks 
to construct the present as a direct continuation of the past. Identity is therefore constructed as 
singular and static. The importance of orderliness, and lack of critical junctures, is core to British 
identity. Political change, therefore, occurs in slow, incremental ways and this projects a national 
identity that is measured and controlled, rather than rebellious and anarchistic. British identity is 
rooted in individualism and independence. Britain is “a self-contained and detached entity with 
its centre of gravity located within itself”491 and must therefore be resistant to the monumental 
changes that membership would foist upon it. British identity is steadfastly linked to the 
perception of the homogeneity of the nation-state, “parliamentary sovereignty remains the only 
fully legitimate source of sovereignty”492 and identity is resistant to change as it is “historically 
firmly embedded.”493 Due to this, national identity has two dominant motifs when positioning 
the EEC as radical Other. Firstly, it seeks to elide sovereignty with identity; that is, the loss of 
sovereignty is also a loss of identity.494 Secondly, British identity is mired in historical myths 
that construct the rest of Europe as corrupt and despotic as against the idealism of the ‘free-born 
Englishman’. 
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A final process of radical Othering also stems from the anti-EEC debates and seeks to configure 
the Continent, and in particular France, in direct opposition. One can argue that “[t]he existence 
of France as an object of discourse underlying the British, or more precisely English, sense of 
national identity has a very long history.”495 The antagonistic positioning of France is firmly 
positioned within an elite reading of history that seeks to draw clear links between past and 
present. To begin with, and perhaps most obviously, the numerous wars between the two states 
have solidified the idea that Britain has at several times been at risk of conquest496 and this 
enables mainland Europe to be positioned as a threat. The invocation of past conflicts, therefore, 
culminating in the “self-protection against the pretensions of pope and emperor”,497 position 
Europe as an encroaching entity, with France at its helm, and with the Continental European 
states categorised into the “victors and vanquished.”498 However, the adversarial positioning of 
the Continent is linked not merely to historical spats, but also to fundamental legal and 
constitutional differences.499 The identities of  
[t]he continental states were also quite similar to one another, both because 
they had sprung from the Napoleonic wars and subsequent historical events and 
because they had a common social basis in peasant agriculture. ... The federal 
idea therefore came naturally to them and did not damage their national 
identity.500 
 
Wallace argues how the controversies in the 1970s were “argued in terms of superiority of 
common law to Roman law, the greater underlying strength of the British democratic tradition, 
and the statist and corporatist assumptions which underlay continental government and 
                                                     
495 Currid, J. (1998) ‘Explaining the Nature of Opposition in Britain to the European Community since 1973’, Sheffield, 
University of Sheffield, Department of Politics, PhD Thesis, p. 156. Cited in George, S. (2000) ‘Britain: Anatomy of a 
Eurosceptic state’, Journal of European Integration, 22: 1, pp. 15-33 (at 18). 
496 Colley, L. (1992) ‘Britishness and Otherness: An Argument’, p. 323. 
497 Wallace, W. (1986) ‘What Price Independence? Sovereignty and Interdependence in British Politics’, p. 382. 
498 Stevens, P. (2005) ‘Britain and Europe: An Unforgettable Past and an Unavoidable Future’, p. 15. 
499 Wallace, W. (1986) ‘What Price Independence? Sovereignty and Interdependence in British Politics’, p. 383. 
500 Parekh, B. (2002) ‘Defining British National Identity’, pp. 9-10. 
 
 
165 
 
administration.”501 Subsequently, France is seen as heavily influencing the European project in 
order to supplant and dominate Britain.502 Due to Britain being “tightly constrained by its 
historical legacy”,503 two key elements of British national identity can be pinpointed within the 
anti-membership debates about the Continent. The first is that Britain possesses a deep feeling of 
insecurity in its relations with its neighbours. The second is that Britain positions itself as 
superior in its practice of democracy, governance and values. 
 
3.6 The Production of British National Identities  
 
Figure 4 summarises and unifies the findings within the debates. The reason for presenting this is 
threefold. Firstly, it synthesises the empirical data in this chapter. Secondly, it provides a 
summary as a means of comparing how which identities in all three empirical chapters have been 
stabilised and which are specific to the historical event. In short, it provides the framework for an 
understanding of change and stasis within the identity formations. This comparative element will 
be examined in detail, however, in Chapter Six. Thirdly, it enables a deeper understanding of the 
factors that help stabilise and produce the identities. Although the debates have been divided into 
pro- and anti-positions, these in turn produce multiple readings of Europe, as well as other states 
and international organisations, which impact on the production of British national identities. 
That is, the discourses produced contain characteristics that have been articulated in both pro- 
and anti-positions. Consequently, although the pro/anti dichotomy has been included as a means 
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of understanding which identities have been produced from which position, it can be said that the 
demarcation has been diluted.  
 
The figure is organised as follows. The processes of Othering and the various pro/anti divisions 
are displayed. Then, the discourses taken from the subject positioning are shown. These, in turn, 
produce a range of identities extrapolated from both the discourses and from the characteristics 
in Table 4. Finally, from these attributes, I argue that six British Selves can be posited. In the 
same way as Othering produces a range of Others – not a single, definable entity – so too does it 
produce a number of Selves. Although these final configurations are state-centric, they can be 
regarded as images of nationhood formulated due to the various identities attributed to them.  
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On the basis of the findings in this chapter, six British Selves are formulated. These are the 
formulations extracted from the processes of predication, presupposition and subject positioning 
within the body of this chapter. The first can be categorised as Britain as a European nation-
state. Three discourses forge this categorisation: Europe as a security bloc, as established and as 
a network of sovereignties. The security dimension lodges Britain within a European framework 
that functions as an essential defence against the ‘East as threat’. As an established and rooted 
construct, Europe is taken as pre-given. Its existence is indisputable as is the dominant agency 
afforded it. Consequently, Britain identifies with this inevitability and is firmly attached to what 
is seen as the increasingly central role that the EEC has. As a network of sovereignties, European 
membership weds individual nation-states together in a system of interdependencies. Complete 
sovereignty is regarded as chimerical. The interests and identities of states are neither diluted nor 
threatened because the Community provides the means to ensure they are exercised and 
protected. A number of British national identities are produced from these discourses. For the 
purposes of explanation, they can be grouped in two ways. Firstly, identity is multiple, European 
and pragmatic. Multiplicity reveals a non-exclusionist view of British identity that includes an 
overlapping spectrum of different allegiances. The most dominant is Europe that is fashioned out 
of a realistic, matter-of-fact necessity. The attachment to Europe, however, does not preclude 
other alliances. This is because of the cross-cutting nature of identity and also the fact that 
political authority very much continues to be lodged within the sphere of the nation-state. 
Secondly, identity is in crisis, militarised, defensive and demonstrative of a fading power status. 
The reification of Europe as a major identity for Britain is made sense of within a security 
structure that has two elements. The first is that Europe functions as a means to protect its 
members from outside threats. ‘Cold-War Europe’ is the dominant configuration that gives 
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Britain meaning. The second is that Britain, with its declining dominance, is forced to anchor 
itself to the Community as a means of bolstering its national authority abroad.  
 
The second British Self is as a transatlantic, securitised nation-state. Two discourses construct 
this reading. The first is the USA as a security alliance. As with the previous discourse, identities 
are framed by defensive measures although as an alliance, the security relationship is more 
mutually determined. The second discourse constructs the USA as a cultural and historical 
linkage. The USA is imbued with a sense of fraternity and commonality. These two discourses 
produce several British national identities that can be grouped into two clusters. One focuses on 
Britain as militarily influential, regionalist and defensive. Apart from the dominance of the 
already mentioned security dimension, identity is lodged within a regionalist perception that 
pinpoints the USA as a conduit for Britain and helps forge two more identities: Britain as 
culturalised and historicised. That is, identity is not governed by geographical proximity but by 
regional association defined via history and culture. As a consequence, Britain is configured as 
possessing a transatlantic identity which functions in opposition to a historically and culturally 
distant Europe. 
 
The third British Self can be identified as a transnational European power. Three discourses 
produce this understanding: Europe as a transnational cooperative, Europe as a superpower and 
the Commonwealth as past. Firstly, Britain possesses a level of transnationalism that exercises an 
influence on Europe and as well as beyond. This influence is governed principally by trade links 
which help formulate Europe as a cooperative: a union of like-minded unitary members whereby 
interdependency dominates due to the common goal of prosperity via commerce. The second 
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discourse is generated by the non-radical Othering of the USA in which Europe can function as a 
both a complement and a competitor to the Atlantic Alliance. That is, Britain’s voice can best be 
exercised via being a solid member of a united Europe that has become an actor with significant 
status, capable of dealing with the many security responsibilities hitherto exercised by America. 
Conversely, Europe functions as a global force in which American unilateralism can also be 
checked. Thirdly, a waning relationship with the Commonwealth nonetheless provides the 
argument than Britain retains a sense of transnationalism denied other states. It possesses a level 
of exceptionalism that positions it as unique in its sense of global reach, not in terms of hard 
power but via historical connections. As a consequence, several British national identities are 
produced. First of all, Britain is interdependent, dominant and trade-driven. That is, Britain and 
Europe shape one another in terms of mutual reinforcement and lodges the common pursuit of 
prosperity and stability to the proliferation of free and unrestricted trade. Wary of the perils of 
isolationism, Europe is read as an international power that animates the status of individual states 
and imbues them with a level of instrumentality. This process enables member states to gain 
from membership but it places a small number of states, including Britain, as part of core 
Europe. In this sense, Britain is also invested with a sense of dominance in being a primary 
shaper of Europe. Secondly, Britain is global and internationalist. Although already mentioned, 
the albeit fading links to the Commonwealth are exercised to highlight a global British identity 
that still retains trade and historical links to non-European states and echoes the fact that 
although such affinities are largely redundant, Britain still possesses a distinctive capacity to 
forge international friendships denied to Continental Europe.   
 
This configuration is reproduced in the fourth British Self which can be classified as a 
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transnational nation-state. Only the Commonwealth as past perpetuates this reading of Britain. 
As already mentioned, this weakening alliance nonetheless produces global and internationalist 
British identities because again Britain has the sole ability to transcend what is seen as the 
confining and restrictive obsession with the Community to develop, retain and salvage trade and 
cultural networks abroad. However, this configuration differs in one manner. Britain’s Self is 
lodged in the notion that political power resides within self-governing nation-states.  
 
A cooperative European power is the subsequent British Self. This is produced by three 
discourses: Europe as a superpower, Europe as its historical antithesis and the USSR as not 
Europe. Again, Europe as a superpower locates Britain as a contributing force to Europe’s 
dominant actor status. Furthermore, Europe is read as an entity functioning in opposition to its 
past. This temporal configuration is tightly wedded to a particular reading of British identity. 
That is, Britain’s past is also part of Europe’s in which a rivalrous and destructive history is 
invoked to highlight the new Europe as embodied in the Community: an association 
characterised by trade, common interests and mutual cooperation. The final influence on identity 
is the USSR as not Europe. The Soviet Union is not part of a European consensus in which trade 
and conciliation flourish and it is positioned as expansionist and wedded to the dissemination of 
Communism. That is not to say that the Soviet Union is beyond reform. However, within this 
configuration, Britain is part of a broader European Self. Europe defines itself geographically, 
politically and economically from states that lie beyond its boundaries. It is geographically 
determined, politically democratic and economically free trade driven. The USSR, by contrast, is 
a closed system, promulgating and exporting centralising policies and functioning as a military 
threat. As a consequence of these discourses, Britain is dominant, free, peaceful, liberating, non-
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isolationist and democratic. These identities are very much value-laden and operate according to 
European values based on the ability of its citizens to exercise freedoms. As a cooperative state, 
Britain sees itself as against isolationist barriers and instead positions itself as a conduit for 
promulgation of inter-European trade and contact. Furthermore, it is a liberating unit as it 
functions as a principal actor in battling protectionism, a source of isolationism and conflict, and 
instead has effectively forged a cooperative reading of Europe.  
 
The final British Self can be categorised as a sovereign parliamentary body. Two negative 
readings of Europe formulate this. The first is Europe as a federal state. The EEC is regarded as 
part of a long process to consolidate power into a number of states and non-state actors. France is 
very much utilised within this construction and Europe is effectively a tool for French 
aggrandisement. Additionally, the Community is notable for its encroaching power and influence 
that threatens the authority of nation-states. These points are iterated via the articulation of 
federalism: that the goal of further integration is to consolidate power via stripping individual 
states of their sovereignty. In addition, Europe as a syndicate highlights that a surreptitious and 
conspiratorial relationship exists between big business and the Community. That is, corporatism 
is the ethos that drives the EEC while unelected bureaucrats carry unfettered capitalism intent on 
disregarding the broader values and identities of the populace. From this reading, a number of 
identity characteristics position Britain as local, organic, unitary, democratic, liberated, socialist 
and welfare-oriented. The singularised nature of Britain unifies its disparate elements by 
projecting the notion that the Community functions as a threat to all regions and elements of 
Britain. Parliament is envisaged as the vanguard of these localised identities. Finally, the socialist 
and democratic nature of Britain functions in opposition to a corporatist Community.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE MAASTRICHT TREATY 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out to examine the discourses surrounding the 1993 ratification of the 
Maastricht Treaty, formally called the Treaty on European Union or TEU. The primary sources 
utilised to construct the discourses and consequent national identities are listed in Appendix 2. 
An explanatory description along with Tables 5 and 6 reveal what has been said and written by 
political elites, are grouped thematically and are followed by numbers which indicate the source 
in the appendix. As with the previous empirical chapter, the numbers next to each quotation 
relate to the various sources in the appendix. Again, single quotation marks within the tables 
appear in the original. The sources can be categorised as follows. Firstly, I employ the general 
election manifestoes of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Democrat parties in the 1992 
general election. As they are an attempt to express elite perceptions on Europe to the wider 
public, they are of empirical importance in the context of this research. Secondly, I utilise 
memoirs and biographies from dominant political figures and spokespeople. Again, these 
individuals were central actors within the event and their accounts are significant as they 
propagated certain arguments, images and perceptions of Europe. Thirdly, I make use of other 
texts containing primary source statements and viewpoints. Finally, I examine the third 
parliamentary reading of the Maastricht Treaty which took place on 20 May 1993. This debate is 
important in two main ways. To start with, it culminated in the highest number of Tory rebels – 
46 – who voted against the government. Thus, the level of dissention and contestability within 
the debate serves as an important conduit for revealing the many conflicting elite-driven 
meanings of Europe. Furthermore, the debate took place after the Maastricht Bill had been 
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completed. This had taken 210 hours and undergone 600 amendments. That is, this debate is 
effectively a summary of many of the common arguments and positions that had been articulated 
over the previous year.  
 
The structure closely follows that of the previous empirical chapter. The opening section 
provides the historical background leading up to the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
Again, this rehearsal of the mainstream position seeks to establish the principal actors, events 
and environment and is not an attempt to advance a challenge to the received history. This part is 
a means of bringing to light the contexts within which the discourses operate. Again, I restrict 
this historical overview to presenting events and positions that concentrate on Europe. The next 
section is an analysis of the various discourses revealed by an examination of the sources listed 
in Appendix 2. The predicates are presented and grouped and the debates are separated into those 
for and against the treaty. Again, it is worth reaffirming that an anti-treaty position is not 
identical with a broader hostility to all that might be considered European and, conversely, a pro-
position might be weakly held. As iterated in the introduction to the previous empirical chapter, 
these positions are ideal types and allow the range of different positions to be organised 
systematically and then examined. Subsequent to this, I present the background knowledge, or 
presuppositions, that take certain truths to be valid. I then show how these meanings are 
organised into subject positions which show the relationships between the various subjects. After 
that, the process of Othering is examined with the array of friendly, non-friendly and radical 
configurations presented. The next section examines how British national identities are 
constructed according to the conceptualisations of these Others and this process is presented in 
Table 7. The final section integrates the empirical data of the chapter to present the array of 
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British Selves, or images of nationhood, along with the national identities that have produced 
them. This is summarised in Figure 5 and is followed by an explanation. Again, for 
straightforwardness, British Selves are highlighted in bold while the discourses and identities are 
italicised.  
   
4.2 Historical Background 
 
It is important to highlight the fact that the vote for Britain to continue membership of the 
European Community, although much flaunted as a radical and unprecedented act, was more 
about the politics of fear that blighted a 1970s recession-hit Britain, rather than an intrinsic desire 
for political change. Despite being an unprecedented national ballot, it was an unenthusiastic 
decision to vote for the status quo and not for far-reaching new initiatives.504 “Support for 
membership was wide but it did not run deep”,505 and very soon the attitudes of British political 
elites reverted very quickly to a ‘business as usual’ attitude in which national interests always 
trounced any sense of Community spirit.  
 
With Harold Wilson’s surprise resignation on 16 March 1976, James Callaghan, the then Foreign 
Secretary, was elected leader of the Labour Party. Although responsible for the renegotiations, he 
had been critical of the Heath government because the commitment to Europe had weakened 
what he regarded as the important bond with America.506 Several European projects certainly did 
seem to grind to a halt during the late seventies, many of which were obstructed by the Labour 
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government. In January 1975, the British government hastily cancelled a Channel Tunnel project 
after the French had already started construction.507 Similar disagreements occurred over 
emissions, fishing quotas and agricultural price reviews, several of these disputes occurring in 
1977 when Britain held the presidency of the EC which is usually regarded as a position to 
provide Community animus and drive.508 Perhaps one of the most important areas of Community 
business was that of the EMS, the European Monetary System. Although Britain had joined, the 
Labour Party lacked enthusiasm for a monetary union that first required states to link their 
currencies to one another. In 1978, the British Ambassador to Paris lamented that  
[o]ur leading European partners were fed up with us – with our reluctant 
Europeanness; and they were determined to go ahead in creating a new 
monetary system for the Community. We would not be able to divide or break 
them even if should we wish to do so.509  
 
Perhaps the final disagreement to round off what had become a turbulent decade was the BBQ, 
the British Budgetary Question, branded the Bloody British Question by the individual 
responsible for its resolution, the then President of the European Commission Roy Jenkins.510 
The need to resolve this crisis stemmed from Britain importing far more products from outside 
the Community than the other eight members and therefore paying more in import levies and 
customs duties.511 By having only a small level of agriculture, which placed little financial strain 
on the Community, Britain found itself as one of the poorest members of the EEC whilst being 
the next biggest budgetary contributor after the richest country Germany.512 Eventually, the 
dispute was resolved somewhat acrimoniously by the Thatcher government in 1984, but the 
                                                     
507 May, A. (1999) Britain and Europe since 1945, p. 64. 
508 Ibid. 
509 Henderson, N. (1994) Mandarin: the Diaries of an Ambassador 1969-82, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, pp. 202-3. Cited 
in Greenwood, S. (1996) Britain and European Integration Since the Second World War, Manchester; Manchester University 
Press, p. 13.   
510 Jenkins, R. (1991) A Life at the Centre, London: Macmillan, pp. 491-508. 
511 Ibid., p. 492. 
512 Ibid. 
 
 
177 
 
excessive burdens of membership helped purvey an image of the Community as iniquitous with 
Britain contributing greatly but getting little in return.   
 
By the time of the 1979 Conservative victory, the Labour Party had lurched into outright hostility 
towards the Community. This culminated in the October 1980 decision at the annual party 
conference in favour of withdrawal and also included this policy in its manifestoes up until 
1988.513 In contrast, Margaret Thatcher’s early support for the Community centred on two main 
arguments. The first was primarily economic, in which Britain had a leading role to play as a 
significant contributor to EC trade. At the Conservative Party conference in 1981, she mentioned 
that “[f]orty-three pounds out of every £100 we earn abroad comes from the Common Market. 
Over two million jobs depend on our trade with Europe, two millions jobs which will be put at 
risk by Britain’s withdrawal.”514 Her second reason concentrated on the Community as a 
safeguard against Soviet belligerence. Such a belief also positioned Atlanticism as fundamental 
and in 1979 she asserted that “[t]he North Atlantic Alliance and the European Community are – 
and remain – free associations of free peoples”515 while a strong Europe would be the best 
partner for the US and the free world.  
 
European issues, however, would not be the focal point of the first two Thatcher governments as 
the Falklands Conflict, the US bombing of Libya, industrial strikes and the implementation of 
austere economic measures to combat double-digit inflation all took precedence during the early 
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and mid-eighties. However, the low-key and essentially pragmatic approach to Europe would 
eventually give way to a series of well-documented and tumultuous disagreements. These 
occurred against the backdrop of what could be argued as the two central issues relating to 
Europe during the Thatcher governments: the Single European Act and entry to the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism. In the build up to such high points, Britain’s relationship with its European 
partners would be defined by conflict. The budgetary question led to a number of lengthy and 
onerous negotiations and Thatcher’s abrasive style has been consistently cited as a source of 
added tension: 
After giving a shrill exposition of the British case – ‘I am not asking for 
anyone else’s money, I just want my money back’ – at the first afternoon of the 
session, she again harangued her colleagues for almost the whole of a working 
dinner which took some four hours. Schmidt feigned sleep, Giscard just sat 
back contentedly watching her weaken her own position, and the others 
became increasingly unconvinced of the validity of the British case.516   
 
Gilmour goes on to argue how a battle against Britain’s European partners was the perfect 
complement to the monetarist crusade at home and “a running row with our European partners 
was the next best thing to a war; it would divert public attention from the disasters at home.”517   
 
In 1985, Jacques Delors, of the French Socialist Party, became President of the European 
Commission and signalled his desire to inject momentum into the integration project by his 
support of the single market. The Single European Act, ratified the following year, involved a 
number of important directives. These included establishing an internal market by 1992, the 
harmonisation and improvement of health and safety, the support of social cohesion by reducing 
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disparities between regions and the extension of Qualified Majority Voting.518 Thatcher always 
insisted that she had been duped and maintained that “[t]he Single European Act, contrary to my 
intentions at the time, had provided new scope for the European Commission and the European 
Court to press forward in the direction of centralization.”519 Thus, she spelt out an alternative 
which included the need to accommodate the new countries of Eastern Europe, the 
acknowledgment of the global economic changes in finance and business which relegated the 
importance of the EC and the need to resist a centralising “hierarchical bureaucracy”520 which 
was utterly inadequate for an ever-growing Europe that needed the market as a model.  
 
In contrast, Delors was a staunch federalist. He had been labelled as “socialist, dirigiste and 
centralist”521 by a close Thatcher aid. In a speech to the European Parliament, Delors pressed 
ahead with the starting notion of “an embryo European government” within six years and the 
prediction that national assemblies would “wake up in horror, scandalized by their loss of 
powers.”522 He also gave a speech to Thatcher’s chief antagonist, the TUC, highlighting the 
social dimension to Europe. Thatcher’s rebuff, her infamous Bruges speech, underscored some 
spectacular differences. Firstly, she positioned Europe and its identity in much broader terms 
than Delors or any of her European counterparts, and made reference to the people East of the 
Iron Curtain who also “once enjoyed a full share of European culture, freedom and identity”.523 
Firmly contingent on this widening and inclusive interpretation of Europe was the USA, which 
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as “the valiant defender of freedom”,524 had a significant securitising role in harbouring the 
newly founded liberties and independence of the Eastern European nations. Secondly, whilst 
recognising the need for cooperation, she revelled in the diversity of Europe and that far from 
becoming a homogenous entity, Europe was and should continue to be a cluster of “independent 
sovereign states”.525 In recognising this, she assigned a special role to the issues of sovereignty 
and identity and celebrated Europe as a family of nations, “understanding each other better, 
appreciating each other more, doing more together but relishing our national identity no less than 
our common European endeavour.”526 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, she poured scorn 
on the bureaucracy and centralism of Brussels and asserted that “[w]e have not successfully 
rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level 
with a European super-state exercising a new dominance from Brussels.”527 These differences in 
vision not only revealed the divisions over how Britain and the Continent saw Europe, but also 
ignited internal rows within the Conservative government. In the aftermath of the Bruges speech, 
Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary, symbolised the alarm felt in Europhile circles and berated 
how “the speech veered between caricature and misunderstanding.”528  
 
Meanwhile, Delors pushed on with his designs, perhaps bolstered by the fact that Thatcher 
increasingly stood alone. The Delors Committee completed a study of Economic and Monetary 
Union in June 1989 and stressed two fundamental aspects of monetary union: free capital 
movements and irreversibly fixed exchange rates.529 Upon its publication, Thatcher noted that in 
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contrast to previous discussions of a ‘three-stage’ system in which a signatory could refuse to 
advance to the later stages, it now insisted that by embarking on the first stage, full economic and 
monetary union was irrevocable.530 She doggedly resisted the call by both her Foreign Secretary, 
Geoffrey Howe, and her Chancellor, Nigel Lawson, to sign up for the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism. Lawson was eventually to resign on 31 October 1989. In July 1990, the Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry, Nicholas Ridley, was forced to resign after describing monetary 
union as “a German racket designed to take over the whole of Europe” and also castigating the 
French for “acting like poodles to the Germans”.531 Although hastily identified as a privately 
held opinion and not a reflection of government policy, the attitude of one of Thatcher’s closest 
allies underscored the idea that “Ridley had spoken aloud the Prime Minister’s private 
thoughts.”532 Meanwhile, after Howe’s ignominious demotion to the perfunctory role of Leader 
of the House of Commons, and with Thatcher’s increasingly strident Europhobia, he resigned in 
November 1990. The disunity eventually led to the Prime Minister’s downfall. The Europhile 
Michael Heseltine had resigned in 1986 over the Westland Affair when he had supported the 
merger of the sole British helicopter manufacturer with European partners as against the Prime 
Minister’s preference for an American merger. His leadership challenge enabled him to win 
enough votes in the first ballot to force her withdrawal.533 Her removal, however, did not impede 
her decision to put her influence behind John Major, a candidate less seduced by the European 
faith.534  
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The Maastricht Treaty set up the phases necessary for the introduction of the Euro and also 
created the pillar structure of the European Community (encompassing citizenship, policies and 
monetary union), the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Justice and Home Affairs. 
Although Economic and Monetary Union did not follow irrevocably from entry to the Exchange 
Rate Mechanism, it was generally believed that ERM would provide the ‘glide path’ to EMU.535 
After Thatcher’s unambiguous and confrontational approach to Europe, and possibly because of 
it, Major adopted a more compliant and consensual role. Overtures were made to Chancellor 
Kohl as a way of assuaging both leaked reports of a seminar which contained more than 
disparaging remarks about the German national character and for Thatcher’s attempt to aggravate 
German reunification.536 This was echoed in March 1991 in Bonn when Major stated “I want us 
to be where we belong. At the very heart of Europe.”537 Two conferences in December 1991 
produced British support for a more intergovernmental ‘pillar’ structure rather than a federal 
system yet the Maastricht Treaty also set out for the first time the objective of EMU, including 
the timetable and means to achieve an eventual single currency.538 
 
Despite the two opt-outs from monetary union and the Social Charter, Major’s difficulties over 
Europe were to snowball. Whilst having ‘federal’ dropped from the treaty but by keeping the 
original phrase ‘ever closer union’ from the original Treaty of Rome, Major accepted federalist 
elements such as subsidiarity.539 Meanwhile, a surprising win in the general election on 9 April 
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1992 enabled his government to return to power with only a 21 majority in the 651-seat house.540 
Such a paltry majority would have severe implications for the level of influence a small band of 
what became known as Euro-rebels would have. As enumerated by a leading rebel: 
With a majority of 100 a rebellion would have been futile. But with twenty, a 
group of determined backbenchers can change government policies. The 
Government can no longer allow itself the luxury of doing just as it likes.541   
 
The newly elected leader of the Labour Party, John Smith, also featured prominently in the 
Maastricht debates. The opt-out from the Social Chapter, he argued, with “low wages, 
inadequate skills and persistent under-investment” functioned as “the real drag anchors on 
Britain’s economic performance”542 However, the most important tensions and splits over 
Europe and specifically Maastricht occurred firmly within the Conservative camp. The fratricidal 
potential the issue had was ostensibly limited to the ruling party at the time.    
 
The anti-Maastricht standpoint was bolstered by two dramatic events. The first was the Danish 
‘No’ vote in a nationwide referendum on the Maastricht Treaty which occurred on 2 June 1992. 
Such a decision provided much animus for the British Eurosceptics as it showed quite clearly 
they were not the only ‘awkward partner’ in Europe. The second event was Britain’s spectacular 
and humiliating crashing out of the ERM on 16 September the same year, commonly referred to 
as Black Wednesday. A number of causes cite rampant speculation, the excessively high level at 
which Britain had entered, high German interest rates and a declining dollar.543 However, it had 
been the Conservative government which had put Britain in the ERM and while both the 
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Bundesbank and the German government might have provided useful scapegoats, the only 
noticeable effect such finger-pointing had was a souring of Anglo-German relations.544  
 
The Maastricht Treaty, during its lengthy and tortuous process of ratification, produced a defeat 
over the Social Chapter by eight votes which has been called “the most serious parliamentary 
defeat suffered by the Conservative government in the twentieth century.”545 A small group of 
rebels were to defy the party whip against phenomenal pressure and thus severely dent the 
modern Conservative Party image of “a united and loyal organisation whose defence of the 
British state and of British interests abroad is not destabilised by intra-party fractures.”546 The 
defeat over the Social Chapter caused a confidence vote Major narrowly won in July 1993 and 
the bill was eventually ratified. However, the passage of the bill was not due to the government’s 
ability in putting down the rebellion, but because of the support from the opposition parties.547 
Apart from the slim Conservative majority, which enabled such a small band of rebels to 
destabilize the government, Major’s less bellicose and more conciliatory style of party 
management also provided a breeding ground for revolt: “[w]hereas, under her, dissidence over 
Europe produced six sackings or resignations from the Cabinet, under Major the dissidents, in 
every case except one, remained inside, free to argue and corrode, challenge and dissent, from 
within the portals of power.”548 It has been argued that “Maastricht may have been the catalyst 
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which mobilized latent anti-Europeanism in the party”549 and effectively made cynicism over 
Europe not merely acceptable but the norm within the Conservative party.  
 
In conclusion, Maastricht is a particularly potent event for extracting identity-related arguments 
over Europe. Firstly, it can be argued, perhaps more so than with the 1975 Referendum on 
membership, that political and economic considerations had become fused. Economic and 
Monetary Union could not be extricated from the subsequent threat to sovereignty and 
independence. In addition, the dominant monetarist ethos of the Conservative Party also had 
political consequences. That is, issues of sovereignty were also wrapped up with positions over 
free trade, protectionism, economic liberalism and exactly how ‘social’ Europe ought to be. 
Secondly, unlike the referndum, Maastricht was an international treaty. The narrow support for 
the treaty in France and the initial rejection in the Danish Referendum contributed its gravity in 
Britain. Finally, the Eurosceptic wing, by voting against the government, was able to produce a 
vote of confidence. Maastricht had challenged the very leadership of the party and had produced 
such a fever pitch of contention that it attacked, according to one rebel, “the very soul of 
Conservatism.”550  
 
4.3 The Pro-Maastricht Debates 
 
In this section, I start by analysing the predicates relating to the pro-Maastricht positions as 
represented in Table 5. As in the previous chapter, the documents, page numbers and columns 
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are given in square brackets. The predicates are the various verbs, adverbs and adjectives that 
give the subjects meaning. These are the characteristics contained within the documents listed in 
Appendix 2. Then I present the background knowledge, the presuppositions, which enable a 
certain reality or world view to function. Subsequent to this, the relationships between the 
various subjects and objects are discussed.  
 
4.3.1 Predication within the Pro-Maastricht Debates 
 
Three findings formulate a particular kind of British subject. Firstly, as expected, Britain 
possesses the ability to shape and influence Europe. ‘We play a central role in world affairs’ [1], 
‘positive part to play’ [9-p.181] and ‘has led the world’ [1] highlight an indelible and far-
reaching level of British influence. More specifically, various predicates emphasise the nature of 
the British imprint on Europe. The Conservative Party Manifesto for the 1992 general election, 
for example, highlighted ‘a great trading nation’ [1] which promotes ‘an outward looking 
Community based on free enterprise’ [1]. Influence, therefore, is predicated on the ability to 
forge open markets. Secondly, the realisation that Britain had been a member of the EC for 
nearly twenty years by the time of the Maastricht Treaty creates a form of trickle-down effect 
whereby the Community has been determined “in our own image”.551 Britain is ‘at the heart of 
Europe’ [1], capable of ‘(promoting) our vision’ [1] and ‘are grown-ups in the Community’ [8-
p.460]. However, by predicating how the EC is influenced by the particular principles and 
practices of its member states, it is configured as an ever-changing entity. As a consequence, 
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European integration is formulated according to the respective make up of its constituent 
members. This formulation makes the ‘widening of the Community a priority’ [2]. That is, a 
dominant British vision seeks to extend and envelop a consensual European network based on 
market liberalisation in contrast to any attempts to deepen and further bureaucratise Europe. A 
final element concerns Britain’s role within Europe as inescapable. John Major, by way of 
example, argued that membership is ‘a fixed point in the future’ [15-p.417] whilst sceptics are 
indulging in a ‘phantom grandeur’ [12-p.376], harking back to an independence that no longer 
exists. An unworkable and idealistic demand for independence must be replaced by a pragmatic 
interdependence otherwise Britain, according to the then Deputy Prime Minister Geoffrey Howe, 
risks ‘being once again shut out’ [6-p.186].   
 
As an object, Europe is broadly configured in five important ways. These include Europe as a 
means of ensuring peace and security; the threat of isolation; a fluid and divisible reading of 
sovereignty; the manner in which the nation-state can coexist within the Community and the way 
in which the Community can encourage monetarist ideas of minimal government intervention, 
free trade and openness to markets. The first concerns issues of security which makes reference 
to the EC founding security dimension in which ‘lasting peace’ [5-p.79] and ‘protection against a 
perceived threat’ [4-p.173] can only be realised within the Community. Both strength and 
prosperity are also perceived as stemming from integration. The references to Europe’s founders 
again position Europe as a defence community firmly lodged within a Cold War scenario in 
which threats are ostensibly military and cannot be adequately countered by unilateral policies of 
individual states.   
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Developing from this theme is the second reading which centres on a fear of ‘missing the boat’ 
and of seclusion. ‘Dangers arise’ [4-p.156] when countries are excluded. Continued membership 
is perceived in rational, self-interested terms in which Britain should not ‘opt out emotionally 
from the club’ [7-p.640]. Similarly, the ‘late starts and squandered opportunities’ [6-p.186] and 
the prospect of a ‘lag’ [9-p.203] culminating in Britain losing out again pitches past 
prevarications as both a hindrance to Community progress and a failure for Britain. The 
Community is regarded as a ‘tide’ [5-p.15] in which British influence, if it is to possess any 
impact, must occur. As a consequence, this EC-as-inevitable object constructs a Community 
dominated by the need to be a part of the decision-making. The then Labour leader, in berating 
the Prime Minister over the opt-out of the Social Chapter, argued that 
[a]fter all, it requires quite an acute form of delusion to claim a triumph of 
negotiating skill in getting one’s country isolated and excluded from a 
decision-making process of great importance to the Community and, 
inevitably, of importance to this country.552  
 
The issue of sovereignty is once again a dominant motif within the debates over Europe and it is 
formulated in two main ways. To begin with, sovereignty is regarded as divisible. ‘Outdated 
notions of sovereignty’ [3] are rejected and pure independence and national integrity are viewed 
as anachronistic and outmoded. It is only the possibility of pooling which can break the cycle of 
‘dominance and subjugation, of power and conflict’ [7-p.631]. Hence, an uncompromising and 
undiluted sovereignty is seen as a cause of war and dispute. In addition, sovereignty is seen as 
transferable. The transfer of power, however, is worth noting in that it does not become lodged in 
an EC-centric orbit. Nigel Lawson, in highlighting his vision of Europe, symbolised a transfer of 
power ‘not to Brussels, but to the people’ [11-p.899]. Sovereignty, therefore, is ‘exploitable in 
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the interests of a nation’ [7-p.631] and consequently empowers a nation’s citizens. It is 
configured as both fluid and definable according to the particular interests it might serve. Both of 
these attitudes are attempts to convey sovereignty as a practical rather than a theoretical 
concept.553  
 
The next configuration within these debates constructs Europe as a community of nation-states. 
Several themes hold together this object. Firstly, in keeping with structuring the European 
Community as an intergovernmental rather than a supranational entity, federalism is rejected in 
favour of cooperation. Power, therefore, ‘is exercised at the lowest level’ [3] and ‘lies as close to 
the citizen as possible’ [3]. With reference to the pillar system eventually adopted, the 
Community is ‘as a temple, not as a tree’ [8-p.460]. Subsequently, power is configured as 
diffused and entrenched within the individual member states rather than within any European 
institutions. Secondly and relatedly, the dominant interplay that exists within Europe is still 
lodged within a nation-state system. That is, ‘the nation states would remain the essential sources 
of authority’ [8-p.461] and, as such, ‘a Europe of nation states, rather than a single Federal 
superstate’ [11-p.892] predominates. The Community operates due to the voluntary practices of 
members and is therefore characterised as ‘a Community of free, independent members’ [12-
p.376] and not as ‘an empire’ [4-p.198]. Finally, the Community is the means to achieve the 
correct balance between the ‘retention of nation states’ [11-p.1031] and ‘the closest possible co-
operation’ [11-p.1031]. The EU, therefore, can ‘cement the peoples of Europe together’ [4-p.3] 
and adulterate the nationalistic drum-beating of ‘saloon-bar xenophobia’ [11-p.900]. 
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A final observation on how Europe is invested with meaning relates to both the roles monetarism 
and the free-market have within Europe. Europe is visualised as a ‘deregulated, free-market’ [11-
p.899] within which Britain will continue to contribute ‘economically conservative’ [7-p.691] 
policies which ‘emphasize sound finance and market liberalization’ [7-p.691]. Europe, therefore, 
must be non-protectionist and free trade driven whereby governments play a limited role. 
Similarly, entry to the ERM is seen as ‘a firm commitment to share in the management of a 
wider system’, a system that is not to be dominated by 
… an over-regulated, bureaucratic, protectionist Europe, where standards are 
enforced by new directives and new regulations from Brussels, where outsiders 
are excluded, and where competition is seen as a threat, rather than a challenge 
to greater efficiency; a Europe in which ‘regulate and protect’ might be the 
motto.554  
 
Of the other states revealed, the former Soviet Union is constructed in three major ways. Firstly, 
its military might is referred to but the unified image of the Soviet Union as a common 
antagonist has been reformulated, according to the former Conservative minister Leon Brittan, as 
a ‘far less conspicuous enemy’ [4-p.2] . As a consequence, ‘a poor, disintegrating Russia is a far 
greater threat’ [4-p.137]. The mutual suspicion of the Cold War in which the enemy is clearly 
defined is replaced by a more shadowy, less easily defined danger. This has the effect of 
producing ‘a less polarized, more unstable world’ [4-p.2]. Subsequently, the need for unanimity 
from Europe is configured as necessary in dealing with this peril. Secondly, although a 
potentially reformist new Russia makes possible a less bellicose relationship and one more in 
accordance with Western Europe norms, the reforms are seen as difficult to implement because 
of a lack of ‘historic memory’ [4-p.213] in realising the shift to a democracy. Consequently, 
remnants of the old Soviet Union still remain, are resistant to change and bear no historical 
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counterpoint for democratisation to easily occur. Finally, and despite the threat from a 
fragmented Russia, ‘suspicions and rivalries’ [9-p.179] can be assuaged ‘by negotiation, by 
verification, by cooperation’ [9-p.203]. This seeks to position the former Soviet Union as capable 
of reform and places a fundamental level of responsibility on the West to try and engage the 
nascent Russia in a ‘new security community’ [9-p.203]. Hence, two distinct Russias, one old 
and one new, are formulated as objects. 
 
Central and Eastern Europe are categorised somewhat differently. Firstly, whilst the former 
Soviet Union suffers from a lack of past application of democracy, Central and Eastern Europe 
are instead ‘members of the same family’ [4-p.195] as Western Europe. EC membership, 
therefore, would not mean ‘casting off the moorings of history’ [4-p.198]. Instead, the ‘new 
liberty’ [9-p.180] is flourishing and greater democracy and reform can occur by providing 
‘generous economic assistance’ [3] to those members that embrace both democracy and the free 
market. Membership of the Community, and of Europe therefore, is very much ensconced within 
the willingness of the emerging states to embrace what are regarded as democratic Western 
credentials.  
 
The political reunification of Germany encapsulates the way in which the pooling of sovereignty, 
mentioned previously, can be used to encourage stability. Hence, Germany is configured 
dualistically as remaining ‘firmly anchored in Europe’ [7-p.638] by ‘sovereignty-sharing’ [7-
p.638] whilst still possessing the superior economic strength to enable it to succeed and flourish 
as a strong member. Whatever power Germany has is tempered by its membership of the 
Community. Subsequently, Germany – particularly with reference to reunification – is 
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constructed as more powerful than other member states whilst simultaneously recognising the 
limiting effect that membership will have on its influence. ‘A strong Germany aroused too much 
fear’ [11-p.901] for it to be able to ‘exercise … power and influence beyond its borders’ [11-
p.901]. The major changes occurring in Germany, although bringing ‘their own problems and 
dangers’ [9-p.203], can only be surmounted by wedding such a core state to the European 
nucleus. 
 
Of the remanding configurations, ‘threats’ [1] are identified as coming from outside Europe. 
Despite the dwindling of the Cold War, and its dominant paradigm, Europe is still blighted by 
dangers which bolster the importance of unification. The Franco-German axis is portrayed as a 
‘charmed circle’ [12-p.268] in which Britain must learn to deal with a club whose rules had 
already been set before it joined and whose ‘natural rhythms’ [12-p.268] have to be understood 
in order to operate within. The relationship with the United States is shaped with reference to the 
military flashpoints that were occurring during the Maastricht debates. The Gulf War had 
initiated a military response and the collapse of the Soviet Union had provided both the fear of 
instability and the hope of independence for many of the Central and Eastern European states. 
The breakup of Yugoslavia had created an inter-ethnic war in which the EC had been incapable 
of unified action in dealing with hostilities and a refugee crisis occurring on Europe’s very 
doorstep.555 The rumbustious relationship Britain had had with Europe, and the desire for some 
semblance of unanimity amongst EC nations, produces one prediction that “America will see 
Europe through the prism of Germany”556 Subsequently, America’s commitment to Europe 
seems contingent on the US understanding that ‘Europe does not take US support for granted’ 
                                                     
555 George, S. (1990) An Awkward Partner: Britain in the European Community, p. 234. 
556 Treverton, G. (1990) ‘Britain’s role in the 1990s: an American view’, International Affairs, 66, 4, pp. 703-710 (at 708). 
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[4-p.178] and that conflicts like the Balkans, posited as Europe’s war, is dealt with by a united 
Europe, rather than a muddle of squabbling so-called allies. Finally, the Commonwealth is 
predicated as a ‘unique inter-racial and inter-hemispheric organisation’ [2] which has a robust 
role to play in ‘fighting racism, hunger and human rights violations’ [2]. Despite this, the 
Commonwealth relationship is not positioned as one in which trade or any common venture 
necessarily flourishes. The Commonwealth no longer plays a dominant role in the perceptions 
British political elites have over Europe and it is not regarded as a viable substitute for further 
European integration. In short, “we are still, by our fingernails, at the heart of the 
Commonwealth.”557  
 
To summarise the predicates and processes in Table 5, Britain is positioned as both a key player 
and shaper of the EC project. The process of Europeanisation constructs a Britain in which 
membership of the Community is inescapable and that Britain’s relationship must be one of 
harmony. Reference is made to previous disagreements with the purpose of projecting an image 
of Britain’s relationship with Europe as friendly and embracing. Five themes are evident within 
the way Europe is constructed: as a means of attaining peace and security, as a way of ensuring 
national interests can be channelled and realised, as a non-threat to sovereignty, as a community 
of nation-states and as an organ for disseminating a deregulatory market-driven ethos. The 
breakup of the former Soviet Union is viewed dualistically: the old regime is the Other that 
remains outside whilst the new Russia, imbued with a feeling of rebirth, has the potential to 
Europeanise. Central and Eastern Europe are categorised as emancipated and democratic and 
particular importance is placed upon including such states within the European sphere. Germany 
                                                     
557 Robertson, G. (1990) ‘Britain in the new Europe’, p. 698. 
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is seen as an example of how shared sovereignty can ensure a level of containment: that is, a 
Germany firmly located within the EC is the greatest protection against it being dominant. Both 
the USA and the Commonwealth have a more peripheral role. American interests can be realised 
via a united rather than fractious Europe and the Commonwealth is representative of past 
complicities which have been relegated by Britain’s commitment to Europe.  
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Table 5: Predication and Processes within the Pro-Maastricht Debates 
Britain European Community Other countries 
We play a central part in world affairs [1] 
Has led the world in helping the reforms in the  
   former Soviet Union...and in building up relations  
   with the republics of the new Commonwealth of  
   Independent States [1] 
Is at the heart of Europe...is a great trading nation [1] 
Promote our vision of an outward looking Community  
   based on free enterprise [1] 
We must accept a greater role in safeguarding the peace  
   in our continent [1] 
Will be a leader in the New Europe [2] 
Make the widening of the Community a priority [2] 
Can only be secure, successful and environmentally  
   safe if we play our full part in building a more  
   united and democratic Europe [3] 
It is in the interests of Britain to be part of the  
   development of Europe [5-p.77] 
Risks minimising our influence and maximising our  
   chances of being once again shut out [6-p.186]  
Had for too long seen itself as engaged in hostile  
   competition with Strasbourg [7-p.615] 
‘Are grown-ups in the Community now, no longer  
   frightened by shadows on the wall’ [8-p.460]  
Would have reduced ourselves to a weak, though  
  no doubt pretentious, nation wedged between the  
  United States and Europe [8-p.476] 
Britain against Europe, Britannia Contra Mundum,  
   cannot in our saner moments be our rallying cry  
   [8-p.482] 
Have a positive part to play in the development of  the  
   new relationship between East and West [9-p.181] 
We are going to see that our country is safeguarded  
   and stimulated [9-p.182] 
There is nothing that can stir the heart like the  
   history of this country [12-p.363] 
I want Britain to mould that change [12-p.363] 
The sceptics were motivated by ‘frustration that we  
   are no longer a world power...they practise a sort  
   of phantom grandeur, a clanking of unusable suits  
   of armour’ [12-p.376] 
Economic success and social progress go hand in hand   
   [13-p.228] 
No future as the sweatshop of Europe [13-p.234] 
‘Our active membership of the Community is a fixed   
   point in our future’ [15-p.417] 
‘Our identity will remain’ [16-col.393] 
Peace and Security: 
We have kept the peace by staying strong [1] 
Europeans have repeatedly been...ready...to trade  
   national sovereignty in order to secure the best  
   protection against a perceived threat [4-p.173] 
The EU is not frogmarching its members into a  
   reluctant defence union against the tide of history  
   [4-p.175] 
Its founders wanted lasting peace in Europe [5-p.79] 
A political coming together for the entrenchment of  
   peace, the advancement of prosperity, to give  
   Europe a stronger voice in the world [7-p.685] 
Isolation and Inevitability: 
Introversion would be no better for Europe’s  
   economy [4-p.136] 
Dangers arise...when...countries exclude others [4- 
   p.156] 
(The Eurosceptics are)...defeatists...running against  
   the tide, a tide that will flow ever more strongly    
   [5-p.15] 
We have paid heavily in the past for late starts and  
   squandered opportunities [6-p.186] 
The trend towards European collective action was  
   many-fronted and inexorable [7-p.608] 
We should not ...‘opt out emotionally from the club’  
   [7-p.640] 
We would have plunged it (the Maastricht Bill) and  
   ourselves into a period of bad-tempered confusion  
   [8-p.476] 
‘I want to be alone’. That is the constant theme. It is  
   not splendid isolation or cunning or sagacity or  
   diplomatic skill [9-p.181] 
If we lag, we lose, yet again [9-p.203] 
Sovereignty: 
We reject outdated notions of national sovereignty  
   [3] 
The coming together of sovereignty excluded...the  
   tragic and traditional philosophy of dominance  
   and subjugation, of power and conflict [7-p.631] 
Should be seen as divisible – and exploitable in the  
   interests of a nation [7-p.631] 
Is not like virginity...now you have it, now you  
   don’t [7- p.631] 
Transferring sovereignty not to Brussels but to the  
   people [11-p.899] 
‘A Europe of nation-states’: 
A citizens' Europe in which power lies as close to the  
   citizen as possible [3] 
A federal community, where power is exercised at the    
   lowest level [3] 
To cement the peoples of Europe together [4-p.3] 
European history is a patchwork of shifting,  
   opportunistic alliances [4-p.173] 
Must build from the bottom upwards, whittling down    
   its differences day by day [4-p.186] 
The European Union is not an empire, but a voluntary  
   meeting of states [4-p.198] 
The European enterprise is not...some kind of zero- 
   sum game [6-p.185] 
Europe as a temple, not as a tree [8-p.460] 
Far from fading away, the nation states would remain  
   the essential sources of authority in most sectors of  
   European cooperation [8-p.461] 
A Europe of nation states, rather than the single  
   Federal superstate [11-p.892] 
Saloon-bar xenophobia [11-p.900] 
The need for the closest possible co-operation and the  
   retention of nation states [11-p.1031] 
Being one of the Community of fifteen meant that  
   sometimes we had to reach a consensus that was not  
   entirely to our taste [12-p.265] 
‘Maastricht has been used as a scapegoat for ...  
   nameless fears about Europe’ [12-p.376] 
Community of free, independent members [12-p.376] 
‘The important thing is to strike the right balance  
   between closer co-operation and a proper respect for  
   national institutions and traditions’ [15-p.424] 
We need to build a more decentralised and diverse  
   Community, outward-looking and free-trading [16- 
   col.384] 
We have a three-speed Europe [16-col.426] 
Monetarism: 
Price stability remained our central objective...(ERM  
   entry was) a firm commitment to share in the  
   management of a wider system [7-p.639] 
Our politics were destined to be economically  
   conservative with continuing emphasis on sound  
   finance and market liberalization [7-p.691] 
The vision of a deregulated, free-market, open  
   Europe [11-p.899] 
The Former Soviet Union: 
There remains a huge military force [1] 
Replaced by a far less conspicuous enemy [4-p.2] 
A less polarized, more unstable world [4-p.2] 
A poor, disintegrating Russia is a far greater threat [4-p.137] 
A weak Russia affects (Europe’s) security [4-p.210] 
It has lacked a historic memory of what democracy and a market economy  
   could actually be like [4-p.213]  
Suspicions and rivalries built up over more than seventy years [9-p.179] 
By negotiation, by verification, by cooperation in a new security community,  
   all prospect of war can be banished from Europe [9-p.203] 
Central and Eastern Europe: 
Yugoslavia show(s) what can happen when Communism collapses in disorder [1] 
Promote democracy and reform in Eastern and Central Europe by coordinating  
   generous economic assistance to countries introducing democracy,  
   guaranteeing human rights and reforming their economies [3] 
Europe talked while Bosnia burned [4-p.168] 
Are not just friendly, impoverished neighbours, to be palmed off with aid, trade  
   and patronage. They are quite simply members of the same family [4-p.195] 
It is odd that they should be considered part of the same European history but  
   should not share a common future [4-p.197] 
Membership would hardly mean casting off the moorings of history [4-p.198] 
The language of the market is echoed...with vigour and zeal [4-p.199] 
If the new liberty being experienced in...countries like Poland and Hungary is  
   surrounded by poverty and under-development...(it) will be fragile [9-p.180]  
Poland and Hungary and independent. Czechoslovakia is a free country...  
   Romania has freedom, but it seems it has yet to achieve the same confident  
   liberty of Czechoslovakia [9-p.202-3] 
Germany: 
Sovereignty-sharing in the EC was the way to ensure that a united Germany  
   remains firmly anchored in Europe [7-p.638] 
These marvellous changes bring of course their own problems and dangers; but  
   they are capable of being surmounted [9-p.203] 
The political and intellectual leadership of Europe which France regarded as  
   her birthright was threatened by...Germany [11-p.901] 
A strong Germany aroused too much fear for it to be able to exercise the  
   political power and influence beyond its borders [11-p.901] 
Commonwealth: 
This unique inter-racial and inter-hemispheric organisation can play a central  
   role in fighting racism, hunger and human rights violations [2] 
Other: 
Increasingly threats come from outside Europe [1] 
The United States will feel more inclined to maintain its commitment to  
   Europe if it knows Europe does not take US support for granted [4-p.178] 
The charmed circle...It had its own natural rhythms [12-p.268] 
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4.3.2 Presupposition within the Pro-Maastricht Debates 
 
The above representations make sense when certain background knowledge is taken for 
granted. According to the texts, several oppositional relationships constitute the ‘deep 
structure’ of the discourses. First of all, Britain is presumed to possess a leadership role. Not 
merely is this configuration based on the promulgation of a liberal and liberalising market 
ethos, but it is also positioned militarily with particular reference to Central and Eastern 
Europe. The leader/follower nexus positions Britain as dominant within Europe and 
possessive of a moral obligation to intervene and defend states beyond.   
 
A further and related presupposition focuses on how the political world is very much carved 
up into stable/unstable zones. Not merely Britain but the Community is regarded as a 
stabilising and unifying force. This has three important aspects to it. Firstly, it encourages the 
process of integration widening because the EC possesses a planetary pull for fractious and 
newly independent states to seek membership. Secondly, the Community is a stabiliser as it 
engenders a commonality of values. In short, Europe speaks ‘the language of the market’ [4-
p.199].  Thirdly, outside threats ensure the necessity of a unified Europe. The breakup of the 
USSR and the reunification of Germany produced a degree of uncertainty and that is played 
out as the articulation of threats.  
 
Another opposition can be characterised by rationalism/emotionalism. The interrelations 
between states are regarded as a pragmatic necessity. Indeed, the whole of European history 
‘is a patchwork of shifting, opportunistic alliances’ [4-p.173]. Subsequently, the cant of 
idealism is replaced by a rational realism that Europe, as a political and economic entity, 
must be engaged with. Such a realisation is also governed by the fact that the nation-state 
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system is not threatened by a stronger and more integrated Europe. Thus, John Major, at a 
party conference, attempting to calm Conservative fears, stated 
For many of you, the heart pulls in on direction and the head in another. … 
Emotion must not govern policy. At the heart of our policy lies one 
objective and one only – a cold, clear-eyed calculation of the British 
national interest …558 
 
A final presupposition draws on a reform/inertia nexus. The integration project is positioned 
as an evolving entity in which the Common Market, previously preoccupied with the 
promotion of freedom of trade and the bolstering of peace and security, has gradually 
developed into a more deep-seated political project. Inherent within this is the voluntarism 
implicit within the decision-making so that nation-states still dictate the course of action of 
the Community. Similarly, the perpetual pace of reform and change in the present is 
contrasted with the static idealism inherent in the past. As such, the reform/inertia binary 
formulates the Treaty of Maastricht as the latest process in the modernisation of Europe.  
 
4.3.3 Subject Positioning within the Pro-Maastricht Debates 
 
The various predicates can be positioned in a number of important ways. Firstly, and similar 
to the pro-EEC debates surrounding the 1975 Referendum, Britain is configured as a key 
player in complementing and providing animus for the EC. Secondly, a process of 
familiarisation of Britain’s historical attachment to Europe is articulated to create the notion 
of membership as a permanent and inescapable feature of British political life. That is, once 
again, Britain’s past is referred to as excessively preoccupied with conflict and disagreement 
and this is contrasted to Britain’s new and present position as a state in harmony with the 
Community. Thirdly, the widening nature of the Community provides a deep contrast to the 
                                                     
558 Major, J. (2000) John Major: The Autobiography, London: HarperCollins, p. 363. 
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idea that countries can continue to ignore the project and merely go it alone. This also 
suggests that the Community is an evolving set of institutional practices in which new 
relationships are continuously being forged. The EC is therefore developing in two ways: 
expanding to include previously non-European nations and deepening to afford key players a 
more dominant and participatory role.  
 
The EC is positioned via five key themes. Firstly, peace and security are linked to economic 
strength and prosperity. These are positioned in opposition to economic weakness and 
scarcity. Secondly, the fear of isolation is articulated by reference to historical late starts and 
dithering. Hence, the European project is constructed as a teleological certainty in which the 
power and importance of nation-states can only be exercised by active participation. Thirdly, 
sovereignty is viewed as a malleable concept in which both its divisibility and transferability 
is lodged in opposition to past configurations of inseparability and rigidity.  Fourthly, the EC 
is a community of nation-states in which authority is transmitted from the individual 
members to the EC institutions and not from the EC to its members. That is, Europe is 
constructed as a deliberate, anti-Empire project whereby the voluntarism of members occurs 
without recourse to an overarching authority. Finally, Europe is seen as a mechanism to 
enhance free marketism. This image sets Europe within a wider free trade system in which 
protectionism is associated with insularity and trade wars.  
 
These different readings of Europe enable it to be discursively constructed to produce three 
discourses. The first is Europe as a security alliance. Threats are articulated militarily. In 
addition, the tying in of increasing prosperity to the continuance of peace fosters the concept 
of the Union as a mechanism for soldering states together. This web of interdependence 
diminishes the potential for conflict. Secondly, Europe as an intergovernmental community 
 
 
199 
 
of nation-states emphasises that the influence of the EC is governed by the actions of states. 
National governments are the centres of power and subsequently determine the level and 
speed of integration. The final construction is Europe as an international free trade area. The 
onus here is on the proliferation of trade via both the limited interventionism of states and 
European institutions. In addition, such a configuration might be labelled as an international 
area in that it is not restricted to European states alone. It seeks to expand what it sees as the 
logic of market deregulation to external zones as well.  
 
Of the other nations and regions mentioned, the former Soviet Union is positioned 
dualistically. The end of the Cold War has produced a new Russia which retains elements of 
the old USSR. The new Russia is capable of reform and part of a potential security 
community. The old USSR is resistant to change and undemocratic. This sense of uncertainty 
somewhat depends on which forces; the democratising, liberalising new or the entrenched 
and dictatorial old; prevail. This difficulty, and Western reactions to it, is summed up by the 
former Conservative member, Leon Brittan: 
Economic policies are more important to international relationships today 
than ever before. The removal of the Soviet Threat is a clear illustration of 
this: since the collapse of the Soviet Union, its erstwhile enemies have 
hurried to help Russia and its former satellites build their markets, stabilise 
their economies and sell their products abroad.559  
 
Such tumultuous changes locate the new Russia within a web of instability which contrasts 
sharply with stable Europe. However, it also places European and Western responsibility as 
paramount: that Russia can only make the transition to a non-threatening state via open 
markets, free trade and the embracing of globalisation. As a consequence, the former USSR 
is structured by two competing discourses. One can be characterised as the former Soviet 
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Union as not Europe. This discourse relies heavily on the Soviet Union as a historically 
repressive, undemocratic regime and seeks to position this threat in contrast to the liberating 
and self-governing member states of Europe. The other discourse takes stock of the shifting 
nature of the East and the manner in which the burgeoning new Russia can shake off its 
authoritarian moorings to become European. This can be labelled as Russia as reformist. 
 
The discourse on Germany welcomes the democratising changes occurring due to the 
reunification but positions Germany as a potential threat; firstly, because the changes have 
ushered in a period of instability and secondly, because Germany possesses a formidable 
level of economic might. Subsequently, it is seen as imperative to tie Germany to the 
European superstructure to ensure this threat is assuaged and also to avoid destabilising all of 
Europe by displacing Germany. As a consequence, Germany can be quantified as an unstable 
but core European nation-state in that although reunification has injected uncertainty, it 
remains the nucleus of Europe. The USA is seen as wanting to cooperate with a unified 
Europe to ensure it is not merely taken for granted. This positions the relationship between 
the USA and Europe as harmonious but also blighted by American frustration over 
squabbling and infighting between European nations as well as an overdependency on the 
US. Finally, the Commonwealth, typified as unique, is configured by its ability to foster and 
safeguard human rights. However, the broader importance of trade, prosperity and security – 
factors iterated within Community membership – are not referred to. Hence, the 
Commonwealth is not positioned as a principal actor. 
 
The states of Central and Eastern Europe are configured slightly differently. That is, whilst 
the new Russia has yet to emerge from its past, Central and Eastern Europe have gained 
independence. This Central and Eastern Europe as enfranchised discourse helps solidify 
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Europe as a securitised and free trade community. It also weds the newly independent states 
to a vision of Europe symbolised in the commonality of values and economic systems.  
 
As a consequence of these interactions, two more configurations of Europe can be identified. 
First of all, the impact and influence of the ever-widening Europe constructs it as an 
enlarging superpower. Not merely is it instrumental but it is also a non-static entity which 
exercises a level of influence for potential new candidates. Its pull, therefore, contributes to 
its enlargement and its subsequent expansion as a power structure. Secondly, Europe as a 
stabilising network configures Europe as a means of tying previously fractious states to a 
stable core. Russia, Germany and Central and Eastern Europe all possess destabilising 
characteristics and the EC is regarded as the mechanism to taper any destructive potential 
such states may have.  
 
4.4 The Anti-Maastricht Debates 
 
In this section, I analyse the anti-EC positions. As with the previous section, the predicates 
are summarised and presented in Table 6 and then the presuppositions are discussed. 
Afterward, both the practices and processes of predication and presupposition are utilised to 
reveal the subject positioning which identifies how the various subjects and objects are 
positioned within the debates.  
 
4.4.1 Predication within the Anti-Maastricht Debates 
 
As a subject, Britain is constituted via several important themes. A first viewpoint identifies a 
Britain as a Transnational 
nation-state 
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‘Britain first, Britain second and Britain third’ [5-p.100] overriding purpose. Britain is 
imbued with a ‘sovereignty’ [5-p.190], ‘… Parliament … traditions … liberties’ [5-.38] 
which are regarded as ‘distinctly alien’ [11-p.1032] on the Continent. Nigel Lawson, the 
former Chancellor, identified that the parliamentary system in Britain is fundamentally 
different to those on the Continent and that ‘Britain is unused to coalition governments’ [11-
p.1032]. Similarly, in addressing the rising fear of federalism, particularly after he had 
received much criticism over his ‘Britain at the heart of Europe’ address, John Major clarified 
that he had adamantly not endorsed Britain ‘slavishly following on at the behest of whatever 
fashionable European majority of that day should happen to be’ [15-p.425]. Subsequently, 
Britain is not merely seen as different but superior. Secondly, once again, the apparatus and 
organisations of the EC are seen as encroaching and demanding. ‘To come under control of 
Brussels’ [12-p.273] and to agree to a ‘federal destiny’ [12-p.273] jar with the openly defiant 
image of a ‘Britain united and independent’ [5-p.36]. Finally, the realities of a ‘post-
Maastricht world’ [8-p.472] are invoked in order to discredit the ‘supranational rhetoric’ [8-
p.472] so repeated by ‘nostalgic outsiders’ [8-p.472]. In short, Europe has moved on from the 
Monnet doctrine of transferring power to supranational institutions, and instead highlights the 
next stage in the evolution of the Community in which cooperation does not threaten national 
diversity and progress need in no way be wedded to institution building.  
    
The anti-Maastricht position constructs Europe as a threat to monetary independence, in 
which the national currency is directly linked to national independence; popular sovereignty, 
in which the machinations of the EC threaten the nation as a whole; parliamentary 
sovereignty, in which the instruments of governance are at risk; and democracy, in which the 
EC possesses a centralising and authoritarian agenda. By identifying the EC within a broad 
spectrum of threats, it takes on the form of a particular type of object. To begin with, as a 
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major part of the Maastricht Treaty concerned the eventual implementation of a single 
currency, monetary independence is cast as an important symbol of national self-
determination. Britain’s ‘unfettered decision’ [1] to join or not, the ‘imposition’ [15-p.424] of 
a ‘rigid grid’ [6-p.183] and a ‘centralised bank trying to rig exchange rates’ [6-p.112] all 
construct the single currency as an intrusion and a direct assault on Britain’s autonomy and 
democracy. The ability for a country to possess its own currency, therefore, is symbolic of a 
broader ability to retain its autonomy. In addition, the retention of the national currency 
embodies ‘the greatest expression’ [7-p.644] and the ‘very heart’ [11-p.892] of sovereignty. 
Subsequently, a very clear reference to British national identity constructs Sterling as a 
symbol of that identity and as an indication of an entrenched uniqueness. 
 
Again, the popular sovereignty representation helps to position the threat from Europe in 
similarly extensive terms. In this sense, it expands the defence of parliamentary sovereignty 
into a more general defence of the nation. The EC is at risk of ‘treading unwittingly on 
cherished national tradition’ [4-p.8], is ‘gnawing at the core of … identity’ [4-p.15] and is ‘a 
battle for national integrity … in the same light as the Second World War’ [5-p.114]. Some 
also argue how the increasing centralisation of the Community is similarly anathema for 
home-grown identities. By way of example, Margaret Thatcher expressed the following: 
[N]ot just in Britain but increasingly in other European countries, the 
popular mood was moving away from remote bureaucracies and towards 
recovering historically rooted local and national identities.560 
 
Subsequently, this position is populist in tone and views the EC as needing to serve the 
interests of ‘citizens and communities’ [3] and not ‘businessmen and bureaucrats’ [3]. 
‘Historical differences’ [4-p.193] rather than the ‘grey, rootless Euro-personality’ [4-p.15] are 
not to be ignored or whitewashed. Secondly, the EC is constructed as interfering and 
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expansionist in its powers and aspirations. There is ‘excessive interventionism’ [4-p.10] in 
which the Commission is ‘inserting itself into the nooks and crannies of everyday life’ [8-
p.459]. This interference erodes ‘the freedoms of ordinary men and women’ [12-p.361]. 
Again, this populist message warns that British citizens are most at risk from the 
encroachment of the EC. This intrusion is evident within the references to how the EC no 
longer influences solely economic areas and its mandate for a ‘massive official expansion … 
into non-economic areas’ [14-p.124] refers to an almost rapacious desire for incursion into 
everyday life. Finally, both the EC and the Maastricht Treaty are demonised as ‘alien’ [5-
p.1], ‘a dinosaur’ [5-p.49], ‘wedded to the past’ [5-p.49] and ‘new-fangled’ [5-p.155]. Such 
references situate further integration as aberrant and an entity which jars with existing 
national and embedded institutions and processes.  
 
Coupled with the focus on popular sovereignty, the threat to parliamentary sovereignty is also 
articulated. In fact, the sovereignty of parliament can be regarded as inseparable from the 
sovereignty of the people.561 The Commission is singled out as wanting ‘to increase its 
powers’ [6-p.184] despite being ‘a non-elected body’ [6-p.184], possessing ‘pretentious, 
interfering ways’ [8-p.476] and ‘overreaching itself with excessive interference and 
regulations’ [8-p.459]. Europe as a whole is ‘over-regulated, bureaucratic’ [11-p.899] and 
‘protectionist’ [11-p.899] while Maastricht ‘will hand over more power to unelected 
bureaucrats’ [12-p.361]. In addition, ‘the Treaty on European Union is involved with almost 
every policy with which a national government could concern itself’ [14-p.121] whilst it also 
indulges in the exercise of policies such as harmonisation which are derided as ‘bureaucratic 
and absurd’ [11-p.894]. In short, national decision-making is being stripped by a level of 
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interference which firstly ought to be the duty of national governments, and secondly, entails 
much legislation that is unnecessary. Political authority must be incontrovertibly invested in 
national governments since ‘sovereignty cannot be carved up’ [14-pp.106/7]. In addition, in 
an article published in The Economist, John Major wrote that ‘it is for the nations to build 
Europe, not for Europe to supersede nations’ [15-p.448]. Again, this highlights that the 
Community is a construct of its architects and members and it should not possess a level of 
power independently of that realisation.  
 
The final reading of the EC concerns its paucity for democratic values. Although obviously 
linked to the concepts of sovereignty, this argument focuses on how the expansion of 
legislatory powers is synonymous with a diminution of democracy. There are three facets to 
this reading. Firstly, Maastricht is condemned as ‘essentially socialist in nature’ [5-pp.48/9], 
driven by ‘a narrow political caucus’ [5-p.161] or ‘exclusive élite’ [5-p.161]. The socialist 
make-up of the treaty, and with direct reference to the Social Chapter, is intent on 
‘subsidizing industry and subsidizing regions’ [11-p.911] which ‘destroys their will to 
compete and their ability to compete’ [11-p.911]. By specifying both the socialist and 
bureaucratic composition of the Community, and particularly against the background of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and the more general repudiation of Communism, the 
Community is viewed in harsh opposition to the prevailing monetarist ethos. Secondly, the 
‘idealistic rhetoric’ [15-p.308] is in danger of subverting the complexities of nation-building; 
that is, ‘you do not make a nation simply be decreeing it to be one’ [11-p.1030]. This pits the 
concept of the development of the nation-state as a slow, organic and incremental process 
that cannot merely be officiously imposed at a higher level, particularly by what are 
described as the ‘bumbling incompetents in Brussels’ [5-p.111]. Finally, the ‘cunningly 
devious plot’ [5-p.182] of Maastricht implies that in order to ratify the treaty, the truth of its 
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story had to be furtively cultivated precisely because it seeks to strip Britain of its democratic 
powers. Likewise, the desire by the Commission to ‘extinguish democracy’ [7-p.644] and the 
affirmation that ‘we have surrendered enough’ [7-p.644] is a call to stop this invasive 
process.  
 
Of the other countries mentioned, the policies of the Soviet Union and of Communism as a 
whole are classified as ‘disasters’ [8-p.427] [11-p.1033]. The West is to be approached ‘for a 
new friendship based on trust’ [8-p.427] which signifies a shift in policy that jars with the 
mutual hostility built up over the Cold War. The new Russia, therefore, is contrasted with a 
past in which the ‘fear of the Soviet military threat’ [14-p.126] is invoked to argue why US 
administrators worked ‘for the political unification of Europe’ [14-p.126]. However, this 
prospect remains distant and the former Soviet Union is still placed within a reading that 
views it as unstable and belligerent.  
 
Germany is endowed with several negative characteristics which can be grouped in a number 
of ways. The primary trait is one of dominance: that economic and monetary union is merely 
a facility to enhance German power. Both the single currency and the central bank are seen as 
prerequisites essential to ‘exercise control over the Community’ [5-p.179] and Germany, 
particularly after reunification, ‘would be tempted to assert once again ... dominance over 
others’ [8-p.420]. Europe is viewed less as a community and more as a theatre for dominant 
interests to dictate its nature and direction, and Germany, as the strongest European nation, is 
very much constructed within an authoritarian guise. Secondly, Germany is viewed as both 
unreliable and volatile. It had ‘mishandled’ [11-p.1024] reunification, been reluctant to abide 
by its obligations and had ‘veered unpredictably between aggression and self-doubt’ [15-
p.358]. The Deutschmark is regarded as a ‘straightjacket’ [5-p.100] which once again 
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threatens monetary sovereignty. Finally, historical references construct a modern Germany 
deeply attached to its Second World War past. Reference is made to the Reichsbank, the 
predecessor to the Bundesbank, furnishing the ‘sinews of war’ [5-p.150] whilst it would be 
‘at least another forty years before the British could trust the Germans again’ [15-p.359]. The 
dizzying array of pejoratives to describe the German national character include ‘angst, 
aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex, sentimentality ... 
capacity for excess, to overdo things, to kick over the traces ... to over-estimate their own 
strengths and weaknesses’ [15-p.360]. Identifying the German national character was the 
position most commonly associated with the Prime Minister during German reunification, 
Margaret Thatcher. Although she had left office in November 1990, before the Maastricht 
Treaty, her opinions on what she regarded as the ‘German problem’ are worth citing:  
I do not believe in collective guilt: it is individuals who are morally 
accountable for their actions. But I do believe in national character, which 
is moulded by a range of complex factors: the fact that national caricatures 
are often absurd and inaccurate does not detract from that.562  
 
Somewhat similarly, two aspects run through the depiction of France within the anti-
Maastricht debates. French motivations for their role within the EC are depicted as self-
serving and the EC apparatus, by making use of the language of integration, is being 
exploited surreptitiously for French national interests. The French ‘were adept at clothing 
their aims’ [8-p.458] and were ‘sticklers for their special interest groups’ [5-p.43]. In 
addition, a familiar reference to the Second World War offers a mocking scenario which asks 
‘how would we have fared in the last war if France or Belgium had been in charge of 
Europe’s survival?’ [5-p.111] France as a whole, therefore, is classified as supine and 
untrustworthy.   
 
                                                     
562 Thatcher, M. (1993) The Downing Street Years, pp. 790-1. 
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The Continent is positioned as suffering from a level of instability which is characterised with 
a ‘weakness in democratic institutions’ [14-p.118] and a ‘restless urge for constitutional 
change’ [11-p.1032]. It does not possess the democratic foundations that Britain does and has 
little problem in allowing its affairs to be ruled by Brussels. Therefore, the ‘present moves 
towards a federal state of Europe’ [14-p.118] poses no threat to other European nations. In 
addition, this discourse is typified by a distrust of outsiders and synonymises EC power with 
handing the ‘Government to a bunch of foreigners’ [5-p.113].  
 
Finally, a much broader reference which goes beyond the boundaries of Europe locates 
Britain’s ‘wealth and prosperity’ [5-p.190] being historically built up by ‘free trade with the 
whole world’ [5-p190]. Hence, the narrow focus and near obsession with Europe stands out 
against a much more all-encompassing desire to include non-European nations. ‘They are our 
natural customers and speak our business language’ [5-p.190]. This instils the idea that 
Britain’s relations with non-European partners are historically more innate.   
 
To summarise the predicates in Table 6, British sovereignty is fused in triplicate; that is, it is 
embedded within monetary independence, popular sovereignty and parliamentary/ 
constitutional autonomy. Hence, sovereignty is broadened to include any and all British 
political and non-political processes, institutions and traditions. Added to this is a 
subdiscourse which constructs European practices as meddlesome, corrupt and devious. The 
post-Maastricht realist world dominated by nation-states is contrasted with the idealistic 
rhetoric of Europe. The vision of Britain is lodged within a free-market dominated, non-
protectionist and non-interventionist political ethos as against a Europe defined by the 
socialist practices of encroaching government intervention, the subsidising of industry and 
the gradual extinguishing of democracy. The policies of the Soviet Union are perceived as 
 
 
209 
 
disastrous and yet the turbulent changes are a sign that the new Russia might distance itself 
from its past. Germany is constructed as aggressive, unstable and unwilling to relinquish its 
historical legacy. German national consciousness is perceived as exploiting European 
mechanisms, particularly EMU, to try and increase German power. As such, Germany is still 
volatile and prone to unpredictable shifts. Both France and the Continent as a whole are 
denigrated. France is perceived as weak yet conniving and the Continent is capricious and 
lacking in democratic institutions.    
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Table 6: Predication and Processes within the Anti-Maastricht Debates 
Britain European Community Other countries 
Resist pressure to extend Community  
   competence to new areas [1]  
To help ensure that poorer countries  
   are not disadvantaged as a result of  
   the Single Market [2] 
‘A Britain united and independent’  
   [5-p.36] 
‘What we feel for our country, our  
   Parliament, our traditions and our  
   liberties. Because of that history,  
   that feeling is perhaps stronger here  
   than anywhere else in Europe’ [5- 
   p.38] 
‘Britain first, Britain second and  
   Britain third. Politics, like charity,  
   begins at home’ [5-p.100] 
‘Proud of our sovereignty, integrity  
   and place in the world’ [5-p.190] 
Our preoccupation with Europe is a  
   weakness, not a strength [5-p.232] 
For us, the nation state is here to stay  
   [6-p.193] 
We lived in the post-Maastricht  
   world. Supranational rhetoric now  
   belonged to nostalgic outsiders [8- 
   p.472] 
Britain is unused to coalition  
   governments [11-p.1032] 
The British, who have grown up with  
   the belief, well placed or not, in  
   their ability to govern themselves  
   find the virtual absence of that  
   belief among some of their partners  
   distinctly alien [11-p.1032] 
We could not allow foreign or home  
   affairs to come under control of  
   Brussels; or to agree to a ‘federal’  
   destiny [12-p.273] 
‘I emphatically did not mean ever  
   Britain slavishly following on at  
   the behest of whatever fashionable  
   European majority of that day   
   should happen to be’ [15-p.425] 
A trading nation [16-col.431] 
The political structures...are obsolete  
   [16-col.434] 
Monetary Independence: 
Will take our own unfettered decision on whether to join [1] 
Keeping our currency free from interference from a centralised  
   bank trying to rig exchange rates [5-p.112] 
‘If we lose control over our currency the House will lose the rock  
   on which our democracy was founded’ [5-p.150] 
A ‘rigid grid’ would deprive the Government of all freedom of  
   manoeuvre [6-p.183] 
‘Totally and utterly wrong’ to agree to ‘abolish the pound  
   sterling, the greatest expression of sovereignty’ [7-p.644] 
Rigid, grand blueprint [10-p.113] 
A national currency lies at the very heart of national sovereignty  
   [11-p.892] 
A single European currency...offends against the democratic  
   canon by entrusting monetary policy to an  independent central  
   bank [11-p.1020] 
As far as monetary union was concerned, ‘we cannot accept its  
   imposition’ [15-p.424] 
‘I hope my fellow heads of government will resist the temptation  
   to recite the mantra of full economic and monetary union...If  
   they do recite it, it will have all the quaintness of a rain dance  
   and about the same potency’ [15-p.448] 
Popular Sovereignty: 
Is still too much an organisation for businessmen and   
   bureaucrats instead of citizens and communities [3] 
Treading unwittingly on cherished national tradition [4-p.8] 
Excessive interventionism and inadequate explanation [4-p.10] 
Nationhood is being sucked away and replaced by a grey,  
   rootless Euro-personality [4-p.15] 
It is gnawing at the core of their identity [4-p.15] 
Roller-coasting people’s identity into oblivion [4-p.15] 
Historical differences are deeper than some Euro-enthusiasts  
   would have had us believe [4-p.193] 
An alien type of government [5-p.1] 
A dinosaur of a treaty, wedded to the past [5-p.49] 
A battle for national integrity...in the same light as the Second  
   World War [5-p.114] 
No government has the right to transfer its power without  
   first consulting the people [5-p.124] 
The new-fangled European faith [5-p.155] 
‘Inserting itself into the nooks and crannies of everyday life’ [8- 
   p.459] 
Erode the freedoms of ordinary men and women [12-p.361] 
If ratified, it would signal a massive official expansion of  
   Community competence into non-economic areas [14-p.124] 
Parliamentary Sovereignty:  
Gives far too much weight to the Council of Ministers at  
   the expense of the European  Parliament [3] 
Yes, the Commission wants to increase its powers. Yes, it  
   is a non-elected body [6-p.184] 
The Commission was overreaching itself with excessive  
   interference and regulations [8-p.459] 
Their fear of the super-state and their resentment of the  
   pretentious, interfering ways of the European     
   Commission [8-p.476] 
(On the Social Chapter): obnoxious legislation [8-p.476] 
Typically bureaucratic and absurd method known as  
   ‘harmonization’ [11-p.894] 
An over-regulated, bureaucratic, protectionist Europe [11- 
   p.899] 
Maastricht will hand over more power to unelected  
   bureaucrats [12-p.361] 
Sovereignty cannot be carved up...The process of  
   accountability is becoming murky [14-p.106-7] 
The Treaty on European Union is involved with almost  
   every policy with which a national government could  
   concern itself [14-p.121] 
‘It is for the nations to build Europe, not for Europe to  
   supersede nations’ [15-p.448] 
They have...become the managers of Europe [16-col.419] 
Democratic Deficit:  
Racked by self-doubt and unsure about its future [4-p.1] 
Maastricht...is essentially socialist in nature [5-p.48-9] 
Bumbling incompetents in Brussels [5-p.111]  
‘The construction of European union has been the  
   handiwork of a narrow political caucus...exclusive élite  
   [5-p.161] 
The tale of Maastricht is simple but it has been transformed  
   into a cunningly devious plot [5-p.182] 
The Commission was ‘striving to extinguish democracy’...  
   ‘we have surrendered enough’ [7-p.644] 
‘Subsidizing industry and subsidizing regions destroys  
   their will to compete and their ability to compete’ [11- 
   p.911] 
You do not make a nation simply by decreeing it to be one  
   [11-p.1030] 
‘The idealistic rhetoric with which “Europe” was already  
   being dressed in some quarters’ [15-p.308] 
The Former Soviet Union and the United States: 
Soviet foreign policy was a disaster...the West (is to be) approached for a new  
   friendship based on trust [8-p.427] 
The disasters of Communism [11-p.1033] 
It was fear of the Soviet military threat which led many US administrations to  
   work for the political unification of Europe [14-p.126] 
Germany: 
The Deutschmark straitjacket [5-p.100]   
‘The Reichsbank, the predecessor to the Bundesbank, became Hitler’s creature   
   and provided him with the sinews of war’ [5-p.150] 
‘Unless there is to be a single currency and a central bank, the Germans won’t  
   be able to exercise control over the Community’ [5-p.179] 
The more Europe was federated, the more Germany would be dominant [7- p.638] 
Unification would unbalance Germany [8-p.420] 
Would be tempted to assert once again...dominance over others [8-p.420] 
Could only be restrained by Britain and France acting together [8- p.422] 
Germany was determined to have the euro for political reasons [10-p.120] 
Mishandled the economic consequences of unification [11-p.1024] 
The Bundesbank; which was guilty not only of irresponsible talk but of  
   damaging reluctance to fulfil its intervention obligations [11-p.1024] 
‘Has veered unpredictably between aggression and self-doubt’ [15-p.358] 
It would be ‘at least another forty years before the British could trust the  
   Germans again’ [15-p.359] 
‘Angst, aggressiveness, assertiveness, bullying, egotism, inferiority complex,  
   sentimentality...capacity for excess, to overdo things, to kick over the  
   traces...to over-estimate their own strengths and weaknesses’ [15-p.360] 
‘The way in which the Germans currently used their elbows and threw their  
   weight about...suggested that a lot had still not changed’ [15-p.361] 
France: 
Sticklers for their special interest groups [5-p.43] 
How would we have fared in the last war if France or Belgium had been in charge  
   of Europe’s survival? [5-p.111] 
Were adept at clothing their aims in the familiar phrases of European integration  
   [8-p.458] 
The Continent: 
‘I didn’t come to this place to hand over the Government to a bunch of  
   foreigners’ [5-p.113]   
The restless urge for constitutional change that characterizes our continental  
   partners is unsettling [11-p.1032] 
The weakness in the democratic institutions explains why some of the  
   Member States show no great concern about the threat to democracy posed  
   by the present moves towards a federal state of Europe [14-p.118] 
Other: 
(Our) wealth and prosperity has been built up on free trade with the whole world 
...They are our natural customers and speak our business language [5-p.190] 
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4.4.2 Presupposition within the Anti-Maastricht Debates 
 
A number of presuppositions provide background knowledge and subsequently create a 
reality within which the subjects and objects possess meaning. Again, some of these 
distillations are configured as binary oppositions whilst others are subtler in their meaning. 
First of all, the debates are located within a very rigid formulation of the nation-state system. 
That is, power is presupposed to exist solely within this entity and any attempt to challenge 
this accepted reality is fraught with danger. It is the supranationalism of the Community 
project that is a direct threat to the national identities of member states because it seeks to 
unglue the very fabric that holds the nation-state system together and also seeks to ignore the 
deeply rooted historical and cultural mores that have produced the identities in the first place. 
As an example, Nigel Lawson wrote in his memoirs: 
You do not make a nation simply by decreeing it to be one. In general, the 
experience of multinational, multilingual federations is not a happy one. 
Whether the problems are faced in a civilized way, as in Canada, or a 
barbarous way, as in Yugoslavia, they are best avoided altogether. If a 
strong sense of national identity is denied the recognition of self-
government, the ugliest manifestations of nationalism are likely to come to 
the fore ...563   
 
A further presupposition focuses on the nature of the EC. It is first and foremost powered by 
the Commission at the expense of both national governments and the only democratic entity 
referred to within the Community: the European Parliament. As has been referred to, the 
Commission is constructed as a particular kind of object: over-regulatory, bureaucratic, 
protectionist, interfering and expansionist. However, what holds these characteristics together 
is an embedded identification with Socialism. It is perceived first and foremost as a socialist 
construct within which an authoritarian ethos is being played out. Somewhat interestingly, the 
                                                     
563 Lawson, N. (1992) The View from Number 11: Memoirs of a Tory Radical, p. 1030. 
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dominance of centre-right European parties on the Continent during the early 1990s did little 
to weaken the ‘EC-as-socialist’ discourse. This presupposition invokes a Cold War narrative 
whilst simultaneously utilising the recent upheavals in Central and Eastern Europe. Thus, 
Socialism is positioned dualistically: as a dominating and restrictive creed in the past, it has 
fractured to produce an equally dangerous and fissiparous ideology in the present. 
 
A principal binary presupposition configures identity within a home-grown/alien nexus. As 
Forster points out, the Europhile perceptions of the EC shifted from being alien and remote to 
being intrusive and encroaching on every aspect of daily life.564 Subsequently, where 
previously the threat seemed distant, now the interventionism enshrined in the Maastricht 
Treaty, particularly in shadowy expressions like subsidiarity and federalism, helps create a 
danger to what are seen as localised, organic traditions and practices. Indeed, such an effect is 
perceived as a greater threat for Britain because the sense of tradition, history and liberties 
are, it is viewed, more deeply felt. 
 
A second process of binarisation presents the idea that the political dimensions of the EC 
effectively ignore the populace. That is, there exists a populist/elite opposition whereby the 
debate plays out as a battle for national identity within which national governments are sided 
with their peoples against a Commission motivated by a non-civic, hierarchical and ambitious 
set of interests. Both Germany and France are part of this hierarchy in that the EC is being 
propelled for and by their motives. Hence, to cite a common phrase, a European Germany, 
mired to the Continent as a way of ensuring peace and stability in Europe, has morphed into a 
German Europe, in which Germany, shorn of its national guilt, can now behave more 
                                                     
564 Forster, A. (200) ‘Anti-Europeans, Anti-Marketeers and Eurosceptics: The Evolution and Influence of Labour and 
Conservative Opposition to Europe’, p. 302. 
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aggressively. Indeed, although falling outside of political elite commentaries, Tony Judt 
neatly captures this position: 
German politicians from Adenauer to Helmut Kohl have made a point of 
playing down German strength, deferring to French political initiatives and 
emphasizing their own wish for nothing more than a stable Germany in a 
prosperous Europe; they have thus fallen victim to their own rhetoric, 
bequeathing to post-1989 Europe a muscle-bound state with no sense of 
national purpose.565 
 
Subsequently, Europe is the vehicle for engendering German dominance, and events in 
European history, from reconciliation with France up to the single currency, are merely tools 
for this ambition.   
 
4.4.3 Subject Positioning within the Anti-Maastricht Debates 
 
The subjects and objects as revealed via the processes of predication and presupposition are 
positioned in several ways. Firstly, in terms of Britain, its domestic institutions and traditions 
are regarded as cherished and organic against imported and false European practices. As has 
been mentioned, Maastricht is regarded as ‘a dinosaur of a treaty’ [5-p.49] which is ‘alien’ 
[5-p.1], ‘wedded to the past’ [5-p.49] and ‘new-fangled’ [5-p.155]. That is, a nexus of 
superiority versus inferiority, traditional versus modern and independent versus federal 
permeates this position. Secondly, supranationalism is configured as defunct and redolent of 
past ambitions to forge European unity. Britain is part of the newly reinvigorated, post-
Maastricht world of nation-statism while its continental partners are stuck in the nostalgia of 
an obsolete ethos. Thirdly, the importance of sovereignty is configured along three main 
areas: monetary, popular and parliamentary. National sovereignty is heavily imbued with the 
determination to retain a national currency. This retention is seen as a democratic right. It is 
                                                     
565 Judt, T. (2001) ‘Europe: The Grand Illusion’ in Tiersky, R. (ed.) Euroskepticism: A Reader, Maryland: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., p. 286. 
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also seen as an important mechanism to enable monetary policy to be flexible and 
controllable and this is contrasted with what is seen the severe rigidity of being part of a 
European-wide monetary system. The issue of popular sovereignty positions elite 
configurations of Europe as a threat in a much broader sphere. That is, further EC 
encroachment threatens not merely the ability of political elites to govern independently, but 
also constructs the EC as interfering in all aspects of political and civil society. Parliamentary 
sovereignty, once again, is seen as under threat from the superseding ambitions of the 
Community. To summarise the articulation of sovereignty, the oppositional relationships 
which dominate this concept include nation-state versus superstate, lack of regulation versus 
overregulation, and a bottom-up configuration of power in which the citizens influence the 
political process versus a top-down structure in which the Community dictates rulings to the 
member states. This reveals a lone-British resistance to institution building, looks upon any 
European development as only occurring under the mandates of national governments and 
fuses constitutional sovereignty with popular sovereignty. Finally, two other formations of 
binarisation can be highlighted. One emphasises the socialist nature of Europe. This positions 
Britain as a vanguard of the free-market and freedoms inherent within a monetarist 
philosophy. Europe, by contrast, via subsidising industry and business encourages sloth, 
inefficiency and corruption. The second reveals the Maastricht Treaty, in keeping with the 
other machinations and agreements in Europe, as a plot propagated by the shallow idealism 
of a small, unaccountable European elite.  
 
As a result of these readings, Europe is constructed using three similar but distinguishable 
discourses. The first is Europe as a Franco-German hegemony. Several linkages stabilise this 
discourse and position Germany in four distinguishable ways. Firstly, it is seen as a dominant 
threat in which reunification will play an important role in enhancing its ambitions. Secondly, 
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it is seen as an avid supporter of EMU which it uses as a mechanism to consolidate power. 
Thirdly, it is unreliable and volatile in contrast to what is perceived as the stable political 
nature and history of Britain. Finally, it continues to hold fast to some elements of historical 
baggage in which British Second World War memories and myths are firmly projected. 
France, as has been mentioned, is part of this duopolistic alliance and is classified as self-
serving and surreptitious in its aims. The next discourse is Europe as a federal superstate. 
The references to encroaching bureaucracy, centralisation and an executive led power 
structure formulate this discourse. In addition, Europe as a socialist assembly engenders the 
elite-driven nature of the Community whilst also referring to its undemocratic and 
authoritarian tendencies. It is insular in nature and governed by a protectionist, state-centred 
rather than market-driven ethos. Finally, one other actor is formulated. The former Soviet 
Union as an unstable power makes a minor qualifying distinction between the former and the 
current state. The cleaving of the USSR has produced an entity which retains too much of the 
old, militaristic and disastrous political ideology that so blighted its past. As a consequence, it 
is positioned manifestly as a threat due to three principal components: its repressive political 
ideology, its militarised nature and its volatility.    
 
4.5 Self, Other and National Identities  
 
The array of Self/Other configurations are summarised in Table 7. The table is organised into 
the various debates; the Self and Other formations; the categorisations of friendly, non-
radical and radical Others; the particular characteristics of the relationships between the Self 
and Other and the sources taken from Appendix 2. Firstly, the EC is unsurprisingly friendly in 
that it has secured accord, affluence and freedoms. It is also the framework within which 
economic policies reflect monetarist ideas and processes of deregulation and market 
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liberalisation. Britain is also part of a broader European Self which includes the burgeoning 
newly democratic Central and Eastern states. As a consequence, they are also categorised as 
friendly. They are firmly meshed within a European framework that categorises them as part 
of the democratic history of Europe characterised by liberalisation. The new Russia, on the 
other hand, is categorised as a non-radical Other in that it contains the potential to be 
cooperative and negotiable whilst also reflecting the fact that hostilities have historically been 
mutually embedded. Germany is also configured as a non-radical Other in that the 
reunification brings new fears as well as new hopes. Regarding the fact that the process of 
Othering need not only include states or visible groups, but can also refer to concepts or 
periods of time, I would argue that the fear of exclusion is configured as a radical Other. That 
is, the concept of isolation is configured as an ontological threat. The former Soviet Union is 
also perceived as a radical Other in that it is both inherently militaristic and lacking in a 
historical commitment to democracy to render it part of a broader Europe.  
 
The anti-Maastricht debates configure the EC as a radical Other. Through an obvious practice 
of binarisation, the Self is constructed as accountable, citizen-driven, deregulated and rational 
as against a bureaucratic, elite-inspired, over-regulated and idealistic Other. The former 
Soviet Union is also regarded as a radical Other in that its policies have been ruinous and that 
European unity became galvanised as a means of combating a common enemy. Germany is 
similarly classified as a radical Other in that it is over-assertive, bullying and intent on 
exploiting the dominance of its currency to dictate the EC. Finally, France and the Continent 
are radical Others in that the Self retains institutions and traditions which are historically 
more strongly committed to democracy and political stability. The anti-debates are interesting 
in that they are all formulated according to radical Otherisation. This suggests two things. 
Firstly, that the enmity towards the EC is embedded in a broader constellation of 
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‘Europeanness’ that includes key figures, such as Germany and France, as well as the 
Continent as a whole. Effectively, the EC is synonymous with Europe. Secondly, that despite 
an anti-Maastricht viewpoint reveals a position frequently associated with pro-Atlanticism, 
the US, surprisingly, does not feature dominantly within the debates.   
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Table 7: Self and Other within the Pro and Anti-Maastricht Debates 
Debate Self Other Categorisation Characteristics Source  
 
T
he
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Britain The EC Friendly Process of strong linking: has safeguarded peace 
and prosperity via unity and ceding of national 
sovereignty; collective action and interdependence 
is inevitable and inexorable; the Community is 
voluntary, built from the bottom upwards and is a 
citizens’ Europe; is a non-federal Community of 
free members; monetary stability is part of a wider 
system characterised by sound finance, 
deregulation, openness and market liberalisation 
1, 3, 5, 
7, 11, 
12, 16  
Europe Central and 
Eastern Europe 
Friendly Process of strong linking: members of the same 
European family, Western responsibility to promote 
democracy and reform, should be treated as part of 
the same European history and future, have 
embraced the free market, characterised as 
experiencing liberty, freedom and independence 
3, 4, 9 
Britain The new Russia  Non-radical Process of mild differentiation: notion of enemy 
has changed from a common enemy to a less 
conspicuous one; difficulty of diluting suspicions 
and rivalries between West and East; potential for 
negotiation, verification and cooperation; capable 
of reform 
1, 4, 9 
Europe Germany Non-radical Process of mild differentiation: important for 
Europe for a united Germany to be anchored, 
reunification is regarded as both marvellous as well 
as heralding in new problems and dangers, France 
has a natural birthright to lead Europe and this is 
threatened by Germany, a strong Germany creates a 
fear which simultaneously confines its power  
7, 9, 11 
Britain as part 
of the mainland 
/ Continent 
Britain as 
detached from 
the mainland /  
     Continent 
Radical Process of strong differentiation: at the heart of 
Europe vs. on the periphery, outward-looking vs. 
inward-looking, widening vs. narrowing, 
functioning as an active member vs. being left 
behind, maximising Britain’s influence vs. 
minimising Britain’s influence, strength vs. 
weakness, the realities of being a participant vs. the 
cult of isolation 
1, 2, 3, 
6, 8, 9  
Europe The former 
Soviet Union 
Radical Process of strong differentiation: militaristic vs. 
peaceful, disintegrating vs. united, no historical 
memory of democracy vs. deep-seated record of 
democracy 
1, 4 
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 Britain The EC Radical Process of strong differentiation:  integrity vs. 
disunity; nation-state vs. federal state; post-
Maastricht vs. supranational; voluntary and elected 
vs. imposed and unelected; citizens and 
communities vs. businessmen and bureaucrats; non-
regulated vs. over-regulated; free trade vs. 
protectionism; confident vs. self-doubt; competitive 
vs. subsidised; rational vs. idealistic 
3, 4, 5, 
6, 11, 
12, 14, 
15, 16  
Europe The former 
Soviet Union 
Radical Process of strong differentiation: success vs. 
disaster; European unity forged by Soviet military 
threat 
8, 11, 13  
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The array of Others is produced due to the discursive contestations implicit within the various 
attempts to impose a particular national identity. I argue that these conflicting notions of 
identity can be revealed via the following enumeration of friendly, non-radical and radical 
Othering.  
 
4.5.1 National Identity and Friendly Othering 
 
Two instances of friendly Othering occur within the pro-EC debates. The first process of 
strong linking positions the EC as a friendly Other. However, it can be argued that British 
national identity is not merely a reflection of certain characteristics – deregulation, openness 
and market liberalisation – implicit within the EC, but it is also reflective of how these 
identifiers have affected Europe. Similarly, unity in Europe is regarded as having secured 
peace and prosperity, and a British identity firmly lodged within a free trade augmentation is 
deemed as contributing to the stabilisation and affluence of Europe. The European project is 
also empowered by the notion of voluntarism. It is governed by the voluntary decision of 
states to enter into agreement and is therefore is not construed as a top-down imposition.  of 
authoritarianism. It is an amalgam of free members, built bottom up and reflects the interests 
Britain Germany Radical Process of strong differentiation: flexibility of 
national currency vs. Deutschmark straitjacket; 
unassertive, non-threatening and competent vs. 
assertive, dominant and incompetent; Europe of 
nation-states vs. federal Europe; stable vs. 
unpredictable; trustworthy vs. untrustworthy; 
aggressive and bullying national character; German 
monetary institutions linked to historical German 
war machine  
5, 7, 8, 
10, 11, 
15 
Britain France and the 
Continent 
Radical Process of strong differentiation: British 
Parliament, traditions and liberties are stronger than 
those on the Continent; constitutional stability vs. 
change; open, transparent and democratic vs. 
surreptitious and adept at cloaking their aims; 
strong democratic institutions vs. weak democratic 
institutions 
5,  8, 11, 
13, 14 
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of all the citizens of Europe. This also places a civic dimension to national identity and 
regards the building of Europe as a freely chosen, anti-Empire project. In short, British 
identity is linked to a conceptual Other that lies outside and, as a result, perpetuates the need 
for closer integration and stability. The concept of Europe is stabilised via the invocation of 
shared histories, cultures, interests, political systems and patterns of trade.         
 
The second process of friendly Othering is that of Central and Eastern Europe. Britain is once 
again linked to a larger European Self and the newly emerging states of Central and Eastern 
Europe are part of the European family. The new liberties being experienced are conducted 
via an economic model that embraces the free market and repudiates those states’ socialist 
legacies. Authoritarianism has been replaced with democracy, free enterprise and 
independence. Britain is seen as part of this democratising process and shares responsibility 
in nurturing the fledgling nations of Central and Eastern Europe. However, the role of Central 
and Eastern Europe, and Britain’s reaction to the tumultuous changes affected them, runs 
deeper. There are two significant aspects to this. Firstly, by repudiating its socialist mindset, 
the new states are being rewarded. Central and Eastern Europe are positioned as ‘not Russia’ 
and are subsequently embraced. Secondly, the reaction of Britain and other Western 
European states is, in part, governed by the fear of the Balkanisation of Europe. With 
reference to the breakup of Yugoslavia, 
[w]hat has been happening there is symbolic both of the perils that lurk 
throughout eastern Europe and of the challenge they present for western 
Europe. The EC bears no responsibility for the onset of the catastrophe 
unfolding on Europe’s rim. But because the Community appears so 
powerful, it is expected to find an answer to that crisis on its periphery.566  
 
Although not all Central and Eastern European states are mentioned as obtaining the same 
level of reform, Britain is pitched as a firm protagonist that can contribute greatly to this 
                                                     
566 Smith. G. (1992) ‘Britain in the New Europe’, Foreign Affairs, 71:4, Fall, pp. 155-170 (at 156).  
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process of development. This structures Britain as possessing substantial influence and also 
responsibility for providing a model for the new states. All European nations share the same 
past and are part of the building blocks of the next stage in the enlargement and development 
of Europe.  
       
4.5.2 National Identity and Non-Radical Othering 
 
Two examples of non-radical Othering also have repercussions for the manner in which 
British national identity becomes formulated. Both are from the pro-Maastricht debates. The 
first is that of the new Russia. The disintegration of the former Soviet Union produces a 
fissure in which both old elements remain and new elements are ushered in. The process of 
mild differentiation still constructs the new Russia as a potential threat but labels it as less 
potent. Consequently, danger persists yet the unifying nature of the common enemy has been 
reformulated. A further reference points to the intractability of East and West histories in 
which rivalry and animosity became so entrenched. Thus, this mutual suspicion may continue 
although the potential for negotiation and cooperation exists. In terms of British national 
identity, this has two elements. Firstly, as Britain is already seen as a leader within Europe, 
the crisis within the new Russia helps add animus to Britain’s role. That is, any source of 
collaboration with Russia must include and be spearheaded by Britain. This places both 
leadership and authority as important aspects of British national identity. Secondly, the 
articulation of the threat factor creates a stable British identity. The changes sweeping 
through the former USSR are in stark contrast to the entrenched political solidity associated 
with Britain.  
 
The second non-radical Other is Germany. In this instance, Britain is part of the European 
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Self. This occurs due to the idea that Germany, as a newly reunified state, needs to be 
anchored steadfastly to Europe; first, as a means of cushioning the upheaval caused by 
reunification and second, as a way of checking rising German power. Subsequently, the 
reunification is labelled as spectacular but suggestive of future dangers. Again, these 
consequences have the following two implications for British national identity. Firstly, it is 
noteworthy that although reunification creates a level of uncertainty, particularly for its 
immediate neighbours, it is not a shift that could be detected by any noticeable changes in 
German policy. Thus, 
German reunification 1989-90 aggravated existing feelings in France and 
Britain and what was already felt to be a novel German assertiveness over 
political union. It was true that for several years after 1989, the German 
government cautiously avoided any formal claims to a new status based on 
increased population and geographical extent.567  
 
Subsequently, German support for the single currency and for political union is symbolic of a 
continued commitment to integration and an indicator of Germany’s Europeanised identity.568 
Secondly, Germany is not perceived as equally threatening to Europe in quite the same way. 
German power threatens what is called the French birthright as political and intellectual 
leader of Europe. At first glance, this may seem to challenge the notion of a stable uniform 
Europe as a friendly Other. However, what it does is reify Europe as a stabilising structure by 
championing the new Germany, shorn of its politically repressive and geographically divided 
East, as European. It also locates Germany, with Britain and France, as part of a triptych of 
core states within Europe. 
          
 
                                                     
567 Middlemas, K. (2001) ‘From Single Market to Maastricht’ in Broad, R. and Preston, V. (eds.) Moored to the Continent? 
Britain and European Integration, p. 108.  
568 Marcussen, M., Risse, T., Engelmann-Martin, D., Knopf, H. J. and Roscher, K. (1999) ‘Constructing Europe? The 
Evolution of French, British and German Nation State Identities’, p. 624. 
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4.5.3 National Identity and Radical Othering 
 
The first process of radical Othering views exclusion from the mainland Continent as an 
existential threat. Not merely is the EC viewed as an association of similar ideas and values, 
but national existence cannot occur outside of the structure of inclusion within Europe. The 
exclusionist danger configures a British identity in two main ways. Firstly, British identity is 
seen as part of a broader European identity. The values which Britain embodies are European 
in heritage and outlook. They contribute to the pool of European characteristics which 
include the exercise of freedoms and liberties. Secondly and relatedly, British national 
identity is internationalist. This is positioned in opposition to what can be called the cult of 
isolation in which British exceptionalism may have been a characteristic feature of Britain’s 
historic relations with the Continent, but now must make way for an identity which is more 
embracing, less antagonistic and firmly wedded to its partners in and beyond Europe. This 
identity is reflective of a process of Europeanisation in that Community membership has 
bolstered a sense of influence and belonging. Identity becomes articulated within a less 
inward-looking and more wide-ranging framework of cooperation and collaboration with 
other European states. Thus, this radical Otherisation is interesting in two ways. Firstly, it is 
not formulated against a physical Other that remains outside. It is constructed according to an 
idea, a temporal perception of self-exclusion that is associated with the weakening of national 
identity. Secondly, it others an imagined political community of what British national identity 
might become without an attachment to Europe: xenophobic, small-minded and nationalistic.   
 
A second practice of radical Othering focuses on the former Soviet Union. The disintegration 
has led to a clear fissure between old and new Russia and British national identity is firmly 
positioned against this hostile configuration. Unlike the other discourses, British national 
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identity is constructed as a part of the unified Self of Europe, peaceful but active, with a 
deeply embedded tradition of democracy. Despite the fact that this position occurs against the 
breakdown of the Soviet state, enough remnants of the older militaristic system remain to act 
as a threat. Hence, this realisation formulates a British national identity which is guarded, 
integrated and law-abiding as against a fissiparous and potentially malevolent Other. 
 
In the anti-Maastricht debates, the EC is also configured via a process of strong 
differentiation. These formulations manifest several aspects of British national identity. To 
begin with, Britain is positioned as a nation united against the fractious nature of the EC. As 
such, European nations are seen as possessing less democratically rooted institutions, 
practices and histories. These debates, therefore, produce democracy as a central tenet of 
British national identity. Next, national identity is formatted around the notion of the nation-
state. Supranational ambitions are regarded as unrealistic. European accord is achievable via 
an intergovernmental rather than institution-building approach. This places British identity 
within a post-Maastricht mould in which decisions must firmly remain in the hands of 
sovereign governments rather than European institutions. Third, British identity is locally 
communalistic. The rights of citizens and communities are prioritised over the agendas of 
businessmen and bureaucrats. The British nation is a national and local entity in which a 
number of communities sit within the broader nation. Thus, it is also civic and home-grown 
as well as heavily imbued with the exercise of economic freedoms. Limited regulation, free 
trade and competition are part of the economic make-up of Britain as against an over-
regulated, protectionist and subsidised Europe. This lack of state interference creates an 
identity in which individualism, free choice and personal enterprise reign. Finally, British 
national identity is characterised by rationalism and practicality. This is lodged against the 
abstract and idealistic attempt to build Europe from the top down. 
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The anti-Maastricht debates also construct the former Soviet Union as a radical Other and 
also position Europe as the Self. However, unlike the pro-EC configuration of the Soviet 
radical Other, Britain is part of the European Self not through the sharing of common values, 
but through the need to unify militarily against the USSR. Hence, this is articulated through 
the Cold War paradigm in which European unity was forged out of the need to resist the 
Soviet threat. This resistance, therefore, is part of what constitutes British identity.   
 
Germany is also defined through a process of strong differentiation. Three major elements 
help construct a British national identity. Firstly, the retention of the national currency is 
regarded as an expression of national sovereignty. Fiscal and monetary independence are 
therefore representative of a broader sense of national determination. In this sense, a 
configuration of national identity is its resistance to Continental financial constraints or any 
uniform attempt to impose a single currency. Secondly, as Germany is constituted as 
dominant, aggressive and unpredictable, Britain is conversely constructed as the antithesis: 
non-threatening and established. A final configuration seeks to tie Germany to its military 
past. That is, the activities of financial institutions, such as the Bundesbank, are reflective of a 
national character which seeks to control Europe. Modern day Germany is linked to its past 
by what is seen as an overbearing and bullying national character. Germany’s past is 
positioned as a present threat and is represented by German assertiveness in Europe while 
Britain functions as a barrier to this increasing transfer of power.  
 
The final process of radical Othering also occurs within the anti-EC debates. Both France and 
the Continent as a whole are configured in several ways. Firstly, Britain possesses a far 
greater sense of tradition and liberty, and its identity, therefore, is more reverential towards 
tradition and constitutional integrity. Secondly, British identity is very much linked to the 
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notion of ‘fair play’ and France, by contrast, is covert in its motives. France is adept at 
projecting a pro-European and fraternal image of itself when conducting Community 
business and yet is motivated by self-serving motives. This last identity formation constructs 
a Britain which is more open and honest in its relations and intentions. Hence, the label 
‘Euroscepticism’ is not merely an aversion to EC institutions but is governed by a much 
deeper suspicion of Europeanism. 
 
4.6 The Production of British National Identities  
 
Figure 5 summarises the findings within this chapter to argue that a range of particular 
national identities and Selves can be attributed. As before, the figure is organised into the 
processes of Othering, with pro- and anti-positions and the subsequent discourses which stem 
from this dichotomy. As before, these readings of Europe are multiple in nature and 
subsequently produce a range of identities some of which may occur in either debate. 
Consequently, certain identities are not necessarily pro or anti-treaty specific. Utilising these 
features, I unify the findings to assert that four unified British Selves have been produced. 
These Selves, or images of nationhood, are representations of how political elites view 
Britain and are formulated according to the identities attributed to them.   
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Figure 5: British National Identities in the Debates over the Maastricht Treaty
Othering                           Pro/Anti                                     Discourses                                             British National Identities                               Britain’s Selves 
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On the basis of an analysis of the debates in this chapter, four British national identities are 
produced. The first can be formulated as Britain as a liberalising European nation-state. 
Several discourses instil meaning into this conception: Europe as a security alliance, as a 
community of intergovernmental nation-states and as an international free trade area. Here 
we see the reformulation of the Europe as a security bloc discourse from the debates over the 
1975 Referendum. However, in contrast, the advent of an alliance rather than a security bloc 
is instructive of a number of modifications. Firstly, the tumultuous changes stemming from 
the breakup of the former Soviet Union effectively forced a reconstitution of the threat value 
attributed to the USSR. As we have seen from the previous chapter, the Cold War was 
perceived in concrete form: that the USSR was intent on imposing Communist principles on 
Western Europe, that Britain’s attachment to the USA functioned as the best means to deal 
with this peril, that a unified Europe was essential and that Britain was concerned about both 
domestic and international issues stemming from its fading power status. By the time of the 
Maastricht Treaty, the threat from the East had splintered into an unstable formation and an 
opportunity had been created to hook the newly formulated states to a peaceable Europe. 
Secondly, a bolstered Europe had, by this time, seen German unification along with the 
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden. As such, and although a security reading of 
Europe and Britain existed, it had transfigured more into an alliance of nation-states rather 
than a homogenous bloc. Another discourse that shifted was Europe as a network of 
sovereignties in the 1975 debates becoming transformed into Europe as a community of 
intergovernmental nation-states. The driving ethos exemplified in this alteration concerns the 
monetarist and liberalising ideology that permeated much of the debates at this time. 
Intergovernmentalism became the key to reforming Europe by ensuring European decisions 
would still be made by individual nation-states and that supranationalistic institution building 
should be vehemently resisted as it destabilised market driven mechanisms. Linked to this is 
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the third discourse which formulates Europe as an international free trade area. As a vehicle 
for encouraging commerce, Europe allows national authorities and identities to remain 
unfettered. That is, there is seemingly no contradiction between upholding the sanctity of the 
nation-state whilst simultaneously forging new markets and patterns of trade. As a 
consequence of these three discourses, British identities can be grouped as follows. Firstly, 
Britain is peaceful, prosperous, European and securitised. Secondly, it is deregulated, anti-
protectionist, monetarist and economically liberal.       
 
The second Self is Britain as a reformist role model. This configuration is similar to the 
previous debates yet is moulded by different discourses. Central and Eastern Europe are 
enfranchised. That is, free from the stranglehold of Soviet domination, the newly autonomous 
states are part of an interlocking core and periphery. Britain and other established members 
are part of a core invested with responsibility, purpose and leadership. The fledgling 
independents are the periphery that can be stabilised, democratised and integrated. This 
produces a Britain possessive of several identities. It is a leader, a peace-maker, united and 
reform-driving. However, two further discourses consolidate these identities. The second is 
Russia as reformist. Again, a fissure exists within which elements of the former USSR are 
prevalent and yet regeneration, democratic change and Westernisation are also championed 
as potential elements of the new Russia. Thirdly, Germany is a core but unstable state. 
Again, the element of unpredictability after Germany’s reunification invests Britain with a 
reform-driving identity.   
 
The third constructed Self is Britain as a global European authority. Again, several 
discourses formulate this reading: Europe as an enlarging superpower, Europe as a 
stabilising network and the former Soviet Union as not Europe. As a superpower, Europe is 
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particularly emboldened in two principal ways. Firstly, as the Maastricht Treaty paved the 
way for the adoption of the Euro, a common currency is formulated as a further example of 
how the EC was gradually evolving into a more powerful political unit. Secondly, the 
dissolution of the Soviet Empire had effectively paved the way for European expansion as it 
produced a number of independent states that could help project the new Europe. Similarly, 
Europe is unified via highlighting how elements of the old Soviet order remain. All of this 
has the effect of producing a more prominent Britain with identities which include stable, 
influential worldwide, authoritative and securitised and model. In addition to this is the 
manner in which Europe functions as a chief stabiliser. Again, the turbulent changes in 
Central and Eastern Europe produce a resolute core of European states that attracts those new 
states recently shorn of their Communist pasts. Of importance is the manner in which such a 
British Self can be contrasted to the previous chapter. In 1975, Britain functioned as a 
cooperative European power which took much of its animus by utilising the dominant role 
the EEC had in empowering Britain. By 1993, the fading power status and sense of national 
prevarication had gone to reveal a more global actor whose nation-state status was helping to 
forge a more progressive Europe. Hence, a shift from reluctant ‘piggybacking’ – staying in 
the EEC through well-entrenched fears and lack of alternatives – had shifted to one of 
confident authoritativeness.  
 
The last reading is Britain as a sovereign civic body. This is instilled with meaning by the 
following discourses: Europe as a Franco-German hegemony, as a federal superstate, as a 
socialist assembly and the former Soviet Union as an unstable power. Thus, the Maastricht 
debates produced a more solid resistance to the EC by equating federalism within a Franco-
German doctrine that effectively charged both states with the ambition to dominate the 
Continent. Coupled to this is the political and economic ethos attributed to the Community. 
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That is, due to its protectionist, statist and centralising tendencies, Europe functions as a 
socialist assembly. This has the effect of reifying the sanctity of sovereignty. In the 1975 
debates that were against EEC membership, sovereignty was configured as a responsibility of 
British parliamentarians that European institutions sought to strip away. In the anti-
Maastricht treaty debates, sovereignty had spread to include all facets of British life. As such, 
a major national identity is that Britain is politically, popularly and economically sovereign. 
As such, Britain is constructed as a civic body whereby a previously localised identity has 
moulded into a more pervasive national entity. Other identities echo both the local and 
national, as against the supranational. Britain is citizen-driven, populist, integrated, unified 
and self-governing. A final identity labels Britain as essentialist. It possesses a fundamental 
‘essence’ that makes its independence born, not made, and subsequently unique.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
232 
 
CHAPTER FIVE: THE TREATY OF LISBON 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out to examine the discourses surrounding the 2008 ratification of the 
Lisbon Treaty and the consequent processes of Othering and the construction of British 
national identities. As in the previous chapters, the primary sources utilised in constructing 
the various discourses and the subsequent contending identities are listed in Appendix 3. As 
shown in the descriptive account as well as Tables 8 and 9, the numbers next to each 
quotation represent the source in the appendix. As also in the previous chapters, quotations 
marks have either been given in the original source or are quotes of quotations. Unlike the 
previous empirical chapters, memoirs and biographies have not been used. This is because 
the event is too contemporary to have been included in many political biographies. The 
sources that have been utilised, however, can be categorised as follows. Firstly, as before, I 
make use of the general election manifestoes of the Conservative, Labour and Liberal 
Democrat parties in the May 2005 general elections. Despite being published three years 
before the Lisbon Treaty, the manifestoes highlight the political elite attitudes towards 
Europe and are subsequently important as a vehicle within which identity issues are thrashed 
out. In addition, I have also included the manifesto of the United Kingdom Independence 
Party as this party was particularly vocal in the run up to the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty 
and had won 12 MEPs in the 2004 European Elections. Secondly, I utilise newspaper articles 
within which political figures have commented on the nature and implications of the treaty. 
In order to delineate which articles to employ, I draw on the search engine 
www.journalisted.com and search category ‘Lisbon Treaty’. The time frame for the articles 
published ranges from December 2007 to November 2009. This covers both the ratification 
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and the parliamentary debates and is therefore obviously the period of time in which political 
spokespeople most habitually expressed their opinions on the treaty. In order for this chapter 
to elucidate and cover these many different viewpoints, the articles have been taken from a 
wide range of newspapers including The Daily Telegraph, The Independent, The Guardian, 
The Daily Mail, The Daily Express, The Spectator, The Times and The Daily Mirror. 
Although the Eurosceptic and, one might argue, Europhobic nature of the British press has 
been well-documented,569 the written media functions as a particularly potent source within 
which political discourses are produced. Only articles by prominent political spokespeople 
have been included. That includes former and current Prime Ministers, Home Secretaries, 
Foreign Ministers and Ministers of Europe, as well as non-cabinet Members of Parliament 
and Shadow Ministers. Articles have also been included by reporters and journalists but, as a 
means of ensuring authenticity in the discourses, only direct quotes from political 
representatives have been recorded from these articles. Thirdly, I include two important 
debates on the Lisbon Treaty in the House of Commons. The second and third readings of the 
European Union Amendment Bill, conducted on 21 January and 11 March 2008, contain 
lengthy arguments over the nature of Europe and are information-rich. The length of the 
debates also ensures a broad cross section of contributors from across the political divides.  
 
The organisation closely follows those of the previous empirical chapters. The opening 
section provides the historical background leading up to the treaty. This orientation section, 
as in the preceding empirical chapters, is not designed to offer an alternative viewpoint to the 
commonly received history but instead functions as an aide-mémoire to highlight the context 
                                                     
569 See, for example, Anderson, P. J. (2004) ‘A Flag of Convenience? Discourse and Motivations of the London-Based 
Eurosceptic Press, European Studies, 20, pp. 151-170; Daddow, O. J. (2006) ‘Euroscepticism and the culture of the 
discipline of history’, Review of International Studies, 32, pp. 309-328; and Grant, C. (2008) ‘Why is Britain Eurosceptic?’, 
Centre for European Reform, Dec., pp. 1-8. 
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within which the discourses function. The next section provides an analysis of the debates 
organised into pro- and anti-Lisbon Treaty ideal types. Each debate outlines the predicates 
and practices: the meanings which are attached to the various subjects. Again, the subjects are 
described in a particular way via specific verbs, adjectives and adverbs, and this descriptive 
process instils the subjects with meaning. Next, the presuppositions are analysed with a view 
to understanding which particular truths are taken as given. The subsequent stage examines 
how these processes are organised into subject positioning. These are investigated in order to 
show the oppositional and non-oppositional relationships between the subjects and objects, 
and to expose what relationships exist between them. These findings within the debates are 
revealed in Tables 8 and 9. The process of Othering, with friendly, non-friendly and radical 
configurations, is then presented in Table 10 and described. The concluding section examines 
how British national identities are constructed according to these processes and these findings 
are shown in Figure 6. As with the previous chapters, this figure reveals the assortment of 
British Selves or images of nationhood that have been produced from the national identities. 
Again, these Selves are highlighted in bold, and the discourses and identities from which they 
have been produced are italicised.  
 
5.2 Historical Background 
 
The immediate post-Maastricht period did little to allay the divisiveness over the issue of 
Europe. From in-party squabbling, the disagreements obviously impacted on European policy 
and demonstrated how the Conservative government’s approach to Europe clashed violently 
with those of its European counterparts. In keeping with the support for widening over 
deepening, Major’s government fully endorsed the admission of Austria, Finland and Sweden 
to the EU. The importance of widening was reflected in a speech Major gave at Ellesmere 
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Port in 1994 calling for a “multi-track, multi-speed, multi-layered”570 Europe. Such a flexible 
approach was not held by the German government which instead favoured a ‘two-tier 
Europe’ whereby a ‘hard-core’ of states – Germany, France and the Benelux countries – 
could actively pursue EMU to the exclusion on Britain.571 By 1996, Britain’s resistance 
prompted the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, to remark that Britain, “as the ‘slowest ship 
in the convoy’, would not be permitted to hold the others back.”572 However, perhaps the 
most publicised and acerbic display of antagonism between Britain and Europe was the 1996 
beef crisis whereby the EU banned British beef exports due to the perceived link between 
bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in animals and Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (CJD) in 
humans.573 The illness was referred to more commonly as Mad Cow Disease. Certain 
Conservative members, perhaps enthused by the opportunity the crisis gave them to heap 
opprobrium on Europe, interpreted the ban quite differently. Michael Forsyth, the Scottish 
Secretary, stated “[w]hat we are witnessing is the cynical elimination of a formidable 
competitor from the markets of Europe”.574 Additionally, John Major argued that apart from 
European leaders succumbing to a media-driven frenzy, “action against only British beef 
carried the message that other beef – their beef – was safe.”575 After the continuation of the 
ban, several options were considered and the British government plumbed for a policy of 
non-cooperation. This strategy was announced to the House of Commons on 21 May 1996 
and the Prime Minister made a clear declaration of its reason: “I say this with great 
reluctance, but the European Union operates through good will. If we do not benefit from 
                                                     
570 Major, J. (1994) ‘Ellesmere Port Declaration’, Speech to a European Rally at the Civic Centre, Ellesmere Port, 31 May. 
Cited in Gowland, D., Turner,. A. and Wright, A. (2010) Britain and European Integration since 1945: On the Sidelines, 
London and New York: Routledge, p. 124.  
571 Young, J. W. (1993) Britain and European Unity, 1945-1999, p. 166. 
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good will from partners, clearly we cannot reciprocate.”576 Blocking up to seventy measures, 
however, at least from the perspective of France and Germany, was merely a crude attempt at 
blackmail and it further contributed to the argument that Britain was an unsteady, unreliable 
and out-of-sorts partner. The beef crisis had two fundamental implications. The first was that 
the ban on exporting British beef was construed as indicative of an EU which far from being 
a union governed by the pursuit of common interests was actually self-interested states 
safeguarding their purely national interests. The event provided a great deal of animus for the 
anti-EU factions within the Conservative Party and signalled, once again, that Europe was a 
potentially divisive force. Secondly, notwithstanding the severe economic effects on Britain’s 
domestic farmers, identity factors also played an important role. John Major, for example, to 
a Spanish audience, called beef “part of the psyche of our nation”.577 In short, the beef crisis 
played out as a war and was seized upon by political actors to instil various meanings. The 
dominant perspective within the British government viewed the beef ban as a blatant attempt 
to solidify Franco-German power at the expense of Britain. The prevailing European 
perspective viewed British obstreperousness as the latest event in a long line of disjunctures 
that started with Maastricht and threatened the momentum of the Union.  
 
In the meantime, the domestic political environment was similarly restive and continued to be 
blighted by intra-party splits. Major had to recover from a leadership challenge by the John 
Redwood, former Secretary of State for Wales, which Major won by only three votes above 
the minimum he had set himself.578 Also, despite earlier setbacks in the birth of the Euro, 
with the original launch year of 1997 being postponed by two years, the single currency was 
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now becoming a distinct reality which rendered the ‘wait and see’ policy as more 
problematic. In addition, Major’s distinctive non-combative style, perhaps cultivated as a 
reaction to his predecessor as well as influenced by the minority government he headed, only 
provided a breeding ground for dissent and the ever-great fear of rebellion was never really 
quashed.579 Subsequently, by the time of the 1997 general election, the Conservative Party 
was riddled with disagreements over Europe, and in particular, the single currency. By 
contrast, Labour was buoyed by an increasingly confident approach which promised a clear 
cut referendum on the adoption of the Euro and which operated in stark contrast to the muddy 
signals coming from the ailing Major government. Tony Blair, who had taken over from John 
Smith after his death in 1994, was more at ease with the European social model being courted 
by the Commission, and, in particular, the Social Chapter, and he was certainly aware of how 
the issue of Europe could be so fratricidal to a political party. The Liberal Democrats, in their 
general election manifesto, unambiguously embraced participation in the single currency but 
still lodged the decision within the democratic framework of a national referendum. Other 
political groups had catapulted onto the scene willing to demand that which the Conservative 
Party was unable to offer. The Referendum Party, headed by the businessman Sir James 
Goldsmith, offered just that. The party campaigned on its single issue, a national referendum 
on Europe, and the shrewdly worded question on which the party would campaign was 
unambiguous: “Do you want the UK to be part of a Federal Europe? Or do you want the UK 
to return to an association of sovereign nations that are part of a common trading market?”580 
The UK Independence Party, formed three years earlier by the academic Alan Sked, was even 
more strident in its position calling for complete withdraw from the Community.  
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The general election on 1 May 1997 resulted in a Labour landslide. For the new government, 
it was not at all hard to score high and easily on the issue of Europe.581 However, not merely 
was the new government more European by default, but it was led by a man whose Foreign 
Secretary described as “arguably the most pro-European Prime Minister in modern times, 
certainly since Edward Heath.”582 Hence, the signs early on at least pointed towards the 
courting of a more cordial rapport with other European states. Blair, in a speech given upon 
receiving the Charlemagne Prize in the German city of Aachen in 1999, stated that he had a 
“bold aim … That over the next few years Britain resolves once and for all its ambivalence 
towards Europe. I want to end the uncertainty, the lack of confidence, the Europhobia.”583 
Labour’s early tenure coincided with the Amsterdam Summit Meeting which resulted in the 
signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, designed to update the Maastricht Treaty, inject greater 
democracy into the institutions of the EU and also prepare for enlargement. The ratification 
of the Treaty, however, only instigated minor progress. Qualified Majority Voting was 
extended into some areas including employment, the environment, health and transport; the 
opt-out from the Social Chapter was scrapped; and a ‘flexibility’ clause was introduced to 
allow those countries that wished to progress further down the path of integration to do so.584 
In keeping with the Conservative position, border controls were vigorously defended as being 
the domain of national governments.  
 
However, what could be agreed upon should not overshadow the very issue that had become 
dominant and indicative of the ever-evolving and, to some, ever-encroaching Union: the 
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single currency. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, although not objecting to 
adopting the Euro in principle, laid out five economic tests. Particularly after the manifesto 
pledge of a nationwide referendum, Brown’s strategy was met with a level of suspicion. 
Shirley Williams remarked that “[p]erhaps Whitehall keeps tests and conditions on its 
mantelpiece, as cooks keep jelly moulds, there to be used for any purpose.”585 No doubt, and 
particularly in relation to the first wave of countries adopting the Euro in January 1999, the 
tests were sufficiently malleable to position Euro-entry as a foreseeable option for Britain 
whilst simultaneously relegating it as a peripheral issue for the time being. In short, it can be 
argued that the tests bought the government valuable time to ‘sell’ the idea of the single 
currency to the British people.  
 
In any event, two important aspects of the Blairite approach to Europe characterised the early 
2000s. The first was an attempt to position Britain as a natural leader of Europe. In a speech 
delivered at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Blair claimed that “[t]he fact is that 
Europe is today the only route through which Britain can exercise power and influence. If it 
is to maintain its historic role as a global player, Britain has to be a central part of the politics 
of Europe.”586 Thus, a proactive British European policy was indicative of a fatalistic 
dominance it was destined to possess. Britain was, one could argue, merely playing out its 
identity. Secondly and relatedly, the attempt to play a more assertive role helps explain what 
Julie Smith has labelled “promiscuous bilateralism” whereby the Labour government 
dispensed with forging relationships with ideologically similar counterparts and instead 
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attracted strong working relationships with centre-right figures including Spain’s José-María 
Aznar and Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi.587 In contrast, by proselytising the new economic model 
based on deregulation, called ‘the third way’, Blair’s strategy brought him into conflict with 
centre-left political figures like Lionel Jospin of France, who was decidedly more 
interventionist, and Gerhard Schröder of Germany, who although warm to the idea early on, 
had to distance himself from such policies due to pressure from his Social Democratic 
Party.588 Furthermore, Labour’s non-participation in the European currency cast a shadow on 
whether the UK government could reasonably position itself as a leader in Europe.  
 
What happened to be the greatest threat to Blair’s attempt to lead Europe actually occurred 
during his second tenure: the invasion of Iraq. The Labour government, and Blair in 
particular, had not been reticent about military intervention prior to 2003. His adamant 
support for military involvement in Kosovo in 1999 had highlighted the inadequacy within 
Europe of a military response to crises and the ever-important role Britain believed it had in 
acting out its global and Atlanticist role. Even before this test of international alliance, in a 
speech delivered on 10 November 1997, Blair argued that “[w]e are the bridge between the 
US and Europe.”589 However, Blair’s close relationship with President Clinton and 
particularly with his successor, George W. Bush, in light of the latter’s unilateralist pursuits 
which included the non-ratification of the Kyoto Protocol and the lack of support for the 
International Criminal Court, certainly created unease with several European leaders most 
notably Jacques Chirac and Gerhard Schröder.590 Even though Europe had stood 
                                                     
587 Smith, J. (2005) ‘A missed opportunity? New Labour’s European policy 1997-2005’, International Affairs, 81, 4, pp. 
703-21 (at 709 and 711). 
588 Fella, S. (2006) ‘Robin Cook, Tony Blair and New Labour’s Competing Visions of Europe’, The Political Quarterly, vol. 
77, no. 3, July-Sept., pp. 388-401 (at 394).  
589 Blair, T. (1997) ‘Speech to the Lord Mayors Banquet’, 10 Nov. Cited in Wallace, W. (2005) ‘The Collapse of British 
Foreign Policy, International Affairs, 82 (1), pp. 53-68 (at 55).  
590 Bache, I. and Nugent, N. (2007) ‘Europe’ in Seldon, A. (ed.) Blair’s Britain: 1997-2007, p. 540.  
 
 
241 
 
overwhelming firm with the USA after the terrorist attacks on September 11 2001, and that a 
broad alliance had supported the start of the War in Afghanistan in the same year, British 
support for the invasion of Iraq showed that the much lauded bridge metaphor no longer 
existed. Bulmer cites two immediate repercussions of what he calls New Labour’s utilitarian 
supranationalism. Firstly, the split between European states over Iraq greatly reduced the 
British government’s ability to shape the EU agenda and secondly, the domestic unpopularity 
of the war made the government more defensive on European policy.591  
 
Despite this rift, a number of key European objectives can be said to characterise the Labour 
government’s approach to Europe. First was a championing of EU enlargement which saw 
ten new countries, most of them from Central and Eastern Europe, join the EU in 2004. 
Historically, both Labour and Conservative had consistently supported this strategy and the 
focus on market integration which enlargement brought was as congruent with pro-Europeans 
as it was anti-Europeans.592 Second, the issue of the adoption of the Euro was taken off the 
agenda after the Chancellor Gordon Brown announced that a Treasury analysis had indicated 
that only one of the key economic tests had been met.593 Third, the Treaty establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, which among other developments designated the post of permanent 
President of the European Council, established the position of the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
to represent the EU internationally and gave legal power to the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the Union, was to be approved via a referendum but remained permanently 
unratified after the French and Dutch rejections in May and June 2005. Indeed, it has been 
argued that the treaty was so injected with a British influenced neo-liberal spirit that it was 
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anathema to the French social model.594 However, perhaps this relates to what can be argued 
as one of the most important aspects of Blair’s tenure. That the British attempt to break with 
past hesitancies, standoffishness and outright conflict led to what has been called “the 
Anglicising of Europe”.595 Indeed, the British contribution closely identified with this process 
was summed up in a newspaper article by the then Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon 
Brown, in 2003. He argued that  
British values also have much to offer, persuading a global Europe that the 
only way forward is inter-governmental, not federal; mutual recognition, 
not one-size-fits-all central rules; tax competition, not tax harmonization, 
with proper political accountability and subsidiarity, not a superstate.596 
 
These set of values clearly distinguished precisely what Europe should and should not be. 
Although Labour’s less antagonistic relationship with the EU was viewed as laudable, it is 
also evident that such influence was restricted at home. Europe continued to be viewed with 
scepticism within Britain. As Stevens wrote before Blair’s second electoral win, “[t]his 
government cannot much longer make Britain’s case in Europe unless it can make Europe’s – 
and the euro’s – case in Britain.”597 In short, although Blair had succeeded in putting Britain 
into Europe, he had not successfully planted Europe into Britain.  
 
The 2005 election produced a manifesto which promised to put the Constitutional Treaty to a 
referendum and to also continue with the five economic tests as a precursor to a 
parliamentary vote and final referendum on the Euro.598 The Conservative manifesto, under 
its leader Michael Howard, adamantly opposed joining the Euro and supported the 
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renegotiation and restoration of the opt-out on the Social Chapter.599 Both main parties 
championed the enlargement of the Union to include Turkey and others. The slim Labour 
victory would produce a further two years of a Blair-led government that had the UK 
Presidency of the EU in 2005. Prior to this, Blair gave a speech to the European Parliament 
on 23 June 2005 in which he called for greater reform to economic and social policies, 
criticised the burdensome role agriculture played in the EU budget and queried whether the 
debate over the Constitutional Treaty had really brought Europe nearer to the people.600 Of 
his remaining tenure, Blair announced the following year that he would resign within 12 
months thus handing over power to his long-in-waiting chancellor.   
 
It has been well-documented that although Gordon Brown’s surface pro-Europeanism was 
apparent early on, he possessed little of Blair’s personability. As one biographer describes 
him: 
He often arrived late in Brussels or Luxembourg, and made excuses to 
avoid staying for lunch. The tortuous sessions bolstered his conviction that 
European politicians were building a protectionist, anti-American fortress. 
Regardless of the formal agenda, he would use the meetings to deliver 
finger-pointing lectures about Europe’s insularity and failure to adopt 
Anglo-American policies.601   
 
It can also be noted that Brown’s brand of Britishness sought to enshrine Britain with its own 
values rather than position it as part of the ‘we’ of Europe. For example, in the British 
Council 70th Anniversary Lecture, given on 7 July 2004, Brown said that “British qualities 
and values can play a leading part in shaping a Europe that must reform, be flexible, be 
competitive, be outward-looking and build better trading and commercial relationships with 
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the USA.”602 The USA, therefore, is positioned as a better representative of these values than 
the EU. Conversely, this transatlantic theme, redolent after the 11 September attacks, 
possessed less clout by 2008. As Dumbrell notes, “[the] European political landscape had 
also shifted with the more pro-American noises emanating from Paris and Berlin.”603 In 
addition, Europe itself was given new impetus. The lifeless Constitutional Treaty, after what 
had been called ‘the reflection period’, was revived by the German government in 2007 
during its presidency of the EU.604 Major elements of the treaty included the merging of the 
pillar system to produce just one institution, the creation of a high representative for foreign 
policy and the enactment of legislation to formulate the Union as a single legal personality. 
However, there was sufficient argument to suggest that the Constitutional Treaty had merely 
been repackaged. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel told El Pais newspaper 
that “[t]he fundamentals of the Constitution have been maintained in large part … We have 
renounced everything that makes people think of a state, like the flag and the national 
anthem”.605 Despite a delay, due to an earlier rejection of the treaty in a national vote in 
Ireland – the only country to have a national referendum on the adoption of the treaty – the 
Treaty of Lisbon became law on 1 December 2009.  
 
To conclude, the Lisbon Treaty is a significant event for analysing the construction of 
national identities for a number of reasons. Firstly, as a recent event, it enables a 
contemporary reading of Europe. This is particularly useful when considering the 
comparative element of this study and for revealing which British identities have been 
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transformed and which have remained the same over the three critical events. Secondly, the 
Lisbon Treaty is information-rich. One of the deeper background elements to the treaty 
relates to the issue of a national referendum. Both Labour and Conservative parties were 
routinely castigated for reneging on this promise. An Economist article derided the “pitifully 
unconvincing”606 argument that Labour used: that the treaty and the constitution were 
completely different propositions. This had the effect, once again, of calling on political 
spokespeople to define precisely what the EU was and what the treaty would enable it to 
become. Finally, the treaty existed within a paradigm of globalisation. States no longer 
possess the capacity to ignore the worldwide interconnectivities between actors. This issue of 
how to function in a global environment ties in to the retention of national identities and 
makes the broader issue of identity more trenchant. For example, in a 2000 speech by the 
then Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook affirmed that “the age of globalisation has been 
paralleled by strong assertions of national identity and culture.”607 As a consequence, 
globalisation is taken as a given entity and galvanises debate over what impact such 
transnational processes have over national identities.  
 
5.3 The Pro-Lisbon Debates 
 
In this section, I examine the predicates relating to the pro-Lisbon positions as represented in 
Table 8. These are the descriptive traits evident from the sources listed in Appendix 3. The 
predicates and processes are summarised, the presuppositions explained and then the various 
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subject positions are discussed. As in the previous chapters, the documents, page numbers 
and columns for the appendix sources are given in square brackets.  
 
5.3.1 Predication within the Pro-Lisbon Debates 
 
To begin, and very similarly to all debates that predicate membership as a positive, the fear of 
seclusion is situated as an existential threat that goes against the prominent and agential role 
Britain is afforded. Isolationism ‘risks damaging this country’ [32-col.1249] and is a position 
that ‘Britain cannot afford’ [23]. Influence is, as expected, very much lodged within a high 
level of participation and again takes its animus from the reference to the ‘missing the boat’ 
argument that looks upon Britain’s early history with the Community as one blighted by 
missed chances and counter-productive prevarication. Subsequently, Britain is a leader ‘at the 
heart of international decision-making’ [2], ‘shaping the EU and making sure it delivers’ [32-
col.1253]. Britain and Europe mutually enforce one another in a relationship of 
codependency. A second formulation reveals a dual identity in which one can be ‘proud to be 
British … and European’ [15]. In addition, there are several references to how Europe has 
consistently been articulated through ‘the prism of Britain’s past … that the EU is … a vast 
conspiracy against the UK’ [32-col.1319] and ‘the myth that we are threatened with a 
European superstate’ [32-col.1252]. Again, the anti-EU fixation is viewed as delusional and 
draws upon a long history of viewing Community relations as conspiratorial and malevolent. 
Also, the Labour member, Patricia Hewitt, referencing speeches she witnessed in the Labour 
Common Market Safeguards Committee in the early 1970s, highlights the ‘chauvinism, 
protectionism and sheer little Englandism’ [33-col.176] of the anti-Common Market position. 
Finally, Britain is viewed as being part of a ‘multipolar world’ [32-col.1290]. The ‘old 
balance of power politics’ [32-col.1316] has receded and given way to a ‘new’ [2] Europe. 
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Within this new Europe, contestations between nation-states have been replaced by the need 
to recognise interdependence and association. Thus, the dominant role afforded Britain is part 
of a broader changing Europe that has shed its Cold War rivalries to function within a sphere 
where no single centre of power dominates. Britain is also perceived as having ‘led the 
enlargement process’ [33-col.196] which again reveals the desire to diffuse and decentralise 
power. 
 
In contrast to the previous empirical chapters, Europe is viewed in a more multifaceted way 
that produces a greater number of readings or ‘Europes’. Europe is constructed in seven 
particular ways. It is firstly configured as a continuously changing entity. Far from static, 
enlargement is regarded as ‘perhaps Europe’s greatest achievement’ [5] and ‘was the biggest 
and most dramatic peaceful shift of population and power’ [32-col.1303]. It is ‘enlarged and 
growing’ [32-col.1266], ‘has changed forever’ [32-col.1316] and is ‘organic’ [33-col.204] 
and ‘plastic’ [33-col.204]. Change, therefore, is regarded as a means to accelerate 
decentralisation and is not equated with instability or insecurity. This diffusion of power has 
a unifying effect on the member states. Instead of rivalries and divisions, all members are 
instead viewed as belonging to an ever-broadening alliance. Subsequently, ‘there is no old 
Europe, no new Europe, no East or West Europe. There is only one Europe’ [15]. This 
singularising reading produces a representation of Europe as a unified and homogenous bloc.      
 
Relating to Europe as a continuous and active body, the second construction reveals the 
broadening influence and agenda of the EU. Apart from the well-versed articulation of 
Europe as promoting free trade and reducing commercial barriers to trade, its authority is 
extended to also include many more challenges. These include ‘a stronger poverty focus’ [32-
col.1248], ‘global warming’ [32-col.1253] as well as the threats of ‘climate change, 
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international terrorism and international crime’ [33-col.182]. Thus, instead of the duties of 
the Union being solely reducible to a commitment to free trade and economic liberalism, its 
influence is extended to include a much broader set of challenges of which the EU is seen as 
instrumentally capable of meeting and resolving. This configures Europe as possessing a 
moral role and duty to address domestic as well as international grievances. 
 
A third manner in which Europe is constituted relates to how membership actively 
strengthens rather than weakens individual member states. Membership is not only seen as a 
means of bolstering national sway, but the process involves intergovernmental agreement 
rather than supranational absolutism. The stress on the voluntary compliance implicit within 
intergovernmentalism reveals how the Lisbon Treaty ‘offer(s) faster decision making’ [32-
col.1248] and ‘gives national parliaments a decisive and direct say for the first time in EU 
decision-making’ [23]. By highlighting the Union’s intergovernmentalist structure, this also 
reduces decision making and policy within Europe to the vying domestic interest groups 
implicit within member states. This reductionism functions in contrast to many aspects 
attributed to the Union in the anti-Lisbon debates, namely that it is a bloated, bureaucratic 
superstate. Similarly, the emphasis on a shift to democratisation has the simultaneous effect 
of distancing it from the oft-cited perception of it as a technical construct.  Additionally, the 
EU as sui generis places weight on its accomplishments. For example, Mark Lazarowicz, a 
Labour Co-operative politician, called it ‘a success story’ [33-col.241] in that ‘27 member 
states, representing so many nations, cultures and languages, have built up the institution; that 
regional blocs across the world talk about emulating the European Union’ [33-col.241]. 
Membership therefore has not only accrued major benefits for its participants but has also 
functioned as a role model for other organisations around the world.    
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Fourthly, Europe is envisioned as a vehicle and hub for generating free trade. Its antithesis – 
protectionism – is regarded as ‘the politics of defeatism, retreat and fear’ [15]. The EU was 
referred to by the then Foreign Secretary David Miliband as the ‘largest single market in the 
world’ [25]. Again, this predication highlights the all-encompassing nature of the 
Community. Membership is ensconced within the notions of market liberalism, anti-
protectionism and the free flow of labour and capital. Its antagonism pitches isolationism as 
negative and alarmist which, as a policy, ‘protects no one at all’ [15]. 
 
A further configuration relates to the notion of sovereignty. Very similar to the discourses in 
the previous two empirical chapters, sovereignty is essentially a pooled concept in which 
individual actors, by giving up some autonomy, end up contributing to a network which 
effectively defends and protects their remaining powers and interests. Hence, by contributing 
to ‘a greater good’ [33-col.205], Britain ‘get(s) better results than if we were to act alone’ 
[32-col.1287]. Again, the opposing position instils a similar association with extremist and 
potentially dangerous associations. For example, the former Minister for Europe, Denis 
MacShane, identified how isolationism was ‘creating a network of unpleasant, ugly, anti-
European parties’ [16]. Thus, isolationism is more broadly linked with an unsightly recourse 
to nationalism which is configured as a source of potential conflict between states. By 
revealing that ‘too often, the treaty is treated as a religion’ [32-col.1302], the fluid notion of 
sovereignty is highlighted to reveal that Europe, rather than as a rigidly deterministic mass, 
can contain the adaptability to ensure member states follow a path of integration of their own 
choosing.  
 
A sixth illustration centres on how membership has done much to invigorate democracy and 
enhance peace and security. There are two aspects to this position. To begin with, a more 
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effectual defence policy is seen as ‘a complement to Nato’ [25] rather than an attempt to 
displace the existing security framework. That is, Europe possesses a broadening military 
dimension and not merely a commercial or economic one. Historical references to war-torn 
Europe abound. One of the advantages of the Community ‘has been to heal the rift between 
France and Germany’ [33-col.201] and ensure ‘the prevention of war in Europe’ [32-
col.1249]. Consequently, ‘History, if nothing else, teaches us of the importance of a united 
Europe’ [32-col.1249]. Although these references cultivate the oft-cited image of a 
destructive past, the military aspect is widened to highlight new security alliances and 
arrangements. In addition, the EU is regarded as a model of ‘how different nations, tribes and 
faiths can live together safely and sustainably’ [33-col.182]. Subsequently, a creeping 
Europeanisation is underscored to reveal that trade and security linkages have deepened into 
a much more expansive network of commonalities and dependencies. This Europe-wide 
identity is lodged within the promulgation of similar political ideas and values. For example, 
closer association between member states has been responsible for the spreading ‘democracy 
and the rule of law across our continent’ [13].  
 
The concluding configuration makes reference to the conspiratorial beliefs that are seen as 
intrinsically embedded within the anti-positions. The sedition and intrigue regularly cited as 
inherent within the EU institutions by the Eurosceptic position are mocked. Europe is a 
foreign occupying power – ‘some alien force imposing its laws upon us’ [33-col.178] and is 
‘about to devour us’ [33-col.204]. It is ridiculed as a plot within which ‘the other 26 member 
states are prepared to sacrifice their sovereignty in order to destroy ours’ [32-col.1282]. There 
are two broad aspects to this final reading. Firstly, suspicion of the EU and its institutions is 
regarded as blind and irrational verses a pro-EU position that is rational and pragmatic. 
Secondly, the attempts to view Britain’s relationship with Europe as a kind of Manichean 
 
 
251 
 
battle of good versus evil are delusional in that they readily ignore the continuingly dominant 
role played by national governments. That is, despite the power wielded by the EU and its 
institutions, it has not supplanted the powers of nation-states. This has the effect of showing 
that British influence within Europe has not occurred due to some shadowy conspiracy by 
political elites but has materialised because the EU is ‘an association of which we are willing 
and leading members’ [33-col.178].  
 
Of the other countries mentioned, both the United States and China dominate the debates. 
The relationship with the US is configured in three important ways. Although making 
reference to ‘the special relationship’ [25], ‘a new relationship’ [3] is highlighted in order to 
draw attention to the fact that Britain, if it is to possess any Atlantic influence at all, can only 
achieve this ‘as full top-table participants in the EU’ [32-col.1290]. Indeed, MacShane stated 
that ‘the security challenges of the world are too serious to be handled exclusively by the US 
– or even exclusively by the US and Britain’ [33-col.210]. Multipolarity dominates and no 
single nation, even a Superpower, has unqualified recourse to unilateral action. Secondly and 
relatedly, this viewpoint functions in the aftermath of an American administration that had 
behaved unilaterally and had antagonised many European states with a ‘go-it-alone’ [33-
col.210] policy. Such policies are regarded as ‘redundant’ [33-col210] and lead to the 
argument that ‘America needs to rebuild its partnership with Europe and we, as Europeans, 
need to rebuild our partnership with America’ [33-col.210]. Subsequently, The Liberal 
Democrat general election manifesto called for ‘a partnership of influence, not one of 
uncritical subordination’ [3]. Hence, America is configured as a mutually beneficial alliance 
but is part of a wider sense of community that places Europe of equal importance. A final 
point relating to America is the means by which a united Europe can check US power. This 
configures world politics as determined by power blocs and the best means of resisting 
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unchecked power is to form a counterweight. ‘Our best shot is to get Europe to stand up’ [30] 
is regarded as the most salient way of avoiding ‘a world where the US and China carve it up’ 
[30]. This configures the USA as less of an alliance and more a competitor.  
 
China is similarly configured as a means by which British influence must be directed from 
within a cohesive Europe rather than via a unilateral policy. That is, there are a series of 
‘special relationships’ with the US, China and India which enable Britain to exert a dominant 
role within Europe. Power, however, is not configured militarily but is instead about 
‘effective influence when it comes to our relations with Russia, China, India and the wider 
world’ [33-col.248]. China, therefore, is regarded as an important country in which British 
relations directly impact on the networks within which Britain belongs. A close relationship 
between Britain and China results in closer links between Europe and China. Britain’s allies, 
it is said, should be ‘those countries that are democracies, that abide by the rule of law and 
that respect human rights’ [32-col.1270]. However, it is the sense of unity within Europe that 
can function as an authority to ‘influence China on the road to liberal democracy’ [32-
col.1270]. As such, China does not possess the liberal values inherent within European 
nation-states but is capable of modification and democratisation.  
 
Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia are characterised as being part of a success story in 
that ‘thirty years ago, would anyone have predicted the reunification of Europe, with 
Communism finished and democracy taking root’ [32-col.1269]. The debate highlights two 
important aspects of these countries. The first is that they have successfully shaken off their 
Communist pasts and fully embraced liberal democracy. They are part of a broader Europe 
that Britain has helped shape. For example, the Labour politician Keith Vaz asserted that “all 
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the eastern and central European countries – look to the UK as their champion. We are the champion 
of enlargement and we led the enlargement process.”608 
 
British agency is bolstered by the notion that it functions as a model for newly admitted and 
potential EU states. Secondly, Europe is configured as a non-static entity in which its strength 
is boosted by the further enlargement. This process also includes ‘Turkey, the Balkans and 
Eastern Europe’ [1]. Thus, membership has the potential to bring nations like the Balkans, 
with tumultuous and undemocratic histories, into a European fold. The importance of 
enlargement and inclusion is marked by the suggestion that ‘we must reach out further to 
countries to the east and south’ [26].  
 
Of the final countries and organisations mentioned, the scope of the EU is broadened to 
construct an organisation whose influence extends much further than the confines of Europe 
itself. Subsequently, ‘the concerns of British citizens lie outside our borders’ [32-col.1286], 
‘the EU can play a role in promoting security and stability in neighbouring countries’ [33-
col.158], and such influence stretches to ‘the Balkans, Lebanon and Chad’ [33-col.158]. 
Thus, the EU engenders security as well as political and economic stability in war-torn and 
politically fractious areas. Moreover, the fact that ‘Europe is the world’s biggest aid donor’ 
[33-col.158] positions it as a force for poverty prevention on a global scale. A final point 
refers to how ‘our continental partners … regard the present Commission as over-liberalising, 
over-Anglo Saxon, over-free trade’ [33-col.204]. Although this refers to the influence that 
British policy has had on European institutions, it also positions a British approach which is 
distinct, novel and even in opposition to other European states. It has been argued that such a 
contrast developed from the Blair government and, in particular, the “new ‘third way’ based 
                                                     
608 Vaz, K. (2008) HC Deb., 11 March, vol. 473, col. 196. 
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upon an Anglo-Saxon deregulatory economic model, the dynamism of which was contrasted 
with the rigidities of the continental economies.”609 Thus, the British approach of trade 
liberalisation and the reduction of barriers are positioned in antagonism to recalcitrant and 
static Continental states which still continue to favour a system of protectionism and 
economic self-interest. This antagonism, although not dominant, alludes to the manner in 
which Europe is constructed from the perspective of a British political elite:  less a solidified, 
homogenous institution and more a process that is continuously being remade.  
 
To summarise the predicates in Table 8, Britain’s interests are lodged within an anti-
isolationist, proactive stance in which Britain is both irreversibly part of Europe as well as a 
much broader multipolar world. Europe embodies a number of important configurations. First 
is the process of enlargement, regarded as integral to Europe’s future in reiterating its ever-
modifying nature. Second is Europe’s broadening agenda, encompassing the challenges of 
global poverty and climate change as well as international trade. Third is the manner in which 
the treaty streamlines decision making and strengthens national policy by predicating the EU 
as a forum to realise national interests. Fourth is the role Europe has in reducing 
protectionism and expanding free trade. Fifth is the manner in which sovereignty is both 
transferable and pooled leading to both the strengthening of national influence and the greater 
good. Sixth is how Europe has contributed to peace, prosperity and democracy. Seventh is 
how anti-EU sentiment is wedded to baseless conspiracy theories and myths. The USA is an 
alliance of note but only one of several. Europe functions as the most important association 
which effectively is both the surest way of ensuring a close partnership with the US and of 
checking American power. As a consequence, the USA is part of a multipolar international 
system. The other notable relationship is with China. Its rising power status is taken as given. 
                                                     
609 Fella, S. (2006) ‘Robin Cook, Tony Blair and New Labour’s Competing Visions of Europe’, p. 394. 
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Again, European unity is regarded as the most pertinent means of democratising China. 
Central and Eastern Europe are classified as invoking Britain as a role model and as being a 
formation of states that have successfully freed themselves from totalitarian rule.  
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Table 8: Predication and Processes within the Pro-Lisbon Debates 
Britain European Union Other countries 
At the heart of international decision-making [2] 
Membership...boosts...international clout  [2] 
Leaders in the European Union [2] 
Outside...we would be weaker...more vulnerable [2] 
We will be leaders in a reformed Europe [2] 
We must remain fully engaged [5] 
Britain's interest to be at the heart of Europe [6] 
Same old divisions threatening isolation [7] 
The stability of our relationship with Europe [8]  
Proud to be British and...European [15] 
Not...an island adrift from Europe...not in Europe's  
   slipstream but firmly in its mainstream [15] 
Britain cannot afford to be isolated [23] 
Isolated from influence and threatening isolation  
   for Britain [24] 
A country like ours, with all the pillars of   
   international power [30] 
(Isolationism)...risks damaging this country both  
   politically and economically [32-col.1249] 
The myth that we are threatened with a European  
   superstate [32-col.1252] 
At the heart of Europe, shaping the EU and making  
  sure it delivers [32-col.1253] 
At the heart of the new European Union foreign  
   and security policy structures [32-col.1265] 
To deny a central role for the EU...is historically  
   illiterate [32-col.1269] 
We must either be there, influencing Europe...or we  
   must walk away [32-col.1273] 
As though they are always going to Brussels to fight  
   demons...to achieve great victories by beating off  
   threats to our interests [32-col.1281] 
We get better results than if we were to act alone  
   [32-col.1287] 
We live in a multipolar world [32-col.1290] 
A modern Britain in Europe [32-col.1292] 
We are no longer a front line in the old balance of  
   power politics [32-col.1316] 
The prism of Britain’s past...that the EU is...a vast  
   conspiracy against the UK [32-col.1319] 
Stuck in the past...obsessed with myths [33-col.159] 
Chauvinism, protectionism and sheer little  
   Englandism [33-col.176] 
We led the enlargement process [33-col.196] 
We have to influence what is happening [33- 
   col.196] 
Enlargement/Changing nature of Europe: 
The new Europe [2] 
Perhaps Europe's greatest achievement [5] 
Today there is no old Europe, no new Europe, no East  
   or West Europe. There is only one Europe - and it is  
   our home Europe [15] 
Confident in its sense of achievement and bold in its  
   ambition [25] 
An enlarged and growing EU [32-col.1266] 
Was the biggest and most dramatic peaceful shift of     
   population and power in Europe since the decline of  
   the western Roman empire [32-col.1303] 
The world is changing..and...Europe has changed for  
   ever [32-col.1316] 
Europe...is organic; it is plastic [33-col.204] 
Broadening influence and agenda: 
‘Deliver a stronger poverty focus’ [32-col.1248] 
‘A Europe that addresses global poverty, global  
   warming, global trade’ [32-col.1253] 
Our vision of Europe, as one that is more liberal,  
   more open and more interested in global trade and  
   global environmental questions [32-col.1311] 
The challenges include climate change, international  
   terrorism and international crime [33-col.182] 
Streamlining/Strengthening member states: 
Gives national parliaments a decisive and direct say  
   for the first time in EU decision-making [23] 
Europe makes us stronger [24] 
Brings to an end institutional navel gazing [30] 
Offer faster decision making [32-col.1248] 
Clearly intergovernmental [32-col.1265] 
Keeps foreign policy on an intergovernmental basis  
   but makes changes...that will enable British foreign  
   policy to be more effective [32-col.1265] 
All the benefits that flow [33-col.182] 
A Europe that is a lot more confident [33-col.209] 
Is a success story. The fact that 27 members states,  
   representing so many nations, cultures and  
   languages, have built up the institution; that  
   regional blocs across the world talk about emulating  
   the European Union [33-col.241] 
Anti-protectionist/Pro-free trade: 
Protectionism is the politics of defeatism, retreat and  
   fear and in the end protects no one at all [15] 
Is the largest single market in the world [25] 
Sovereignty as pooled: 
Tory isolationism is now creating a network of  
   unpleasant, ugly, anti-European parties [16] 
Too often, the treaty is treated as a religion [32- 
   col.1302] 
By pooling sovereignty we can do better together  
   than we can do alone [33-col.177] 
They think power is a zero-sum game...rather than  
   acknowledging the concept of leverage...by sharing  
   power, the UK increases our power [33-col.178] 
Treaties are about sharing some sovereignty for a  
   greater good [33-col.205] 
Peace, security and democracy: 
Has done much to reconcile the painful division of  
   Europe and to spread democracy and the rule of law  
   across our continent [13] 
A more effective EU defence policy is a complement  
   to Nato [25] 
Has contributed to...the prevention of war in Europe  
   [32-col.1249] 
History, if nothing else, teaches us of the importance  
   of a united Europe [32-col.1249] 
In a dangerous world...it is more important that we  
   have strong international institutions, not just  
   worldwide but at European level [32-col.1251] 
The European ideal of keeping peace, stability and  
   economic prosperity in Europe [32-col.1291] 
How different nations, tribes and faiths can live   
   together safely and sustainably [33-col.182]  
One of the benefits...has been to heal the rift between  
   France and Germany [33-col.201] 
This treaty will help to secure the maintenance of  
   peace and prosperity [33-col.231] 
As a conspiracy: 
Is some kind of organised conspiracy...the other 26  
   member states are prepared to sacrifice their  
   sovereignty in order to destroy ours [32-col.1282] 
‘Present fears are less than horrible imaginings’ [32- 
   col.1303] 
Fears and the conspiracy theories [33-col.176] 
Some alien force imposing its laws upon us – instead  
   of an association of which we are willing and  
   leading members [33-col.178] 
A Europe about to devour us [33-col.204] 
The United States and China: 
We can fashion a new relationship with the United States: a partnership of  
   influence, not one of uncritical subordination [3] 
If Britain moves itself to the margins of Europe...the...special relationship  
   with the US will become a piece of historical nostalgia [25] 
The UK’s...assets are valuable to the US, but without the political weight to drive  
   Europe forward we are a far less useful ally [25] 
I don’t want to live in a world where the US and China carve it up between  
   them...Our best shot is to get Europe to stand up [30] 
Who should be our closest and strongest allies? It is surely those countries  
   that are democracies, that abide by the rule of law and that respect human  
   rights...It is through the power of the EU collectively that we are far more  
   likely to influence China on the road to liberal democracy [32-col.1270] 
As a result of Britain’s special relationships with the United States and now  
   with China and India...that influence has been enhanced. Those connections  
   will ensure that the UK will always have influence in Europe [32-col.1288] 
We cannot hope to...influence the direction of global US foreign policy to the  
   extent that we can as full top-table participants in the EU [32-col.1290] 
We...are a leading member of the EU, play a huge role within the...Commonwealth,   
   and have an important and close relationship with the USA [33-col.177] 
We want a powerful relationship with the United States, but I note that last  
   year European growth was higher than that of America [33-col.209] 
The security challenges of the world are too serious to be handled exclusively  
   by the US – or even exclusively by the US and Britain [33-col.210] 
The go-it-alone ideas expressed by Donald Rumsfeld...and some others...loosely  
   called neo-conservatives are now perceived...to be redundant. America needs  
   to rebuild its partnership with Europe and we, as Europeans, need to rebuild  
   our partnership with America [33-col.210] 
That is because it is not just about the projection of power on the international  
   stage, but about effective influence when it comes to our relations with Russia,  
   China, India and the wider world [33-col.248] 
Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia: 
Bring closer EU membership for Turkey, the Balkans and Eastern Europe [1] 
We must reach out further to countries to the east and south [26] 
Thirty years ago, would anyone have predicted the reunification of Europe,  
   with Communism finished and democracy taking root [32-col.1269] 
Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria...look to the UK as their champion [33-col.196] 
Other: 
The concerns of British citizens lie outside our borders [32-col.1286] 
As we have seen in the Balkans, Lebanon and Chad, the EU can play a role in  
   promoting security and stability in neighbouring countries [33-col.158] 
Europe is the world's biggest aid donor [33-col.158] 
British Commonwealth...is a completely different kind of association [33-col.177] 
Our continental partners...regard the present Commission as over-liberalising, over-  
   Anglo Saxon, over-free trade [33-col.204] 
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5.3.2 Presupposition within the Pro-Lisbon Debates 
 
Background knowledge helps construct a certain set of truths relating to the actors. As with 
the previous two empirical chapters, some of these presuppositions are lodged within a 
relationship of binarisation whilst others are more nuanced in their meaning. First of all, a 
clear process of innovative/obsolete envisions how a Europe of the future must embrace a 
contemporary, pioneering outlook against entrenched and resistant elements. A number of 
discursive practices highlight this position. For example, several references to ‘modern’ [32-
col.1292], ‘reform’ [2], ‘new’ [2] [3] [32-col.1265] and ‘change’ [32-col.1265] [32-col.1316] 
[33-col.182] posit Europe as a progressive, developing force. Part of this articulatory practice 
focuses on the ever-increasing responsibilities of the European Union. Although more 
established references to trade and economic linking are expressed, the influence stretches 
into a focus on global poverty, climate change and international terrorism, crime and aid. 
However, it is important to point out that the presupposition of an ever-broadening Europe is 
not an elite-inspired exercise but is lodged within the very existence of the Union: that a 
limited, insular focus on intra-European issues will produce stagnation whilst a perpetual 
extension of influence into non-Europe invigorates and redefines its role and responsibilities.  
 
A further presupposition focuses on a change/stasis binary.  The European Union embodies 
transformation in a number of examples including the need for enlargement, the extension of 
its operations into humanitarian aid and to deal with climate change and its increasing sense 
of purpose and ambition. This is contrasted with a rigid, unwavering fetishism for out-of-date 
modes of thinking which include an obsession with myths and balance of power politics. The 
transnational nature of commerce, values and interests dilutes the ‘us versus them’ paradigm 
which is seen as redundant and emblematic of an isolationist sense of idealism.  
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A final presupposition relates to the shifting nature of political actors. Other states, hitherto 
largely ignored, are incorporated into the debates. The role of India, and in particular China, 
and their rising power status, helps generate a reality within which the political world is 
dominated by large states or robust associations such as the EU. Although seemingly 
obvious, this observation has two repercussions. Firstly, and related to the references to 
smaller, unstable states which include the Balkans, Lebanon and Chad, the larger actors are 
invested with a responsibility to less powerful actors. Again, this configures threats or ‘hot 
wars’ as stemming from non-unified, dissipated actors that do not belong to a larger 
cooperative.  Secondly, the belief in the world being governed by regional blocs not merely 
makes the importance of the Union more acute, but also cultivates a multipolar world view in 
which closer concentration is naturalised. Europe, therefore, as a political and economic unit, 
is located as being on the right side of history.   
 
5.3.3 Subject Positioning within the Pro-Lisbon Debates 
 
The predication and presupposition produce a number of subject positions which show how 
the subjects and objects are located within the debates. First of all, as has been explained, 
Europe is predicated as seven related but sufficiently different subjects. These, in turn, 
produce five explicit discourses. The first is Europe as a project in progress. As a power 
structure, it is not vested with a finite nature or unchanging set of policy goals. Instead, 
despite possessing achievable ambitions, it is an evolving set of practices that continue to be 
redefined according to international challenges and circumstances. As such, its scope for 
influence is consistently changing and is no longer solely referred to as trade-based, 
economics-driven entity. The second is Europe as a humanitarian agent. In keeping with its 
expanding obligations, particular focus falls on Europe as a means to address global poverty, 
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climate change and international crime. This discourse, therefore, helps shift Europe away 
from the dispassionate, elite-governed and institution-building project to instead reconnect 
with the wider public. This humanitarian concern, one can argue, is attached to the attempt to 
build a more sympathetic ‘people’s Europe’. The third is Europe as a community of 
intergovernmental nation-states. Within this configuration, Europe is a voluntaristic 
organisation whereby agreement is powered by individual members and not by any federal 
institution. As such, the Community takes strength from this lack of coercion and recognises 
that the interplay between actors positions the nation-state as still the most adroit embodiment 
of authority. The fourth Europe configured is Europe as an open market. Rather than a free 
trade area, which is regarded as restricting trade from outside, this discourse seeks to create a 
network with other non-European actors. For example, the then Chancellor, Gordon Brown, 
gave a speech at the Mansion House in London which highlights this aspect: 
The Britain that will succeed in this open global economy will be the 
Britain that, true to our history, rejects any form of protectionism or 
parochialism and, instead, sees the channel not as a moat cutting us off, but 
as a highway to the world. That is why I am so keen to break down trade 
barriers between Europe and the USA, and to build strong trading links 
between Britain and Asia – especially between Britain and China and 
Britain and India.610 
 
The fifth position is Europe as a global security alliance. The global dimension makes 
references to other non-European actors and underscores how the EU functions as a 
complement to, rather than a replacement for other security alliances such as NATO.  
 
In addition, Central and Eastern Europe are also located in a particular way. This can be 
described as Central and Eastern Europe as European democracies. The inclusion of these 
                                                     
610 Brown, G. (2005) ‘Global Britain, Global Europe: a Presidency founded on Pro-European Realism’, Speech given by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer at the Mansion House, London, 22 June. Available at: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/press/2005/press_57_05.cfm. [Accessed 12 Dec. 2011].  
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states into the European family is imperative. Evident within this is the fear of fractiousness 
and the potential threat of the Balkanisation of Europe. However, although this instability is 
alluded to, an important change in the relationship between West and East Europe has 
occurred. The dissolution of the Soviet Union, which occurred in 1991, created a new 
European periphery of Central and European newly independent states. As these over the 
years had become absorbed into the European core, and by the time of the Treaty of Lisbon, a 
new periphery, including the Balkans and Turkey, had been formulated. This periphery is 
recognised as the next group of nation-states to be taken in and, as a consequence, is 
predicated as firmly attached to core Europe. This attachment is recognised by the 
periphery’s shift away from authoritarianism to free-market liberalism and the fact that they 
are correspondingly affirmed as democratic states. 
  
Two non-European actors are also positioned. The first is the USA as a multipolar alliance. 
The USA is positioned as dominant and this is problematic in two main ways. Firstly, the 
image is hierarchical. That is, recent history is invoked to illuminate the danger of a ‘go-it-
alone’ [33-col.210] America in which subordination to an overactive American foreign policy 
is now redundant. In keeping with the broadening influence Europe possesses, a partnership 
between the USA and Europe is called upon, rather than a relationship of subservience. 
Secondly, America’s dominant actor status is one in which a unified Europe functions as an 
important counterweight. The ability to modify US policy, particularly with reference to the 
splits within Europe open the War in Iraq and the broader War on Terror, is seen as an 
important requirement for unity within Europe. The second non-European actor positioned is 
China as a rising power. Again, China is perceived as a state with a considerable degree of 
agency and the democracy it may become can only occur via the initiative of a united Europe. 
This reading, very much like the positioning of the USA, formulates power as emanating 
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from certain blocs. Europe, in order to exert influence, must continue on its strategy of 
enlargement. 
 
Finally, it can be argued that two additional configurations relate to a dualistic British 
attachment to Europe as well as to beyond. The first is Europe as a global network in which 
national borders no longer define particular policy. In this sense, Europe functions as a 
complex within which trade, cultural and historical linkages radiate. Secondly, Europe as an 
Anglicised association reveals the impact Anglo-dominant thinking has had on mainland 
Europe. In addition, as has been observed, it is a tradition that “does not look to the European 
social democratic tradition but draws its moral inspiration from English and Scottish 
liberalism and North American conceptions of civil society.”611 As such, this discourse is 
heavily value-laden and is invested with the ambition to mould Europe to embody what are 
seen as the Anglo-centric qualities of “liberty, pluralism, and a moral civil society”612 In 
addition, the deregulation and trade liberalisation implicit in this process of Anglicisation 
have effectively dislodged the practices of state intrusiveness and protectionism that 
previously blighted European institutions.  
 
5.4 The Anti-Lisbon Debates 
 
In this section, I analyse the predicates and processes involving the anti-EU positions as 
represented in Table 9. As with the previous sections, the predicates are elaborated, the 
background knowledge – or presupposition – explained and then the subject positioning of 
the particular actors is presented. 
                                                     
611 Gifford, C. (2010) ‘The UK and the European Union: Dimensions of Sovereignty and the Problem of Eurosceptic 
Britishness’, p. 330.  
612 Ibid. 
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5.4.1 Predication within the Anti-Lisbon Debates 
 
Britain is assembled in a number of particular respects. First of all, due to what is regarded as 
an unremitting European focus, the EU is actually perceived as cramping Britain’s greater 
potential for trade and relations outside of this narrow sphere. That is, as a counterweight to 
the usual charge of isolationism, one specific facet of the anti-Lisbon debates constructs 
Britain as internationalist. Britain is consequently ‘a global trading nation’ [1] with ‘global 
influence’ [1] and with ‘horizons (which) extend much further’ [1] than its immediate 
neighbours. As such, Europe is a set of relations that effectively stifles Britain’s ability to 
play out its ‘unique role in the world’ [1] and encourage and solidify new relationships. 
Secondly, Europe is held responsible for muddying the nation’s sense of Self. This point 
relates to a societal feeling of non-belonging that EU interference has helped erode. For 
example, the UKIP general election manifesto of 2005 argued that when Britain is 
independent from the EU, and democracy reestablished, ‘individuals … will regain a stronger 
sense of belonging to a society with the family as the basic stable unit and a better set of 
values’ [4]. Thus, not merely is British society blighted by a plethora of European rules and 
restrictions, but membership has also weakened a national sense of unity. A further point 
regards how Britain, once again, sits apart from its Continental counterparts via its history, 
geography and national culture. ‘We have a maritime disposition’ [33-col.240] with a 
‘different history and geography … Our institutions and our … law have tended to evolve … 
rather than be the result of invasions or revolutions’ [33-col.239]. Accordingly, Europe is 
composed of states whose histories have been punctuated, violent and revolutionary rather 
than a British history marked by gradual development and incremental change. A final 
configuration positions Britain’s membership of the EU as stifling its potential for leadership 
and instead ensuring it plays a subordinate role. ‘Being in Europe’s mainstream meant 
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following in others’ slipstream’ [20] and although the promotion of British interests is ‘no 
narrow agenda’ [7], it must take precedence over any commitment to other European states.  
 
Europe is constructed as five distinguishable objects within these debates. To begin with, a 
political environment in which naturalised patterns of decentralisation, deregulation and 
transparency is threatened by a treaty that seeks to reverse this process. As such, the then 
Shadow Foreign Secretary, William Hague, identified how the Treaty of Lisbon goes ‘against 
the spirit of our age’ [7]. Instead of an ‘EU that acts by agreement among nations’ [7], there 
is ‘an over-arching government’ [17], ‘unelected enclaves of the European Commission’ [33-
col197] and ‘a torrent of legislation from Brussels’ [33-col.232]. Subsequently, an early 
configuration positions Europe and its machinery as obstructing a political culture of 
liberalisation by imposing centralisation. In addition, Europe is divorced from its citizens and 
is being made by ‘the estrangement of a plutocratic elite’ [33-col.202] that has built 
‘powerful institutions … remote from the ordinary citizen’ [33-col.232] and have produced a 
treaty with ‘appalling Eurojargon … completely inaccessible’ [33-col.232]. Thus, the Treaty 
is regarded as part of the next stage in the consolidation of power by European institutions. 
Coupled to this is what is seen as the supine complicity with which British political elites 
have effectively handed over power. A ‘cosy consensus’ [20] dominates in which further 
integration is unquestioningly accepted while pro-Europeans have been willing to do 
‘anything for a quiet life, and never mind the national interest’ [32-col.1261]. A final point 
regarding the way in which Europe is constructed as an elitist enterprise is how Europe has 
absorbed some of the symbols of statism. The EU constitution, the establishment of an EU 
foreign minister and the European anthem and flag are all redolent of the ‘paraphenalia of a 
state or state in the making’ [32-col.1276]. As a consequence, rather than a loose amalgam of 
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nation-states, the EU is perceived as becoming a state in itself with all of the symbols and 
institutions deemed essential to wield power. 
 
A second subject focuses on the intransigence and overtly static nature of the Union. There 
are two aspects of importance. Foremost, its rigidity is a barrier for those who, according to 
the Conservative party general election manifesto of 2005, ‘wish to see the EU evolve in a 
more flexible, liberal and decentralized direction’ [1]. ‘The fight for a deregulated Europe’ 
[1] is a quest for greater efficiency and for a Europe which is more influenced by an anti-
centrist Anglo-Saxon ethos. Next, Europe’s inflexibility is also a barrier to meeting 
challenges implicit in an ever-changing political environment. That is, the EU will need to 
have a ‘nimble, flexible structure’ [19] in the 21st Century. Such a possibility is further 
hampered by ‘complex, bureaucratic’ [33-col.201] aspects that continue to blight EU 
structures, institutions and decision-making processes.  
 
Third, Europe is constructed as non-organic and artificial. There are a number of specific 
aspects to this discourse. To begin with, as a top-down creation where the impetus and drive 
has come from elites and technocrats, the attempt ‘to create political union … from above 
undermines any tendency for one to grow naturally’ [29]. Consequently, Europe is a 
manufactured entity, does not possess an innate or natural structure and, as a result, does not 
meet citizens’ interests. Indeed, the EU is a fabricated construct which could only come about 
via what William Hague labelled as a ‘sustained deception’ [32-col.1260] in which 
commonality and fraternity are moribund. ‘[T]here is no single European electorate … no 
language of Europe … no shared political experience, no demos’ [33-col.234]. This 
fundamental lack of shared experience impacts on what Europe should be. It needs to be ‘an 
association of member states’ [13], each of them ‘determining … the amount of integration 
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… they are prepared to accept’ [32-col.1277], rather than a ‘dictatorship’ [32-col.1284] 
which is starting to adopt ‘the dimension of empire’ [20].    
 
A fourth reading shapes the Union as a body lacking representation and democracy. Three 
elements are articulated within this formulation: the intrusiveness of the EU, the manner in 
which populist and citizen-oriented structures are compromised and the increasing 
centralisation of power within the Union. To begin with, the EU is regarded as impinging 
upon all areas not merely of political life but also in the domestic arena. For example, the 
Conservative member William Cash argued how there is ‘an avalanche of European laws … 
like a tsunami’ [32-col.1293] with an obsession towards standardisation, over-regulation and 
harmonisation. What is left is a society in which there is ‘scarcely any area where the EU has 
not taken over’ [33-col.201]. Furthermore, the threat to democracy is similarly affirmed. In 
this sense, democracy in not concerned with parliamentary sovereignty and national 
autonomy in a legislative sense. Instead, democracy is wedded to the consent of the people. 
Subsequently, the treaty is regarded as especially egregious not merely because it constitutes 
the ‘unwarranted power over our national life’ [33-col175] but also because ‘it is not 
politicians’ power to give away’ [13]. Again, identity is seen to be lodged very much within 
the Westphalian notion of the nation-state. The Union ‘lacks popular allegiance and 
legitimacy’ [33-col.234] and ‘it is not a single political entity on which democracy can 
operate’ [33-col.234]. The last configuration pits the EU as ‘taking powers away from the 
nation states’ [28], ‘an over-mighty Executive’ [32-col.1308], ‘undemocratic, complicated 
and remote’ [33-col.232] as well as ‘corrupt and unreformable’ [4]. The European Court of 
Justice, one of Europe’s instruments for its consolidation of power, is ‘activist’ [32-col.1309] 
whilst the Commission ‘not elected’ [10]. One aspect that deviates from this oft-cited image 
of the EU as an unstoppable bureaucratic force is the manner in which its power does not 
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automatically go unchecked. Nation-states do possess the capabilities to resist the Union’s 
encroachment. Consequently, in a 2009 speech, David Cameron declared that ‘European 
integration is not a one way street … powers can be returned from the EU’ [13].  
 
A final formulation relates to how Europe is divisive and anti-global in its practices. At the 
outset, common policies on agriculture and fisheries are regarded as ‘damaging to free trade 
and conservation’ [1]. National decision making is looked upon as essential in these areas. 
Furthermore, Europe has been responsible for shying away from ‘decisions that demonstrate 
unity’ [22]. What it has actually achieved is to bring about a level of divisiveness by falsely 
assuming a sense of commonality. Subsequently, ‘old tensions are re-emerging’ [33-col.202] 
whilst one prediction laments that ‘it will disintegrate, causing enormous trouble’ [33-
col.203]. The EU, therefore, is regarded as an inadequate organisation for forging harmony 
and has done little to dislodge the security fears that exist between nation-states. Finally, the 
Union ‘should be concentrated on adapting to globalisation’ [31]. In all these regards, Europe 
is treated as an ineffectual player dominated by an ethos characterised as a ‘low-growth 
continental system’ [33-col.235]. Such a position sits in stark contrast to Britain possessing ‘a 
global role’ [33-col.235] that can reach out to fashion up-and-coming powers and encourage 
links with foreign networks. In this sense, Europe’s strength and ability to deal with the surge 
in globalisation is limited because it seeks to curtail the opportunities inherent within global 
trade and economic liberalisation. 
 
A number of other states also feature. The United States is predicated as an important alliance 
that moulds and produces a ‘distinctive British foreign policy’ [5]. However, this policy is 
also impacted ‘through new friendships and alliances beyond North America and Europe’ [5]. 
Subsequently, the alliance is notable but also one of several. In addition, it is configured as 
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strained, once again by reference to an administration that has alienated European leaders. 
The ‘fractured Atlantic alliance’ [22] is ripe for ‘repair’ [22] and a new administration is a 
welcome catalyst for building a friendlier, less combative relationship between the USA and 
Europe as a whole.  
 
France, Germany and the Continent as a whole are unsurprisingly configured negatively. 
They can each be apportioned separate and distinctive postulates but it is worth noting that a 
unified interpretation pervades these readings: that France, Germany and the Continent are 
frequently used interchangeably and that they all possess a threat value. First of all, France 
contains a number of important characteristics. The political system is dominated by 
‘backward-looking parties like the French Socialists’ [20]. France is governed by regressive 
dirigiste forces that hark back to a Delors-era period of centralisation and protectionism. The 
French-led suspension of enlargement in the wake of the Irish ‘No’ vote in June 2008 is 
regarded as a ‘classical negotiating ploy’ [21] while the Treaty as a whole is slated as ‘a 
European manoeuvre … concocted by the Eurocrats, by Germany and by France’ [32-
col.1295]. Reminiscent of the Maastricht debates, France is construed as a self-serving nation 
that exploits European affairs as an extension of its foreign policy. Subsequently, it covertly 
pushes for self-interest under the cloak of pro-European rhetoric. Germany is similarly 
demonised. The treaty was ‘railroaded through by the German presidency’ [33-col.196] 
whilst both Germany and France have been responsible for cultivating the hysterical notion 
that unless EU rules and treaties are slavishly adopted by all member states, ‘we will be at 
Germany’s throat, we will be fighting the French, or we will be after the Spanish’ [33-
col224]. Consequently, the EU is a joint German-French venture and an environment of fear 
has been nurtured to ensure conformity and subservience to EU doctrine. In terms of the 
Continent as a whole, the treaty ‘locks us into a continental system that is in defiance of our 
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historical experience, outlook and trade’ [33-col.234]. The Continent possesses a deep 
historical effect on the construction of British policy and attitudes as ‘much of our history has 
been bound up with what happened elsewhere in Europe, but we are more than that’ [33-
col.234]. Again, a focus on Europe and Europe alone risks closing off the many other 
organisations, states and international groupings that Britain has historically and culturally 
forged. In this sense, ‘the treaty tries to switch off that maritime global magnetic field and 
suck us irreversibly into a continental destiny’ [33-col.235]. In addition, ‘the continentals 
often express themselves in antagonism to the Anglo-Saxon’ [33-col.240].  
 
Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia are part of a common European heritage and must 
therefore be part of the ongoing enlargement process. In addition to diluting the Franco-
German bloc, the admission of other nations would ‘(make) Europe more diverse’ [2] and 
would ‘entrench stability’ [13] particularly in ‘the Western Balkans where so much European 
blood has flowed’ [13]. Nascent democracies, however, run the risk of being alienated if they 
are not sufficiently supported. The fractious nature of Central and Eastern Europe is 
highlighted to reveal that these states have only recently become newly dependent and still 
carry a significant risk of implosion and fissure. 
 
 Of the final countries mentioned, and reiterating the manner in which Europe is seen as a 
threat to building broader relationships, ‘we will stand for … an EU that looks out to the 
world, that builds strong and open relations with rising powers like China and India’ [13]. 
William Cash stated that the ‘common resource of the English language’ [32-col.1294] as 
well as the ties of ‘economic co-operation’ [32-col.1294] position India as a source of British 
collaboration. Such a position is orchestrated by the importance of India as both a democracy 
and a historical link. 
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To summarise the predicates within the anti-Lisbon debates, Britain is internationalist and 
global in its influence and aspirations. Its full potential is viewed as constricted by a plethora 
of limiting and power-sucking European rules and agreements. Similarly, it is classified as 
maritime and gradualist in its political and social evolution. Europe is elitist, inflexible, non-
organic, centralised, undemocratic and non-unifying. The US is configured as an important 
association in need of repair from a new administration. France and Germany are part of a 
dominant axis that has moulded Europe in their own image. Such a policy is perceived as 
bullying, uncompromising and based on the mythical notion that the unity imposed by EU 
membership has forged peace between European nations. The Continent is classified as 
limiting British interests in other regions by tying Britain to a restricted set of trading 
practices. Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia are key players in that they are part of the 
enlargement process in which greater diversity and harmony can flourish. This also has the 
effect of unsettling the Franco-German dominated nature of the EU. India has common links 
to Britain founded on democracy, historical ties, economic cooperation and language. Its 
rising power status is seen as an opportunity for and not as a threat to British interests.   
 
      
 
 
270 
 
Table 9: Predication and Practices within the Anti-Lisbon Debates 
Britain European Union Other countries 
A global trading nation [1] 
Plays a unique role in the world [1] 
Our horizons extend much further [1]   
Links open markets, free trade, property  
   rights, the rule of law, democracy,  
   economic development and social progress  
   [1] 
Our global influence [1] 
Is run for British people, not for career  
   politicians and bureaucrats [4] 
When Britain is rid of the EU...the prospects  
   for businesses, employment and  
   international trade will be bright [4] 
Individuals...will regain a stronger sense of  
   belonging to a society with the family as  
   the basic stable unit and a better set of  
   values [4] 
National interest is no narrow agenda [7] 
Because the world is going into powerful  
   blocks...that we have to give up more and  
   more control of our own affairs [11] 
In Europe not run by Europe [11] 
Never...slide into a federal Europe [14] 
Our own Parliament...has become a  mere  
   county council [17]   
Co-operating where necessary...but we don’t  
   want to be part of this political union [18] 
Being in Europe’s mainstream meant  
   following in others’ slipstream [20] 
Locks the UK into...further integration [27] 
Damages the British national interest and  
   weakens democracy [32-col.1261] 
To infuse the EU into our constitutional and  
   legal framework...in our democracy for  
   which so many have fought and died [32- 
   col.1296] 
We...are the internationalists [33-col.232] 
(Our) history is a long struggle [33-col.233] 
We have a different history and a different  
   geography. We are an island...Our  
   institutions and our...law have tended to  
   evolve...rather than be the result of  
   invasions or revolutions [33-col.239] 
We have a maritime disposition [33-col.240] 
Elitist: 
Against the spirit of our age [7] 
We seek a(n) EU that acts by agreement among nations [7] 
Ever greater centralisation of power beyond the democratic control of  
   the people [7] 
Has taken a wrong turn and urgently needs reforming [12] 
Have taken too much power over issues that are contested aspects of  
   public policy [14]  
An over-arching government. [17] 
Dominated by a cosy consensus that deeper European integration is  
   per se a good thing [20] 
‘Anything for a quiet life, and never mind the national interest’  
   [32-col.1261] 
Paraphernalia of a state or state in the making [32-col.1276]  
Undermines this country and  its voters, it was pushed through by  
   deceit...rammed through by the Whips [32-col.1293] 
The iron determination of the EU institutions not to give up their  
   powers [32-col.1298] 
Unelected enclaves of the European Commission [33-col.197] 
Embedding of the estrangement of a plutocratic elite, who want to  
   create a united states of Europe as a political entity [33-col.202] 
Appalling Eurojargon...completely inaccessible [33-col.232] 
Powerful institutions...remote from the ordinary citizen [33-col.232] 
A torrent of legislation from Brussels [33-col.232] 
Inflexible: 
Wish to see the EU evolve in a more flexible, liberal and decentralised  
   direction [1] 
The fight for a deregulated Europe [1] 
Needs reform to become more efficient and...accountable [3] 
(EU will need to have a)...nimble, flexible structure [19] 
Europe...needs greater flexibility, the treaty moves more power to the  
   centre...nations need the freedom to compete [32-col.1254] 
Aspects of Europe...are complex, bureaucratic [33-col.201] 
As non-organic/unnatural: 
An association of member states [13] 
The Treaty gave the EU ‘the dimension of empire’ [20] 
Leadership is... missing in today's Europe [22] 
Trying to create political union...from above undermines any tendency  
   for one to grow naturally [29] 
Sustained deception [32-col.1260] 
Different member states determining...the amount of integration...they  
   are prepared to accept [32-col.1277] 
When it comes to a dictatorship...we lose out  [32-col.1284] 
There is no single European electorate...no language of Europe...no  
   shared political experience..no demos [33-col.234] 
Centralised power/Lack of democracy: 
More democracy...openness, less waste...less bureaucracy [3]  
Unelected Commission [3] 
A political project designed to take control of all the main functions  
   of national governments [4] 
It is undemocratic, corrupt and unreformable [4] 
People should only be led and governed with their consent [7] 
The nature of democracy is really at stake [9]   
The European Commission, which is not elected, and the  
   governments of member states which are elected [10] 
No...guarantee that the last word on our laws stays in Britain [13] 
Ultimate authority as resting with the EU [13] 
The steady and unaccountable intrusion of the EU into almost every  
   aspect of our lives  [13] 
European integration is not a one way street...powers can be  
   returned from the EU [13] 
It is not politicians’ power to give away [13] 
Taking powers away from the nation states [28] 
Denial of democracy is not far away [29] 
Erosion of our national democracy [32-col.1263] 
A treaty that lacks democratic legitimacy [32-col.1278] 
An avalanche of European laws...like a tsunami [32-col.1293] 
The treaty takes us further towards a superstate [32-col.1296] 
Centralised, harmonised, and obsessed with standardisation and  
   over-regulation [32-col.1299] 
An over-mighty Executive, who do damage to us [32-col.1308] 
Activist...always increasing the federal power [32-col.1309] 
Will hold powers that the British people never gave it permission to  
   hold [33-col.175] 
Unwarranted power over our national life [33-col.175] 
Scarcely any area where the EU has not taken over [33-col.201] 
An overcentralised, over-regulated Europe [33-col.202] 
Undemocratic, complicated and remote [33-col.232] 
It lacks popular allegiance and legitimacy...is not a single political  
   entity on which democracy can operate [33-col.234] 
As a non-unifying, anti-global threat: 
Damaging to free trade and conservation [1] 
Shies away from taking the...decisions that demonstrate unity [22] 
Needs to be...a commitment to free trade [29] 
Should be concentrated on adapting to globalisation [31] 
What I want to see is a confederation [32-col.1310] 
Old tensions are re-emerging [33-col.202] 
It will disintegrate, causing enormous trouble [33-col.203] 
Our global role is our strength, but we are being forced to choose a  
   low-growth continental system  [33-col.235] 
The United States: 
Distinctive British foreign policy...will also be advanced  
   through the alliance with the United States...through new  
   friendships and alliances beyond North America and  
   Europe [5] 
President Bush's valedictory Europe tour gives rise to  
   excited hopes that his successor will want to repair the  
   fractured Atlantic alliance [22] 
France, Germany and the Continent: 
Backward-looking parties like the French Socialists [20] 
Classical negotiating ploy by the French [21] 
This treaty is a European manoeuvre. It was concocted by  
   the Eurocrats, by Germany and by France [32-col.1295] 
Railroaded through by the German presidency [33-col.196] 
Protectionism at the heart of French policies [33-col.202] 
It locks us into a continental system that is in defiance of  
   our historical experience, outlook and...trade...much of  
   our history has been bound up with what happened...  
   in Europe, but we are more than that [33-col.234] 
The treaty tries to switch off that maritime global magnetic  
   field and suck us irreversibly into a continental destiny  
   [33-col.235] 
The continentals often express themselves in antagonism to  
   the Anglo-Saxon [33-col.240]  
Apparently we will be at Germany’s throat, we will be  
   fighting the French, or we will be after the Spanish [33- 
   col.224] 
Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia: 
Making Europe more diverse by working to bring in more  
   nations, including Turkey [2] 
To entrench stability in the Western Balkans where so  
   much European blood has flowed...also to Turkey [13] 
Fledgling democracies will not be given the money that  
   they were expecting and will start turning against the  
   EU as it is currently constructed [33-col.202] 
Other: 
We will stand for...a strong transatlantic relationship; an  
   EU that looks out to the world, and that builds strong and  
   open relations with rising powers like China and India  
   [13] 
Our historic ties with India...since democracy has taken  
   root in that great country...building on the best of the past  
   and on economic co-operation, and promoting our  
   common resource of the English language...based on free  
   trade and co-operation [32-col.1294] 
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5.4.2 Presupposition within the Anti-Lisbon Debates 
 
Two principal presuppositions provide background knowledge. The first centres on the way 
political power is seen to diffuse. That is, a citizen/elite binary exists within which, from the 
position of Britain, political authority resides in the citizen while power within the EU is 
located in elite structures. As a consequence, this positions both Britain and Europe in 
hierarchical ways. Britain is situated as possessing a home-grown, organic and democratic 
structure within which political figures act as guardians for the people. Europe, by contrast, is 
placed as an anti-populist executive whose legitimacy is estranged from the electorate.  
 
A second presupposition focuses on how the deepening of integration, rather than being a 
source of closer harmony, is potentially disintegrating. In the third reading of the Treaty of 
Lisbon in the House of Commons, William Cash explained: 
Old tensions are re-emerging. There is protectionism at the heart of French 
policies. There are problems between the European Union and Kosovo, 
whose Parliament is standing out against the European Union. There are 
enormous strikes in Germany, which are barely reported, and 19 per cent 
unemployment in the eastern part of Germany. The Spanish economy is 
faltering. NATO is under threat. Russia is reawakening.613 
 
Subsequently, the received wisdom of European integration functioning as a means of tying 
states’ interests into a web of dependency whereby conflict becomes improbable is inverted: 
that a united Europe is largely illusionary and its centralising policies, bureaucracy and lack 
of democracy actually contribute to destabilisation. In short, diversity is emblematic of a 
system within which national governments must retain their powers and identities. Any 
attempt to conglomerate these forces risks breeding tensions and nationalist impulses. 
   
                                                     
613 Cash, W. (2008) HC Deb., 11 March, vol. 473, col. 202. 
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5.4.3 Subject Positioning within the Anti-Lisbon Debates 
 
The processes of predication and presupposition reveal how the subjects are positioned within 
the debates. Europe is formulated as two objects. Firstly, there is Europe as a protectionist 
power.  Although this ethos is driven by Germany and France as its protagonists, Continental 
Europe as a whole is structured as deeply insulated. Its vision is stunted and global reach 
limited by an exclusive preoccupation with mainland Europe. Secondly, there is Europe as 
federal executive. Related to the dominant citizen/elite presupposition, Europe is positioned 
within a federal projection of power that seeks to emasculate civic and localised institutions. 
Its executive status affords it a managerial and overbearing nature. 
 
Other states mentioned are utilised in contrast to the narrowness evident within Europe’s 
elite-governed structure. India, for example, is positioned as an economic alliance in which 
its strengthening economic clout, coupled with common patterns of trade and language, 
provide an opportunity for Britain to exercise its transnationalism. Britain here is positioned 
as exceptional in that it alone possesses the historical prerequisites and present capacity to 
mould new alliances. In addition, Central and Eastern Europe as European democracies 
position Europe in much more open and liberal terms. Central and Eastern Europe are 
regarded as the means to dilute the Franco-German led monopoly on EU affairs. 
Furthermore, the criticism of Europe being preoccupied with closing itself off in a 
protectionist policy is adulterated by enabling previously occupied states to enter and shape 
Europe. This diversity is seen as paramount to forging a less exclusionist Europe. Finally, the 
USA is situated as a fractured alliance. That is, American unilateralism is derided as 
destructive. The US is positioned as one of several alliances that no longer solely fashions a 
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particular British foreign policy but is still attributed with the credentials of a ‘friendship’ and 
a new relationship, therefore, is prescient. 
 
5.5 Self, Other and National Identities  
 
The array of Self/Other configurations are summarised in Table 10. As in the previous 
empirical chapters, the table is organised into the various debates; the Self and Other 
arrangements; the categorisation of friendly, non-friendly and radical Others; the particular 
characteristics of the relationships between the Self and Other and the sources taken from 
Appendix 3. In the first place, in the pro-EU debates, the EU and more broadly Europe are 
regarded as a friendly Other as the commonality and dependence between the entities 
construct the Other as both an extension of the Self and as a means of protecting and 
promoting the values the Self wishes to export to the international stage. The synonymy 
between the EU and Europe can be understood via the impact EU processes have had. Any 
mention of ‘Europe’ is unmistakably wedded to the infrastructure, nature and role of its 
apparatus. Central and Eastern Asia and Eurasia are categorised as a friendly Other as they 
express common values and are fundamental to the process of enlargement. The USA is 
perceived as a non-radical Other in that it is regarded as one of several special relationships 
and does not possess an overridingly unique role outside of Britain’s more immediate 
relationship with the rest of Europe. China is also a non-radical Other as it is not immediately 
configured as a threat to the Self, and although embodying negative features, nonetheless 
retains the capacity to reform. Non-attachment to the mainland is configured as a radical 
Other. That is, the sense of belonging and interdependence between Britain and mainland 
Europe is constituted as a fundamental reliance and exclusion is regarded as a serious threat. 
 
 
 
274 
 
In the anti-debates, India has the status of a rising power, is not configured as threatening and 
instead creates benefits for the Self based on a sense of kinship determined by deep-seated 
economic, historic and linguistic dependencies. Likewise, Central and Eastern Europe and 
Eurasia are also constituted as a friendly Other. In this case, Britain is part of a broader 
European Self and responsibility for the Other is explicitly stated. The Other is part of this 
European Self and the Europe is regarded as the means to ensure this sense of ‘we-ness’.  The 
US is a non-radical Other as it alludes to a rupture within the relationship between Self and 
Other which although reparable is nonetheless demonstrable. The EU and Europe are a 
radical Other is that they are a direct threat to the interests and nature of the Self. France, 
Germany and the Continent are all configured similarly in that they seek to import a vision of 
Europe which jars significantly with the Self’s history and pattern of trade.  
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Table 10: Self and Other within the Pro and Anti-Lisbon Debates 
Debate Self Other Categorisation Characteristics Source  
 
T
he
 P
ro
-L
is
bo
n 
D
eb
at
es
 
Britain The EU / Europe Friendly Process of strong linking: clear dependence on 
Other; singular and unifying notion ties Self to 
Other;  common liberal values and global 
ambitions; capable of meeting global challenges; 
vehicle within which Self has greater influence; 
capable of ensuring peace, stability and prosperity; 
expanding and promoting liberal and democratic 
values via enlargement; intergovernmentalist and 
non-Federal; new, dynamic and malleable 
2, 5, 13, 
15, 24, 
32, 33 
Britain Central and 
Eastern Europe 
and Eurasia 
Friendly Process of strong linking: importance of inclusion 
within the EU; common values defined by 
democracy, unification and the end of Communism; 
Other looks to Self for inspiration; clear association 
between Self and Other 
1, 26, 
32, 33 
Britain The USA  Non-radical Process of mild differentiation: a new relationship, 
influence but not subordination, relationship 
possesses value as long as Self is part of a unified 
Europe, security challenges cannot be met by Other 
alone, one of several special relationships,  
predatory, less important economically than 
Europe, potential for Other to abandon previously 
alienating foreign policy   
3, 25, 
32, 33 
Britain China Non-radical Process of mild differentiation: rising power not 
configured as an immediate threat, ability to be 
influenced, undemocratic but capable of reform,  
potentially predatory 
30, 32, 
33 
Britain as part 
of the mainland 
/ Continent  
Britain as 
detached from 
the mainland / 
Continent 
Radical Process of strong differentiation: strength of 
inclusion vs. weakness of exclusion; stable vs. 
unstable; mainstream vs. slipstream, participation 
vs. isolation; at the heart of Europe vs. on the 
periphery; central role vs. subordinate role; leading 
vs. following; moderation vs. extremism;  
multipolar system vs. unipolar system; forward-
thinking present vs. backward, myth-laden past; 
enlargement vs. stagnation 
2, 6, 8, 
15, 16, 
23, 24, 
28, 32, 
33 
      
 
T
he
 A
nt
i-
L
is
bo
n 
D
eb
at
es
 
Britain India Friendly Process of strong linking: Self is part of a 
transnational network that seeks to build strong 
relations with Other, Other is described as a ‘rising 
power’, historical ties between Self and other based 
on economic collaboration, free trade and language 
13, 32 
Europe  Central and 
Eastern Europe 
and Eurasia 
Friendly Process of strong linking: Other brings diversity to 
Self, links help forge stability for both Self and 
Other, potential for Other to ‘turn against’ Self if 
responsibilities are not met 
2, 13, 33 
Britain The USA Non-radical Process of mild differentiation: an important 
friendship than affirms a particular British policy 
but one of several which stretches beyond North 
America, regarded as a ‘fractured’ alliance, capable 
of repair 
5, 22 
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Due to the discursive contestations, and the range of Others produced, a number of national 
identities are generated. The positioning of a number of threats and alliances, as indicated by 
the formulation of Others, has repercussions for elite interpretations of Britain’s sense of Self. 
I argue that these conflicting notions of identity can be revealed via the following 
categorisations of friendly, non-radical and radical Othering. 
 
5.5.1 National Identity and Friendly Othering 
 
Four friendly Others are evident, two in each of the debates. The first friendly Other within 
the pro-Lisbon debates is the EU and Europe as a whole. There are several configurations that 
construct particular British national identities. Firstly, there is clearly a feeling of mutual 
dependence which constructs the Other as a singular entity. This hegemonised construction 
categorises a Britain that is part of the Other in terms of shared interests, values and 
identities. What is also apparent is the manner in which Britain is categorised as a global 
entity. This process is bolstered by the fact that such internationalism can only occur by 
engendering a close relationship with the Other. Subsequently, the Other is both an entity and 
a process within which the Self can extend its international authority. Secondly, the Other is 
the means by which peace, stability and prosperity can be strengthened. British national 
Britain The EU / Europe Radical Process of strong differentiation: democratic vs. 
undemocratic; civic power vs. institutional, 
bureaucratic power; flexible vs. intransigent, part of 
an association of member states vs. hegemonic 
superstate; elected member states vs. unelected 
Commission;  non-encroaching vs. Empire-
building; natural and home-grown vs. artificial and 
elite-driven; island status vs. mainland status; 
maritime vs. landbound  
3, 4, 7, 
9, 10, 
11, 12, 
13, 14, 
17, 18, 
19, 20, 
22, 27, 
29, 31, 
32, 33   
Britain France, 
Germany and 
the Continent 
Radical Process of strong differentiation: forward-looking 
vs. backward-looking; free-trade vs. protectionist; 
maritime and global vs. limited and Continental;  
Other concocted by Eurocrats; fear used to 
consolidate power; Self possesses unique historical 
experiences, outlook and pattern of trade 
20, 21, 
32, 33 
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identity here is configured as non-isolationist. Parochialism is positioned as unrealistic and 
defunct. Thus, the Self cannot maintain any sense of sovereignty or sway without being 
inextricably tied to the Other. Thirdly, such influence is positioned within the notion of 
Europe as an intergovernmentalist venture rather than a Federal one. That is, Europe is 
representative of the competing domestic interests implicit within individual member states 
rather than as a supranational entity. Fourthly, enlargement is also very much a central focus 
of the British position. This places its identity within a wider European framework that seeks 
to promote liberal and democratic values via the widening of the Union. Finally, and 
similarly, the EU is regarded as new, dynamic and malleable. Its subsequent attachment to 
Britain similarly imports these qualities into British national identity. Therefore, instead of 
Europe being regarded as a monolithic entity with a fixed and static existence, it is actually 
continuously being made due to the contributions by member states. Perhaps as a reaction to 
the much-articulated criticism of the EU as old, stagnant and bureaucratic, its flexibility and 
dynamism is a clear rebuff to this commonly held position.         
 
Secondly, in the pro-Lisbon debates again, Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia are 
configured as a friendly Other. There appears a clear association between Self and Other. 
However, the importance relates to the manner in which the Other must be included within a 
broader European sense of community. The Other is characterised as having undergone a 
chaotic shift within its own identity. Having dispensed with Communism, it has embraced 
democracy via unification. The Other looks to the Self for inspiration on this passage. Its 
desire to implant stability and European values is closely tied to the influence and sense of 
responsibility implicit within the Self. That is, British national identity is closely tied to 
possessing the responsibility to nurture a democratic environment within which emerging 
sovereign states can flourish. 
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The third friendly Other is positioned in the anti-debates. India is classified as having 
historical ties with the Self based on economic collaboration, free trade and a common 
language. This articulation also occurs against the background of India as a rising power. 
That is, it is not a peripheral economy but is in the process of reasserting itself internationally. 
The Self, therefore, is part of a transnational network that seeks to build strong relations with 
the Other. Such relations, as already mentioned, are built on historically defined notions of 
kinship and mutual cooperation. Thus, British national identity is configured as extra-
European in that it embodies a special, non-geographically bounded status.  
 
The final friendly Other, similar to the pro-Lisbon viewpoints, configures Central and Eastern 
Europe and Eurasia favourably. There are several aspects to this last configuration in which 
the Self is regarded as the EU. Firstly, Europe is defined as lacking in diversity. 
Consequently, one means of importing diversity within is structure is to develop strong links 
to Central and Eastern Europe. Diversity is required as an attempt to unshackle Europe from 
what is regarded as its Franco-German dominated mindset. Hence, greater heterogeneity 
effectively dilutes any centralisation of power within the Union and shapes it more in what is 
regarded as the Anglo-Saxon mould: a decentralised, liberalised and free trade oriented group 
of voluntarily participating member states. Secondly, the strong links between the Self and 
Other help cultivate a sense of co-dependency emboldened by the mutual desire for stability. 
In this sense, an Other firmly anchored to the Self in terms of policy and identity reinforces 
mutual security. Thus, the welfare of the Self is inextricably linked to the well-being of the 
Other. Finally and analogously, this relationship places a level of responsibility on the Self. 
That is, British national identity becomes wedded to the notion of assistance and safeguard 
for flourishing democracies that are potentially at risk. This dimension further positions 
Britain as an animated and active shaper of events inside and outside of the EU.     
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5.5.2 National Identity and Non-Radical Othering 
 
Three non-radical processes of Othering occur, two of which have been extracted from the 
pro-Lisbon debates. The first of these is the USA. In this discourse, the much-lauded and 
somewhat overused reference to ‘the special relationship’ is threatened. What is called for is 
a relationship based on mutuality and not on subservience. This pitches British national 
identity as being bolstered by a sense of national awareness: that a strong transatlantic 
relationship is as important for America as is it for Britain. This feat, it is argued, can only be 
accomplished by Britain functioning within an Anglo-Saxon moulded EU in which all 
member states function in accordance with a unified stance. Thus, one formation of identity 
effectively becomes a bridge between Europe and the USA due to the fact that it retains 
elements of both. Furthermore, the US is classified as one power among many. The 
interdependency between the US and Europe is based on a network of security, trade and 
shared interests. As a result, two concepts feed into British national identity. The first is that 
Britain’s sense of Self is characterised by its ability to forge several important relationships. 
It is transnational, transatlantic as well as European. Secondly, and bearing in mind the US is 
invested with a potentially predatory agenda, Britain is regarded as a means of checking 
unqualified power. That is, by being part of the European Union, Britain has more sway in 
European and non-European arenas.   
 
The second non-radical Other is China. Although perhaps historically regarded as a threat, 
China contains two main characteristics which construct a less antagonistic relationship. First 
of all, China is classified as undemocratic. However, this is not a static configuration but 
instead introduces its capacity for reform and modification. As a result, Britain is regarded as 
a potential galvaniser of this process. Thus, one aspect of British national identity reveals 
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Britain’s ability to exert pressure. This pressure is applied not militarily but via the spread of 
democratisation. As a result, China, although not redolent with European values, nonetheless 
possesses the ability to reform and such modification can only come about via the prodding 
of influential states. In addition, China is partially constituted as predatory. Again, this forces 
British national identity to be part of a much broader European sense of Self in which 
coalescence is the best means of defence against unstable states. Subsequently, China’s non-
radical composition is positioned due to a mildly threatening component that nonetheless 
possesses the potential to reconstitute itself when enticed to do so. 
 
The final non-radical Other again is the USA and is taken from the anti-Lisbon position. As 
in the pro-treaty debates, the US is configured very similarly. Again, the alliance, although 
important, has been ruptured and requires resolution. Thus, British national identity is not 
wedded to a static role in its relationship with the US. Instead, this role is modifiable and 
governed by a sense of equivalence on the world stage. Britain, therefore, is classified as 
active and preponderant rather than supine. The notion of ‘the special relationship’ is 
regarded as outdated as a new relationship based on parity and mutual respect is highlighted.      
 
5.5.3 National Identity and Radical Othering 
 
Analogous within the Maastricht debates, the first process of radical Othering configures 
non-attachment to mainland Europe as a viable threat. To begin with, due to its marked 
connection with Europe, Britain is stable, preeminent and authoritative. Europe is seen as a 
means within which Britain can exert its sense of Self. A duality exists within which Britain 
is incontrovertibly European and expresses common characteristics and values, and the EU as 
a facility within which British interests can be furthered. Subsequently, Europe creates an 
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environment within which a key number of British national identity characteristics can be 
forwarded: solidity, strength and leadership. A second feature of national identity within this 
discourse centres on the environment within which British identity operates. The political 
environment is multipolar. This projects a Self which functions within a region where no 
single state can dominate and yet several can function as key agents of authority. British 
national identity is therefore regarded as non-exceptional and tied to a network of European 
states. Non-participation is linked to a national feeling of subordination and peripheral 
influence. The issue of multipolarity further reinforces the notion of stability in that no single 
authority is allowed to dominate and that diversity flourishes. A final element of national 
identity related to non-attachment configured as a radical other concerns how the discourse 
alludes to a sense of rationalism and pragmatism positioned in contrast to largely myth-laden 
fears and emotionalism. The relationship with the EU is couched in terms of matter-of-
factness and the need for expediency. The EU seemingly is here to stay and British identity is 
wrapped up in the fact of its existence. Subsequently, this commonsensical approach 
recognises the immutability of the Union and is positioned in conflict with an almost 
hysterical, fear-mongering obsession that blights the anti-Lisbon camp. This has the effect of 
purporting an identity based on a sense of reason and pragmatism.    
 
A further impact on British identity concerns the way in which the EU and Europe are 
configured in the anti-positions. Again, there are several significant effects on the way British 
national identity is characterised. Firstly, British institutions are regarded as protective of a 
civic sense of identity. That is, parliament’s duty is to provide a democratic and non-
centralised system of civic responsibility and protection. This authority is threatened by an 
undemocratic, institutionalised and largely interfering European leviathan. Subsequently, 
parliamentary sovereignty is once again fused with popular sovereignty in order to project the 
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idea that a threat to British institutions is simultaneously a threat to every British citizen. 
Therefore, an early identity-related configuration positions Britain as civic, democratic and 
with power structures which serve its citizens rather than its political elites. A further 
configuration of national identity positions Britain as a member state freely volunteering the 
level of participation in European affairs it wishes to take. This association suggests that a 
largely peaceful sense of coexistence between members is being ruptured by the Empire-
building implicit within the European project. Its institutions are regarded as encroaching and 
elitist as against a national identity which is non-combative and anti-imperious. National 
identity is, therefore, positioned as harmonious within a system of nation-states and is at risk 
due to the persistent attempts by the EU to forge its own power against the interests of the 
very states it is supposed to serve. A third configuration of British national identity highlights 
the organic and home-grown nature of British institutions, laws and practices. This alludes to 
a kind of built-in pattern of power that has evolved gradually and therefore not been the 
construct of violent rivalries or the result of victories of powerful interests. By contrast, the 
radical Other is regarded as a concoction by Eurocrats who have consolidated power by 
projecting a mythical belief in anarchy and conflict occurring without the EU’s apparatuses 
of power. A final point reveals how the island-status Britain possesses still feeds into political 
elite notions of identity. Although the island status is configured as a means of security, it 
also functions as a way of instilling an identity that still looks to far away nations for its sense 
of Self. In this sense, to be European is positioned as too narrow an artifice for Britain to 
absorb or attempt to be. Instead, the maritime nation looks outward to distant opportunities in 
a way the landbound Continent never can. In this, British national identity contains a global 
element that cannot be constrained by a sole preoccupation with its European neighbours.        
The final radical Other which configures British national identity positions France, Germany 
and the Continent as a homogenous unit. They can be grouped as a single entity because they 
 
 
283 
 
all possess similar and complimentary characteristics. This is perhaps indicative of the idea 
that the anti-discourses very much take their animus that the EU has consistently been a 
Franco-German tool conveyed under the masquerade of Eurospeak. Two aspects dominant 
this process of Othering and subsequently feed into British national identity. Firstly, Britain is 
seen as forward-looking in its support for EU enlargement and its impetus based on the desire 
to see a more deregulated, less centralised EU. By contrast, the most obdurate counterparts to 
this position are France, Germany and the Continent as a whole. Again, this is due to the fact 
that the EU is both seen as a Franco-German dominated project and because it is infected 
with a dirigiste, authoritarian ethos that jars decidedly with the Anglo-Saxon attempt to inject 
it with transparency and efficiency. Secondly, Britain is characterised as possessing a history, 
pattern of trade and outlook that differs quite strongly from those on the Continent. British 
exceptionalism is celebrated as a strength against which the Continent is treated as a unified 
and limited whole. British national identity is configured as vibrant, diverse and all-
encompassing in contrast to a Continental identity treated as narrow and uniform.  
 
5.6 The Production of British National Identities  
 
Figure 6 summarises the findings within this chapter and presents the various British national 
identities produced. As before, it is organised into the processes of Othering, with pro- and 
anti-positions and the consequent discourses which have been utilised from the subject 
positioning in this chapter. These readings of Europe contain the British national identities 
listed. I then assert that six British Selves have been produced. As iterated in the previous 
empirical chapters, these British selves are images of nationhood that have been formulated 
by elite perceptions of national identity. 
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Figure 6: British National Identities in the Debates over the Lisbon Treaty 
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As can be seen from the figure, the analysis within this chapter has produced a more expansive 
display of discourses and a correspondingly broader invocation of identities. First of all, from 
Britain as a European nation-state in the referendum debates to Britain as a liberalising 
power during the Maastricht Treaty, Britain during the Lisbon Treaty is an interventionist 
European power. Six discursive constructions of Europe produce this Self. Firstly, Europe is a 
project in progress. The structure of Europe is perceived as ever-evolving and ever more willing 
to engage with other international actors and mould the international environment. From the 
1975 referendum, one can see a particular dominant reading of Europe as a means to safeguard 
security. By the time of the Maastricht Treaty, this had been implanted with a free market ethos 
that pushed for deregulation and unfettered trade. By the most recent debates, Europe continued 
to be regarded as an evolutionary project in which new remits forged a more global and 
interventionist role with Britain as its key shaper. Secondly, and relatedly, this embryonic 
responsibility produces Europe as a humanitarian agent. In this sense, the Union’s burgeoning 
role develops from a securitised stabiliser into a deliverer of aid and welfare. As a consequence 
of these two readings of Europe, British national identity is European, adaptable, liberalising, 
and expansionist. Thirdly, Europe as a community of intergovernmental nation-states highlights 
the power structure within the EU. Supranational institution building is still firmly resisted to 
reveal an authority and drive that still resides within the sovereign state system. As such, Europe 
is a network of voluntary but self-interested alliances.  Fourthly, Europe is an open market. The 
previous chapter similarly centred Europe as a free trade area and positioned the proliferation of 
commerce as a fundamental bulwark of prosperity and stability. However, a free trade area 
suggests an intra-regional series of trade agreements that is too restrictive and limiting an 
arrangement. As a consequence, the trading element is reconfigured to position Europe as an 
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internationalist rather than regionalist entity. These two elements produce the following British 
national identities. Britain is configured as prosperous, pragmatic, participatory and moderate. 
The fifth discourse is Europe as a global security alliance. Unlike the security alliance 
formulated in the previous chapter, the global nature of this association suggests that threats are 
worldwide in scope and must therefore be dealt with via as wide a network of nation-states as 
possible. This produces national identities that are dependent and stable. The final discourse is 
Central and Eastern Europe as European democracies. From Maastricht, one can see the 
transition of these states from historically destined but unstable new entrants to the European 
family of nations to fully fledged participants in a developing, vibrant political and economic 
project. As such, Britain is unified and democratic.   
 
 
The second Self is Britain as a free trade catalyst. India as an economic alliance helps produce 
this reading. Apart from India’s mushrooming power, historical and cultural linkages are utilised 
to underscore the importance of a trade network beyond Europe. In addition, Central and 
Eastern Europe as European democracies help position the idea that patterns of trade flourish 
between states that have open political and economic systems. As such, British national identity 
is historicised, trade-driven, diverse and democratic.  
 
Britain as a liberal interdependency is the third Self. Two readings of non-European states 
formulate this. The first is the USA as a multipolar alliance. In this sense, Britain is fashioned as 
a more dominant complement to a transatlantic relationship in which several ‘special 
relationships’ reign. As such, Britain is imbued with a greater sense of Self and responsibility. 
This is complemented with the second formulation, China as a rising power. Whereas with the 
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USA Britain’s pattern of influence is historically embedded, China possesses the potential to 
reform and such a transformation is contingent on Britain as an open, value-laden catalyst for 
political change. As such, Britain is liberal in the sense that it is willing to fashion markets and 
alliances worldwide. It is also interdependent due to such relationships and, as a result, reform-
driven.  
 
In addition, Britain is a global nation-state. Only one formulation, the USA as a fractured 
alliance, formulates this understanding. British identity is global and uniting. As such, this 
reading is orchestrated towards the notion of the nation-state as the most pertinent means of 
dealing with the souring of the relationship between Britain and the US.  
 
From Britain as a cooperative European power in the 1975 debates to Britain as a global 
European authority during Maastricht; two discourses, Europe as a global network and as an 
Anglicised association, produce Britain as an Anglo-Saxon network. This evolved 
conceptualisation is centred on the notion that a ‘social Europe’ dominated by excessive 
legislation and protectionist thinking is being seriously challenged by a ‘British Europe’ in which 
trade, free marketeering and openness govern. An important identity generated, therefore, is that 
Britain is culturally essentialist; that it contains a fundamental essence stemming from a unique 
cultural and historical status that is able to mould and fashion the Europe it sees itself very much 
as a part of. In addition, Britain is liberal in that it is forward-thinking and moderate, as well as 
competitive and progressive.   
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Finally, Britain is a hyperglobalist nation-state614 in that it possesses a maritime, globalist 
identity drawn from the negative positioning of two readings of Europe: Europe as a 
protectionist power and Europe as a federal executive. Again, this can be contrasted with the two 
preceding chapters in which Britain was first configured as a sovereign parliamentary body 
and secondly as a sovereign civic body. Here we see the ever-emboldening of the nation-state as 
the means to resist supranational intrusions and the notion that past configurations of identity are 
particularly resilient and on-going. In addition, sovereignty, from an executive-centred reading 
early on in the debates, is extended to filter into all aspects of British society. As such, identity is 
also civic, flexible and pluralist. Finally, it is liberating in that the retention of national autonomy 
is an emancipatory goal within which self-government is the heavily guarded structure by which 
the other values and identities are protected.    
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
614 I take this expression from Baker, D., Gamble, A. and Seawright, D. (2002) ‘Sovereign Nations and Global Markets: Modern 
British Conservatism and Hyperglobalism’, pp. 399-428. 
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CHAPTER SIX: ACCOUNTING FOR CHANGE - THE EVOLUTION OF BRITISH 
NATIONAL IDENTITIES  
 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This final empirical chapter examines the array of identity configurations, discourses and British 
Selves over the historical junctures to provide a comparative element. The original contribution 
of the thesis is recapitulated in the form of identifying the discursive struggles that have taken 
place over the three events examined. That is, as a means of summarising how British national 
identity has been configured, this section seeks to highlight patterns of similarity and 
dissimilarity between the various readings of subjects and objects.  
 
The following figure shows the array of discourses developed from an analysis of the processes 
of predication, presupposition and subject positioning; British national identities and the 
formulations of Britain’s Selves over the three historical events. Figure 7, therefore, is a 
composite of information extracted from figures 4, 5 and 6. Table 11 condenses the data to show 
just the formation of British Selves over the events. What follows is an explanation of the images 
of nationhood implicit in the range of British Selves. The patterns of likeness that pervade the 
debates are first observed and are then followed by an examination of the themes that echo 
discontinuity. As a result, this chapter argues that although much of the literature has asserted 
that identities, although subject to change are “sticky”615 and “sedimented over time”,616 with 
                                                     
615 See, for example, Cederman, L. E. (2001) ‘Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What it Would Take to Construct a 
European Demos’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 7, no. 2, pp. 139-174; Marcussen, M., Risse, T., 
Engelmann-Martin, D., Knopf, H. J. and Roscher, K. (1999) ‘Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British and German 
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British national identity being perceived as more resolute than most, the empirical findings 
suggest the disruptions that punctuate the discourses are as much a part of the production of 
British national identities as the continuities. As such, some discursive constructions, it can be 
argued, are clearly both event and time-specific. 
 
 
 
                                                     
Nation State Identities’, pp. 614-633; Risse, T. (2002) ‘Nationalism and Collective Identities: Europe versus the Nation-State?’ in 
Heywood, P., Jones, E. and Rhodes, M. (eds.) Developments in West European Politics 2, Basingstoke: Palgrave, pp. 77-93;; 
Risse, T., Engelmann-Martin D., Knopf, H. and Roscher, K. (1999) ‘To Euro or Not to Euro? The EMU and Identity Politics in 
the European Union’, pp. 147-187. 
616 Norval A. J. (1999) ‘Rethinking Ethnicity: Identification, Hybridity and Democracy’ in P. Yeros (ed.) Ethnicity and 
Nationalism in Africa: Constructivist Reflections and Contemporary Politics, London: Macmillan, p. 84.  
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Figure 7: The Production of British National Identities: a Comparison 
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MENTARY 
BODY    
 
 
 Europe as a Project 
In Progress 
 Europe as a 
Humanitarian Agent 
 Europe as a Community 
Of Intergovernmental 
Nation-States 
 Europe as an Open 
Market 
 Europe as a Global 
Security Alliance 
 Central & Eastern 
Europe as European 
Democracies 
 
 India as an Economic 
Alliance 
 Central & Eastern 
Europe as European 
Democracies 
 
 USA as a Multipolar 
Alliance 
 China as a Rising Power 
 
 USA as a Fractured 
Alliance 
 
 Europe as a Global 
Network 
 Europe as an Anglicised 
Association 
 
 Europe as a  
Protectionist Power 
 Europe as a Federal 
Superstate 
 
European  
Adaptable 
Liberalising 
Expansionist 
Prosperous 
Pragmatic   
Participatory 
Moderate 
Dependent 
Stable 
Unified 
Democratic 
 
 
 
Historicised 
Trade-driven 
Diverse 
Democratic 
 
 
Interdependent 
Reform-driving 
Liberal 
 
Uniting 
Global 
 
Essentialist 
Liberal 
Competitive 
Progressive 
 
Maritime 
Globalist 
Civic / Flexible 
Pluralist 
Liberating 
CO-
OPERATIVE 
EUROPEAN 
POWER 
LIBERAL- 
ISING 
EUROPEAN 
POWER                            
REFORMIST 
ROLE 
MODEL                         
GLOBAL 
EUROPEAN 
AUTHORITY            
SOVEREIGN
CIVIC 
BODY 
INTER-
VENTIONIST 
EUROPEAN 
POWER              
HYPER- 
GLOBALIST 
NATION- 
STATE 
FREE TRADE 
CATALYST            
ANGLO- 
SAXON 
NETWORK 
GLOBAL 
NATION- 
STATE 
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Table 11: Identifying Images of Nationhood 
 
 
 
 
Othering 
 
 
 
 
Pro/Anti 
 
Britain’s Selves 
The Referendum The Treaty of 
Maastricht 
 
The Treaty of Lisbon 
 
 
 
Friendly 
 
 
 
Pro 
 
 
 
Anti 
 
 
EUROPEAN 
NATION-STATE 
 
 
TRANSATLANTIC, 
SECURITISED 
NATION-STATE 
 
 
LIBERALISING 
EUROPEAN POWER 
 
 
--- 
 
 
INTERVENTIONIST 
EUROPEAN POWER 
 
 
FREE TRADE 
CATALYST 
 
 
 
Non-radical 
 
 
 
 
Pro 
 
 
 
Anti 
 
 
TRANSNATIONAL 
EUROPEAN POWER 
 
 
TRANSNATIONAL 
NATION-STATE 
 
REFORMIST ROLE 
MODEL 
 
--- 
 
LIBERAL INTER-
DEPENDENCY 
 
 
GLOBAL NATION-
STATE 
 
 
 
Radical 
 
 
 
Pro 
 
 
 
Anti 
 
 
COOPERATIVE 
EUROPEAN POWER 
 
 
SOVEREIGN 
PARLIAMENTARY 
BODY 
 
 
GLOBAL EUROPEAN 
AUTHORITY 
 
SOVEREIGN CIVIC 
BODY 
 
 
ANGLO-SAXON 
NETWORK 
 
 
HYPER-GLOBALIST 
NATION-STATE 
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6.2 Identifying Images of Nationhood 
 
6.2.1 Continuity 
 
Globalism, Globalisation and Britain as a Global Actor 
 
A first identifiable dominant trend concerns the fact that all processes of Othering point towards 
a pattern of growing British influence. This position is perhaps more commonly associated with 
those individuals critical of European Union institutions, leadership and governance. A recent 
edition of The Economist, for example, states that “[s]omething close to a Cutty Sark vision for 
Britain – nimble, free and ready to roam the globe in pursuit of profits – fills the dreams of 
Conservative politicians and policy types.”617 As analysed over the three empirical chapters, the 
viewpoints within the anti-positions produce a diverse range of criticisms which all seek to stifle 
and threaten Britain’s naturalised, exceptional and global identity. As such, Britain’s Self 
functions as a universalist power that views Europe as too geographically bounded, politically 
rigid and economically bureaucratic to accommodate. However, what is striking is that within 
the pro-positions, British identity is not merely lodged within a European structure but is also 
conveyed as a global authority operating within a globalist-defined international system. As a 
definition, globalism “seeks to describe and explain nothing more than a world which is 
characterised by networks of connections that span multi-continental distances.”618 Globalisation 
“refers to the increase or decline in the degree of globalism. It focuses on the forces, the 
                                                     
617 Bagehot (2012) ‘The lure of the open sea’, The Economist, 14 April.  
618 Nye, J. (2002) ‘Globalism vs. Globalisation’, The Globalist, 15 April. Available at: 
http://www.theglobalist.com/StoryId.aspx?StoryId=2392. [Accessed 8 April 2012].  
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dynamism or speed of these changes.”619 Although a ‘logic of no alternative’ has been analysed 
to produce an image of globalisation as a non-negotiable external economic constraint with 
reference to New Labour620, we can actually see that the attempts to formulate integration as a 
reaction to, a response to and a shaper of increasing globalisation is a dynamic that started 
earlier.  
 
From Table 11, global identity can be plotted over the three pro-positions according to the three 
practices of Othering. Starting with the practice of friendly Othering in the first configuration, in 
1975 Britain was perceived as a European nation-state. The nestling of this articulation stems in 
part from the ‘Cold-War Europe’ reading that dominated political thinking coupled with the 
‘Britain in decline’ thesis. By the time of Maastricht, globalising linkages became defined less 
through security considerations and more via the proliferation of economic ideologies. 
Rosamond, for example, argues that “strategically motivated actors within the EU have utilized 
the concept of globalization to create cognitive allegiances to the idea of ‘Europe’/the EU as a 
valid economic space.”621 This economic space, one can argue, had become legitimised in such a 
way that economic and market liberalisation became routinely associated with many of the 
dominant identifiers of Britain. These value-laden characteristics position Britain as prosperous, 
democratic and ensconced with a historically prevalent and naturalised sense of leadership. 
Again, the dissolution of the USSR helped demonise statism and made any attempt to deviate 
from the inherent logic of liberalisation less able. By the time of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
                                                     
619 Ibid.  
620 Watson. M. and Hay, C. (2003) ‘The discourse of globalization and the logic on no alternative: rendering the contingent 
necessary in the political economy of New Labour’, Policy & Politics, vol. 31, no. 3, pp. 289-305.  
621 Rosamond, B. (1999) ‘Discourses of globalization and the social construction of European identities’, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 6:4, pp. 652-668 (at 666-7).  
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globalisation was being constructed as the means to further empower an ever more 
internationalist notion of British nationhood. As identified by Ash, the EU has become the means 
to play out Britain’s world role.622 With reference to the pro-configurations stemming from non-
radical Othering during the referendum, Britain functioned as a transnational European power. 
That is, although identity was firmly embedded within the burgeoning and novel European 
structure, identity held out to non-European linkages, namely the Commonwealth and the USA. 
In fact, European unity was seen as a necessary precursor to retain and develop these 
associations. During Maastricht, the British Self had moulded into a reformist role model within 
which globalism became not merely an economic or trade-bound system of affiliation but one in 
which the seismic shifts in Central and Eastern Europe echoed a reinvention of British identity. 
This new identity saw Britain as a promulgator of European values of liberty and independence. 
Interestingly, within the pro-positions during the Maastricht debates, the USA did not appear as a 
formative influence on British identity. As such, this suggests what one scholar called at the time 
the possibility of “a post-‘special relationship’ identity”,623 shorn of the Atlanticist illusions of 
the past and reinvigorated by the emergence of newly independent fledgling nations positioned 
firmly within the European sphere. During Lisbon, Britain became reformulated as a liberal 
interdependency. It is perhaps important again to highlight that this configuration is not merely 
the market liberalism associated with the burgeoning of trade and opening of markets but also 
about the extension of rights and need for global action. David Cameron, in his speech to the 
2006 Conservative Party Conference, articulated this brand of liberalism: 
                                                     
622 Ash, T. G. (2006) ‘Why Britain is in Europe – the Ben Pimlott memorial lecture’, Twentieth Century British History, vol. 17, 
no. 4, pp. 451-463 (at 460). 
623 Robertson, G. (1990) ‘Britain in the new Europe’, p. 697. 
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I'm not a neo-conservative. I'm a liberal Conservative. Liberal - because I 
believe in spreading freedom and democracy, and supporting humanitarian 
intervention. That is why we cannot stand by and watch further genocide in 
Darfur. But Conservative - because I also recognise the complexities of human 
nature, and will always be sceptical of grand schemes to remake the world.624 
 
Again, the concept of interdependency formulates an international structure within which 
isolationism is an unreality. The burgeoning status of China also creates a formative influence on 
Britain’s global identity. Firstly, it helps drive the need to fashion a consolidated response to 
dealing with China’s rising power status. As such, it provides an opportunity for Britain to try 
and animate the EU into a less parochial entity that possesses responsibilities and impact far 
beyond the confines of its immediate sphere. Secondly, it contributes to constituting the political 
world as being separated into global blocs. A united Europe, framed by a proactive Britain, 
possesses an international sway that enables a more much formidable global reach. The final 
Selves formulated from the various pro-positions, this time produced via radical Othering, 
similarly identify the manner in which Britain plays out its global identity. In the pro-
membership debates, Britain is initially constructed as a cooperative European power. Although 
firmly lodged within a European axis that takes its animus from the Soviet/Communist threat, 
what is interesting is the manner in which European unity not be used as a catalyst for 
reinvigorating seclusion. That is, British identity must not revert to an antediluvian narrowness 
that hankers after its former Empire but instead must display internationalism and partnership as 
the best means of both reconciling states’ interests and resisting the encroachment of 
Communism. In the early 1990s, Britain had become cast as a global European authority in 
which global influence was firmly situated within an attachment to Europe. Again however, 
                                                     
624 Cameron, D. (2006) ‘Speech to the Conservative Party Conference’, Oct. 4. Available at: 
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2006/10/Cameron_The_best_is_yet_to_come.aspx. [Accessed 12 Oct. 2012].   
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Europe is very much formulated as a pliant entity within which Britain functions as a chief 
vehicle for modernisation and change. The final British Self, formulated during the Lisbon 
deliberations, is as an Anglo-Saxon network. As has been mentioned, all pro-positions have 
sought to instill Europe as a commonality of values. Throughout many of the configurations, 
Britain is perceived as a harbinger of these. However, what is particularly pertinent about the 
final Self is the manner in which a global Britain becomes concretised. By way of example, 
Gordon Brown, speaking to the British Council in 2004, neatly sums up the manner in which 
British national identity, encompassing certain traditions and institutions, can effectively 
globalise Europe: 
A Britain that thinks globally not only builds from our traditions of openness 
and outward-looking internationalism but builds upon huge British assets and 
strengths – the British Council itself, the BBC, the BBC World Service, our 
universities and our long-felt sense of obligation to the world’s poor.625    
 
To conclude, there initially seems a contradiction related to moulding identity to the sanctity of 
nation-state units, in which Britain and other European and non-European actors are very much 
categorised as sovereign bodies, and the realisation that global forces render such units as 
secondary. However, the British state is very much linked to the propagation of globalisation in 
two ways. Firstly, by constructing Britain as a global actor, Britain stands at the forefront of the 
attempt to forge greater linkages not merely within Europe but beyond. Over the debates, Britain 
is located as transnational, interdependent, cooperative, global and hyper-globalist. Even though 
globalism might be defined via increased interconnectivity, this process comes about not merely 
due to extant forces but by nation-states. Britain is consistently referred to as a dominant shaper: 
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in the pro-debates as an actor invested with status to mould linkages to Europe and beyond. In 
the anti-debates as an actor resisting the stultifying narrowness of a Euro-centric orbit when 
Britain’s interests, due to its historical, culturalised and unique identity, actually lie far beyond 
the confines of the protectionist Continent. Secondly, in both pro- and anti-positions, the desire 
for widening over deepening is remarkably consistent. With reference to Eastern enlargement, 
Anthony Browne, European correspondent for The Times, argued that 
[e]nlargement – first championed by Margaret Thatcher in 1988 – has shifted 
the centre of gravity in Brussels. It is providing the death-knell of the Franco 
German vision of a high-tax social Europe and sealing the domination of the 
Anglo-Saxon free-market, transatlantic vision.626 
 
Within the discourses relating to enlargement, spatial references to ‘core Europeans’, ‘peripheral 
Europeans’ and ‘potential Europeans’627 are clearly evident. Support for the entry of Central and 
Eastern European states during the Maastricht debates and championing the entry of the Balkan 
states and Turkey around the time of the Treaty of Lisbon can be made sense of in the attempt to 
supplant the ‘Europe as Franco-German hegemony’ threat with an Anglo-Saxon model of 
cultural cosmopolitanism, economic liberalisation and trade-driven association.  
 
A Britain of Values 
 
It is very apparent that Britain’s sense of Self is a value-laden configuration. The readings of 
Europe and other objects, far from implying a detached and stony evaluation of narrow interest, 
imply that certain virtues are consistently attached to Britain. What is important, however, is not 
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627 Rovisco, M. (2010) ‘One Europe or several Europes? The cultural logic of narratives of Europe – views from France and 
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that values matter. Their purpose is well-established in nurturing a national identity. More 
specifically, it has been suggested that the role of shared values has three purposes. Firstly, to 
pursue policy or ideological goals by aligning a particular policy to the values of the people; 
secondly, to mobilise the population in times of national tension such as war; and thirdly, to 
encourage inter-regional unity when faced with multiple territorial boundaries within a state.628 
However, one might also add that particularly in light of the empirical finding, the invocation of 
values is also an attempt to create a Britain not born anew but, in the words of George Orwell, 
“an everlasting animal stretching into the future and the past, and, like all living things, having 
the power to change out of recognition and yet remain the same.”629  
 
Several recurring values pervade the discourses. First of all, and as has already been highlighted, 
the agency afforded Britain in the debates over all three events constructs it as a power that 
matters, even if this is coupled to an admittance of decline. The characteristic of leadership is 
frequently referenced and is read as essentialist and historically pre-given. That is, it is not a 
state-sponsored attempt at exercising power but is embedded in the make-up of the British Self. 
Thus, the reading of Britain as a natural leader is innate. This quality appears in both guises: as 
the shaper and prime catalyst of development and stability in the pro-positions and as the 
instigator of free trade and open markets beyond the narrow Continent in the anti-debates. From 
Table 11, one can see that from the pro-perspective, Britain has moulded from a European to a 
liberalising to an interventionist nation-state. Subsequently, the changing nature of the EU is also 
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reflected in this: that in the 1970s, the Community organ prioritised the sustenance of security 
and encouragement of free trade. By the 1990s, with the advent of the Single Market and the 
early framework for the single currency, trade had shifted in importance. It had become a truly 
global ambition to forge both worldwide commercial and financial networks. By the late 2000s, 
Europe had taken on an interventionist role to exercise influence over global, economic, climatic 
and environmental concerns. As a mirror of this, British identity became more assertive and 
more willing to try to continually drive Europe into an ever-expanding set of responsibilities. In 
contrast, the anti-position went from Britain as sovereign bodies in the first two events to a 
hyperglobalist nation-state in the Lisbon debates. Again, it seems British interests, and 
consequently identity, far from the isolationism frequently associated with such a position, was 
intent on cultivating a more self-assured role for itself. To sum up, the various values that 
represent Britain as a leading actor can be revealed by the identities in Table 11: militarily 
influential, dominant, liberating, securitised, leader, influential worldwide, authoritative, 
expansionist, reform-driving, progressive and globalist. Such identities traverse all discourses 
and can subsequently be classified as a core component of the British Selves.  
 
A second value is stability/prosperity. This dualism is evident as both are treated as natural 
preconditions for the other. As dominant predicates, they are invoked by EU supporters to 
highlight how the peace and stability inherent within European integration have garnered a 
material wealth and subsequent standard of living that simply could not have occurred within a 
fragmented and destructive Continent. Wartime references, particularly in the referendum 
debates, very much focus on Europe’s annihilative past as a means to bring to light a materially 
advantaged and thriving present. EU opponents position peace and prosperity within a dual 
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requirement to forge further trading and commercial links and a recognition that Europe 
functions too frequently as a means to hinder financial rewards from these natural trading 
patterns. Similarly, although the Maastricht debates coincided with the break-up of the former 
Soviet Union and allowed elites to formulate Britain as a chief catalyst for social change and 
economic well-being, the concept of the Anglo-Saxon model lives on in the disputes over the 
Treaty of Lisbon. For example, Jonathan Freedland, journalist for The Guardian, affirmed that 
the trend in Europe is in Britain’s direction. For nearly a decade, the old 
Franco-German motor has been stalling as both nations have struggled 
economically: new members have been reluctant to follow their example. 
Enlargement has brought in ex-communist states which prefer so-called Anglo-
Saxon liberal economics to the French model, with its statist protections and 
regulations.630  
 
Third, Britain is heavily ensconced with democratic values. However, democracy is not 
exclusively defined in a parliamentary, legislatory or constitutional sense. There are three 
important aspects related to the elite reading of Britain as a democracy. Firstly, this quality is 
very much linked to Britain’s capacity to exercise influence. From the heralding of Central and 
Eastern European states as European in the Maastricht debates to championing Turkish entry to 
the EU in the Lisbon debates, democratic values are an attempt to forge commonality between 
nation-states and are a vehicle for Britain to take what political elites see as a prevailing role in 
widening Europe. Secondly, democracy is stabilised within a web of closely related concepts that 
equates it within a broader spectrum of values. As such, democracy is the essential precondition 
for political stability, prosperity, peace and free trade. States that do not exhibit these tendencies, 
such as the Soviet Union during the referendum debates, are othered. Finally, democracy is 
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utilised in both debates. That is, it is a cross-cutting identity that gets seized upon in the 
battleground over discursive meaning. Each debate contains the attempt to position its 
protagonists as the true standard bearers of democracy. In much of the anti-led arguments, the 
Community is berated for its lack of democracy: it is ruled by bureaucrats not elected officials, it 
supersedes national democracies and its size is indicative of its intent to strip away local power. 
The opposing camp instead frequently argues that Europe, providing an intergovernmental 
consensus dominates, is a mechanism for exporting democratic values and a model for how 
democratic nation-states might successfully play out their interests. In this sense, Britain, as a 
harbinger of democratic values, democratises Europe and contributes to regulating member state 
behaviour.    
 
6.2.2 Discontinuity 
 
Temporal and Conceptual Othering 
 
A number of distinct temporal and conceptual Others were generated within some of the events. 
Temporal Othering means that “what we are can be defined in terms of critical distance from 
what we once used to be.”631 In the 1975 referendum, Britain’s past was conceived as a radical 
Other in the pro-membership debate. As has already been articulated, negative imaging of war-
torn Europe, a struggling post-war British recovery and the myth-laden return to Empire all help 
constitute a present that was being formulated in opposition to its past. However, what is 
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304 
 
informative is the manner in which this temporal configuration is not evident in the other two 
historical junctures. This dislocation can be enumerated with three observations. Firstly, and 
most simply, in 1975 many of the British political figures within the membership debates had 
had personal experience of the Second World War. Indeed, many of the wartime allusions would 
have possessed a deep and profound level of embeddedness for the populace. To provide one 
example, the Keep Britain in Europe campaign published an advertisement in a national 
newspaper stating “[f]orty million people died in two European wars this century. Better lose a 
little national sovereignty than a son or a daughter.”632 As such, war references had a particular 
level of potency and helped structure both the ‘Europe as a security bloc’ and ‘Europe as its 
historical antithesis’ discourses. Secondly, the lack of temporal Othering during Maastricht and 
Lisbon suggests that this process has a particularly lifespan and is event-specific. One scholar 
has noted the recent return of geopolitical Othering with Europe being constituted via its 
opposition to Islam and the USA and, as a consequence, signifying the loss in importance of 
temporal Othering.633 Subsequently, one can argue that the narrative of ‘Europe as past’ threat in 
1975 had shifted to a much more tangible spatial threat signified with the breakup of the Soviet 
Union and the Balkan Wars. Thirdly, by the time of the Lisbon treaty, security discourses had 
become distinctly weaker in both pro- and anti-positions. However, the weakening of temporal 
Othering occurred not merely due to wartime experiences becoming more distant in the national 
memory. In fact, one can argue that the changing nature of Europe left no room for political 
elites to harbour worn-out and over-used references to the Second World War. In short, the 
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meaning of Europe had changed. One can notice, for example, particularly with reference to the 
pro-positions in the categorisation of friendly Othering during the Lisbon debates, that the 
discourses over Europe and subsequent British national identities had multiplied quite radically 
in comparison with the previous empirical episodes. The security discourses of ‘Europe as a 
humanitarian agent’ and ‘as a global security alliance’ instead looked towards reinventing 
Europe’s security identity not in relation to Europe’s battle strewn past, but to a challenging and 
reinvigorating future. Again, it is worth noting that Britain is very much deemed as being the 
primary catalyst for Europe’s role rebirth.    
 
In the Maastricht and Lisbon debates, non-attachment to the mainland/Continent was 
orchestrated as a conceptual Other vis-à-vis the pro-treaty positions. Similar to temporal 
Othering, conceptual Othering projects certain characteristics onto a particular notion and links 
the Self to or differentiates the Self from such a concept. In addition, there are several other 
formulations that highlight the conceptual nature of Europe. For example, the construction of 
‘Europe as a family of nation-states’, seen within the anti-positions of the Maastricht debates, 
projects the image that no single unit of power dominates. Europe is a heterogeneous but linked 
set of relationships in which power is distributed linearly rather than vertically. That is, political 
influence is an across-the-board concept that individual states exercise under the inviolability of 
their own domestic identities. It is not an exercise in which a small cabal of dominant states push 
integration to serve their own ends. As such, the British involvement with decentralisation, 
liberalisation and trade is very much wrapped up in this attempt to dilute top-down power 
structures and effectively stymie supranationalistic ambitions.  
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The conceptual Othering of non-attachment to the mainland/Continent in the pro-Maastricht 
debates produces Britain as a global European authority. Several of Britain’s identities – 
influential worldwide, authoritative and securitised – are stabilised via this process of Othering. 
The issue of influence and the fear of not being in a role to exercise it was echoed by the then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, in his resignation speech in 1989. He reaffirmed 
that “it is vital that we maximise Britain's influence in the Community … we will not be able to 
exert that influence effectively, and successfully provide the leadership, as long as we remain 
largely outside the EMS.”634 The second example of conceptual Othering is identically lodged in 
a fear of non-attachment and is visible in the pro-configurations during the Lisbon debates. This 
process contributes to producing a British Self as an Anglo-Saxon network. However, unlike the 
previous example, the influence that attachment brings helps fashion Europe into a much more 
British construct. British influence is seen as part of an importance process of modernisation and 
progressivism that moulds Europe into a network of multipolar linkages. As such, British 
attachment to Europe helps formulate the Continent as a whole into a forward-looking and 
dynamic set of associations. This process produces two chief identities: Britain as liberal and 
progressive.    
 
To sum up, both temporal and conceptual Othering play a role in formulating several British 
Selves. What is also important is that both of these practices help strengthen the argument that 
identity need not be governed by the exclusion of a geographical, political or ethnic state or 
group but might come into being by the fear of what the Self may become. The formation of the 
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307 
 
Other, therefore, might be perceived as a national state of mind and not just a physically bounded 
construct.  
 
The Changing Nature of Sovereignty and the Nation-State 
 
A further strand is the issue of sovereignty and how it has metamorphosised particularly with 
reference to the anti-membership/treaty positions. Within the pro-positions, it retains a very fluid 
form over the duration of the three events. Sovereignty, however, can be said to possess several 
meanings: the legal right of final decision, the integrity of national decision-making and the 
power for a state or society to exercise control over its destiny.635 In addition, the loss of one 
formulation might produce gains in another.636 This notion of malleability, that sovereignty is a 
means to an end rather than an untouchable idol, features in all of the supportive viewpoints and 
is instrumental in welding Europeanness to Britain. Indeed, all pro-configurations that factor the 
EEC/EC/EU as a friendly Other structure Britain as possessing a European identity, as can be 
seen in Figure 7.  
 
However, sovereignty undergoes a transformation in the opposing camp. From Table 11, one can 
see within the 1975 debates that sovereignty was very much lodged within a parliamentary-
centric reading. Britain is positioned as a sovereign, parliamentary body. Key stabilisers within 
this formulation are the fact that Britain is unitary, democratic and liberated. From the 
perspective of a particular kind of nation-state, Britain possesses a unitary identity in which 
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parliament serves as the sole function of governance and democracy can only flourish with the 
retention of the powers of a sovereign parliament. In addition, the nation-state as a body helps 
propagate two more British identities. Identity is both local and organic and therefore operates in 
contrast to an EEC which is classified as bloated and concocted. Nonetheless, both sovereignty 
and the nation-state are classified as elite affairs. The Treaty of Maastricht saw a shift within 
which parliamentary sovereignty became fused with monetary and economic sovereignty. Thus, 
the preservation of Sterling became wedded to the broader fight to resist Europeanisation and the 
adoption of the Euro was symbolic of the latest attempt by Europe to raid national boundaries. In 
this way, the British Self became reformulated as a sovereign, civic body. Civic because 
European integration now no longer merely threatened the British mechanisms of state, but was 
also interfering with over-regulatory impulses to change the fabric of British life. Again, as a 
body, rather than a nation-state, helps to purvey certain British identities. Britain is classified as 
integrated, unified and citizen-driven. By the time of the Treaty of Lisbon, sovereignty had been 
reformulated once again to place authority within the inviolability of the nation-state and had 
injected the British Self with a hyper-globalist nature. As a nation-state, Britain is now invested 
with more internationalist identities that enable it to operate as a distinct challenge to the EU’s 
supranational ambitions. As such, British identities are maritime, globalist and liberating.  
Sovereignty, therefore, far from being narrow and inward-looking, did not prevent states forging 
alliances and networks elsewhere. As such, one can posit that the comparative success of the 
British ‘Eurosceptic’ position can be very much attributed to two notions of sovereignty. Firstly, 
the capacity to configure sovereignty as an issue that permeates all aspects of life – political, 
societal and civic – helps to solidify its importance. Secondly, that the international system is 
constructed as dominated by the interaction between sovereign units and attempts to transfer 
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governance to supranational institutions defies this pure logic. As such, the EU, particularly with 
reference to its size, encroachment and federalist ambitions, quickly becomes configured as a 
threat.     
 
Although British discourses take nation-states to be the prime actors within the international 
system, there are a number of distinct differences as to how the nation-state is formulated. First 
of all, nation-statism does not fit neatly into the pro/anti dichotomy. That is, rigid determinations 
of it may well be equated with a simplified Eurosceptic position but there is not sufficient 
evidence to argue that an aversion to Europe is synonymous with an emboldening of the British 
nation-state. Most positions within the debates take the nation-state as a given, pre-existing 
entity. Neither is an attachment to the nation-state indicative of insularity and non-participation 
in international affairs. As has been seen from the empirical chapters, elites frequently held out 
for much broader linkages to states and organisations that both pre-date European integration and 
view a preoccupation with the Community as too restrictive. Subsequently, the issue of insularity 
or is read in different ways. The pro-camp often views EU dissenters as lodged within an insular 
mindset incapable or unwilling to accept the expiration of Britain’s imperial identity. The anti-
camp frequently perceives EU enthusiasts as lodged within a similarly blinkered mentality that 
refuses to recognise the wider world out there: a world that Britain helped to shape and an 
opportunity that EU backers fail to seize. As has also been mentioned, the emboldening of the 
nation-state is not symptomatic of blinkeredness. The proliferation of international allegiances 
and networks within the debates attest to the fact that nation-statism is lodged within a reading of 
political power as residing within the structures of sovereign governments. As such, 
internationalist or global images of Self do not contradict or threaten this national autonomy.  
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The Role and Status of Actors 
 
Despite a wide array of actors that have informed British national identity, and the fact that a 
core number have consistently cropped up, the status of most of the actors has changed over the 
historical events. Fundamentally, as non-European states, the USA and the USSR/Russia have 
been dominant. The USA has operated according to the much-referenced allusion to affinity, 
cultural linking and, in another way, the long since redundant ‘Greece to their Rome’ ploy aimed 
at “civilizing and guiding the immature young giant.”637 As can be seen from Figure 7, the USA 
appears in two discourses: as a security alliance and as a cultural and historical linkage. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the USA did not function as a particularly strong informer of British 
identity over the Maastricht debates. Even the anti-positions reveal a Britain preoccupied with 
counterbalancing what is regarded as the Franco-German hegemony but the USA is not pitched 
as a viable substitute. However, by the time of the Lisbon debates, the USA appears as a 
fractured alliance and a new rapport, based more on mutuality, is called upon.  
 
Effectively, ‘Cold War Europe’ had transposed into ‘multipolar Europe’ in which no single state 
power dominated. The issues that dominated the international sphere, such as international 
terrorism, global warming, climate change and poverty reduction all soldered the notion that 
such global responsibilities could only be tackled via mutual address and not via individual, non-
collective action. Again, the USSR was consistently othered in the first historical juncture to 
construct it as a non-European entity and existential threat. With the dissolution of the USSR, the 
                                                     
637 Reynolds, D. (1985-6) “A ‘Special Relationship’? America, Britain and the International Order Since the Second World War”, 
International Affairs, vol. 62, no. 1, pp. 1-20 (at 2).  
 
 
311 
 
discursive field correspondingly shifted into two camps: the first retaining the Cold War rhetoric 
that alluded to authoritarian and communist characteristics and the second ushering in an array of 
potentially progressive elements, including democratisation, reform and cooperation, which all 
symbolised the potential for a new mutualism. By the time of the Lisbon debates, discourses on 
Russia had become noticeably fewer. The burgeoning of other states, as threats and 
opportunities, had transplanted Russia to reveal that it no longer functioned as a key informer of 
British identity.      
 
France and Germany as European states have also functioned as key signifiers. In the anti-
referendum debate, France stands out as the vehicle most at odds with British ambitions. 
Undoubtedly linked to the two French rejections of British entry to the EEC, which were still 
quite fresh events in 1975, and along with the invocation of much deeper historically embedded 
rivalries, France functioned as a metaphor for the Community as a whole and seemed to embody 
everything Britain opposed. By the time of the Maastricht Treaty, Germany had become the 
major antagonist and its threat value made much more alarming by the employment of a readily 
available array of references to wartime expansionism and Teutonic swaggering. Finally, a level 
of consistency is applied to the Commonwealth. Since the 1975 debates over the referendum, it 
is configured as in decline and this trend continues into the Lisbon debates. This entertains the 
argument that some actors, although peripheral, still possess influence for British identity 
because even if the present relationship is materially weak, historical discourses of attachment 
and linkages may still abound. In short, these political units, due to their consistent presence 
within the debates, have had a powerful effect not merely on how British elites have constructed 
the British Self but on how Europe as a whole has been invested with meaning.  
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Apart from these key actors, a number of other entities have transpired, particularly in the Lisbon 
debates. References to the Balkan states, Turkey, India and China all reveal the shifting, fluid 
nature of identity construction. Firstly, both the Balkans and Turkey are vehicles for the British 
pursuit that has cut across all political parties and both pro- and anti-configurations. Once again, 
the goal of widening over deepening is unfailingly regular. This is governed by the attempt to 
rupture the pushiness of ‘protectionist Europe’ and replace it with ‘liberal Europe’. This is also 
the desire to challenge the cultural/core aspects of Europe and shift its centre of gravity away 
from Franco-German diktats. By way of example, David Cameron, in a speech given in Ankara 
in 2010, stated the following:  
Do you know who said this: “Here is a country which is not European … its 
history, its geography, its economy, its agriculture and the character of its 
people – admirable people though they are – all point in a different direction 
… This is a country which … cannot, despite what it claims and perhaps even 
believes, be a full member.” It might sound like some Europeans describing 
Turkey. But it was actually General de Gaulle describing the UK before 
vetoing our EU accession.638 
 
As such, Europe is positioned as a club in which the benefits of membership need to be extended 
beyond the core of the original signatories of the Treaty of Rome. Similarly, the Balkans, in 
particular regarding the wars of the 1990s, is another region ripe for EU membership. In this 
sense, Europe possesses a planetary pull designed to absorb and dissipate ethnic tensions and 
bloodshed. Again, Britain is positioned as a staunch advocate and humanitarian agent of enabling 
such fractious states to be stabilised under the European family of nations. Finally, both India 
and China can be categorised as recent informers of British national identity. India possesses a 
level of historical, cultural and commercial contingency in which Britain is imported with a 
                                                     
638 Cited in Bagehot (2010) ‘David Cameron’s disingenuous defence of Turkey’, The Economist [online], 27 July. Available at: 
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313 
 
degree of transnationalism. China remains potentially unstable within the Lisbon debates but 
again has the potential to be regarded as a fellow nation-state via the influence of a Europe with 
Britain, not without.  
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Conclusion 
 
Recapitulating the Findings 
 
The purpose of this study has been to make an original contribution in the academic field. What, 
therefore, can be said to have been discovered? Several aspects can be recapitulated. To begin 
with, and perhaps most importantly, discourses, identities and the derivative British Selves can 
be characterised as possessing both continuity and discontinuity. Identities, as has been 
mentioned, have been commonly taken as ‘sticky’, and change, when it happens, is slow and 
incremental. However, the instability in the discourses, which is evident within Figure 7, 
certainly points towards a level of identity disruption. Relating to this, the empirical findings 
suggest several discoveries about British national identity. Firstly, the permanence of certain 
discursive tropes over the events is clear. Britain is both a global and value-laden actor and the 
consistent articulations of these identities is not in dispute. Far from being curios of the past, 
such configurations are so potent that they continue to be played out in the present. A recent 
incident to generate a flood of discussion over Britain’s relationship with Europe occurred due to 
the European Council Summit of 8-9 December, 2011, when the current Prime Minister, David 
Cameron, refused to sign up to the “fiscal stability union”639 designed to deal with the gamboling 
financial crisis. In response to this decision, Cameron’s statement abounded with familiar themes 
that are so deeply woven into the fabric of Britain’s discursive history that they are utterly 
naturalised: 
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It (the Treaty) would not just have meant a whole new bureaucracy ... it would 
have changed the nature of the EU – strengthening the eurozone without 
balancing measures to strengthen the single market. ... We are a trading nation, 
and we need the single market for trade, investment and jobs. The EU makes 
Britain a gateway to the largest single market in the world for investors ... and 
membership of the EU strengthens our ability to progress our foreign policy 
objectives, too, giving us a strong voice on the global stage on issues such as 
trade and, as we have seen in Durban this week, climate change and the 
environment.640 
 
The British national identity being constructed from this example is still firmly attached to 
visions of firm leadership, open markets, the image of Britain as a ‘gateway’ or vehicle to 
proliferate trade, and the notion that the remit of the EU, instead of an insular fixation with 
developing ever more overbearing legislation, must address the challenges of external threats to 
the environment.  
 
However, what is also apparent from this study is the level of discursive instability. Even within 
the configuration of Britain as a global player, dissent occurs. Firstly, there are the various layers 
of meaning. As a global actor, one can see this in the range of reformulations within which 
Britain’s globalness sits, such as a transnational, cooperative, transatlantic, reformist, European, 
interdependent or hyper-globalist actor. As such, being global invites the question: global to 
whom? It has over the course of the discourses been to a number of varying units, including at 
times the Commonwealth, the USA, the EU states, Europe as a whole and potential Europeans. 
Secondly, the disruption in the discourses reveals that certain sacred strongholds of meaning – 
sovereignty, the nation-state, security, unity and independence – are actually prone to quite 
dramatic shifts in meaning. What is revealing is not that ‘Britain is a sovereign nation’ is not in 
dispute, but that such commonplace phrases make sense only in so far as they operate within a 
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discursive field that positions sovereignty in such a meaningful way. As such, shifts in British 
national identity, far from rare, are actually the norm.   
 
A second claim made in this study concerns at least when considering the case of Britain, the 
underdeveloped exposition of both temporal and conceptual Othering. Britain has been 
traditionally very much considered a historical entity in which its essentialism of the past flows 
uninterruptedly into the present and continues into the future. It contains an essentialist identity 
in which a core set of characteristics can be apparently plotted over many years and even 
centuries. However, the ‘past as Other’ and ‘concept as Other’ formulations have questioned this 
convenient narrative. Certain bastions of identity, such as the Second World War, have had their 
role in helping to construct a supine and capitulating Continent and equally to imbue Britain with 
a greater moral and physical presence. Equally as well is the more abundant position throughout 
the early section of the discourses that such a conflict was instrumental in Europeanising Britain. 
What is further suggested is that the conceptual fear of isolation acted as the glue to keep Britain 
firmly attached to the Community.  
 
Thirdly, as identity is as much about belonging as not belonging, radical Othering, although 
frequently regarded as such, does not automatically refer to a process of demonisation or 
exclusion. The temporal Othering in the 1975 referendum, for example, in which Britain’s past is 
configured as a threat, produces a positive embrace of European idea and thinking. In addition, 
the process of identity production is as governed by friends as well as foes. As such, this study 
has introduced two neglected elements and the role they have played in forging British national 
identities, non-radical and friendly Othering. Similarly, Othering, very much like the discursive 
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processes that have produced it, does not necessarily remain static. It can be argued that from the 
1975 Referendum debates, the USSR had a dominant role in forging European unity and British 
attachment. By the time of the Lisbon Treaty debates, along with the emerging challenges and 
opportunities of states like China and India, Russia had a less formative influence on British 
identity.  
 
Finally, although the construction of identity is forged out of difference, and is certainly taken as 
a process that is a permanent part of the human collective, commonality is as much a potent force 
as dissimilarity. No unit – be it political, ethnic, geographic or statist – can derive an identity and 
therefore exist without its positioning against an Other. This project was inspired by the notion 
that difference need not degenerate into antagonism and that we-feeling, although too often the 
contrary, can be forged by friends and not via the seemingly eternal pursuit of enemies. As such, 
and as one noted scholar observes, “[a]nalyses of collective identity formation should contribute, 
however timidly, to our living in difference, and not to some of us dying from otherness.641 
 
Future Applications 
 
To conclude this study, it is worthwhile outlining the manner in which this dissertation might 
inform other areas of inquiry. An obvious albeit important point is that although this research 
project has focused on Britain, its theoretical and methodological framework can be applied 
elsewhere. Discursive techniques, be they employed to reveal predicates, presuppositions, 
subject positioning, themes or metaphors, are not specific to a particular political body and can 
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subsequently be applied to reveal the identities of any state or non-state actors. In addition, 
although the focus has been on political elite perceptions of phenomena, a discursive reading 
might be applied to any group, be it civil, societal, institutional or media related. Relatedly, 
although this has been a single case study, there are no obvious limits on using it to provide a 
comparative analysis between two or more units.  
  
As Self/Other relations frequently imply a superior and an inferior, and notwithstanding the 
aforementioned argument that Othering might not routinely require a process of demonisation 
and exclusion, hostilities do tend to be more apparent when the Self and Other are highly 
polarised. Hence, there is a moral imperative to try and ascertain what formulates identity as a 
means to understanding patterns of belligerency and conflict that may be enacted towards others. 
This study recognises how identities might conflict when they come into contact with one 
another as well as identifying the processes and images frequently acquainted with negative 
imaging,  and an identification of these patterns has implications for foreign and security policy.  
 
Finally, although the time frame applied in this dissertation is lodged within modern British 
political history, there exists a seemingly endless number of identifiers that, when brought to 
light, can help convey how identity is constructed according to differing periods. In the same 
way that this thesis has argued that a singular and unified Europe has not discursively and 
historically operated as Britain’s Other over the examined events, a wide range of ‘Europe as 
Other’ Others might be investigated. These can include temporal, conceptual, geographical, 
political, cultural and material agents. As multitude of Others produces readings of many 
different Selves, one might utilise the theoretical framework implicit within this study to reveal a 
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panoply of historical Europes that again impact on the way the EU, Europe or its constituent 
members are configured. The Europes in this study have included ‘Wartime’, ‘Cold War’, 
‘Social’, ‘Liberal’, ‘Anglo-Saxon’, ‘Multipolar’, ‘Progressive’ and ‘Global’, to take a few 
examples. The scope for further inquiry might be broadened to include ‘Medieval’, ‘Christian’, 
‘Catholic’, ‘Renaissance’, ‘Napoleonic’ or ‘Empire’ Europes for a longer historical study. More 
contemporary configurations might focus on how ‘Multicultural’, ‘Regional’ or even ‘Eurozone 
Crisis’ perceptions of Europe impact on national identities. Finally, historiographical 
investigations might further open up academic inquiry to consider both temporal and conceptual 
Othering, particularly given Europe’s fratricidal and tumultuous past. The uncovering of all these 
Europes, along with the linkages that stabilise and inform them, can contribute to the 
fundamental constructivist premise that who we are still determines what we do.  
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